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ABSTRACT / LAY SUMMARY 
This thesis focuses on institutional arrangements designed to strengthen the 
ability of political institutions to assess the constitutional implications of legislation in 
the law-making process. It sheds light in the under-developed field of parliamentary 
constitutional assessments by bringing together disparate constitutional theory 
literature that discusses or touches upon the distinctiveness of this activity with a view 
to conceptualise “legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds” (“LSGC”). The thesis 
distinguishes three alternative conceptions of LSCG: a legalistic conception, a 
conception of constitutional deliberation, and a conception of constitutional 
construction and development. This work characterises these conceptions and employ 
them as a framework to interpret the working practices of the United Kingdom (“UK”) 
Parliament.   
The thesis shows that the UK has a set of institutional arrangements, 
consolidated through time, which are designed to foster legislative scrutiny of the 
constitutional implications of legislation. It argues that the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Select 
Committee on the Constitution are the main parliamentary drivers of constitutional 
thinking in the UK law-making process. The thesis suggests that these constitutional 
committees face significant challenges in pursuing their legislative scrutiny work. 
From a substantive point of view, the very nature of the UK constitution shapes the 
work of these committees. Constitutional committees struggle working out the 
contents of its constitutional principles, values, conventions, practices, doctrines and 
other standards. The UK constitutional framework is one of multiple layers, and no 
clear constitutional philosophy. It remains essentially contested, and therefore cannot 
provide clear normative guidance about which LSCG conception should be preferred. 
Each committee has responded differently to this challenge, having its own approach 
to the constitution, underpinned by a different conception of LSCG.  
From a procedural point of view, constitutional committees have encountered 
significant difficulties to mainstream constitutional considerations among elected 
politicians, either in government or in Parliament. Constitutional committee reports 
provide a highly valuable resource, that might bridge the gap between the highly 
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technical and complex nature of constitutional matters, and the lack of time, energy 
and information among elected politicians to engage in constitutional assessments. 
However, as far as the UK is concerned, these institutional arrangements have not met 
their normative expectation to mainstream constitutional considerations among elected 
politicians. 
Yet, these committees have become necessary points of reference for bill teams, 
legislative drafters, and the Law Officers. In Parliament, the House of Lords engages 
with their reports, which both inform their debates and some of peers’ amendments to 
government legislation. Hence, whilst constitutional committees may not have a 
substantial impact among elected politicians, they form part of a wider network of 
political and legal accountability checks. These checks operate on the basis of 
interactions and collaboration between government officials, the Lords, parliamentary 
lawyers and legal advisers, and the other relevant civil society actors. It is mainly 
through these interactions that constitutional committees have managed to operate as 
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I. Problem and research questions 
Constitutional lawyers commonly think of the practice of assessing the 
constitutional implications of legislation as the natural competence of courts. On 
reflection, this thinking is rather surprising. As a matter of fact, only a fraction of 
enacted legislation is ever challenged before a court. More significantly, political 
branches of government conduct their own assessments about the constitutional 
implications of legislation in the law-making process. Governments have their own 
legal service, which advises ministers on the constitutional dimension of government’s 
intended legislation, from the earliest stages of the policy-making and legislative 
drafting. Ministers may either have a commitment to finding constitutionally 
consistent legislative means to achieve their policies; or they may be concerned with 
the prospects of successful judicial challenges, and therefore have a risk-assessment 
approach. Similarly, legislative assemblies may either gather legal advice from their 
own parliamentary lawyers or seek views from legal academics or the wider public on 
the constitutional implications of government legislation. Furthermore, there may be 
“constitutionally-aware” MPs, which due to their legal background and/or interests, 
take issue with the constitutional implications of legislation. In addition, constitutional 
issues may dominate parliamentary debates when they gain political salience. It may 
also be that Parliament has a pragmatic approach and seeks to approve “constitution-
proof” legislation. In sum, there are multiple instances in which political institutions 
engage in constitutional assessments of legislation. Courts have no monopoly in the 
modern constitutional state on assessing the constitutional implications of legislation. 
However, the role that political institutions perform in developing, interpreting, 
changing and deliberating about the Constitution, as well as keeping legislation within 
its confines, remains generally neglected.1 There are only a few contributions on this 
topic. On the one hand, there is seldom constitutional scholarship on bureaucratic 
controls of legality and constitutionality of primary legislation.2 On the other hand, 
                                                
1 Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana, ‘New Ways of Looking at Old Institutions’ in Richard 
W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the 
Constitutional State (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
2 Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and 
Internal Control (Oxford University Press 1999), Ch7. 
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there is some constitutional scholarship that discusses the role of Parliament on 
constitutional assessments. However, an overwhelming majority of this body of work 
limits their analysis to parliamentary contributions on human rights matters,3 
neglecting its engagement with other constitutional standards.4 The academic literature 
                                                
3  The UK literature parliamentary constitutional assessments is largely human rights-centred. 
See David Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ [2002] Public Law 323; 
David Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process’ (2004) 25 Statute Law 
Review 91; Danny Nicol, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Politicians’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 451; 
Janet Hiebert, ‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of 
Rights?’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1; Francesca Klug and Helen Wildbore, 
‘Breaking New Ground: The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Role of Parliament in Human 
Rights Compliance’ [2007] European Human Rights Law Review 231; Grégoire Webber, The 
Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2009); Tom 
Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review with a Democratic Charter of Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing 
and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - Sceptical Essays (Oxford University 
Press 2011); Aruna Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights 
Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2012); Murray Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ 
in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing 
2013); Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliament and Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing 2015); Elin Weston, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Effectiveness of Parliamentary 
Scrutiny’ (2015) 26 King's Law Journal 266; Janet Hiebert and James Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of 
Rights: The Experiences of New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2015) 
; Adam Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing 
and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - Sceptical Essays (Oxford University 
Press 2011); Michael Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Rights in the United Kingdom: Assessing the 
Work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (2009) 44 Australian Journal of Political Science 41; 
Alice Donald and Phillip Leach, Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2016) Kirsten Roberts Lyer and Philippa Webb, ‘Effective Parliamentary Oversight of 
Human Rights’ in Matthew Saul, Andreas Follesdal and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The International Human 
Rights Judiciary and National Parliaments (Cambridge University Press 2017); Grégoire Webber and 
others, Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018); Alexander Horne and Megan Conway, 
‘Parliament and Human Rights’ in Alexander Horne and Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law 
(2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018). 
For a comparative perspective, see Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional 
Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press 2000); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model 
of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013); Hiebert and Kelly; 
Thomas Bull and Iain Cameron, ‘Legislative Review for Human Rights Compatibility: A View from 
Sweden’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing 2015); Donald and Leach; Matthew Saul, Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein, The 
International Human Rights Judiciary and National Parliaments (Cambridge University Press 2017); 
Janet Hiebert, ‘The Charter’s Influence on Legislation: Political Strategizing about Risk’ (2018) 51 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 727. 
4 For UK literature looking at constitutional standards other than rights, see Robert Hazell, ‘Who 
is the Guardian of Legal Values in the Legislative Process: Parliament or the Executive?’ [2004] Public 
Law 495; Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 
33; Dawn Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The Case for Standards and Checklists’ [2006] 
Public Law 219; Peter Davis, ‘The Significance of Parliamentary Procedures in Control of the 
Executive: A Case Study: The Passage of part 1 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006’ 
[2007] Public law 677; Jack Simson Caird, ‘Parliamentary Constitutional Review: Ten Years of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’ [2012] Public Law 4; Andrew Le Sueur and Jack 
Simson Caird, ‘The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’ in Alexander Horne, Gavin 
Drewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing 2013); Jack Simson Caird, 
‘Identifying the Value of Parliamentary Constitutional Interpretation’ (DPhil thesis, Queen Mary 
University 2014); Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ The Constitution 
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has not provided a systematic analysis of the different ways in which Parliament and 
the Constitution relate in the law-making process.  
Most constitutional theorists place little faith in the possibility of politicians 
taking the Constitution seriously. Their intuition is that MPs may not promote and 
protect constitutional principles, values and other standards. The relationship between 
the Constitution and the exercise of political powers through elected representatives 
tends to be depicted as one of potential conflict.5 While there exists a variety of views 
about the degree in which the Law disciplines the exercise of political powers, most 
constitutional scholars think that the Constitution imposes substantive limits on the 
exercise of political powers, and that courts should act as arbiters in this conflict 
between Law and politics. Although it may seem an overstatement, Jeremy Waldron 
has a point when he argues that “(…) constitutionalism takes democracy and the power 
assigned to ordinary people through elective and representative procedures as its 
natural enemy.”6 This set of beliefs has had an agenda-setting impact on constitutional 
scholarship. Constitutional scholars spend significant time and resources addressing 
questions such as whether judges should have powers to strike down legislation in 
breach of constitutional rights, and under what conditions such an exercise of 
constitutional review powers would be legitimate in the democratic constitutional 
state. This has resulted in a detriment of the analysis of alternative forms of 
constitutional assessments that take place in the political branches of government.  
It could be argued that constitutional scholars have neglected Parliament’s role 
of assessing the constitutional implications of government legislation for good 
reasons. Thus, empirical evidence suggests that politicians usually fail to fully engage 
with constitutional matters.7 Instead, they prioritize political and policy considerations. 
                                                
Society <https://consoc.org.uk/publications/constitutional-guardians-the-house-of-lords/> accessed 8 
January 2018; Jack Simson Caird and Dawn Oliver, ‘Parliament's Constitutional Standards’ in 
Alexander Horne and Andrew Le Sueur (eds), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart 
Publishing 2016); Mark Elliott and Stephen Tierney, ‘Political Pragmatism and Constitutional 
Principle: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018’ [2019] Public Law 37. For a comparative 
perspective, see Gabrielle Appleby and Anna Olijnyk, ‘Constitutional Deliberation in the Legislative 
Process’ in Ron Levy and others (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge University Press 2018).  
5 AW Bradley, Katja S Ziegler and Denis Baranger, ‘Constitutionalism and the Role of 
Parliaments’ in AW Bradley, Katja S Ziegler and Denis Baranger (eds), Constitutionalism and the Role 
of Parliaments (Hart Publishing 2007), 2. 
6  Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory (Harvard University Press 2016), 38.  
7 Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The Case for Standards and Checklists’, 226.  
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Nevertheless, this argument has a noticeable drawback. It is possible to design 
institutional arrangements to promote political engagement with the Constitution. 
Take for instance the experience of some countries that belong to the Commonwealth 
tradition. Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (“UK”) and Australia have 
imposed statutory duties on government to report to Parliament about the compatibility 
of its legislative proposals with human rights.8 In addition, the UK and Australia have 
created specialised and permanent joint committees of both Houses of Parliament 
which scrutinise government bills for their human rights implications. Moreover, the 
Australian Senate has a Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which scrutinises 
bills referred by the Senate. This committee engages with a wide range of subjects, 
including legislative scrutiny of bills on constitutional grounds. The UK House of 
Lords has a strong machinery of two specialised committees dealing with 
constitutional matters. The remit of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee (herein, “DPRRC”) is to scrutinise every provision delegating powers and 
defining degrees of parliamentary oversight. Secondly, the Select Committee on the 
Constitution (herein, “SCC”) scrutinises the constitutional implications of legislation. 
These examples show that constitutional democracies can design institutional 
arrangements with a view to foster political engagement with the constitutional 
implications of legislation in the law-making process.  
This is a thesis about institutional arrangements designed to strengthen the 
ability of political institutions to assess the constitutional implications of legislation in 
the law-making process. It mainly focuses on Parliament’s role in this activity, which 
I conceptualise as “legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds” (“LSCG”). My 
research questions are as follow: How to conceptualise LSCG? What are its theoretical 
                                                
8 In Canada, section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985 imposes a duty on the 
Minister of Justice to examine every bill introduced by the government to the House of Commons and 
to report whether any of its provisions is inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In New Zealand, section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that 
the Attorney-General shall bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision of a 
government bill that may be inconsistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. 
In the UK, section 19(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter, “HRA”) requires that the minister 
responsible for a government bill to make a statement of compatibility with Convention rights. In 
Australia, clause 8 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 provides that an MP who 
introduces a bill through Parliament must present to the respective House of Parliament a statement of 
compatibility or incompatibility with human rights. Similar provision exists in clause 28 of the State of 
Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, and in clause 37 of the Australian 
Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 (although, in this case, the statement must be prepared by 
the Attorney-General). 
 5 
foundations? How does a concrete set of constitutional arrangements shape LSCG? 
How does LSCG work in practice? Can institutional arrangements such as those 
abovementioned ones foster LSCG? Who are their main actors? Do these institutional 
arrangements deliver their promises to mainstream the constitution among politicians? 
Do they foster political accountability of the government for the constitutional 
implications of its bills? 
II. Methodology and case study 
I will address these questions by employing a methodology that is attentive to 
the theoretical concerns of constitutionalism, as shaped and constrained by empirical 
realities. I look at the two main political institutions, namely, Parliament and the 
executive. This thesis discusses how legislative powers ought to be exercised in the 
context of the modern constitutional state, while discussing its application in a real-
world legislature operating in a country that embraces the key tenets of 
constitutionalism.  
The first step in this argument is to provide a theoretical conceptualisation of 
LSCG. I identify three different conceptions of LSCG, and discuss which conception 
of the Constitution underpins each of them. The second step is to employ these 
theoretical insights to interpret and assess the LSCG practice of a real-world 
legislature, operating under a concrete set of constitutional arrangements. To pursue 
the second step, this thesis employs the UK Parliament as a case study.9 There are 
good reasons to focus on this jurisdiction. Firstly, because the UK has a long-standing 
tradition of parliamentary democracy. Secondly, because the UK government justifies 
the constitutional implications of its legislative proposals in compliance with statutory 
duties and/or long-standing practices of publishing explanatory notes attached to bills 
and/or dedicated memorandums. Thirdly, and critically, because the UK Parliament 
                                                
9 There is a nation-wide UK Parliament, namely, the UK Parliament at Westminster, and regional 
legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This thesis is only concerned with the 
former. The three devolved legislative assemblies partially respond to a different model of 
constitutionalism. They are legislatures of limited competence. In contrast, the UK Parliament has 
theoretically supreme legislative powers. This means that there are no legal limits on its legislative 
power. For an analysis of political institutions conducting pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny on 
constitutional grounds in the context of a devolved legislature, see Christopher McCorkindale and Janet 
L. Hiebert, ‘Vetting Bills in the Scottish Parliament for Legislative Competence’ (2017) 21 Edinburgh 
Law Review 319. 
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has a strong system of permanent and specialised constitutional committees assisting 
parliamentary deliberations about the constitutional implications of legislation.  
This two-step methodology means that this thesis combines literature review and 
critical analysis of constitutional theory scholarship with insights provided by political 
science and other empirically informed materials, as well as analysis of primary 
sources such as parliamentary debates, committee reports and committee meetings, 
and other rules of soft law. This thesis not only theorises a concrete set of institutional 
arrangements designed to secure political engagement with the constitutional 
implications of legislation. It also interprets and assesses the UK law-making practice 
as a concrete manifestation of these arrangements. Hence, normative and empirical 
considerations perform an essential role in the development of theoretical insights, but 
may also enter into a relationship of tension, thus leading to an immanent critique or 
reformulation of theoretical models. 
III. Contribution 
This thesis makes the following contributions. 
Firstly, it brings together disparate constitutional theory literature that discusses 
or touches upon the distinctiveness of parliamentary assessments on the constitutional 
implications of legislation. The aim is to conceptualise LSCG. This thesis 
distinguishes and presents three discrete conceptions of LSCG. This theoretical insight 
may operate both as a model to understand and interpret, as well as to assess, the 
activity performed by real-world legislatures assessing the constitutional implications 
of legislation. 
Secondly, this thesis presents the three constitutional committees as a part of a 
set of institutional arrangements designed to foster constitutional assessments in the 
law-making process by the political branches of government. There is constitutional 
scholarship discussing discrete components of this system. By an overwhelming 
margin, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (“JCHR”) has attracted most of the 
attention.10 In contrast, section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which imposes a 
statutory duty on ministers to issue a statement of compatibility on every government 
                                                
10 See references in footnote 3. 
 7 
Bill, has captured little attention.11 There has been some interest on the SCC.12 Finally, 
there has been little interest in the DPRRC.13 Although a few contributions have 
suggested that these three constitutional committees form part of a system,14 there are 
no studies theorising, discussing and presenting them as a system. In my view, doing 
so presents both substantive and procedural challenges. From the first point of view, 
it requires understanding what it means to assess the constitutional implications of 
legislation in the UK context. Secondly, it requires interpreting and describing each 
constitutional committee’s approach to the UK constitution, and the conception of 
LSCG that underpins their work. From a procedural point of view, it is essential to 
understand the ways in which constitutional committees interact with each House of 
Parliament and other select committees. However, constitutional committees also 
interact with ministers and civil servants, through formal and informal channels. 
Finally, these committees interact with the wider civil society. Without accounting 
those interactions, it is not possible to have a grasp of the place that constitutional 
committees have in the law-making process.  
Finally, this thesis also provides clear grounds to compare the work of the three 
constitutional committees. 
I shall make a note of caution. This is not a thesis that seeks to demonstrate the 
superiority of legislative reasoning over judicial reasoning when it comes to assessing 
the constitutional implications of legislation. This thesis keeps peace with the fact that 
most modern constitutional states provide some form of constitutional review of 
legislation. LSCG is compatible with a range of alternative institutional arrangements. 
Nevertheless, those institutional arrangements will shape the practice of LSCG in each 
state. 
IV. Outline of the thesis 
The main argument of this thesis is that there is an overlooked practice of LSCG 
in the UK law-making process which is mainly driven by key constitutional thinkers 
                                                
11 Elin Weston, ‘Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Importance, Impact and Reform’ 
(DPhill, King's College London 2013). 
12 See references in footnote 4. 
13 Philippa Tudor, ‘Secondary Legislation: Second Class or Crucial?’ (2000) 21 Statute Law 
Review 149; Chris Himsworth, ‘The Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee’ [1995] Public Law 34.  
14 Hazell, ‘Who is the Guardian’ (n 4); Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’, 
‘Constitutional Guardians’ (n 4). 
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at Parliament, namely, the JCHR, the DPRRC and the SCC. This thesis claims that 
each constitutional committee has its own distinctive approach to the constitution, 
underpinned by a different conception of LSCG. At the two ends of a spectrum, while 
the JCHR has a legalistic, liberal and normative approach, the DPRRC has adopted a 
quite flexible case by case analysis with no clear constitutional underpinnings. In 
contrast, the SCC is a more complex committee which at times employs a nuanced 
legalistic approach, and at others a more prudential-based assessment of the 
constitutional implications of legislation. Whilst, as noted above, constitutional 
committees are institutional devices designed to promote political ownership of the 
constitution and to improve parliamentary deliberation on matters of constitutional 
significance, a practice-based account of their operation and impact in the legislative 
process tells a different history. Thus, this thesis argues that constitutional committees 
have not been able to mainstream constitutional considerations among elected 
politicians, either at government or Parliament. Nevertheless, constitutional 
committees are effectively operating as conduits through which constitutional 
considerations are channelled into political decision-making. This takes place through 
a series of interactions between constitutional committees and non-elected actors in 
the law-making process, such as members of the House of Lords, and civil servants in 
government. Consequently, the UK experience tells a history of relative success of a 
system of constitutional committees. Yet, one in which these institutional devices have 
a modest impact on political deliberation, while promoting in significant ways 
technocratic deliberation among bureaucrats and non-elected actors at Parliament. 
To make this argument, this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter One provides a 
theoretical framework to conceptualize LSCG. This chapter starts by defining LSCG 
and then explores the potential distinctiveness of parliamentary assessments about the 
constitutional implications of legislation, by comparison to judicial review. It develops 
three alternative theoretical conceptions of LSCG, and identifies their conception of 
the constitution. Chapter Two discusses the possibility of LSCG in the UK Parliament. 
The main objective is to find the locus of constitutional thinking in this legislature. I 
discuss the challenges that LSCG faces at the House of Commons, and the advantages 
that the Lords offer as a forum for LSCG. I introduce the three constitutional 
committees, namely, the JCHR, the DPRRC and the SCC, and justify the thesis’ focus 
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on their contribution to LSCG. Chapter Three discusses the LSCG conceptions in the 
context of the UK unwritten constitution. This chapter sets out the challenges that arise 
for those assessing the constitutional implications of legislation in this jurisdiction. For 
this purpose, Chapter Three discusses some features of the UK constitution that have 
a significant impact on parliamentary assessments. In addition, it disentangles how the 
peculiar nature of UK constitutional arrangements shapes LSCG conceptions. 
Chapters Four and Five discuss constitutional committees’ substantive assessments. 
While Chapter Four examines the DPRRC and the SCC, Chapter Five discusses the 
JCHR. These two chapters analyse how each committee approaches the UK 
constitution when they scrutinise legislation, and interpret their substantive 
assessments in light of the three LSCG conceptions presented in Chapter One. Chapter 
Six re-examines questions about legislative practice and process. It provides a dynamic 
account of the operation of constitutional committees. The chapter discusses evidence 
about their impact in the formal stages of the legislative process, as well as evidence 
about their preventive influence at the early stages of policy-making and legislative 
drafting. In light of these findings, this chapter reconsiders the place of politics in 
LSCG. Finally, Chapter Seven illustrates many of the claims made in previous 
chapters by providing a detailed account of two case studies. The first discusses the 
passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and the contribution of the 
SCC and the DPRRC to legislative scrutiny of delegated powers. The second discusses 
the political response of the UK to the adverse ECtHR judgment in the case of Hirst 
No. 2, and the contribution of the JCHR.15
                                                
15 Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41. 
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 CHAPTER 1 PARLIAMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS 
I. Introduction 
This thesis explores and assesses the role that the UK Parliament performs 
scrutinising the constitutional implications of legislation. It is therefore a thesis 
concerned with legislative scrutiny, but only to the extent that this activity assesses 
government’s legislative proposals based on a variety of constitutional standards. Most 
of the literature claims that Parliament should perform a role protecting the 
constitution in the legislative process. However, there is little elaboration about how 
such protective role takes place. This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual 
framework to assess Parliament’s role scrutinising the constitutional implications of 
legislation. It is a first step towards moving on from the significant degree of generality 
present in the literature.  
The chapter starts by introducing the concept of “legislative scrutiny on 
constitutional grounds” (hereafter, “LSGC”). Section II, therefore, has two key 
components. Firstly, it defines “legislative scrutiny” by briefly introducing the role 
that Parliament performs in law-making in contemporary legislative practice. 
Secondly, it explains what comprises “constitutional grounds”. Although the content 
of the Constitution will vary across different jurisdictions, I will argue that normally, 
Constitutions have, among other standards, constitutional principles of institutional 
design, human rights, conventions and doctrines, and I will briefly introduce them.  
After introducing this concept, section III draws on the literature that compares 
the institutional differences between Parliament and courts as protectors of human 
rights values. Most of this literature discusses these differences with a normative 
project in mind. Literature relies on these differences to argue in favour or against an 
expansive programme of judicial activism in constitutional review. However, the point 
of section III is not to take sides on that debate. Instead, it intends to identify the 
specific institutional features of Parliament as a constitutional scrutiniser. In other 
words, the objective of this section is to advance Parliament’s distinctive approach to 
different constitutional standards.  
 11 
Section IV continues the effort of grasping the concept of LSCG by identifying 
three different theoretical conceptions. Although section III provides an insight into 
Parliament’s distinctive approach to constitutional standards, how Parliament should 
perform LSCG also depends on normative theories about the constitution. In other 
words, there are different ways in which the relationship between Parliament and the 
Constitution can be conceived. Firstly, some stress the role that abstract, universal and 
timeless constitutional principles and values perform as substantive and legally 
enforceable constraints on political powers. This view emphasises the role of legal 
reasoning techniques in identifying and articulating these principles and values. 
Hence, this conception will focus on substantive standards and legislative outputs. 
Nevertheless, I will show that there are two strands of thinking within this conception, 
namely, hard and soft legalism. Secondly, an alternative conception emphasises the 
legitimating capacity of deliberation in representative democracy. This conception 
approaches different constitutional standards as relevant rational considerations that 
should be prioritized by politicians, and should frame deliberation both at government 
and Parliament. This view focuses on the quality of the procedure through which 
constitutional standards are considered by political branches of government in law-
making. This conception also welcomes improved deliberation at government among 
policy-makers, legal advisers and legislative drafters. Finally, others have a sceptical 
view about the role of abstract, universal and timeless rationalism in public law, and 
emphasise the function that concrete traditions of behaviour and thought have in 
shaping political and constitutional practices within the state. Some authors taking this 
view have recently argued that constitutional principles and values are broad and 
underdetermined. These standards are in need of legislative action plans that develop 
their consequences. Otherwise, these principles and values cannot have real existence 
and cannot impact in real life. These authors claim that political branches of 
government enjoy significant discretion to develop these constitutional principles and 
values in different ways.  
Before moving on, two words of caution are called for. Firstly, it is most likely 
that a majority of constitutional scholars will endorse nuanced versions of my three 
conceptions, or some sort of combination of these conceptions. The point of presenting 
three discrete conceptions is to provide a grasp of their underlying values, and how 
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they envisage the relationship between Parliament and the Constitution. Secondly, this 
is mainly a theoretical chapter, and therefore will inevitably provide an idealized 
version of legislatures. Its main objective is to clarify basic concepts and to provide a 
framework to assess a real-world legislature scrutinising government legislation 
against a concrete set of constitutional arrangements. Although the endeavour is 
mainly theoretical, since this thesis employs the UK Parliament and its constitutional 
committees as a case study, I will provide a empirically-informed few insights as the 
discussion takes place. Yet, it will be mainly for subsequent chapters of this thesis to 
tailor these theoretical insights into the specificities of the UK Parliament and 
constitution. 
II. What is Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds? 
A conceptualization of LSCG must start by answering the most basic questions. 
These represent what I mean by legislative scrutiny, on the one hand; and by 
constitutional grounds, on the other. The idea of legislative scrutiny, whatever the 
grounds upon which it is performed, has a broader background. This is the role of 
Parliament in the law-making process. The classic tripartite separation of functions 
between the creation of law, the execution of laws and the adjudication of disputes 
suggests that Parliament is a law-maker. However, in contemporary legislative 
practice, the executive branch is in control of the law-making process, by means of 
developing policy and drafting legislation.1 For instance, in the UK, broad policy 
decisions are taken at party meetings, when political parties discuss and draft 
manifestos, and at ministerial and cabinet level. Then, broadly speaking, policy is 
developed by civil servants and legislation is drafted by lawyers at the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel.2 For these reasons, the role of Parliament in the legislative 
process is to react to government’s legislative proposals by subjecting them to 
                                                
1 Here I am thinking about the control exerted at the pre-legislative stages. Whether the 
government controls the formal stages of the legislative process may depend on other factors. For 
instance, in Westminster systems, the executive normally controls Parliament by asserting its 
parliamentary majority.   
2 Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and 
Internal Control (Oxford University Press 1999), 253; Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process (7th 
edn, Hart Publishing 2015), 9, 17; Phillip Norton, Parliament in British Politics (2nd edn, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013), 75. 
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scrutiny.3 Theoretical accounts highlight Parliament’s character as a representative 
assembly as its main asset.4 MPs bring different perspectives and views to 
parliamentary debates about policy matters. In this way, Parliament deliberates on the 
merits and demerits of government’s legislative proposals. “Legislative scrutiny” 
refers to Parliament’s role in law-making, namely, the activity through which MPs 
analyse, discuss, amend and approve government’s legislative proposals. In British 
parliamentary democracy, where the business of Parliament is organised in terms of 
the logic of confrontation between government and the main opposition party, this role 
is mainly performed by the “loyal opposition”.5 MPs supporting the government 
provide the basis for effective government. Opposition MPs, by contrast, hold 
government’s bills to account. The leader of the main opposition party performs a 
fundamental role in confronting governmental policies and providing an alternative 
view about how to conduct the government’s business. In sum, legislative scrutiny 
refers to the modern role performed by Parliament in the legislative process. This role 
is about checks on the government’s business by scrutinising and holding its bills to 
account.  
This takes us to the second concept, namely, constitutional grounds. Parliament 
can scrutinise legislation against a wide range of considerations. For instance, it can 
assess the economic impact of policies, their effectiveness, consider alternatives 
courses of action, etc. Prima facie, parliamentary debates are open to all relevant 
considerations; all sort of reasons for actions can be discussed. Among them, MPs can 
certainly look at the constitutional implications of the government’s proposed 
                                                
3 However, Parliament also exerts a more subtle and preventive influence before legislation is 
formally introduced to the legislative process. See Daniel Gover and Meg Russell, Legislation at 
Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and Influence in the Making of British law (Oxford University Press 
2017). 
4 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Cambridge University Press 
2010), Ch5, especially 100-1 and 104; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 
(3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009), 149; Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2014), 127; Alexander Horne and Andrew Le Sueur, ‘Introduction’ in 
Alexander Horne and Andrew Le Sueur (eds), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart 
Publishing 2016), 2; Stephen Laws, ‘What is the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation for?’ in 
Alexander Horne and Andrew Le Sueur (eds), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart 
Publishing 2016), 20-21. 
5 Grégoire Webber, ‘Loyal Opposition and the Political Constitution’ (2016) 37 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 357. Note, however, that other opposition parties do contribute to holding the 
government to account. On the other hand, government backbenchers may occasionally rebel against 
its government, and make their own contribution to legislative scrutiny. 
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legislation. For instance, Parliament can assess the impact of legislation on principles 
such as democracy, political representation, the Rule of Law, human rights, the 
separation of powers, among others. The content of the Constitution is something that 
varies across different jurisdictions. However, in modern western constitutional states, 
it is possible to distinguish between two main constitutional grounds.6 On the one 
hand, there are human rights. This includes what we commonly call social and 
individual rights. Rights raise questions of political morality about the just distribution 
of scarce resources, the common good, dignity, equal respect, toleration, liberty, 
among others. These are questions about the ideals and ends that our political 
communities should promote. On the other hand, there are constitutional principles of 
institutional design. These are principles about how to constitute and organize the 
exercise of political power in our societies. Any state must have institutions with 
powers to pursue policies that should achieve aims of public good. These principles of 
institutional design establish relationships between the different institutions of the 
state, provide mechanisms to arbitrate disagreement about ends and means, and impose 
limits on the exercise of political powers, including systems of checks and balances 
and accountability mechanisms.  
Yet, Constitutions are not only abstract rationalisations of principle and value. 
There are modes in which Constitutions are lived, as reflected in long standing, more 
flexible and less articulated conventions, practices and understandings.7 These are 
developed organically in the traditions of a given political community, rather than 
being the product of deliberation and will. The UK constitutional framework, lacking 
a written constitution, in important respects, remains a traditional constitution.8 Key 
institutions of the state, such as the office of government and the practices of 
parliamentary democracy have been developed through a series of constitutional 
conventions, practices and understandings, and these standards continue to perform a 
critical role, even on those modernised layers of the constitution, such as devolution. 
Assessing the constitutional implications of legislation in this jurisdiction, therefore, 
                                                
6 Here I follow the distinction between questions of justice and questions of political institutions 
as developed by Jeremy Waldron in Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory (Harvard University 
Press 2016) and Nick Barber in N.W. Barber, The Principles of Constitutionalism (Oxford University 
Press 2018). 
7 Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution (Oxford University Press 2013), Ch1. 
8 For discussion, see Chapter Three below. 
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demands also paying due regard to these ever evolving and less articulated 
constitutional standards.9 Finally, landmark case law and highly regarded 
constitutional scholarship may also provide constitutional standards against which to 
assess the constitutionality of legislation. In the UK, these two sources are relevant 
components of the unwritten constitution. Yet, their significance and weight will vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
To sum up, in this thesis, legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds includes 
both human rights and constitutional principles of institutional design. These two 
standards are abstract, universal and timeless rational formulations, developed by 
constitutional theory as benchmarks to assess the legitimacy of a given state. Human 
rights, in addition, are grounded on moral theory and political philosophy. 
Constitutional principles of institutional design have normative implications, and may 
pursue overarching moral values as well. These standards should be contrasted with 
the more immanent, practice oriented, flexible and less articulated nature of 
constitutional conventions, political practices and understandings. Finally, the 
category also includes case law adjudicating on matters of constitutional significance, 
and highly regarded constitutional scholarship. While the basic concepts of legislative 
scrutiny on constitutional grounds have been laid down here, little has been said so far 
about what it means to perform this sort of scrutiny. The next sections continue to 
grapple with this concept. 
III. Theoretical expectations about Parliament’s performance conducting 
Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds 
Courts and Parliament have different institutional features. These differences 
shape their distinctive approaches to constitutional standards. This section looks at the 
literature on normative debates about the role of courts in protecting human rights 
values, with a view to identify some distinctive features in Parliament’s approach to 
the Constitution. As explained above, this thesis does not take sides on this normative 
debate. I keep peace with the institutional fact that most jurisdictions incorporate legal 
and political constraints on the exercise of political powers. I do not attempt to 
                                                
9 Yet, as Martin Loughlin notes, political conventions, practices and understandings remain 
significant even in jurisdictions that have adopted a written and entrenched constitution. See Loughlin, 
The British (n 7), 11-13. 
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demonstrate the superiority of legislative reasoning on constitutional matters. Instead, 
the point of this section is to gain insights to continue my work of characterising 
legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds.  
Before starting, it is worth noting that this literature raises two problems. On the 
one hand, it relies on highly idealized accounts of these branches of government. 
Moralised accounts of constitutional theory which favour judicial review provide an 
idealized account of courts. Ronald Dworkin’s “herculean” judge is a case in point.10 
Conversely, they tend to depict Parliament in a critical way. By the same token, those 
who prefer legislatures, provide dignified accounts of legislatures, and highlight 
pathological cases of judicial decisions.11 For this reason, the insights gained here will 
necessarily be theoretical and idealised, and will need to be confronted with the 
problems and pathologies suffered by real-world legislatures.12 In Chapter Two, I will 
discuss the possibility of LSCG in the UK Parliament. As far as this chapter is 
concerned, the point is to canvas what the ideal legislature may achieve performing 
LSCG. The second problem of this body of literature is that it tends to neglect the 
analysis of constitutional standards other than human rights values. Its focus is on how 
courts perform constitutional review on human rights grounds, and whether Parliament 
could perform better than courts. For this reason, most of the examples I will draw on 
are related to human rights values. Bearing these two caveats in mind, I will compare 
constitutional assessments by courts and Parliament. 
The key difference between Parliament and courts is that while the former is a 
law-making body, the latter is a law-applying body. Understanding how both 
institutions approach constitutional standards, therefore, requires conceptualizing 
what it means to adjudicate in law and how it differentiates from legislative reasoning. 
I will therefore start by characterising courts. Firstly, I will focus on legal reasoning 
on human rights grounds. For these purposes, I understand human rights as moral and 
political values that express those individual and collective goods required in a 
political community for its members to flourish. As such, human rights belong to the 
                                                
10 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Hart Publishing 1986), 239-40. 
11 See for instance, Grégoire Webber and others, Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 
2018). 
12 Consider for instance Rosalind Dixon’s observation about the Canadian Parliament suffering 
from “blind-spots” and “burdens of inertia”. See Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada, 
Charter Dialogue, and Deference’ (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 235, 257ff. 
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domain of political morality. However, courts are law-applying institutions. Their 
reasoning must be grounded on institutional reasons. Constitutional adjudication 
cannot merely be reasoning about free standing moral values. How those moral values 
should feature in judicial reasoning is a matter of debate. However, a key feature of 
human rights adjudication is that it is mediated by the law. Take for instance Ronald 
Dworkin’s account of constitutional review on human rights grounds.13 Dworkin 
argues that judges are constrained by the value of “integrity”. Courts must interpret 
clauses concerning rights in accordance with past constitutional traditions and 
practices, including constitutional texts, dominant lines of precedents and the 
structural design of the Constitution. Understood in this way, constitutional 
interpretation is about the best conception of the constitutional text and practice as a 
whole. Human rights adjudication is moral reasoning, yet subject to institutional 
constraints.14 
Constitutional review under the Human Rights Act 1998 (herein, “HRA”), for 
instance, provides a good example of how institutional constraints shape legal 
reasoning. Firstly, adjudication must start from a text, namely, Convention rights 
domesticated by means of section 1(1) HRA and set out in its schedule 1. Rights in the 
European Convention of Human Rights (herein, “ECHR”) have a certain formulation 
and are subject to certain limitation clauses. The text must be the object of 
constitutional interpretation, and therefore when judges construct its meaning must 
follow certain cannons and accepted practices. Those cannons and practices are 
developed by common law, doctrinal analysis and jurisprudential analysis. Secondly, 
section 2(1) HRA imposes a requirement on domestic courts to take into account any 
relevant European Convention jurisprudence on the issues that may be relevant to the 
proceedings in which the question has arisen. Common law has struggled to interpret 
the scope of this duty, moving from feeling bound to follow any European Court of 
Human Rights’ (herein, “ECtHR”) relevant interpretation, to a more qualified and 
                                                
13 Dworkin, Laws’ Empire (n 10), especially 363ff; Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral 
Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press 1996), 10. 
14 Cf Jeff King, ‘Rights and the Rule of Law in Third Way Constitutionalism’ (2015) 30 
Constitutional Commentary 101, 117-18, who is sceptical about the capacity of the text to effectively 
impose meaningful constraints on courts. 
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reflexive approach to its case law.15 Again, section 2(1) HRA highlights the 
significance of past precedents as the basis to construct the meaning of Convention 
rights clauses. Section 2(1) has not only prompted cross-fertilization between the 
ECtHR’s case law and domestic approaches to Convention rights interpretation. 
Domestic courts have also followed the international trend towards employing 
proportionality analysis when assessing the human rights implications of legislation.16  
Thirdly, the HRA has incorporated human rights considerations into statutory 
interpretation. Its section 3 requires courts to interpret legislation, so far as it is possible 
to do so, in a way that is compatible with Convention rights. This means that judges 
must construct the meaning of statutes in a human rights-friendly fashion. Hence, 
human rights also operate as cannons of interpretation. 
Fourthly, for institutional reasons, courts may exercise self-restraint and refrain 
from declaring primary legislation in breach of the human rights. This is a recognition 
that courts are ill-suited to make certain decisions, and therefore it is better for political 
branches of government to take them.17 Judicial deference can be on different grounds, 
such as democratic legitimacy, epistemic or institutional grounds, among others. For 
instance, certain decisions require consulting interest groups and/or experts, gathering 
and processing a wide range of information, assessing policy considerations, and so 
on. Neither courts; nor the judicial process are designed to undertake those tasks. In 
recognition of their institutional limitations, in these cases courts may defer to political 
branches of government. Judicial deference is a contested issue which gives rise to 
different theories.18 Yet, it is beyond doubt that courts do recognise the significance of 
judicial self-restraint, and usually defer decisions to political branches of government. 
Finally, there are limitations that flow from the rules that govern constitutional review 
                                                
15 Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge 
University Press 2009), Ch6. 
16 Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller and Gregoire Webber, ‘Introduction’ in Grant Huscroft, 
Bradley W. Miller and Gregoire Webber (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, 
Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge University Press 2014). Furthermore, there have been instances 
where proportionality analysis or some variation of it has been transplanted into the common law. See 
Paul Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012), at para 21-012. 
17 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Judges as Moral Reasoners’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 2, 13-4; Adam Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism’ in Tom Campbell, 
Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - Sceptical Essays 
(Oxford University Press 2011), 26. 
18 Jeff King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 409. 
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in a given jurisdiction. Take for instance the UK. The HRA provides for a system of 
concrete ex post review on human rights grounds. In this jurisdiction, courts’ 
institutional competence and reasoning is limited by the scope of a claim brought by a 
specific victim, directed against a specific provision of an Act, and grounded on a 
specific human right violation.19 The alleged human rights violation frames the case. 
Courts cannot broaden the scope of review, nor develop the constitution in ways that 
go beyond this setting.  
These are not exclusive features of rights-adjudication. Any judicial 
interpretation of constitutional principles of institutional design such as separation of 
powers, questions of access to public information, federalism or devolution, are 
subject to similar legal constraints. An inherent characteristic of constitutional 
adjudication is that it is subject to institutional constraints. Legal reasoning must be 
mediated by the law. Courts must engage with the relevant law, restrict their analysis 
to the issues raised by the parties, and respect the institutional competences of other 
branches of government. Their reasoning is essentially limited by institutional 
considerations. 
In contrast to courts, Parliament is a law-making body. I will identify four 
consequences for its handling of the Constitution that arise from this fact. Firstly, 
Parliament has the capacity to assess the implications of legislation before it comes 
into force.20 This means that parliamentary assessments may have a preventive effect. 
MPs conducting legislative scrutiny may identify certain provisions as having a 
negative impact on constitutional standards. Parliament could strike a compromise 
with government and amend the original text of a bill in a way that is more respectful 
of the Constitution. On the other hand, this preventive effect can operate in subtler 
ways. If the government is aware that Parliament will conduct anxious scrutiny of the 
constitutional implications of legislation, ministers may exercise self-restraint.21 As 
Kelly and Hiebert claim, legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds can have an 
impact on the way legislative decision-making is done, and shape legislative outcomes 
                                                
19 R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice and Another [2013] UKSC 63, [99]-[102] (per 
Lady Hale). 
20 Note that in certain jurisdictions, constitutional courts have preventive powers to review 
legislation before it comes into force. 
21 Gover and Russell, ‘Legislation at Westminster’ (n 3), Ch8. For an account of constitutional 
committees’ preventive effect in the UK legislative process, see Chapter Six below. 
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along the lines of the Constitution.22 This preventive effect takes place at the early 
stages of the policy-making and drafting of legislation. In the UK, there is evidence of 
this preventive effect in the role that civil servants, legal advisors and lawyers at the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel are asked to perform in terms of assessing the 
constitutional implications of legislation. As shall be explained in Chapter Six below, 
these advisors are warned that constitutional select committees may look carefully at 
the constitutional implications of legislation.23 This fosters deliberation about 
constitutional matters among civil servants, and further consolidates internal legality 
checks within government. 
Secondly, Parliament can engage in free-standing assessments of political 
morality without any need for institutional support on legal materials. Parliament is 
not subject to statutes, legal doctrines, precedents or any other institutional constraints 
in the way courts are.24 Legislative scrutiny can address all the issues directly on their 
merits. In addition, Parliament can consult experts and interest groups, and gather a 
wide range of information on the issues.25 Questions about constitutional standards are 
complex. Legal and moral considerations are relevant. However, there are other 
relevant dimensions that Parliament can consider. For instance, it should take into 
account how a given legislative proposal fits into the broader constitutional framework 
and traditions, political practices and understandings. There may also be relevant 
budget considerations and other aspects to bear in mind. Furthermore, decisions are 
not taken in a vacuum, they have polycentric effects, including knock-on effects on 
other constitutional standards. Parliament’s institutional position as a law-making 
body allows MPs to assess a wide range of considerations.  
A good illustration of the different considerations that should feature in LSCG 
is provided by the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) 
Bill 2018. This bill was introduced to address the lack of a power-sharing executive in 
Northern Ireland. The bill, among other things, provides general discretionary powers 
to civil servants to administer in Northern Ireland while efforts to restore the executive 
                                                
22 Janet Hiebert and James Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2015), 4. 
23 In Chapter Six, I will argue that this specially applies to Convention rights matters and 
delegated powers. 
24 Waldron, ‘Judges as Moral Reasoners’ (n 17), especially 20. 
25 Barber, The Principles (n 6), 230, 233. 
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continue take place. Effectively, civil servants may make decisions on matters of 
policy –which should be limited to government ministers– if they think there is public 
interest in taking a decision rather than deferring it. The UK Select Committee on the 
Constitution (herein, “SCC”) published a report addressing the constitutional issues 
raised by this piece of legislation.26 The report argues that the legislative proposal may 
conflict with constitutional principles, because it raises questions about political and 
legal accountability of these unelected officials. However, the SCC adopts a prudential 
approach in its assessment. The committee is keenly aware of the complex political 
context in Northern Ireland. In its view, the current situation puts the stability of 
institutions at stake. Legislation, therefore, should address the emergency and avoid 
creating a vacuum in the provision of services that may arise if no government 
continued in Northern Ireland. Otherwise, other relevant principles of the Belfast 
agreement may be at risk. Although civil servants should not exercise political power, 
there are prudential reasons to maintain the devolved institutions working. This 
example shows that legislative constitutional reasoning can balance different relevant 
considerations with a degree of freedom that would not be appropriate for courts. 
Thirdly, legislatures can consider all the opinions and perspectives that might be 
relevant to a decision. Hopefully,27 these views and opinions will be aired in a 
pluralistic and deliberative environment, reasons will be given for each side of the 
argument, and legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds will operate as an input to 
improve the quality of debate and a more informed decision-making procedure. On the 
one hand, MPs are representatives of the people; they must make the voices of their 
constituents heard. On the other hand, public bill and select committee meetings 
provide an opportunity for experts and other stakeholders to make written 
representations and/or provide oral evidence. Other previous instances may be offered 
if there is consultation prior to the passage of a bill. Parliamentary debate may feed 
from this wealth of perspectives on the position in question. Where possible, this may 
lead to consensus motivated by the coercion of the best argument, and therefore, to a 
stable decision. In other cases, where disagreement persists, the legislative process will 
                                                
26 Select Committee on the Constitution, Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise 
of Functions) Bill (HL 2017-19, 211). 
27 I include this caveat because usually constitutional considerations are overshadowed by policy 
and political considerations. 
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provide a fair system of decision-making in which all the relevant perspectives will be 
considered. 
Fourthly, LSCG has a broader scope. On the one hand, both the executive and 
Parliament can assess the complete legislative agenda, and not only the small 
proportion of legislation that is challenged before courts.28 Furthermore, Parliament 
can scrutinise the whole scheme of any bill, including every single provision of any 
government proposal. Contrast this, for instance, with a judicial review challenge 
based on human rights. Legislative scrutiny is not limited to an analysis of a victim’s 
claim based on a specific right. Nor is it limited to the techniques and constraints of 
constitutional interpretation, or to due deference to other branches of government.29 
Therefore, the UK Parliament, for instance, can cover the rights scheduled to the HRA, 
and even rights embodied in other Conventions signed and ratified by the UK. A move 
away from the text expands consideration not only to an individualistic perspective, 
but rather to “the more equal or fuller enjoyment of the full range of rights by other 
groups”.30 This is significant, since courts usually remain attached to issues of liberty 
and property,31 and tend not to be assertive when it comes to issues of social rights.32 
Finally, as Adam Tomkins has argued, “Parliament has the in-built ability 
repeatedly to return to the same subject”,33 being able to reassess legislation, even after 
enactment. In other words, Parliament not only looks to the future, it can also look to 
the past. Parliament can revisit its decisions, and assess policies against empirical data. 
Post-legislative review offers an opportunity to examine whether the operation of 
legislation complies with constitutional standards. On the other hand, there are many 
instances in which MPs do not push for constitutionally inspired amendments and rely 
on ministerial assurances, evidence and justification. If Parliament conducts post-
legislative scrutiny, it could assess the merits of government’s justification against 
                                                
28 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 22), 7; Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human 
Rights’ (n 17), 27-9 (referring to the haphazardness of litigation). 
29 Tom Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review with a Democratic Charter of Rights’ in Tom 
Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - Sceptical 
Essays (Oxford University Press 2011), 468-9. 
30 Richard Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 86, 255. 
31 Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 29), 468. 
32 Cf Ioanna Tourkochoriti, ‘What Is the Best Way to Realise Rights?’ [2019] Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies. 
33 Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights’ (n 17), 27. 
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empirical evidence about the operation of the Act. In the UK, the practice of post-
legislative scrutiny by parliamentary select committees is still a work in progress.34 In 
2012, the Liaison Committee included post-legislative scrutiny of Acts of Parliament 
as one of the core tasks select committees should perform.35 Currently, the government 
publishes a memorandum on post-legislative assessment, which may or may not be the 
subject of an inquiry by a select committee. Despite this, there have been instances 
where constitutional select committees have been proactive. For instance, in the field 
of counterterrorism, the JCHR has subjected to post-legislative scrutiny the extension 
of the period of detention of suspected terrorists without charges introduced in 2007.36 
There is certainly room for improvement, but the potential for post-legislative scrutiny 
is there. 
In sum, there are sharp differences between Parliament and courts’ 
considerations of constitutional standards. These differences derive from the different 
institutional roles that each branch performs, one as a law-maker and the other as a 
law-applier. By assessing and promoting Parliament’s role as a law-maker, this section 
sought to identify the distinctiveness of LSCG. Although this is a good starting point 
to conceptualize LSCG, there are different ways to conceive LSCG. These different 
conceptions are expressions of deeper views about the relationship between Parliament 
and the Constitution. The next section will explore three alternative conceptions that 
emerge from different accounts of constitutional theory. 
IV. Conceptions of Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds 
There are different ways in which legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds 
can be conceived. In what follows, I explore different conceptions of how Parliament 
should assess the constitutional implications of legislation. Although they are 
                                                
34 Richard Kelly, ‘Select Committees: Powers and Functions’ in Alexander Horne, Gavin 
Drewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing 2013), 172-4; Christopher 
Johnson, ‘Select Committees: Powers and Functions’ in Alexander  Horne and Gavin  Drewry (eds), 
Parliament and the Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 111. 
35 Liaison Committee, Select Committee Effectiveness, Resources and Powers (HC 2012-13, 
697), at para 2. 
36 The JCHR incorporated post-legislative scrutiny as part of its working practices in Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (2005-06, HL 239, HC 1575). 
See also Francesca Klug and Helen Wildbore, ‘Breaking New Ground: The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights and the Role of Parliament in Human Rights Compliance’ [2007] European Human Rights Law 
Review 231, 237. 
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grounded on different ways of thinking about the relationship between Parliament and 
the Constitution, there is room for nuanced and mixed approaches to LSCG. The point 
about providing a self-contained account of each conception is to identify the 
underlying values and constitutional philosophy of the respective conceptions. This 
approach also seeks to provide some analytical clarity on a generally neglected field 
from the point of view of constitutional theory. 
1. The legalistic conception 
The first conception of LSCG claims that abstract, timeless and universal 
constitutional principles and values should be employed as benchmarks to assess the 
constitutional implications of legislative proposals. This conception is akin to 
jurisdictions that have written Constitutions. In these jurisdictions, the predominant 
thinking is that Constitutions are a deliberate and deliberative attempt, informed by a 
set of universalistic moral and political beliefs, to frame and limit the exercise of 
political powers in a political community.37 This is a modern idea, which draws from 
the political theory of the Enlightenment. Modern liberal constitutionalism advocates 
a set of principles, values and doctrines as the cornerstones to legitimate the coercive 
powers of the state. Among these are central tenets such as popular sovereignty, 
democracy and political representation, the separation of powers, human rights and the 
independence of the judiciary, among others. In most Constitutions of Western modern 
states, the rules, principles and values that constitute and regulate the institutions of 
the state are underpinned by these tenets. The legalistic conception draws from this 
thinking about the Constitution. It takes the Constitution as the key legitimating source 
for the exercise of political powers. The legalistic conception therefore claims that 
Parliament’s legislative powers must be subject to its rules, principles and values. 
While closely connected with constitutional practices of jurisdictions that have written 
constitutions, this legalistic conception of LSCG is also possible in jurisdictions that 
lack a written constitution, such as the UK. In these cases, the contributions of 
constitutional theory to develop the central tenets of constitutionalism, moralised 
                                                
37 I point out that this is the predominant thinking, because the better view is one that understands 
that modern constitutions are both a set of arrangements framed by a text, as well as modes in which 
political power is exercised. By the latter, I mean also a set of conventions and traditions that inform 
political practices. See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 183; Loughlin, The British Constitution (n 7), 9-13. 
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accounts of the unwritten constitution, highly regarded legal doctrines and 
constitutional practices and conventions may provide benchmarks to assess the 
constitutional implications of government legislation.  
The legalistic conception is generally sympathetic to the 20th century trend 
towards understanding the Constitution as a form of “higher law” to be policed by 
courts through judicial review, including constitutional review of legislation.38 These 
developments have contributed to thinking that regards the relationship between 
Parliament and the Constitution as one of either stark or potential tension, as enacted 
legislation may represent a threat to the rules, principles and values of the Constitution. 
Against this background, a legalistic conception claims that Parliament should prevent 
the enactment of unconstitutional legislation. Parliamentarians, specialised 
constitutional committees and legal advisers should identify red lines or no-go areas 
for legislation. They should employ the Constitution to constrain policy objectives and 
legislative means. In sum, a legalistic conception focuses on identifying substantive 
standards, assessing legislation against those standards, and on securing 
constitutionally appropriate legislative outcomes. 
A legalistic conception of LSCG, consequently, expects both government and 
Parliament to develop “legal expertise”. Political branches of government should 
master legal reasoning techniques such as constitutional interpretation and 
proportionality analysis, among others. Whilst the government can rely on 
bureaucracies, developing legal expertise presents a challenge to legislatures. 
Parliament will have to develop its own in-build legal advice service. For instance, to 
assists MPs in their understanding of complex constitutional matters, legislatures will 
have to rely on parliamentary lawyers, based at the House’s library services or directly 
advising specialised select committees. Specialised committees may also gather 
specialist knowledge from academics and legal experts. 
A key question that political branches of government performing legalistic 
LSCG must address is their relationship with the judiciary. Consider the case of 
jurisdictions where courts perform constitutional review, either strong or weak, ex ante 
or ex post. Consider also the case of jurisdictions that are members of a regional system 
                                                
38 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2000), 31. 
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of international human rights protection. In these jurisdictions, there will be legal and 
political reasons for LSCG to generally conform to courts’ case law and settled 
interpretations. How far or close should Parliament remain from courts’ reasoning, 
case law and doctrines will be a matter of legal, political and scholarly controversy. 
Depending on the response to this question, it is possible to distinguish two branches 
of legalism, namely, hard and soft legalism. 
Hard legalistic conceptions claim that political branches should mirror courts 
when assessing the constitutional implications of legislation.39 Where there are clear 
precedents or settled constitutional interpretations, government and Parliament should 
conform to them. In matters where courts have not issued a judgment, political 
branches should try to second-guess the likely outcome of such judgment. Overall, 
government and Parliament shall perform an assessment that resembles the one 
performed by constitutional courts in jurisdictions that have a system of ex ante and 
abstract review of legislation. In practice, it will involve a “risk-assessment” analysis 
of the likelihood of a piece of legislation being found incompatible with the 
constitution or with human rights standards. Examples of this approach are provided 
by pre-legislative assessments on the human rights consequences of legislation 
performed by governments.40 
This strand should be confronted with a more nuanced approach to legalism.41 
“Soft legalism” is sympathetic to the significance of legal arguments and case law in 
LSCG, because of its adherence to a normative conception of liberal constitutionalism 
                                                
39 See for instance David Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ 
[2002] Public Law 323, 328ff; David Feldman, ‘Democracy, Law, and Human Rights: Politics as 
Challenge and Opportunity’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and 
Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2015), 104ff, 111-2.  
40 On the UK government’s approach to Convention rights compatibility assessments under 
section 19 Human Rights Act 1998, see Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 22), Ch7. 
On the Canadian Ministry of Justice’s assessments on the compatibility of legislation with the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, see Janet Hiebert, ‘The Charter’s Influence on Legislation: 
Political Strategizing about Risk’ (2018) 51 Canadian Journal of Political Science 727, 734ff. For a 
similar account of the practices of governments in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, see Stone Sweet, 
Governing with Judges (n 39). 
41 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional 
Watchdog’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2015); David Kinley, ‘Finding and Filling the Democratic Deficit in Human Rights’ 
in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing 2015), 36; Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ The Constitution 
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that stresses the need to constraint the exercise of political powers. However, this 
strand is also attentive to the institutional advantages of legislatures as law-making 
bodies (see section III above), and pays tribute to the democratic legitimacy of the 
representative assembly. Consequently, this strand will stress the value of comity and 
demand expressions of mutual self-respect between branches of government. Whilst 
this strand of legalism will generally demand political branches of government to 
conform with courts’ judgments, this normative expectation will be dependent on the 
assumption that courts exercise judicial self-restraint when assessing legislation. On 
the other hand, soft legalism will welcome from political branches a more independent 
legal assessments rather than mere second-guessing. It will also emphasise the need 
for evidence-based assessments to challenge government’s claims and will promote 
the incorporation of legal safeguards in the face of bills to address constitutional 
concerns raised by government legislative proposals. 
One field which the legalistic conception is prone to emphasise is that of human 
rights. Scholars and courts have developed sophisticated argumentative devices, such 
as constitutional interpretation, legal reasoning and proportionality analysis to assess 
the human rights implications of legislation. A legalistic conception will see merit on 
political branches relying on these contributions, as well as on domestic and 
international case law.  
Understood in this way, LSCG is likely to be informed by a moralised account 
of constitutional theory.42 Whilst a hard legalistic conception will focus on the idea of 
the right answer to legal issues that ultimately raise moral questions, and may therefore 
promote a sort of subjection of Parliament to courts;43 a soft legalistic approach will 
insists on the idea of comity. The later will stress that the intimate connection between 
legislative reasoning and legal contributions by scholars and courts should be 
underpinned by a theory of inter-institutional collaboration between Parliament and 
courts.44 There will be an spectrum of views, yet most soft legalistic scholars may 
                                                
42 Although there are a few exceptions, these theories tend to be grounded on liberalism, and 
therefore, emphasise the protection of individual liberties.  
43 Jonathan Morgan, ‘Amateur Operatics: The Realization of Parliamentary Protection of Civil 
Liberties’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human 
Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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constitutional dialogue, this debate has become difficult to map out, due to different concepts of 
dialogue. See Alison Young, Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (Oxford University Press 
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argue that Parliament should not normally challenge adverse human rights 
judgments,45 and should closely follow settled interpretations of rights by courts. 
Without endorsing a theory of judicial activism, soft legalism will stress that there are 
instances in which courts may address issues that Parliament is not well equipped to 
identify, such as legislative blind spots, burdens of inertia and the interests of under-
represented minorities and disadvantaged groups.46 The idea of comity is one in which 
both Parliament and the courts shall bring their own institutional advantages and work 
together as equal partners in the collaborative enterprise of upholding the 
Constitution.47 
While legalistic conceptions may provide a workable framework to assess the 
human rights implications of legislation,48 its application to other constitutional 
standards such as constitutional principles of institutional design raise some questions. 
A legalistic conception of human rights assessments, although controversial,49 is 
conceivable. In contrast, LSCG of constitutional principles of institutional design 
requires a multi-layered and complex assessment.50 Firstly, these principles must pay 
due regard to the political culture and institutional history of a country. Theoretical 
ideals will have to be balanced against the constitutional traditions of the country.51 
                                                
2017), 11. I agree with Aileen Kavanagh that this has reached a point in which the concept has become 
unhelpful. See Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Lure and the Limits of Dialogue’ (2016) 66 University of 
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45 For such an account, see King, ‘Rights and the Rule of Law in Third Way Constitutionalism’ 
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46 Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court’ (n 12) 257ff. Legislative blind spots refer to the incapacity of 
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48 However, see remarks in section IV.3 below. 
49 For a critique, see section VI.3 below. 
50 In what follows, see Barber, The Principles (n 6), Ch1 and Ch8; Waldron, Political Political 
Theory (n 6), Ch1. 
51 The degree of authority of a written constitution is dependent on the acceptability of its 
principles and values by the people. As Martin Loughlin notes, the political culture of a country must 
embrace the constitution. If the constitution does not fit the customs of the people, its political authority 
may erode. Loughlin, The British Constitution (n 7), 11-13.   
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Secondly, when discussing the application of abstract principles of institutional design, 
the state may face budget restrictions. When faced with these restrictions, political 
branches may need to fall short of the theoretical ideal, and try for a second best option. 
Thirdly, there is a value dimension that may be subject to disagreement. People have 
different views about the reasons why we establish a democracy; the separation of 
powers; federalism, devolution or centralization of powers; a unicameral or bicameral 
Parliament, etc. In these debates, there will be multiple values at stake, such as the 
prevention of arbitrary power, the protection of dignity, truth and loyalty, justice, equal 
respect, stability, etc. These value choices have an impact on our understanding of 
these principles, and, therefore, on our assessments about whether they have been 
respected or not. Finally, constitutional principles of institutional design are under-
determined, and admit different ways to realise them. In choosing one alternative there 
will be complex assessments that balance value choices, indigenous constitutional 
traditions, political culture and budget considerations. I sum, constitutional principles 
of institutional design require multi-layered assessments that bring together a variety 
of perspectives and contributions not only from legal and political theory, but also 
from social choice theory, history, economics, and so on. There will also be a need to 
balance different principles and values, and to consider possible knock-on effects on 
other principles. A wide-ranging analysis will be necessary to “produce a coherent, 
prospective, set of rules to structure the relationship between institutions”.52  
While a hard legalistic conception may insist on the need for conformity with 
abstract ideals, a soft legalistic conception will be attentive to these other dimensions, 
and therefore provide a more adequate framework to conduct assessments based on 
constitutional principles of institutional design. Similar reasons suggests that hard 
legalism neither provides an appropriate framework to assess the impact of legislation 
on constitutional conventions, political practices and understandings. These more 
flexible constitutional standards are expressions of traditions and modes of political 
conduct that are intrinsically contextual and contingent. By contrast, the hard legalistic 
conception is intrinsically linked to abstract, universal and timeless thinking. This does 
                                                
For discussion about the significance of a conservative disposition in the context of constitutional 
change, see Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘A Conservative Disposition and Constitutional 
Change’ (2019) 39 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 526. 
52 Barber, The Principles (n 6), 230. 
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raise a question about the suitability of hard legalistic conceptions in a jurisdiction 
such as the UK, where the constitution remains in significant aspects a traditional 
constitution. I will discuss this matter in more depth in Chapter Three below. As far as 
this chapter is concerned, suffice to say that generally hard legalistic conceptions 
operate better when there is a written entrenched Constitution, and/or clear 
constitutional principles and values with undisputed pedigree and core normative 
content. 
Nevertheless, the application of hard legalistic assessments in the field of human 
rights is not without controversy. The discussion is intimately connected with broader 
debates about the nature of rights-claims and their counter-majoritarian effect. If rights 
are political claims, and, therefore, matters about which people disagree within a 
political community, it seems at odds with the representative nature of Parliament to 
foreclose ample debate about them. Parliament is a pluralistic and deliberative 
assembly where all relevant matters and views about rights are discussed. Furthermore, 
the legislative process is designed to take disagreement seriously,53 because it provides 
enough room to consider different reasons for legislative action, empirical evidence, 
expert advice, consultation, demands for justification, etc. Hard legalistic conceptions 
pay less tribute to the institutional differences of courts and Parliament as law-applying 
and law-making institutions, respectively (see section III above). There is a risk that a 
strongly legalistic conception of LSCG, which advocates for a priority of the legal over 
the political, will neglect these differences. Furthermore, while rights assessments may 
consider case law developments, courts’ settled interpretations, proportionality 
analysis and other legal advice, rights raise other issues as well. Legislative scrutiny 
must consider not only political and moral disagreement about rights, but also the 
legitimate democratic scope for developing broad statements of rights in different 
ways,54 budget restrictions, polycentric effects, among many other issues. A legalistic 
conception may provide a relevant perspective to assess the human rights implications 
of legislation. However, it should neither foreclose debate, nor demand legal reasons 
to take priority over any other relevant consideration, because in a deliberative 
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54 On this matter, see section VI.3 below. 
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assembly all relevant reasons should be considered when assessing the human rights 
implications of legislation. 
Despite these considerations, a hard legalistic perspective remains an attractive 
approach for elected politicians from a pragmatic point of view. Consider for instance 
those jurisdictions where courts have strong constitutional review powers. Politicians 
have incentives to avoid successful legal challenges to their policies.55 They will prefer 
to deploy preventive checks to avoid the frustration of the bill’s policy objectives. As 
Alec Stone Sweet noted in his comparative study of constitutional review in 
continental European countries, the interaction between courts and Parliament has led 
to a process of “judicialization of law-making”.56 This process takes place in two steps. 
On the one hand, courts work out the limits on the exercise of legislative powers; and 
on the other, political branches of government take account of these limits. Notably, 
in the UK, where courts do not enjoy strong judicial review powers, and cannot 
invalidate legislation, declarations of incompatibility by domestic courts carry 
significant political weight.57 The figures suggest that these declarations have become 
de facto binding, because political branches of government regularly comply with 
these judgments.58 On the other hand, pragmatic reasons are also relevant when the 
country is subject to the jurisdiction of an international system of human rights 
protection. In these cases, there may also be an interest to protect the country’s 
reputation on compliance with its international obligations.59 This may have an impact 
in the country’s stance in the wider context of international relationships. In sum, this 
analysis suggests that while a hard legalistic conception may be defended on normative 
and pragmatic grounds, there are legitimate concerns about its suitability as a 
framework for a law-making institution such as Parliament. 
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2. Constitutional deliberation 
There is an alternative understanding of LSCG that shares the legalistic 
conception’s concern for delivering protection of constitutional fundamentals. 
However, by contrast to the legalistic conception, deliberative constitutionalism is not 
intimately connected with a moralised account of the Constitution. In addition, by 
contrast to hard legalistic conceptions, deliberative constitutionalism seems to retain 
faith in the democratic process and in political accountability mechanisms as effective 
tools to deliver constitutional protection. These ideas find inspiration from the so-
called deliberative turn in democratic theory.60 Deliberative theories claim that 
democracy is not merely a decision-making procedure to settle disputes between 
confronting views about policy by means of preference aggregation.61 If the 
democratic process aspires to be legitimate, it must go beyond the operations of 
majoritarian rule. Instead, democratic decisions must be the product of informed 
debate in which different reasons for action are interchanged and citizens are 
persuaded by the coercion of the best argument. Employing this very framework, some 
scholars have argued that the Constitution should frame political debates because its 
principles, values and other standards may foster rationality and deliberation in 
political decision-making. 62 Accordingly, constitutional standards should be 
prioritised in decision-making procedures, and be submitted to a serious public process 
of rational consideration and assessment. This process should involve different actors, 
the public, politicians and civil servants. It should extend from the initial stages of the 
policymaking process, including the drafting of legislation, and then continue 
throughout the legislative process.  
Although “constitutional deliberation” is a wide-ranging process, this thesis is 
concerned with such deliberation insofar as it takes place among political branches of 
government, in the institutional setting of the legislative process, including its pre-
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legislative stages. Within this institutional framing, constitutional deliberation aims at 
developing a “culture of political justification” in regards to decisions affecting 
constitutional fundamentals.63 By contrast to the legalistic conception, deliberative 
constitutionalism does not necessarily embrace a given constitutional philosophy of 
the Constitution. This conception can remain open to all sort of relevant considerations 
and perspectives when assessing the constitutional implications of legislation. 
Deliberative constitutionalism can provide room for different constitutional standards 
to be employed as the basis of the assessment. Deliberative constitutionalism will 
welcome reasoning on the basis of abract constitutional principles and values, as well 
as a wider set of constitutional standards, such as constitutional conventions, 
traditions, prudential reasons, political understandings and practices. In contrast to the 
legalistic conception, which focuses on legislative outcomes, deliberative 
constitutionalism puts a premium on the quality and legitimacy of the decision-making 
processes. Hence, this conception tolerates a wider range of outcomes –even if at pains 
with constitutional standards–, provided that legislation is the product of good quality 
deliberation.  
Constitutional deliberation, therefore, is different from the legalistic conception, 
but not necessarily opposed to it. Constitutional deliberation should be sympathetic to 
legal analysis, insofar as it improves the quality of parliamentary deliberations about 
the constitutional implications of legislation. This raises two separate points. The first 
concerns the relationship between courts and Parliament under the conception of 
constitutional deliberation. One view considers the sophistication of legal reasoning 
deployed in constitutional review as an example of public reason.64 As noted above, 
constitutional courts may also identify legislative blind spots and burdens of inertia. 
This suggests that parliamentary deliberations may benefit from courts’ judgments. 
These matters will be discusses in more depth in Chapter Five. As far as this chapter 
is concerned, it is important to note that there are different ways in which legislative 
reasoning may relate to case law, but will not always result in a positive impact on 
deliberation. Secondly, constitutional deliberation allows for a wider concept of the 
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Constitution that incorporates –but is not reduced– to abstract reasoning based on 
principles and values. There is room to consider case law, constitutional interpretation 
and proportionality analysis. However, deliberative constitutionalism remains open to 
other views about constitutionalism. This conception can be receptive to arguments 
grounded on political practices, constitutional conventions and traditions. It may 
consider political, moral, historical, economic and philosophical perspectives about 
the Constitution, including any empirical evidence, polycentric effects and budget 
restrictions that may be relevant. Furthermore, deliberative constitutionalism can be 
orientated towards a theory of constitutionalism that rejects abstract rationalisations 
and instead embraces constitutional practices, contestation and tradition. This is quite 
significant in this jurisdiction, as the UK lacks a written constitution, and although it 
has undergone a process of constitutional modernisation, this process remains 
incomplete.65  
As noted above, constitutional deliberation relies on the quality of parliamentary 
debate. Parliament must demand full justification for the impact of government’s 
policy objectives and legislative means on constitutional standards. Parliamentarians 
must subject such justification to strong and all-encompassing legislative scrutiny. The 
very idea of a “culture of democratic justification” concerns demanding that elected 
politicians, both at government and Parliament, confront their responsibility for 
legislation that has negative impact on constitutional standards. These standards, 
therefore, are seen as tools that furnish better and stronger scrutiny of government 
legislation. They identify focal points to demand proper justification from the 
government. However, a key challenge for this conception of LSCG is how to secure 
proper deliberation about constitutional matters in real-world legislatures. Take for 
instance the UK, a jurisdiction where parliamentary debates at the Commons are based 
on a two-sided confrontation between the two main political parties, one in control of 
the government, while the other is the leading opposition party. Party loyalties and 
political considerations tend to overshadow constitutional considerations. On the other 
hand, even if constitutional considerations make their way into parliamentary debates, 
the electoral system has historically secured strong majority government which control 
                                                
65 For discussion, see Chapter Three. 
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the legislative process.66 For these reasons, long-standing anxieties exists about the 
prospects of politicians engaging in high quality deliberation on constitutional 
fundamentals.67  
Deliberative constitutionalism, therefore, should propose institutional 
arrangements that secure proper considerations of constitutional standards in the 
legislative process. Some take the view that matters involving constitutional standards 
cannot merely depend on a strong and enlightened political culture.68 The degree of 
engagement with constitutional matters, on the other hand, will depend on the salience 
of the issues. In the UK, concerns about government’s control of the legislative process 
and party loyalty are amplified by the lack of a written and entrenched constitution, 
and a bespoke procedure for constitutional change. The fact that the UK constitution 
can be changed by statute throws into sharp relief the need for institutional 
arrangements to secure proper deliberation of legislation that has constitutional 
implications.  
Some think that proper legislative scrutiny grounded on constitutional standards 
could mitigate the challenges raised by this institutional setting.69 A constitutional 
consideration focus might conceivably cut across party loyalties. The creation of 
permanent and specialised constitutional committees at the UK Parliament has been 
seen as a means to strengthen and focus parliamentary assessments about the 
constitutional implications of government legislation.70 The point, as far as this chapter 
is concerned, is that deliberative constitutionalism is quite demanding. It not only 
requires the incorporation of constitutional standards into political decision-making. 
Deliberation also requires both government and Parliament to be open to reconsider 
their views, in good faith, in light of the interchange of reasons at parliamentary 
debates. Rational arguments grounded on constitutional standards, should therefore 
prompt governmental self-restraint during the preparatory stages of legislation, and 
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constitutionally inspired amendments during the formal stages of the legislative 
process.  
In sum, LSCG is depicted by constitutional deliberation mainly as an exercise in 
rational assessment of the constitutional implications of legislation. This is achieved 
through different means: raising consciousness about constitutional standards among 
political branches of government, demanding justification, promoting critical 
assessments, and the willingness of the relevant actors to change views in light of 
debate. The focus will be on the quality of the procedure, rather than on substantive 
considerations and the outcome of the legislative procedure. A key advantage of 
constitutional deliberation is its openness to different conceptions of constitutionalism, 
and different constitutional standards. 
3. Constitutional construction and development 
Finally, there is a third conception of LSCG that I will refer to as “constitutional 
construction and development”. I draw this conception from contributions to human 
rights scholarship by Grégoire Webber,71 which have been refined in a recent co-
authored book by Webber himself, Paul Yowell, Richard Ekins, Maris Köpcke, 
Bradley Miller and Francisco Urbina (herein, “Webber et al”).72 A similar view has 
been developed by Jeremy Waldron and Nick Barber’s account of constitutional 
principles of institutional design.73 As such, this conception focuses on two types of 
constitutional standards, namely, constitutional principles and human rights values. Its 
proponents have not worked out how this conception would apply, if at all, to other 
standards such as constitutional conventions and practices. 
Webber et al have articulated this conception as a framework for discussion of 
human rights values. Webber argues that countries with written constitutions74 tend to 
think of human rights as “end-states”, as finished products that impose legal limits on 
political powers. However, he submits that human rights clauses should be taken just 
as a starting point. Webber notes that rights clauses are formulated “at the highest level 
of abstraction”. Furthermore, these clauses are subject to equally broad and abstract 
                                                
71 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 54). 
72 Webber and others, Legislated Rights (n 11). 
73 Barber, The Principles (n 6); Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 6). 
74 While the UK does not have a written constitution, the domestication of Convention rights by 
the HRA makes Webber’s analysis relevant in this jurisdiction, because this Act operates as the UK’s 
statutory bill of rights. 
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limitation clauses. On the basis of this observation, Webber argues that rights clauses 
do not resolve “the great moral-political debates alive in the community”.75 He claims 
that the “constitutional edifice” is only completed when Parliament enacts legislation 
that specifies and develops human rights clauses. Through legislation, rights are given 
a “three-term jural structure, which defines a class of right holder, an act or act-
description, a set of circumstances and a corresponding class of duty holders.”76 
Without this further specification, rights cannot have real existence and impact in our 
lives. 
Webber’s observation, according to which rights clauses are underdetermined 
and need legislative action is, arguably, one that many people would endorse.77 
However, Webber et al take their argument from the empirical to the normative 
domain. According to Webber, in the democratic constitutional state, questions of 
political legitimacy about how to accommodate the principles of democracy and 
human rights ought to remain open, on an ongoing basis, to contestation and re-
negotiation. This account, therefore, is a normative defence of Parliament’s democratic 
legitimacy to make decisions about rights. These authors are sceptical about the role 
and contribution of judges in reviewing legislation on human rights grounds. Relying 
on Waldron’s circumstances of politics,78 they claim that rights do not settle debates 
on political morality because people fundamentally disagree about these questions. 
Hence, the Constitution ought to remain open for re-negotiation through democratic 
channels.79 It is through a process of construction and development of rights that 
political communities settle and re-negotiate the Constitution, distribution and 
constrains over government power. In their view, Parliament is a representative 
assembly with democratic credentials that has been institutionally designed to take 
those disagreements seriously. It provides the forum for different understandings of 
                                                
75 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 54), 53. 
76 Grégoire Webber, ‘Rights and Persons’ in Grégoire Webber and others (eds), Legislated 
Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
77 Note the following examples of scholars who, while having different views about the 
relationship between Parliament and human rights, come to recognise the role of Parliament in 
developing these moral values: Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (n 
15), 279; Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012), 41ff; Campbell, 
‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 29), 459-64. 
78 Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 54), 101-2. 
79 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 54), 9. 
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rights to be discussed and assessed. Parliament is also able to modify rights, as views 
and understandings about these moral values evolve.  
The conception of constitutional construction, therefore, conceives the 
relationship between Parliament and the Constitution in stark contrast to the legalistic 
conception. While this conception mainly understands rights as imposing substantive 
constraints, the conception of constitutional construction regards them in more 
“positive” or empowering terms. Constitutional construction assumes that rights 
clauses can be developed in different ways, and it is for the democratic legislature to 
decide from a broad range of reasonable alternatives. The relationship between 
Parliament and the Constitution works both ways. The Constitution operates both as a 
frame, and as something to be framed by the legislator. Notably, this conception moves 
away from the idea of rights as a priori, abstract, universal and timeless values with 
clear normative content. Instead, there is an emphasis on change, disagreement and the 
democratic legitimacy of legislatures.80  
There are two additional aspects of this conception that are worth bearing in 
mind. The first point is that the legalistic conception depicts the relationship between 
common good and human rights as one of tension and in need of balancing 
(proportionality analysis). By contrast, Webber et al combine the concepts of the 
common good and of human rights. In their conception, good reasons to change the 
law are reasons that promote the common good. And human rights are fundamental 
components of the common good. These two concepts are not in tension because a 
decision that promotes the common good is one that takes into consideration human 
rights. 
The second point is that these authors are aware that legislative decisions can 
have serious effects on the enjoyment of individual and social rights. In response to 
those that raise legitimate concerns about the protection of human rights, these authors 
provide a highly dignified and idealised account of legislatures. Constitutional 
construction has a strong commitment to the workings of parliamentary democracy 
and political accountability mechanisms. This conception depicts Parliament as a 
                                                
80 A conception of constitutional construction can be read in different ways. It can be the 
expression of conservative scepticism over abstract and universal rationalisations. It can also be an 
expression of left wing scepticism about the inherent bias of the judiciary towards the protection of 
individual rights. Finally, it can also be read as a programme of radical democracy. 
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rational agent that conducts high quality deliberation, and acts on the basis of good 
reasons to change the law.81 Underpinning this conception is an account of Parliament 
as a strongly deliberative forum, which exercises “moral reasoning informed and 
framed by empirical and technical reasoning”.82 However, as discussed above, on 
many occasions real world legislatures fall short off the ideal of a well-functioning, 
fully representative and deliberative legislature. Consequently, this view is subject to 
criticism from this perspective. 
Although Webber argues that his conception of constitutional construction and 
development applies to the whole constitutional framework, and not exclusively to 
human rights clauses,83 neither he nor the co-authored book develops how this 
conception applies to other constitutional standards. Webber’s contention seems 
correct, as far as constitutional principles of institutional design are concerned. As 
Waldron notes, many provisions related to political institutions contained in modern 
constitutions are deliberately drafted in vague or abstract language. This results in 
“major features of the country’s political arrangements, the limits on government, or 
the restraints imposed on governmental power”84 being undefined. Along similar lines, 
Barber’s account of constitutional principles of institutional design is also at pains to 
stress that these principles are inherently under-determined; and that therefore, there 
are many ways in which states can pursue them.85  
Take for instance the principle of democracy. Legislative action is necessary to 
realize democracy. This requires addressing issues such as what the boundaries of 
constituencies should be, whether there should be a unicameral or bicameral 
Parliament, its powers and limitations, whether it is legitimate to have an appointed 
second chamber, what the qualifying voting age should be, which voting 
disqualifications we ought to implement, etc. Furthermore, a legislative assembly will 
                                                
81 Richard Ekins, ‘Legislation as Reasoned Action’ in Grégoire Webber and others (eds), 
Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
82 Grégoire Webber and Paul Yowell, ‘Introduction: Securing Human Rights Through 
Legislation’ in Gregoire Webber and others (eds), Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 
2018), 11. 
83 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 54), 9, 13 (“The 
constitution of a democratic constitutional state, and especially constitutional rights, ought to remain 
open, on an ongoing basis, for democratic re-negotiating.”). 
84 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 6), 42. 
85 Barber, The Principles (n 6), 14. Note, however, that on Barber’s account, the principles of 
constitutionalism are thought as abstract, universal and timeless principles. This is not quite the way 
how Webber et al think of human rights values. 
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also require regulation on political parties, public financing, caps on campaign 
spending, among many other matters. In this process of legislative specification and 
development, Parliament will have to address the different layers of these 
constitutional principles of institutional design. Developing these principles will 
require a wide-ranging analysis that takes into account the constitutional framework 
and traditions, policy considerations, budget restrictions, history, and so on. In sum, as 
in the case of human rights, the relationship between Parliament and constitutional 
principles of institutional design can also be seen in more positive and empowering 
terms.   
Although this conception seems to be premised upon the existence of a written 
and entrenched Constitution, some of its key insights seem fully applicable to the UK. 
From the point of view of human rights, this conception adds to the literature that 
mistrusts the role that domestic courts perform under the UK statutory bill, namely, 
the HRA. The observation that rights clauses are drafted in broad terms, and subject 
to equally broad restrictions, is fully applicable to Convention rights. From the point 
of view of constitutional principles of institutional design, questions arise because 
there is inherent dispute about their pedigree and normative content in the UK. Despite 
this, as will be discussed in length in Chapter Three, there is a trend in British 
constitutional scholarship to think about the constitution as embracing principles 
developed by modern constitutionalism. Along these lines, a conception of 
constitutional construction and development should be welcomed, because it 
highlights the flexibility of these abstract principles, and the legitimate scope for 
choice that the democratic legislature has between different instantiations of such 
principles.86 
To sum up, the conception of constitutional construction and development 
advances a rich understanding of LSCG. This conception is fundamentally opposed to 
legalistic conceptions, both in terms of its depiction of the relationship between 
Parliament and the Constitution, and in terms of its constitutional philosophy. Since 
broad constitutional principles and values are open for democratic negotiation, 
Parliament’s role is to assess the merits and drawbacks of government legislation 
                                                
86 For discussion about how should constitutional principles be constructed under the UK 
constitution, see Chapter Three below. 
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developing and specifying the Constitution. In other words, this conception requires 
Parliament to deliberate on matters of constitutional policy, principle and practice. The 
Constitution as an activity puts at the heart of legislative scrutiny on constitutional 
grounds normative questions such as what Constitution we ought to have, what sort of 
rights citizens ought to enjoy, what distribution of law-making powers between 
government and Parliament ought to be in place, which mechanisms promote 
transparency and open government, how to hold the government into account, to 
prevent corruption, and so on. The idea of the Constitution as activity, therefore, is 
closely associated with ideas of constitutional deliberation. 
V. Conclusion 
LSCG is a manifestation of Parliament’s role holding the government’s bills to 
account. However, as there are conflicting views about the relationship between 
Parliament and the Constitution, there are different views about how to conceptualize 
this exercise of legislative scrutiny. I have confronted two different strands of a 
legalistic conception, namely, hard and soft legalism. Whilst the former remains highly 
attach to abstract reasoning based on first principles, the latter has a more nuance 
approach that pays due regard to Parliament’s institutional position as a law-making 
body and, therefore, takes advantage of the distinctive features of the legislative 
process, as compared to an adjudicative process. Secondly, I have identified a 
conception that stresses the deliberative potential of constitutional considerations. This 
conception of deliberative constitutionalism, rather than adhering to a certain moral 
conception of the Constitution, it focuses on the procedural aspects of political 
decision-making. Finally, I identified a different conception, closely connected with 
the ideal of constitutional deliberation, but based on a different theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between Parliament and the Constitution. This view 
moves away from an idea of delivering constitutional protection and imposing 
substantive limits on outcomes, to the recognition that constitutional principles and 
values require legislative action for their realisation. LSCG, under this view, is an 
assessment on constitutional policy. I have called this conception “constitutional 
construction and development”. 
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These three conceptions can be seen in terms of the traffic light metaphor. The 
legalistic conception’s starting point is a set of abstract, universal and timeless 
constitutional principles and values, which are seen mainly as substantive criteria to 
limit the exercise of political powers. This conception tends to depict the relationship 
between Parliament and the Constitution as one of conflict. LSCG operates as a red 
traffic light.  Deliberative constitutionalism can be seen in terms of an amber traffic 
light. It demands from political branches careful consideration, awareness and 
engagement with the constitutional implications of legislation. There is an emphasis 
on justification and assessment. This conception differs from the former in that 
constitutional standards receive indirect protection, delivered by means of procedural 
rationality. Finally, the conception of constitutional construction and development 
emphasises political branches’ discretion to flesh out the principles and values of a 
Constitution, within a wide range of possible alternatives. This view can be seen in 
terms of a green traffic light, because it puts a premium on the under-determined 
character of the Constitution. This view thinks of constitutionalism in more positive 
and empowering terms. 
I will conclude with a couple of notes of caution. Firstly, most authors may prefer 
a nuanced version of these conceptions, or some mixed conception. The effort 
developed here does not foreclose this possibility. Instead, it seeks to advance a more 
systematic theoretical analysis of matters that have not been at the centre of debates in 
constitutional and legal theory.87 Secondly, there is no need for a given legislature to 
adopt only one of these conceptions. Furthermore, in Chapter Three I will make the 
case for a pluralistic model of LSCG in the UK constitution. In addition, I will show 
in Chapters Four and Five that UK constitutional committees employ a plurality of 
conceptions of LSCG. Normative debates will arise about which conception ought to 
be preferred. Yet, these debates will be underpinned by broader debates about the role 
and meaning of the constitution in the modern state and its local constitutional 
traditions.
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CHAPTER 2 THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS IN THE UK PARLIAMENT 
I. Introduction 
Chapter One provided a theoretical account of legislative scrutiny on 
constitutional grounds (“LSCG”). I argued that legislative assemblies have a 
distinctive approach when they engage in the protection of constitutional 
fundamentals. I also identified three alternative conceptions of LSCG and explored its 
theoretical underpinnings. However, it is not possible to gain a proper understanding 
of LSCG without engaging with the peculiarities of a real-world legislature, operating 
against a concrete constitutional framework. In other words, a theory of LSCG should 
identify the institutional, political and cultural factors that condition the ability of a 
concrete legislature to be an effective constitutional scrutiniser. Secondly, a theory of 
LSCG should explore how the concrete constitutional provisions, principles, practices 
and other standards of a given country shape constitutional assessments of legislation. 
This chapter and Chapter Five will address the first conditioning factor. Chapters 
Three and Four will focus on the second conditioning factor. 
The aim of this chapter is to find the place of LSCG in the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) Parliament. This requires looking at both Houses of Parliament and their 
respective select committees with a view to identify where there is a possibility for 
LSCG to flourish, and why. In the UK, this exploration should start by recognising the 
difficulties that Parliament faces to perform its general legislative scrutiny function. It 
is common to address those difficulties by considering the significant control that the 
executive exerts over the democratic House of Commons. For instance, mainstream 
political science literature has argued that the capacity of legislatures to influence 
policy-making is a product of the relative autonomy that they enjoy from the 
executive.1 Following this contention, this literature tends to depict the United States 
(“US”) Congress and the UK Parliament as paradigms of a strong Congress and a weak 
Parliament, respectively. There are sharp differences between these two legislatures.2 
                                                
1 Meg Russell and Philip Cowley, ‘The Policy Power of the Westminster Parliament: The 
“Parliamentary State” and the Empirical Evidence’ (2016) 29 Governance 121. 
2 For the contrast between the UK and the US legislatures, I follow Peter Cane, 
‘Reconceptualising Separation of Powers’ (2015) 101 Amicus Curiae 2. 
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In the US presidential system, the President, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate operate according to a logic of “power-sharing” which effectively imposes 
mutual checks and balances. These three political institutions interact in the context of 
a horizontal and multi-polar relationship, whereby each institution enjoys a discrete 
source of authority, and none of them have authority over the other. Cooperation and 
coordination between these institutions is key to prevent deadlocks. By contrast, the 
UK operates with a logic of concentration of powers in a single sovereign authority, 
Parliament. Rather than being autonomous, the power of the executive derives from 
the confidence provided by the Commons. Theoretically, a vertical relationship exists 
between the two political branches of government, expressed in the idea of 
accountability. Ministers are responsive to Parliament; there is authority and 
subordination. However, in practical terms, the power that is theoretically fragmented 
between a government that develops policy and drafts legislation, and Parliament 
which deliberates on government’s proposals and discusses whether to approve them, 
ends up being concentrated in the former. This is made possible by the operation of 
the party system and the electoral system. As a result, the government effectively 
controls the law-making process, and Westminster Parliament is considered an 
epitome of a weak “policy-influencing legislature”. 
These close links between the executive and Westminster Parliament undermine 
the prospects of LSCG. Observers of UK politics may be sceptical about the possibility 
of Members of Parliament (“MPs”) engaging with matters of constitutional 
significance. They will question why government backbenchers would make the 
passage of bills more difficult by raising constitutional objections if their primary 
function is to provide the basis for political support to government at Parliament. On 
the other hand, the opposition, by definition, would not be able to defeat the 
government on constitutional grounds or otherwise. In addition, the system requires 
that the opposition focus on policy debate, as this shows its readiness to assume office 
and allows it to perform informative and educative functions that are essential for the 
functioning of parliamentary democracy. If the prospects of legislative scrutiny in 
general are not good at the most powerful chamber in Parliament, then questions arise 
about the possibility of LSCG in the UK. Thus, the dynamic of political confrontation 
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where policy debates take precedence is likely to overshadow constitutional 
considerations. 
Bearing these considerations in mind, this chapter accounts for the possibility of 
LSCG in the UK Parliament. The objective is to find the locus of constitutional 
thinking in this legislature, and to assess the prospects of each House engaging in 
questions of constitutional significance raised by legislation. This chapter’s central 
claim is that three constitutional select committees provide the main forum for 
constitutional thinking in the UK Parliament. These are the Select Committee on the 
Constitution (“SCC”), the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
(“DPRRC”), and the Joint Committee on Human Rights ( “JCHR”). I also claim that 
the upper chamber is more likely to engage in deliberation about the constitutional 
significance of legislation than the Commons.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: first, I will focus on the Commons. I 
will argue that MPs face significant difficulties to grasp the complex and technical 
nature of constitutional arguments. This is because MPs are mostly generalists, rather 
than experts, and face significant pressures on their parliamentary time. The second 
reason has already been mentioned, but requires unpacking. Westminster style politics 
focuses parliamentary energies in a two-sided confrontation between competing policy 
proposals, that of the government and that of the opposition. This provides little room 
for constitutional arguments. Finally, I will address two normative questions. Firstly, 
the question about the relative importance of legislative scrutiny as a constitutional 
function of the Commons. Secondly, how different conceptions of parliamentary 
democracy impact the prospects of LSCG.  
Then, the chapter will discuss the role of the Lords. I will argue that, in contrast 
to the Commons, the Lords do exercise LSCG of government’s bills as part of its 
regular legislative scrutiny functions. I claim that the Lords provide an ideal 
environment for principled and deliberative debate about the constitutional 
implications of legislation. This is because of the Lords’ relative isolation from 
partisan politics, relative independence from the executive, the expertise of some of 
its members, and because they are assisted in this task by specialised constitutional 
committees. However, this constitutional protection function cannot be taken too far. 
The Lords lack political legitimacy to challenge the Commons’ will in the context of 
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modern British democracy. The Lords have rightly interpreted its role as being a 
revising chamber that prompts second thoughts from the lower chamber. Even when 
confronted with a matter of constitutional significance, if the Commons are not willing 
to compromise, the Lords will defer to the political judgment of the lower chamber. 
Finally, the last section claims that the main drivers of constitutional thinking at 
Parliament are the three constitutional committees mentioned above. To make this 
claim, I will briefly introduce these committees. I recognise that they are not the only 
forums for constitutional thinking at the UK Parliament. However, I will identify five 
features that make them the “main” forum for conscious and systematic thinking in the 
UK Parliament, and the main drivers of LSCG. 
II. The House of Commons as a general policy forum for political 
confrontation 
The possibility of LSCG in the Commons has been approached with scepticism. 
Take for instance Dawn Oliver and Jack Simson Caird, who argued that the Commons 
is dominated by a culture of resistance and an adversarial approach to legislative 
scrutiny which “does not leave much room for a consensual, principled and detailed 
approach to scrutiny of legislation to develop.”3 The government has a culture of 
resistance that irradiates among its backbenchers. Ministers are not willing to 
compromise and aim at keeping amendments and concessions to a minimum. They 
can also control the flow of information and may not always be willing to explain their 
justification for their legislative proposals. The adversarial logic of confrontation 
between government and the opposition also creates challenges for LSCG. 
Government may not make concessions, as these could be interpreted as short-term 
gains for the opposition. Although there may be instances of high quality legislative 
scrutiny, particularly in public bill committees, the adversarial logic diverts most 
efforts to issues of policy. In their view, this is regrettable, since engagement by MPs 
on more detailed scrutiny about the constitutional implications of legislation would 
provide a strong democratic legitimacy imprint to LSCG.4 
                                                
3 Jack Simson Caird and Dawn Oliver, ‘Parliament's Constitutional Standards’ in Alexander 
Horne and Andrew Le Sueur (eds), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Hart Publishing 2016), 
69. 
4 Ibid, 70. 
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There are two main reasons why MPs struggle to engage with constitutional 
matters. The first one concerns the highly technical and complex nature of 
constitutional arguments. The second one is structural, and concerns the logic of 
operation of Westminster systems. I will explain them in the same order. The final 
section addresses two normative questions. The first one concerns the relative 
importance of legislative scrutiny as a discrete – but not the only – constitutional task 
of the Commons. Secondly, the relationship between LSCG and competing 
conceptions of British parliamentary democracy. 
1. The technical and complex nature of constitutional arguments 
Constitutional theory and law is a discrete area of specialised knowledge. 
Understanding its key tenets, doctrines, rules and principles, requires lengthy and 
laborious study, even for someone trained in the legal profession. Furthermore, LSCG 
is dependent on the constitutional arrangements of a given country. Each jurisdiction 
has its own structures, rules and principles of government. The UK constitutional 
framework, for instance, is unique in that it lacks a written constitution and a bespoke 
procedure for constitutional change. This raises all sort of challenges for constitutional 
lawyers, and makes the subject a highly contested one. Chapter Three will provide an 
account of some of the difficulties that arise from the UK constitution, with special 
reference to LSCG. As far as this chapter is concerned, the point is to highlight the 
technical and complex nature of constitutional law, and to question the ability of MPs 
to grasp its content. The chapter considers three interrelated problems that damage the 
prospects of LSCG. These are knowledge, time and the nature of modern legislation. 
I will briefly refer to them.  
Firstly, MPs are not experts. They have a general knowledge that may cover 
some policy matters, for instance, if they have a specific background. Yet, this usually 
is not enough to address complex policy issues.5 Parliamentary reform has brought 
about specialised select committees which mirror government departments, thus 
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improving its institutional capabilities to hold the government to account.6 This has 
provided an opportunity for MPs to focus their scrutiny work on specific subject 
matters, not least through evidence gathering. The Commons currently has a number 
of select committees that may address matters of constitutional significance. There is 
a European committee, a Brexit committee, a Justice committee, a Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs committees, a Women and Equality 
committee, committees dealing with internal matters of procedure (Procedure, 
Privileges, Standards, Standing Orders committees), and committees dealing with 
matters related to social rights (Housing, Health and Social Care, Work and Pensions, 
Education committees), and matters related to the constituent parts of the Union 
(Northern Ireland Affairs, Scottish Affairs and Welsh Affairs committees). On the 
other hand, half of the JCHR membership comes from the Commons. These instances 
have provided an opportunity for MPs to build up some knowledge on constitutional 
matters. However, we should note the limitations of these forums. Only a few MPs sit 
on these select committees. On the other hand, even in those jurisdictions with strong 
legislatures, empirical evidence suggests that committee members tend to miss the 
broader picture and may only be able to identify specific issues raised by bills.7 The 
Commons has an epistemic disadvantage when it comes to addressing complex and 
technical issues, such as the constitutional implications of legislation.  
The aforementioned limitations are closely connected with a second inherent 
problem of the parliamentary function. MPs usually do not have enough time to form 
a view of their own on complex matters. Instead, they have to trust others’ views 
contained in short briefing materials written by advisors, the Commons’ library, select 
committees or other sources. Furthermore, there are additional demands on 
parliamentary time. MPs also must tend to the needs of their constituencies, attend and 
prepare debates at Westminster Hall, PM Questions, Ministerial Questions, and select 
committee sessions, among others. On the other hand, a permanent concern about 
elections and re-elections will require MPs to engage with “concerns of the day”, gain 
                                                
6 Alexandra Kelso, ‘Parliament’ in Matthew V. Flinders and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
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headlines and “talk points”.8 This further undermines the prospects of MPs for gaining 
constitutional knowledge and employing it to scrutinise legislation. 
Finally, the sheer volume of highly complex and technical legislation that is 
passed every year puts additional pressure upon limited parliamentary resources, time 
and capacity to gather and process relevant information. Government’s legislative 
proposals raise relevant policy issues, and it is likely that MPs will focus on these 
matters. Otherwise, MPs will not be able to conduct proper legislative scrutiny. This 
additional factor leaves little room for MPs to address the issues of constitutional 
significance raised by bills. 
In sum, the highly technical and complex nature of constitutional considerations 
undermines the prospects of MPs addressing these matters. They do not have 
specialised knowledge, and lack time, energy and resources to equip themselves with 
the expertise necessary to scrutinise properly the constitutional implications of 
legislation. Ultimately, MPs have to rely on experts’ opinions to address these matters. 
2. Westminster-style politics 
A second challenge for the possibility of LSCG at the Commons comes from 
structural factors related to the operation of Westminster systems. The key point to 
note here is Parliament does not have a single identity and voice.9 This is not merely 
in the obvious sense that Westminster is a bicameral legislature. Mass democracy and 
the electoral system have favoured the representation of two main political parties at 
the Commons. This has had profound consequences for the operation of Parliament. 
Here, I am interested in the dynamics of parliamentary debates. They are dominated 
by a two-sided political confrontation about policy proposals between the government 
and the main opposition party. This focus on policy confrontation is a second factor 
that significantly pressures the possibility of LSCG at the Commons. In what follows, 
I will try to unpack how these structural factors operate.  
The logic of the Westminster-system provides for a theoretically strong 
Parliament with supreme and unlimited powers to legislate at will. Currently, in a 
modern attempt to justify the legitimacy of these theoretically unlimited powers, the 
so-called “doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty” is grounded on ideas of popular 
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sovereignty that permeated the Commons as the franchise was enlarged and mass 
democracy emerged. The Commons is the politically representative popular assembly. 
Representation at the Commons is a factor of the first past the post electoral system. 
This system is designed to ensure that one party gains a single parliamentary majority, 
regardless of its overall performance in the elections. The second runner, on the other 
hand, is recognised as the main opposition party and designated as “her majesty’s loyal 
opposition”. This puts party politics at the centre of parliamentary working practices.10 
Parliamentary debates focus on a two-sided confrontation between competing policy 
alternatives.11 On the one hand, there is the party that commanded a majority and 
controls the government. From the point of view of law-making, the government’s 
focus will be on pursuing a legislative agenda that implements its manifesto 
commitments, responds to matters of public interest, advances ministers’ agendas, 
among other things. On the other hand, the focus of the opposition will be on 
highlighting policy alternatives, because these proposals will be tested in the future 
general elections. The key challenge for the opposition in Westminster systems is to 
present itself as a credible alternative for government. Once again this provides little 
room for constitutional arguments. The government’s main concern will be to advance 
its policy agenda, rather than study the constitutional issues raised by legislation. The 
opposition, on the other hand, even if it is willing to pursue a constitutional agenda, by 
definition, will not be able to defeat the government. Yet more fundamentally, rather 
than focusing on legislative scrutiny, the opposition may devote most of its energies 
on discussing the government’s policy agenda and on presenting an alternative of its 
own. In this bi-polar logic, there is also a risk that constitutional considerations may 
be weaponised by the opposition against government legislative proposals. 
This logic of confrontation is further strengthened by political techniques and 
institutions designed to secure strong party allegiance and cohesion. Firstly, the 
government has a significant presence at the Commons.12 A convention of ministerial 
                                                
10 Adam Tomkins, ‘‘Talking in Fictions’: Jennings on Parliament’ (2004) 67 Modern Law 
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11 Ivor Jennings, Parliament (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1957); J. A. G. Griffith, ‘The 
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collective responsibility means that ministers should vote in favour of the government 
legislative proposals. Secondly, the whip. Backbenchers are key parliamentary actors 
for the government, as they provide the executive’s base of political support. 
Ultimately, the success of the government’s legislative programme depends on its 
capacity to exert its parliamentary majority. There may be an expectation that 
backbenchers will have a natural adherence to party policies. However, the critical 
significance of party loyalty has required to organise backbenchers’ contribution to the 
legislative process. Whips secure support for governmental bills. On the other hand, 
backbenchers have additional incentives to support the government, as this may foster 
their prospects for progressing in their political careers.13 Hence, they may be 
rewarded with ministerial offices. Such mechanisms are critical to prevent backbench 
rebellions. In single majority governments, without rebellions, the government will 
not be defeated. Party allegiance undermines the prospects of LSCG, as backbenchers 
do not have incentives to voice constitutional concerns and make the passage of 
government’s bills more difficult.  
These considerations are premised on the assumption that Westminster systems 
will secure strong single majority governments. However, recent developments raise 
questions about the continuing validity of this premise. Consider first the assumption 
about backbenchers’ loyalty. Westminster Parliament has traditionally been depicted 
as a weak policy-influencing legislature.14 However, in recent years, there has been a 
decline in party voting cohesion.15 Yet, more fundamentally, the evidence suggests 
that governments exercise political self-restraint at the policymaking and drafting 
stage if there are prospects of backbench rebellions.16 This suggests that government 
backbenchers exert influence in policymaking, but in more subtle and informal ways. 
The inherent obscurity of behind the scenes action prevents exact quantifications of 
the policy impact of Parliament. However, this raises doubts about traditional 
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assumptions of parliamentary influence. It may well be that MPs can voice concerns 
about the constitutional implications of legislation, and the government may be willing 
to address those concerns, especially if they are likely to obstruct the passage of a bill. 
The second assumption may also no longer apply. Since the post second World War 
period, single majority governments have been the rule, rather than the exception. MPs 
coming from third political parties were marginal. However, since 2010, the 
significance of third political parties has increased, changing the dynamics of the 
modes of relationship between the executive and Parliament.17 In the 2010 elections 
no party gained an overall majority, leading to a coalition between Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats. A coalition government has a more complex relationship with 
Parliament, as it must secure support from backbenchers coming from two parties, in 
addition to frontbenchers from the junior coalition party. In coalition governments, 
there is a possibility that unhappy MPs dealing with an unwanted coalition may 
weaken the government’s control of its parliamentary majority. In these cases, the 
government may not be as strong as observers of Westminster systems may expect. 
Minority governments face even more pressure. This is clearly exemplified in 
the experience of Theresa May and Boris Johnson’s Conservative minority 
governments.18 Between 2017 and 2019, the Conservative party was in government, 
but dependent upon a confidence and supply agreement with the Democratic Unionist 
Party. The divisive issue of exiting the European Union (“EU”) put under significant 
stress the capacity of government to control Parliament.19 Policy differences within 
the Conservative party significantly eroded the government’s political power. During 
the 2017-19 parliamentary session, there were significant backbench rebellions on the 
more fundamental policy issue facing the UK, namely, the exit from the EU. MPs 
managed to introduce significant changes to the government’s flagship Brexit piece of 
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legislation, namely, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.20 Furthermore they 
have even been able to gain control of the legislative agenda through changes on 
Standing Order 14(1) at fundamental times. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2019 (the so-called Cooper-Letwin Act) and the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 
2) Act 2019 (the so-called Benn Act) represent an example of Parliament going further 
than a merely policy-influencing legislature, to effectively a policy-making one. 
Although it represents the exception rather than the rule, it further reinforces other 
trends mentioned above. Weak minority governments may well become the rule, rather 
than the exception, because of the unsavoury experience of the Liberal Democrats as 
junior partners in the 2010-15 coalition, and the context of divided politics at the 
plurinational level.21 In addition, the operation of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 
may result in minority government keeping office despite lacking a working 
parliamentary majority.22 
These factors may change mainstream accounts about the relationship between 
government and Parliament. The UK Parliament may no longer be the epitome of a 
weak legislature. In the context of non-stable coalitions or weak minority 
governments, the prospects of a few backbench rebellions may be enough to put the 
government’s legislative agenda at stake. This rebalances the distribution of political 
power between ministers and Parliament, and may provide new avenues for LSCG. 
Empowered MPs may potentially raise constitutional concerns, either informally or 
during the formal stages of the legislative process. Yet, this possibility does not change 
the fact that MPs will struggle to grasp issues of constitutional significance, and may 
lack time and energy to engage with them. Epistemic challenges will remain in place. 
Although an emerging reconfiguration of the relationship between government 
and Parliament may offer new avenues for LSCG, it is worth noting that government 
has other means to control the legislative process and undermine parliamentary 
scrutiny of legislation. Firstly, the executive has significant epistemic advantages, 
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when compared with Parliament.23 It can rely on a professional civil service to develop 
policy and draft legislation, which provides capacity to gather expert knowledge and 
information, assess policy impact and prospects, set priorities within a budget, etc.24 
As noted in section II.1 above, MPs face significant asymmetries of information and 
struggle to understand the scheme of a complex bill, let alone its constitutional 
implications. These features put the executive in control of law-making. In the 
exceptional cases where Parliament manages to take control, these epistemic 
disadvantages affect the quality of legislation, as the recent passage of the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 exemplified.25 Secondly, the government has a 
legislative agenda setting power, because it controls what, how and when matters are 
debated at Parliament. This includes the ability to set the time that Parliament will 
spend on one or more stages of a bill’s passage. By rushing bills through Parliament, 
the government prevents detailed scrutiny of the constitutional implications of 
legislation. Thirdly, there is a long-standing trend towards delegating broad law-
making powers to government ministers and other agencies. These are to a significant 
extent natural and inevitable consequences of changes in government scope in the last 
150 years.26 However, as will be argued in Chapter Three, since the 1980s the 
government has employed broad and wide-ranging delegated powers, including Henry 
VIII powers, to circumnavigate parliamentary scrutiny and take decisions on issues of 
policy and even matters of principle.27 The so-called Brexit bills, including the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018,28 provide a good example of government 
capacity to obtain from Parliament significant delegated powers on key matters of 
principle and policy. The limited effectiveness of parliamentary mechanisms to 
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scrutinise statutory instruments raises additional concerns about the ability of 
Parliament to assess the constitutional implications of executive law-making.29 
In sum, Westminster-style politics structures parliamentary debates on a two-
sided policy confrontation between government and the opposition. MPs have 
traditionally aligned according to party loyalties. Backbenchers have little incentive to 
rebel against their own government, let alone to obstruct the passage of bills grounded 
on constitutional concerns. Currently, there has been a change in traditional 
understandings. As rebellions have become more frequent, research has demonstrated 
MPs’ ability to influence behind the scenes, and strong single majority government 
may be in retreat. However, it remains the case that MPs may focus on policy matters, 
leaving little room for LSCG. Furthermore, Parliament faces significant epistemic 
difficulties to understand matters of constitutional significance. It lacks time, energy 
and resources to address them properly. Although the new trends suggest stronger 
assertiveness in Parliament, the executive can still employ other techniques to pre-
empt the prospects of LSCG at the Commons, such as programming and delegated 
powers. 
3. The constitutional role of the Commons and conceptions of British 
parliamentary democracy 
If the Commons face epistemic challenges, and their limited energies are mainly 
focused on policy confrontation, it is worth asking what is the place for legislative 
scrutiny in general, and LSCG more specifically. Thinking about this role in the wider 
context of Parliament’s other constitutional roles provides a clearer picture about the 
place of LSCG at the Commons. This first question explores the significance of 
legislative scrutiny in the broader context of other constitutional functions performed 
by the Commons. Then, I will address a second question concerning the role that the 
Commons should perform in legislative scrutiny. The answer to this question depends 
on broader conceptions about British parliamentary democracy. I will address these 
two questions in the same order. 
Although traditionally people think of Parliament as a law-making institution, 
constitutional scholars do not necessarily consider legislative scrutiny as the main 
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constitutional function of the Commons. About 150 years ago, Walter Bagehot 
identified four tasks that pertain to the Commons.30 These were, by order of priority, 
to elect the government; to perform an informing function about the state of affairs of 
the nation;31 to express the minds of the people on all the different matters that come 
before the House; to teach the people; and finally, to legislate. Bagehot thought that 
the significance of legislation varied among parliamentary seasons. Yet, overall, 
Bagehot considered that other tasks outweighed in significance the legislative 
function.32  
Following Bagehot’s contention that the Commons’ key function is to elect the 
government, the idea of partisanship becomes highly relevant. The Commons must 
provide the basis for political support to sustain the government’s ability to fulfil its 
manifesto commitments. Party discipline allows the government to act as the 
“efficient” secret of the British constitution. On the other hand, agonistic politics at the 
Commons is also essential for the fulfilment of its constitutional tasks. As Grégoire 
Webber notes, it is through debate between the two main political forces at the 
Commons that this chamber fulfils its “expressive, teaching and informing 
functions”.33 Political parties provide a coherent set of ideas, policies and beliefs about 
the political community and the state of affairs of a country. Agonistic debates 
highlight differences between alternative political proposals. Citizens must choose 
between these proposals contained in political parties’ manifestos at the general 
elections. By focusing on policy debates, opposition parties communicate their 
alternative proposals, thus enabling them to present themselves before citizens as a 
credible alternative for government. Political confrontation between two alternative 
policy proposals performs a constitutional function essential for British parliamentary 
democracy. It shapes debate and reflection.  
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This view has further implications for the Commons’ working practices. The 
role of the opposition is not to defeat the government. Nor is the main role of 
government backbenchers to make the passage of government’s bills more difficult. 
Partisanship is not seen as an obstacle for the Commons to perform its constitutional 
functions, insofar as there is a democratic system with two factions trying to achieve 
and maintain power by persuasion.34 The point about agonistic politics is to engage in 
a democratic exercise of defending and criticising the government. In this scheme, the 
opposition must present itself as a credible alternative for government. This requires 
choosing a leader and shadow ministers who mirror government departments, 
channelling criticism through persuasion,35 and putting forward alternative policy 
proposals. 
Others take a slightly different view. Adam Tomkins, for instance, argued that 
the key constitutional role of the Commons is to hold the government to account.36 In 
this view, partisanship is troubling. According to Tomkins, the key idea of responsive 
government means that the executive only remains in office for as long as it retains 
Parliament’s confidence. Parliament must hold the government to account for the 
general state of the nation, and to maintain or withhold confidence, accordingly. This 
view portrays the relationship between government and Parliament in monolithic 
terms. Parliament must act in unity and independent from government, inspired by the 
promotion of the public good.37 Not surprisingly, Tomkins identifies an inherent 
tension between the Commons’ role providing political support for the government, 
and its role as a democratic accountability mechanism.38 Note that on Tomkins’ view, 
there is a general accountability role that may include legislative scrutiny, but covers 
a wider range of matters, such as the role of Prime Ministers Questions, accountability 
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for policy implementation, control of spending, etc. Furthermore, according to 
Tomkins, the general accountability task of Parliament takes precedence over its 
legislative function.39 
Whether we follow Bagehot’s account or that of Tomkins, a common feature 
that emerges is the complexity of the constitutional roles performed by the Commons. 
The lower chamber appears overburdened by other significant functions, such as 
general accountability, educative, expressive and informing functions. In performing 
these functions, another feature that emerges is the role of agonistic politics. These 
functions, on the other hand, pressures the legislative scrutiny function, which 
although important, appears slightly downplayed in the broader context of other 
constitutional functions. Against this background, LSCG appears marginalized. From 
a more observational perspective, I noted in sections 1 and 2 above that LSCG faces 
epistemic difficulties, time pressures and tends to be overshadowed by policy debates 
and confrontation. Now from a more normative perspective, the possibility of LSCG 
appears again diminished by other slightly more relevant constitutional functions 
performed by the Commons. There is an inherent difficulty in finding space for LSCG 
in the Commons. 
The second question in this section is more specific. I will put aside the question 
about the significance of legislative scrutiny in the wider context of the constitutional 
role of the Commons. In what follows, I will briefly discuss what role we should expect 
from the Commons in the context of law-making, and the implications for LSCG. 
Recently, the changes that MPs managed to implement in the operation of Standing 
Order 14(1), which secures precedence for government business in Parliament, the 
passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019 and the European Union 
(Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019, which directed the government to seek a delay of exit 
day, and the question about whether the government could advise the Queen to 
withhold royal assent, put the spotlight on different conceptions about British 
parliamentary democracy.40 There is no room here for in depth study of this debate, or 
to form a view about which conception should prevail. Yet, it is important to briefly 
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characterise these two conceptions, and to note that the possibility of LSCG may 
require taking sides between these competing views.  
The first conception interprets parliamentary elections as a competition between 
political leaders that presented the people with a manifesto containing policy 
proposals. Hence, elections are about choosing a government. The workings of the 
Commons must be strictly organised through party loyalties, thus enabling the 
governing party to implement its manifesto commitments through legislation. 
According to this view, “any interference in the implementation of the winning party’s 
manifesto is an affront to democracy, because it constitutes defiance of the electorate’s 
choice.”41 The recent defence of the government’s privileged position as a lawmaker 
by Richard Ekins and Stephen Laws fits this view.42 These authors put a premium on 
the convention of responsible government. They think it is right for the government to 
retain control of policy-making and the legislative agenda. Parliament is ill-equipped 
to take control of the legislative process. If it does, the UK parliamentary system will 
risk incoherent and unaccountable policy-making. Governments can rely on the 
legitimacy of their party manifesto to pursue their policies through Parliament. This 
does not mean that Parliament should be prevented from holding the government to 
account. Yet, if Parliament is no longer willing to support key government policy 
proposals, the solution is not a “subversion” of the constitutional roles of Parliament 
and government. Instead, it is a vote of no confidence and change in government. 
There is a second view, which puts the emphasis on the position of the Commons 
as the key component of a sovereign Parliament. According to this view, British 
parliamentary democracy is grounded on ideas of representative democracy and 
political accountability of government. Rather than mere members of a party, MPs are 
representatives of the people, and must take decisions inspired by the common good. 
The government is dependent on Parliament, and can only govern through Parliament. 
In holding the government to account, this conception expects the Commons to behave 
as a deliberative body, which discusses relevant matters of public life, including 
government’s legislative proposals, with a critical and fair-minded spirit. The 
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emphasis is placed on reason-demanding and reason-giving, as well as willingness to 
change views based on good reasons. Hence, it is legitimate for the Commons to 
challenge the government, insofar as dissent is based on good reasons. Faced with 
rebellions and opposition to its policies, the government should either justify its 
proposals, or seek changes that address parliamentary concerns. 
There is a wide range of possibilities in between these two extremes. Assessing 
the debate about Parliament’s attempt to gain control of the legislative agenda, Alison 
Young pointed out that these competing views of democracy have been in constant 
tension, alternating dominance at times.43 The case of Parliament gaining control of 
policy-making seems to be an exception, rather than the rule. In times of crisis, the 
tensions become apparent. Yet, it should be noted that, as Martin Loughlin has argued, 
the British constitution works by “holding governmental institutions and practices in 
a relationship of mutual tension.”44 Tension is not alien to the British constitution. As 
far as LSCG is concerned, it seems apparent that there needs to be a strong deliberative 
component in Parliament. Otherwise, LSCG may not be able to flourish. I began my 
discussion about the possibility of LSCG by recalling Oliver and Simson Caird’s 
contention about the need for a “consensual, principled and detailed approach to 
scrutiny of legislation”. These ideas are better served by the second conception of 
British parliamentary democracy. LSCG needs a strong and deliberative Parliament 
where constitutional arguments gain prestige and exert influence among MPs. If the 
Commons continue to behave most of the time along party lines, the place of LSCG 
will have to be found elsewhere. 
III. The House of Lords as a constitutional protector 
By contrast to the Commons, the upper chamber has inherent characteristics that 
make it a more effective forum for the sort of reasoned and principled debate that 
LSCG requires. Hence, the LSCG finds a natural place at the Lords in British 
parliamentary democracy. I will start by identifying the key characteristics that make 
the case for LSCG at the Lords. However, in subsection 2 I note the difficult position 
of the Lords as the appointed chamber in the context of British parliamentary 
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democracy. This imposes inherent limits on the legitimacy and capacity of the Lords 
to perform LSCG. 
1. The Lords as a forum for principled and reasoned debate 
The role of the Lords in the legislative process is generally described as that of 
a revising chamber. Hence, the Lords scrutinises legislation, proposes amendments 
and prompts second thoughts on the Commons.45 In this capacity, the Lords 
complement the work of the Commons, addressing those areas where the lower 
chamber fails to find time to conduct proper work.46 One of those areas, as argued 
above, is scrutiny of the constitutional implications of government’s bills. This idea is 
grounded on the attractive view that the Commons and the Lords should collaborate 
in the joint enterprise of protecting the constitution. Since the Commons do not have 
time, energy or expertise to address issues of constitutional significance, the Lords, 
exercising its revising role, should flag these issues. Lords’ amendments addressing 
constitutional concerns should prompt second thoughts in the Commons. These 
amendments may command the support of the opposition and some backbenchers. If 
the government envisages possible backbench rebellions, or for any other reason is 
forced to compromise, it may either accept the Lords’ amendments or may propose its 
own amendments. The passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, for 
instance, provides significant examples of this collaborative operation between 
chambers.47 
The idea that the Lords should assess bills affecting constitutional fundamentals 
has been proposed for at least a century.48 A LSCG role has also been present in more 
recent debates about the reform of the Lords,49 and vehemently defended by some 
constitutional scholars.50 Moreover, this LSCG role is not only present in reform and 
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academic debates. There is evidence that the Lords has engaged in constitutional 
arguments in the legislative process,51 and the recent passage of the Brexit bills 
provides further evidence that it continues to do so, as mentioned above. 
By contrast to the Commons, the Lords provide a natural forum for principled 
and reasoned debate about the constitution. There are a few reasons for this. Firstly, 
the Lords face fewer pressures upon parliamentary time. Peers are not elected. This 
means that they do not have constituency work to attend. On the other hand, they do 
not have to take care of daily political business and seek headlines and talking points, 
as peers do not face pressures to be re-elected. Not surprisingly, the Lords spend an 
average of half of its sitting time scrutinising public bills.52 Secondly, since 1999, an 
overwhelming majority of peers is appointed. Appointments are considered an 
“honour”, and should be based on the candidate’s merits. This is not always the case, 
as frequent controversies about party patronage in appointments suggest.53 Despite 
this, it remains true that the Lords can draw from the legal and constitutional expertise 
and knowledge of many of its members, among which are civil servants, lawyers, 
former senior judges and academics, including legal academics and political scientists. 
Thirdly, the Lords is relatively isolated from partisan politics and more independent 
from the executive.54 Even in the case of peers who are politicians, they are appointed 
late in their political careers, and therefore, face less pressure to progress. On the other 
hand, although there is a strong party presence at the Lords,55 since the removal of all 
but 92 hereditary peers, there is no overall party majority. Furthermore, crossbenchers 
account for more than twenty per cent of membership, and the government has less 
presence than in the Commons. For these reasons, the government is not in control of 
the upper chamber. Finally, the Lords’ role in scrutinising the constitutional 
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implications of legislation is assisted by select committees. In contrast to the 
Commons’ select committees, Lords’ committees do not mirror government 
departments but operate on cross-cutting areas, and perform legislative scrutiny 
functions. The SCC and the DPRRC are remarkable examples of Lords’ committees 
engaging with issues of constitutional significance raised by legislation. The Lords 
also draws from contributions by the JCHR. This committee also performs legislative 
scrutiny. Given their key importance for the purposes of this thesis, I will address them 
in depth in the next section and subsequent chapters of this thesis. As far as this section 
is concerned, suffice to say that these reports enlighten debate on matters of 
constitutional significance, and that the Lords do engage with them when performing 
legislative scrutiny functions. These four factors, among others, have favoured an 
ethos of rational debate and emphasis on justification that characterises the Lords’ 
approach to legislative scrutiny.56 This less partisan and politically driven debate 
provides an ideal environment for LSCG. 
2. The political limitations in the role of the Lords as a revising chamber 
It is already clear that the Lords do provide an environment for principled and 
consensual debate about matters of constitutional significance, and that they engage in 
LSCG. However, a different question is how far can the Lords take these constitutional 
arguments forward. This question is relevant because the Lords have a difficult 
position in contemporary British parliamentary democracy. Numerous attempts to 
introduce a democratic component at the Lords have failed. The vast majority of its 
members are appointed, 92 are hereditary peers,57 and 26 are Archbishops or Bishops 
of the Church of England. The lack of a representative58 and democratic basis of the 
Lords remains an unsolved constitutional problem, and there are no prospects of 
                                                
56 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future (n 43), at 
paras 4.39-41; Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ (n 48), 31. 
57 Ironically, this remains the only elected component of the Lords. 
58 According to Russell, the composition of the Lords in terms of party representation is “more 
proportional to the way that people vote in elections than … in the elected House of Commons” (Russell, 
The Contemporary House of Lords Westminster - Bicameralism Revived (n 48), 71). Russell is right to 
question the representative character of the Commons, which is a factor of the electoral system. 
However, the agreement between incumbents about the need to maintain some party proportionality in 
the Lords is ultimately dependent on the Prime Minister. On the other hand, under Jeremy Corbyn’s 
leadership, the Labour Party has slowed down its appointments, and the SNP has remained fiercely 
opposed to sit at the Lords (Campion and Kippin, ‘How Undemocratic’ (n 51)). Furthermore, women, 
ethnic minorities and the North are significantly underrepresented. Finally, there are no democratic 
accountability chains. 
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reform.59 For these reasons, the relationship between the two chambers requires 
securing the primacy of the Commons. I will briefly explain how this is secured, the 
limitations of this scheme, and the impact that this has on LSCG. Finally, I will discuss 
whether it is legitimate for the Lords to exercise LSCG. 
The primacy of the Commons is secured through a set of institutional 
arrangements. It comprises long standing constitutional conventions and practices, as 
well as statutory requirements. Yet, the idea that the Lords should defer to a majority 
government supported by the Commons is a long standing one. It had started to 
manifest itself by the mid 1800s.60 Although the Lords had the power to reject 
legislation, it was thought that they could not carry this right to its extremes. By 1867, 
Walter Bagehot argued that the Lords was “a chamber with (in most cases) a veto of 
delay with (in most cases) a power of revision, but with no other rights or powers.”61 
During the 20th century, these political practices were secured by means of the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. By the same token, other conventions and practices 
continued to develop.62 The point of these institutional arrangements is to prevent the 
Lords from blocking legislation or passing amendments that wreck the Commons’ 
will, whatever the reasons.63 Therefore, the lack of democratic credentials means that 
the Lords will be able to perform LSCG, to criticise legislation that conflicts with the 
constitution, and/or propose constitutionally-informed amendments. However, if 
confronted with opposition at the Commons, it may have to step back from its 
constitutional concerns.  
                                                
59 Dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic credentials is long-standing. It is expressed in the 
preamble of the Parliament Act 1911. Membership reform has been approached in a quite British 
piecemeal and pragmatic fashion. The Life Peerages Act 1958 incorporated appointed life peers to the 
hereditary and aristocratic chamber. The House of Lords Act 1999 removed all but 92 hereditary peers. 
Since then, disagreements about the future composition of the Lords have prevented further reform. 
There have been white papers, pre-legislative scrutiny efforts and even a failed bill (The House of Lords 
Bill 2012). 
60 Jennings, Parliament (n 11), 402. 
61 Bagehot, The English Constitution (n 28), 128-31. 
62 An example of a convention is the Salisbury Convention, according to which the Lords will 
not vote down at second or third reading a government bill that implements a manifesto commitment. 
An example of a political practice is that the Lords usually approve bills at second reading, regardless 
of whether the bill implements a manifesto commitment or not. The Lords may propose amendments, 
but they will not vote down the whole bill. For an account of these practices and conventions, see Joint 
Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament (2005-06, HL 265-I, HC 1212-I). See 
also Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords Westminster - Bicameralism Revived (n 48), 133. 
63 Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ (n 48); Phillipson, ‘The Greatest 
Quango’ (n 47), 377-79. 
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Nevertheless, the limitations referred to above are not as straightforward as they 
appear. Consider a few examples. Firstly, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 only 
apply when the Commons is the chamber of introduction. If disagreement between the 
two chambers arises, and the bill was introduced at the Lords, the ping pong stage can 
potentially be endless. Although the government should avoid introducing 
controversial bills in the Lords, this may not always be possible. For reasons related 
to an appropriate distribution of work between the chambers during a legislative 
session, cases arise in which the government is forced to introduce controversial bills 
at the Lords. In these cases, the Act will not apply. On the other hand, even when bills 
are introduced at the Commons, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 is rarely 
employed.64 Instead, most government defeats at the Lords end up in some sort of 
compromise, rather than in a protracted ping pong that may require the application of 
the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949.65 There are different explanations for this, but the 
point is that the power of delay can have damaging effects on governmental policy 
objectives, and may force the government to compromise. Finally, the Salisbury 
convention is premised on the assumption that the people have elected a single 
majority government. The idea is that by doing this, the people have democratically 
endorsed the policies contained in the manifesto. However, as noted above, recent 
governments have not been able to command a majority in Parliament. The very 
prospect of coalition and minority governments becoming the rule rather than the 
exception puts the operation of the Salisbury convention under increasing pressure.66 
Consequently, the institutional arrangements that secure the primacy of the 
Commons are not perfect. Ultimately, the relationship between both Houses is largely 
dependent on political practices such as that of not blocking bills in second reading, 
and of having the government’s business dealt with in reasonable time.67 These 
practices are an expression of consensus among peers and MPs about the need to 
preserve the pre-eminence of the Commons.68 Despite this, it should be noted that 
                                                
64 Richard Kelly and Lucinda Maer, The Parliament Acts (House of Commons Library Briefing 
Paper No 675, 2016). 
65 Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’, 31-32. 
66 Ibid, 48ff. 
67 Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament (n 60). 
68 Ibid. 
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since the removal of almost all hereditary peers in 1999,69 the Lords have felt more 
confident to perform their functions. The redistribution of political forces at the Lords 
has prompted a new assertiveness, to the point that political scientists have argued that 
the UK is experiencing a revival of bicameralism.70 However, even this confident 
upper chamber must employ political judgement when confronted with opposition 
from government and the Commons. There is room for the Lords to exercise LSCG, 
and invite the Commons to “think twice” about the constitutional implications of 
legislation. However, the lack of democratic credentials will require the Lords, in 
certain circumstances, to stand back and defer to the Commons’ will. As Oliver frankly 
puts it, for reasons of practical politics and survival, the Lords must exercise restraint 
when they oppose the government and the Commons.71 
3. Concluding remarks: the worst of both worlds? 
In conclusion, the Lords are subjecting government’s bills to LSCG. Their 
relative isolation from partisan politics, independence from the executive, expertise of 
some of its members, and inputs from specialised constitutional committees, has 
provided an ideal environment for principled and deliberative debate about the 
constitutional implications of legislation. However, when performing this function, as 
with any exercise of legislative scrutiny, the Lords must exercise political self-restraint 
and avoid challenging the primacy of the Commons. The Lords will have to balance 
two constitutional considerations when exercising LSCG. On the one hand, their 
contribution to the protection of constitutional principles and values. On the other 
hand, the need to maintain the primacy of the democratically elected Commons. There 
will be tensions between these two considerations. Ultimately, how far the Lords can 
pursue LSCG will depend on a political judgement.  
A final remark worth making is that Jeremy Waldron has questioned the 
legitimacy of the appointed House of Lords to perform a constitutional protection 
function.72 Waldron has argued that this would require the Lords to become an elected 
                                                
69 According to section 2(2) of the House of Lords Act 1999, up to 92 hereditary peers may sit 
at the upper chamber. 
70 Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords Westminster - Bicameralism Revived (n 48); Gover 
and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 14). 
71 Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ (n 48). See also, Phillipson, ‘The 
Greatest Quango’ (n 47), 377-79. 
72 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 36), 87. See also Vernon Bogdanor, Politics and the 
Constitution: Essays on British Government (Dartmouth 1996), 246-47. 
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body. Discussing bicameralism, he argued that “constitutional review by an appointed 
chamber would be the worst of both worlds.”73 However, Waldron is not clear enough 
in regards to the nature of the function he is thinking about. I take his remarks to be 
referring to a comprehensive replacement of a system of strong judicial review by a 
sort of abstract, ex ante, “legislative” review by the upper chamber. His scheme seems 
to envisage veto powers, as Waldron’s main concern is with non-democratic 
institutions with powers to block the decision of a democratic and representative 
legislative assembly. Since the Lords lack legal and political standing to challenge the 
Commons’ will, LSCG performed by peers should not be considered “the worst of 
both worlds”.   
Yet, it is also worth mentioning that Waldron’s depiction of a constitutional 
protection function by legislatures is a different kettle of fish from the idea of LSCG, 
as understood in this thesis. This thesis does not discuss LSCG as an alternative 
remedy to constitutional review. Furthermore, I have argued that LSCG could operate 
in a constitutional system with strong, weak or no judicial review powers. Nor is my 
view that LSCG requires that a chamber or parliamentary body (for instance, a select 
committee) performing legislative scrutiny to have veto powers. Moreover, as stated 
at the beginning, this thesis is agnostic to the question about the legitimacy of judicial 
review. I do recognise that the constitutional architecture of a given country has an 
impact on LSCG. For that very reason, after providing a theoretical framework, I have 
moved from the polarised debate about the legitimacy of constitutional review, to an 
attempt to understand the operation of LSCG in the context of a real-world legislature. 
IV. Constitutional committees and Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional 
Grounds 
Discussing the possibility of LSCG at the Lords, I identified constitutional 
committees as one reason that explains peers’ engagement with matters of 
constitutional significance. This section focuses on the DPRRC, the SCC and the 
JCHR. I will argue that these three committees provide the main forum for systematic 
and conscious thinking about the constitution in the UK Parliament. Their task is to 
perform LSCG of government bills, and to publish reports to enlighten debate about 
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issues of constitutional significance raised by government bills on the floor of both 
Houses. In this section, I will briefly introduce these three committees. Then, I argue 
that these constitutional committees are essential components of any assessment of 
LSCG in the UK Parliament. For this very reason, this thesis focuses on the work of 
the DPRCC, the SCC and the JCHR. This section, therefore, performs a key role in 
the context of this thesis. It justifies why subsequent chapters of this thesis, without 
neglecting the consideration of both Houses of Parliament, will focus mainly on the 
contribution of these three constitutional committees to LSCG. 
1. Constitutional thinking at the UK Parliament and the place of 
constitutional committees 
The creation of the three committees mentioned above does not respond to a 
masterplan, but took place individually and with little thought to their constitutional 
relationship. In 1992, the House of Lords created a select committee on delegated 
powers, currently known as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. 
It is a permanent select committee exclusively based at the Lords, whose remit is to 
scrutinise clauses delegating powers and providing degrees of parliamentary oversight 
on the exercise of those powers.74 It emerged out of concerns about the expansion of 
the scope of delegated powers during the 1980s.75 In 2001, the Lords created the Select 
Committee on the Constitution. This is also a Lords’ based permanent committee. Its 
remit is to scrutinise the impact of government bills on the constitution, and to keep 
the constitution under review. It was created following a proposal by the Royal 
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, whose members were concerned 
about the quality of constitutional reform in the UK.76 Finally, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights is the first permanent joint select committee. It entered into operation 
in 2001, on a proposal by the New Labour government, as part of its effort to 
mainstream human rights within Parliament.77 The JCHR performs human rights 
protection functions, including the scrutiny of legislation on human rights grounds. 
Quickly, these three constitutional committees grew in reputation on the basis of their 
                                                
74 The DPRRC also scrutinises Legislative Reform Orders created under the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006. 
75 Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House, (HL 1991-92, 35-I), at para 133. 
76 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future (n 43), at 
para 5.21. 
77 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill 
(Cm 3782, October 1997), at para 3.6. 
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significant contribution to LSCG. Hence, writing in 2006, a leading constitutional 
scholar considered them the “three new pillars of the constitution”.78  
Constitutional committees do not exhaust the avenues for constitutional debate 
in Parliament. Matters of constitutional significance are debated at Prime Minister 
Questions, Ministerial questions, at various select committees,79 at the floor of both 
Houses, Westminster Hall debates, etc. In these debates, individual MPs and peers 
sometimes take issue with matters of constitutional significance.80 There are other 
more focused forums for constitutional debate. For instance, Commons’ select 
committees sometimes have held inquiries on constitutional matters,81 and both 
Houses of Parliament have created ad hoc commissions to address issues of 
constitutional significance.82 Moving on from general discussions about matters of 
constitutional significance to LSCG more specifically, individual MPs and peers may 
contribute to the scrutiny of the constitutional implications of legislation at public bill 
committees, at the committee stage at the Lords, or in debates at the floor of both 
Houses. There have also been instances of ad hoc select committees or joint select 
committees performing either scrutiny83 or pre-legislative scrutiny84 of bills and draft 
bills raising issues of constitutional significance.  
                                                
78 Robert Hazell, ‘Who is the Guardian of Legal Values in the Legislative Process: Parliament 
or the Executive?’ [2004] Public Law 495. 
79 Robert Hazell, ‘Time for a New Convention: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Constitutional Bills 
1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247, 277-78. 
80 For various ways in which individual peers contribute to constitutional protection, see Lucy 
Aitkinson, ‘'Talking to the Guardians'’ The Constitution Unit Research Paper 
<https://consoc.org.uk/publications/constitutional-role-house-lords/> accessed 10 November 2017, 
12ff. 
81 For instance, the Commons’ Procedure Committee has led inquiries into parliamentary 
scrutiny of statutory instruments. See Select Committee on Procedure, Delegated Legislation (HC 1995-
96, 152); Select Committee on Procedure, Delegated Legislation (HC 1999-00, 48); Select Committee 
on Procedure, Delegated Legislation: Proposals for a Sifting Committee (HC 2002-03, 501). 
Furthermore, as noted above, the Commons has a significant number of select committees dealing with 
matters of constitutional significance. See also Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Voting 
by Convicted Prisoners: Summary of Evidence (HC 2010-11, 776); Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Future of the Union, Part One: English Votes for English Laws 
(HC 2015-16, 523). 
82 Consider for instance the Brooke Committee on delegated legislation. See Joint Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, Report (1971-72, HC 475, HL 184); Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation, 
First Report (1972-73, HL 188, HC 407); Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation, Second Report 
(1972-73, HL 204, HC 468). 
83 Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, Constitutional Reform Bill Report (HL 2003-04, 125-
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84 Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, Draft Voting Eligibility 
(Prisoners) Bill Report (2013-14, HL 103, HC 924); Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, 
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A number of instances provide an opportunity for MPs and peers to engage with 
LSCG. However, constitutional committees provide the “main” forum for LSCG at 
the UK Parliament. The next section will justify why this is the case. 
2. The distinctiveness of constitutional committees’ contribution to 
Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds 
There are five features of constitutional committees that show why these 
parliamentary bodies are the main drivers of LSCG in the UK Parliament. This section 
provides an account of these five features. I will make comparisons with other 
parliamentary bodies, as appropriate.  These features are their direct involvement in 
legislative scrutiny, their permanent character, their expertise, their consensual and 
non-partisan operation, and finally, their ability to engage in dialogue with government 
both at political and civil service level. 
Firstly, the three constitutional committees are directly involved in legislative 
scrutiny of government bills. Contrast this with the role of the Commons’ select 
committees. These committees were created to enhance the ability of Parliament to 
hold the government to account for the general state of the country.85 For this reason, 
Commons’ select committees mirror government departments.86 There are three core 
tasks of these committees, namely, looking at policy, expenditure and administration.87 
The point of these committees is to provide a public forum for debate about the 
government’s performance. For these reasons, legislative scrutiny has not been 
included by the Commons’ Liaison Committee among select committees’ core tasks.88 
Hence, most of the Commons’ select committees’ time is spent conducting inquiries 
                                                
Draft Modern Slavery Bill Report (2013-14, HL 166, HC 1019); Joint Committee on the Draft House 
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85 Christopher Johnson, ‘Select Committees: Powers and Functions’ in Alexander Horne and 
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87 Standing Order 152 (1). 
88 Liaison Committee, Annual Report for 2002 (HC 2002-03, 558), at para 13. According to the 
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Papers, White Papers, draft Guidance and Draft Bills). However, no mention whatsoever is made to 
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on relevant policy areas.89 At the Commons, public bill committees perform detailed 
legislative scrutiny of bills.90 By contrast, legislative scrutiny is an integral part of the 
three constitutional committees’ core tasks. The SCC and DPRRC’s terms of reference 
incorporate a legislative scrutiny task explicitly. Although such reference is missing 
in the JCHR’s terms of reference, this committee has considered them to be broad 
enough to include legislative scrutiny among its core tasks.91 There is also evidence 
that legislative scrutiny accounts for a significant part of constitutional committees’ 
work. Figures of the 2011-12 Parliament show that legislative scrutiny accounted for 
more than half of SCC and JCHR’s published reports, and the vast majority of 
DPRRC’s reports.92 This focus on LSCG puts these three constitutional committees in 
a privileged position as forums for constitutional thinking in the UK Parliament. 
Secondly, the permanent character of these committees is highly relevant. 
Constitutional committees are able to work out their own understanding of the British 
constitution, as their scrutiny work develops. Committee members are able to develop 
knowledge and expertise through numerous exercises of legislative scrutiny, pre-
legislative scrutiny and special inquiries. On the other hand, permanence allows 
constitutional committees to develop and maintain an institutional memory about the 
constitution.93 Over the course of time, legislative scrutiny builds a body of reasoning 
and recommendations. For this reason, some authors think that it is possible to extract 
constitutional standards and benchmarks from constitutional committees’ reports.94 
This shows that constitutional committees can rely on their previous work and learn 
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from the past when addressing new issues of constitutional significance.95 Another 
relevant point is that permanence allows constitutional committees to build up a 
reputation and gain recognition.96 Their prestige is the natural consequence of hard 
work and high quality insights contained in clear and accessible reports. These reports 
make highly complex constitutional matters accessible to a wider audience of 
generalist MPs and peers. A final relevant aspect of permanence is the possibility to 
consolidate relationships and networks, not only with ministers, peers and MPs, but 
also with civil servants.  
Thirdly, constitutional committees are resourced to address the complex and 
technical nature of constitutional arguments. In terms of membership, these 
committees usually incorporate well respected people, sometimes with expertise on 
specific issues. For instance, in the 2017-19 parliamentary session, among their 
members there were barristers (Lord Pannick, Lord Faulks, Harriet Harman, Joanna 
Cherry, Lord Trimble, Baroness Ludford), a former solicitor (Fiona Bruce), a former 
advocate general for Scotland (Lord Wallace), academics with backgrounds in politics 
(Lord Beith) and the history of government (Lord Hennessy). Leading former 
members of the SCC, for instance, have included Lord Norton, professor of British 
Politics, and Lord Judge, former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lords 
Woolf and Jauncey, retired senior judges, Lord Goldsmith, former Attorney-General, 
Lords Morris and Lyell, former Law Officers, Lord Irvine, former Lord Chancellor, 
among others.97 On the other hand, these committees benefit from the assistance of 
learned academic legal advisors and in House clerks. They provide the necessary 
technical support to assists members’ consideration of bills. The SCC, for instance, 
currently has as legal advisors two leading professors of constitutional theory, namely 
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Jeff King and Stephen Tierney. In the past, professors Mark Elliott, Richard Rawlings 
and Adam Tomkins, Andrew Le Sueur and Maurice Sunskin have served as legal 
advisors to the SCC.98 The JCHR has had as legal advisors professor David Feldman 
and Murray Hunt. By contrast, the DPRRC has relied on parliamentary clerks and 
lawyers to assist their scrutiny work. In addition, constitutional committees usually 
call for evidence from the wider public. Hence, constitutional experts and other 
stakeholders can provide additional insights to enlighten constitutional committees’ 
assessment. For these reasons, constitutional committees are well equipped to 
understand and address the constitutional issues raised by government’s legislation. 
Fourthly, constitutional committees operate in a relatively non-partisan fashion. 
I have already referred to a special ethos at the Lords. Members from the SCC and the 
DPRRC are exclusively drawn from the Lords. This means that they are relatively 
isolated from partisan politics and more independent from government.99 The JCHR 
is equally benefited by the fact that half of its membership comes from the Lords. The 
result is that no party has overall control of the JCHR. In addition, its chair is not drawn 
from the governing party.100 Consequently, as in the case of the DPRRC and the SCC, 
no party has overall control of the JCHR. This feature fosters cross-party consensus 
building. Constitutional committees avoid divisions in their reports. This consensual 
and non-partisan approach allows constitutional committees’ reports to appeal to a 
wider audience. 
Finally, constitutional committees engage in dialogue with ministers and civil 
servants. They send letters to ministers, require information and question both 
ministers and civil servants on matters of constitutional significance. On the other 
hand, it is government’s practice to respond to constitutional committee’s reports.101 
Another relevant point is that constitutional committees have been able to open up 
informal channels of communication with legal advisors and civil servants at 
government departments. This dialogue, which draws on networks mentioned above, 
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operates behind the scenes. As will be argued in Chapter Six, these networks are 
essential to the operation of constitutional committees.  
In sum, these five features show that LSCG finds its natural place in 
constitutional committees. These committees perform a fundamental role in securing 
the consideration of the constitutional implications of government bills at Parliament. 
It is not possible to understand LSCG in the UK without addressing the role that these 
committees perform. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the possibility of LSCG in the UK Parliament. It looked 
at both Houses of Parliament to assess the challenges that LSCG faces. I have argued 
that LSCG has found little room at the Commons. The reasons are twofold. On the one 
hand, MPs struggle to address the technical and complex nature of constitutional 
arguments, and lack the time, energy and resources to address this gap in knowledge. 
On the other hand, the adversarial logic of confrontation between the two main 
political forces at the Commons has a pervasive effect on parliamentary debates. The 
government has been traditionally in control of the lower chamber by exerting its 
parliamentary majority. The opposition, on the other hand, has focused on making 
policy proposals, as they will be tested in next general elections. This has left little 
room for constitutional arguments at the Commons. 
However, I have noted some signs of change at the Commons. Firstly, there is 
pressure on the traditional configuration of political forces at the Commons, as single 
majority governments are in slow retreat. This makes for a more complex relationship 
between government and the Commons, than the mere unilateral control of 
government through its parliamentary majority. It also suggests that Parliament may 
become more assertive and may be willing to defy an unhappy coalition or weak 
minority government. Secondly, a decline in party voting cohesion opens new avenues 
for LSCG, also in the form of government self-restraint when there are prospects of 
backbench rebellions. 
Nevertheless, the government has been able to develop other means to control 
the legislative process and undermine legislative scrutiny, including LSCG. These 
include asymmetries of information, the ability to keep control of the legislative 
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agenda and to set the amount of time that Parliament will spend on one or more stages 
of a bill’s passage, and the employment of skeleton bills and broad clauses delegating 
powers on matters of principle and issues of policy. All of these factors undermine the 
ability of MPs to conduct proper LSCG. 
These remarks drew attention to broader normative questions about the relative 
constitutional weight of the Commons’ legislative scrutiny function. I argued that 
constitutional scholars have traditionally favoured the Commons elective function, as 
well as its informing, educational and expressive functions over its role in the 
legislative process. I also pointed out that although partisanship obstructs the ability 
of the Commons to perform LSCG, party politics is essential for the lower chamber to 
perform its elective, informative and educational functions. Hence, the possibility of 
LSCG at the Commons is undermined by other relevant constitutional functions that 
outweigh the legislative scrutiny function in significance. A second normative 
question is that LSCG is compatible with one account of British parliamentary 
democracy which puts emphasis on the position of the Commons as a sovereign, 
representative and democratic institution. This view argues that government is 
subordinated to Parliament, and that MPs should act as representatives of the people 
and pursue the common good rather than political interests as members of a party. It 
emphasises the deliberative nature of the Commons. This view sits comfortably 
against the idea of LSCG. However, there is an alternative account of British 
parliamentary democracy, which understands parliamentary elections as a competition 
between political parties for government. The winning party should be allowed to get 
its business done through the Commons, because government’s policies were part of 
a manifesto that was endorsed by the electorate. This view emphasises party loyalty 
and the need to protect the principle of efficient government. Under this alternative 
view, LSCG finds little room. LSCG needs a deliberative conception of democracy. 
This analysis of the possibility of LSCG at the Commons raised more questions 
than answers offered. By contrast, at the Lords LSCG finds its natural place. The Lords 
operate as a forum for principled and reasoned debate, because of its relative isolation 
from partisan politics, and independence from the executive. In addition, there is less 
pressure over their parliamentary time, which means that the Lords spend about half 
of their time in legislative scrutiny. Another point is that the Lords can draw from the 
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expertise of some of its members, and is assisted by three constitutional committees 
which scrutinise the constitutional implications of legislation. These considerations 
provide the ideal environment for LSCG to flourish. On the other hand, the Lords 
understand their role as that of being a revising chamber that complements the work 
of the Commons in those areas where time is wanting. The Lords can assess the 
constitutional implications of legislation and propose amendments to address 
constitutional concerns. This seeks to prompt second thoughts at the Commons. The 
system expects these two chambers to work together in the collaborative enterprise of 
protecting constitutional fundamentals. The Lords can flag the issues, and the 
Commons take their suggestions forward. There may be cases where the government 
proposes amendments of its own, especially if it fears backbench rebellions. 
However, there may be cases where neither the Commons, nor government are 
willing to address these constitutional concerns. The Lords cannot take its LSCG’s 
function too far. It must exercise political judgement and respect the principles of the 
primacy of the Commons and of efficient government. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the difficult position of the Lords as an appointed chamber in the 
context of contemporary British democracy. Although there are cracks on the 
institutional arrangements that secure the primacy of the Commons, the Lords must 
exercise self-restraint, even if significant constitutional concerns are at stake. 
Finally, this chapter argued that three constitutional committees, namely the 
DPRRC, the SCC and the JCHR, are the main forums for constitutional thinking in the 
UK Parliament. They perform an essential role in LSCG, to the point that it is 
inescapable to discuss this sort of legislative scrutiny without referring to the 
contribution of constitutional committees. I introduced these three committees and I 
argue that they feed constitutional deliberation at both Houses of Parliament by 
providing clear and accessible analysis of the constitutional implications of 
government’s bills. To justify that these committees represent the main forums of 
constitutional thinking at the UK Parliament, I identified the following five distinctive 
features: their direct involvement in legislative scrutiny, their permanent character, 
their expertise, their consensual and non-partisan operation, and finally, their ability 
to engage in dialogue with government both at political and civil service level. The 
role of constitutional committees is to process the complex and technical nature of 
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constitutional arguments, and provide a high quality, but digestible analysis of the 
constitutional implications of legislation.  
This chapter has shown that there is potential for LSCG to take place in various 
forums. However, the possibility of LSCG at the UK Parliament is dependent, to a 
significant extent, on the contribution of constitutional committees, and the chances of 
the Lords taking their reasoning and recommendations forward. The Commons, 
unfortunately, has a great deal of other matters to attend.
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS UNDER THE UK CONSTITUTION 
I. Introduction 
LSCG is shaped by the constitutional arrangements in which it is set to operate. 
This chapter discusses what it means to perform an assessment of the constitutional 
implications of legislation in the UK context, which lacks an entrenched and written 
constitution, and does not provide courts with strong constitutional review powers. For 
these purposes, I discuss in depth certain features of the British constitution and how 
they shape LSCG in this jurisdiction. I also look at different theoretical accounts of 
the British constitution, including theories about the nature of Parliament’s 
theoretically supreme legislative powers. The main objective of this chapter, therefore, 
is to provide an account of how Parliament –and constitutional committees– may 
scrutinise the constitutional implications of legislation in the context of the UK 
constitution, and to come back to the theoretical conceptions of LSCG developed in 
Chapter One and explore its appropriateness in this jurisdiction. Since this is a chapter 
about how the substance of the constitution has an impact on LSCG conception, I will 
mainly discuss the suitability of the legalistic conception in this jurisdiction. The 
conception of constitutional deliberation has no clear normative theory about the 
Constitution, and therefore its merits will be mainly tested on the ground, considering 
empirical evidence in Chapter Six.  
The claims of this chapter are as follows: Firstly, the unsettled and contested 
nature of the UK’s unwritten constitutional arrangements means that there is no clear 
answer to the normative question concerning which conception of LSCG should be 
preferred. I argue that the answer to this question depends on broader questions about 
the place of theories of parliamentary democracy and the separation of powers in the 
UK constitution, among others. Answering these questions goes beyond the scope of 
this work, and beyond the scope of a theory of LSCG. As far as this thesis is concerned, 
the point is that those exercising LSCG may face challenging questions when 
performing constitutional assessments. I argue that constitutional committees are 
likely to struggle when dealing with confronting theoretical views about the 
constitution, constitutional principles of dubious pedigree and unclear normative 
content. 
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Secondly, I claim that the legalistic conception of LSCG introduced in Chapter 
One above may apply smoothly to those modernized dimensions of the constitution. 
For instance, it can be employed as a framework to assess the human rights 
implications of legislation. By contrast, in those more political and ever evolving 
aspects which remain attached to the traditional constitution, there are questions about 
the legalistic conception’s fit to UK constitutional arrangements. I note that hard 
legalism does not provide a satisfactory framework. In contrast, I claim that in those 
flexible and ever changing areas of the constitution, there is room for more nuanced 
soft legalistic conceptions of LSCG. I exemplify the challenges that the traditional 
constitution raises for LSCG in this jurisdiction by discussing the issue of delegated 
powers. I show that UK constitutional scholars have advocated for this approach to 
legalism. They have argued that constitutional committees have developed broad and 
flexible constitutional standards with core normative principle, but sensible to the 
circumstances of the case, an regularly employ them as benchmarks to assess 
legislation.  
Finally, I discuss the relationship between LSCG and UK style 
constitutionalism. I claim that LSCG in the UK Parliament requires seriously 
considering the existence of “non-legal” limits on Parliament’s theoretically supreme 
legislative powers.1 The chapter discusses two alternative accounts about the nature of 
these “non-legal” limits. Ultimately, these different accounts are an expression of 
different views about the theoretical underpinnings of the constitution. Even though a 
theory of LSCG in the UK cannot, on its own, arbitrate between these confronting 
views, there are implications for the legislative scrutiny work conducted by 
constitutional committees. I therefore propose two principles of good practice for 
constitutional committees, which seek to address the inherent controversies that 
constitutional assessments raise in the UK. 
                                                
1 In this chapter, when I refer to the doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty”, in most instances, 
I will refer to it as “Parliament’s legislative supreme powers”. 
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II. The unsettled constitution and the impossibility to adopt a unitary 
conception of Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds 
1. The basic problem 
The first challenge for LSCG is that the UK lacks a written constitution. 
Consequently, questions that in other countries may be resolved by interpreting clauses 
contained in an entrenched constitutional document, in the UK remain deeply 
contested. The lack of a canonical and codified constitutional text, and of a bespoke 
procedure for constitutional change, means that there is no authoritative statement that 
identifies the principles, values, conventions, political understandings, doctrines and 
other standards that belong to the constitution, and that articulates their content. Efforts 
have been made to address this challenge. One device is the House of Commons’ long-
standing convention to subject bills of “first class constitutional significance” to a 
committee of the whole House. However, the operation of this convention is flawed 
because it is difficult to identify what counts as constitutional in the first place.2 A 
second device is the concept of “constitutional statutes,” created by the common law 
as an interpretative tool to solve clashes between an older and a newer Act of 
Parliament in cases where the former is of constitutional significance, and the later just 
an ordinary statute.3 Although this concept –which not only includes statutes, but also 
other “instruments”–, may be helpful, there is still dispute about what this concept 
includes. Constitutional statutes are still a work in progress.4  
This throws into sharp relief the most obvious challenge raised by the unwritten 
constitution, namely, whether a given standard has sufficient constitutional pedigree. 
A second challenge flows from this. Even if it is possible to identify a set of principles, 
values, conventions, political practices, doctrines and other standards with 
constitutional pedigree, their lack of entrenchment means that these standards can be 
changed by statute. Hence, its content remains in constant flux. It could even be argued 
                                                
2 Robert Hazell, ‘Time for a New Convention: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Constitutional Bills 
1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247, 248; Matthew V. Flinders, Democratic Drift Majoritarian 
Modification and Democratic Anomie in the United Kingdom (Oxford University Press 2010), 218ff; 
Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘'Constitution' as a Statutory Term’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 589, 608. 
3 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) [per Laws LJ]; R (on the 
application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014] 
UKSC 3 [per Lord Reed]. For discussion, see David Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of 
"Constitutional" Legislation’ [2013] Law Quarterly Review 343; Paul Craig, ‘Constitutionalising 
Constitutional Law: HS2’ [2014] Public Law 373. 
4 Khaitan, ‘Constitution’ (n 2), 604ff. 
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that when Parliament legislates in a way that seems incompatible with these standards, 
rather than legislating in breach of them, it is legislating in a way that changes their 
meaning. This introduces significant uncertainty about their content. Another factor 
that raises challenges is that the content of some of these standards remains 
unarticulated. In sum, operating under the UK constitution raises difficult questions of 
pedigree. In addition, inherent disputes arise about the meaning, and normative 
consequences –if any– of its constitutional standards. 
This first challenge throws into sharp relief the difficulties of making sense of 
LSCG in the UK context. Yet, it only represents the starting point. In what follows, I 
will expand on two key features that raise additional difficulties for working out the 
meaning of the constitution. 
2. Two challenging features of the UK constitution 
There are two features of the British constitution that I think are worth 
discussing, for their implications for LSCG. The first is that the constitution is in 
transition.5 Although it remains in fundamental aspects a traditional constitution, since 
the 1970s it has been the object of significant changes inspired by modernising 
principles and values. The result is a mixed constitution whose true nature is 
increasingly difficult to identify. Traditional and modern components have an uneasy 
coexistence, and there are significant differences between them in terms of 
methodology and sources. The second feature is that the UK constitution is not settled 
in terms of its constitutional philosophy. Different, and even rival, theoretical accounts 
of the constitution have been able to coexist. These theoretical debates have been 
fostered by current developments in terms of constitutional reform. These two features 
introduce an additional layer of complexity for anyone trying to work out the contents 
of the constitution, and assess the constitutional implications of legislation. In what 
follows, I will provide a brief account of these two components of the constitution, 
with a view to underscore the challenges that working out the meaning of the 
constitution raises for its operators.   
I will start with the first feature. The traditional constitution does not recognise 
a single constitutive moment in which a foundational text is adopted. Instead, it is 
                                                
5 Here, I follow Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution (Oxford University Press 2013) and 
Neil Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529, who distinguish between the 
“settled constitution” (the old) and the “unsettled constitution” (the new). 
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based on political practices, understandings and conventions. This results in a flexible 
and ever changing constitutional framework. Change takes place incrementally, at a 
slow pace, as political understandings, circumstances and practices evolve.6 These key 
features were given juristic foundation in the late 19th century by Albert Venn Dicey.7  
He identified two main tenets of the constitution, namely the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the Rule of Law. These tenets served a key role. They provided unity 
and an essential character to the constitution,8 despite being an unwritten and ever 
evolving settlement. Change occurs because Parliament is free to enact any law 
whatsoever, without recognising any “legal” limits on its law-making authority. 
Furthermore, there is change because political understandings and conventions mutate, 
and because the Rule of Law is developed through the common law method. 
Nevertheless, Dicey’s two tenets ensured continuity, despite this dynamic of change.  
Constitutional moments and abrupt transformative change are at odds with the 
traditional constitution. As Neil Walker notes, “reform in the evolutionary constitution 
is never holistic, but gradual, piecemeal and typically unsystematic”.9 Reform neither 
seeks to challenge the very foundations of the constitutional order,10 nor is it inspired 
by first abstract rationalistic principles.11 Instead, the traditional constitution is 
pragmatic in its approach, and evolves on a case by case basis, adopting a problem-
solving methodology. In this sense, the traditional constitution draws from experience 
and empiricism.  
Although historically praised for its flexibility, the UK’s traditional 
constitutional arrangements came under increasing pressure, as a sense of economic 
decay and decline of political virtues became apparent in the 1970s.12 Since then, a 
process of constitutional modernisation has taken place, driven both by membership 
                                                
6 Note that the principles, values, conventions and other standards of the constitution also evolve 
when they are developed by legislation and the courts. 
7 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edn, 
LibertyClassics 1915). 
8 Martin Loughlin, ‘The British Constitution: Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents’ 
(2018) 16 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 1, 2-3. 
9 Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 5), 534. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Loughlin, The British Constitution (n 5), 18ff. 
12 Ibid, 39ff.  Along similar lines, see Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (Oxford 
University Press 2003), 14 ff. 
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of the European Union (“EU”),13 a programme of constitutional reform, the 
codification of political understandings and practices in soft law documents, and the 
practice of constitutional referendums.14 Membership of the EU came with acceptance 
of the principle of primacy of EU law,15 which required the judiciary to develop 
interpretative tools to qualify certain doctrines derived from “parliamentary 
sovereignty”.16 Membership of the EU, at least while it continues, effectively created 
a different source of power and law-making, beyond the control of Parliament, and 
hierarchically superior to Acts of Parliament (principle of primacy of EU law).  
Even though this modernising reform constitutes a significant change of 
traditional understandings of the constitution, it still retains certain features of UK-
style constitutional reform. These modernising attempts lack an overarching principle 
which gives coherence to the constitutional reform programme.17 Instead, they have 
been piecemeal and pursued with a great deal of pragmatism.18 Although inspired by 
modernising principles, such as human rights, global constitutionalism, weak forms of 
constitutional review, decentralisation, and so on, these modernising reforms have 
been ambiguous. They have also sought to retain the central tenets of the traditional 
constitution. Take for instance some of the most significant reforms introduced by the 
first wave of the New Labour government’s programme. The Human Rights Act 1998 
is inspired by the idea of universal moral values; the creation of the UK Supreme Court 
on the principle of separation of powers; Devolution sought to recognise the principle 
                                                
13 Loughlin, ‘The British Constitution: Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents’ (n 8). Cf 
Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (n 12), 7ff, who argues that the modernisation process started 
on the mid-1980s. 
14 Loughlin, The British Constitution (n 5). 
15 Debate over the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972 suggests that MPs were 
aware of the constitutional implications of membership to the then European Economic Community 
(Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics (Oxford University Press 
2001), Ch5, especially 92ff). 
16 See cases and discussion referred above in footnote 2. 
17 Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 5), 536. For a critique of New Labour’s 
constitutional reform programme in this respect, see Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (n 12), 3; 
Flinders, Democratic Drift (n 2), 234. For a more recent critique of constitutional reform developments 
post New Labour’s governments, see Select Committee on the Constitution, English Votes for English 
Laws (HL 2016-17, 61), at para 70. 
18 Consider for instance the Human Rights Act 1998. Rather than triggering debate about the sort 
of rights British people should enjoy, New Labour avoided potentially endless disputes and political 
controversy about the catalogue of rights by domesticating Convention rights. 
Likewise, by removing most of the hereditary peers from the House of Lords, New Labour 
achieved an upper chamber no longer dominated by a Conservative majority. And Devolution, as Dawn 
Oliver notes, is partly a “response to loss of electoral support for Labour in Scotland to the Scottish 
National Party” (Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (n 12), 4). 
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of plurinationalism by distributing power to the constituent nations of the Union; and 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was inspired by the principles of transparency 
and accountability. Yet, none of these measures sought to challenge the legislative 
supremacy of the UK Parliament.  
Interestingly, in the context of these reforms, Parliament has issued declarations 
that seem to undermine orthodox understandings of the UK Parliament’s legislative 
supremacy. Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that the Act 
“does not adversely affect the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law”. 
Section 1 of the Scotland Act 2016 declares the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish 
Government as a permanent part of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, expresses a 
commitment by the UK’s government and Parliament to the permanence of these 
institutions, and provides that they can only be abolished by an Act of Parliament 
following a referendum held in Scotland. Section 1 of the Wales Act 2017 makes 
similar provision for the Welsh government and national assembly. In addition, section 
2 to the Scotland Act 2016 put the Sewel convention on a statutory footing, by 
‘recognising’ it. The legal status of these declarations remains a matter of 
controversy.19  
Another relevant feature of modernising constitutional reform, is that the pace 
of change has increased dramatically. As the editors of “The Changing Constitution” 
noted in the book’s 8th edition, “key elements of the British constitution have 
undergone radical transformation”, and “the pace of change seems to be ever-
quickening”.20 In the most recent 9th edition of that book, although the editors focus 
their analysis on the destabilizing effect of the Brexit process,21 they point out that the 
UK constitution “is arguably changing at a faster rate than ever.”22 Although Tony 
Blair’s first New Labour government introduced constitutional reform on a range of 
                                                
19 Defending the orthodoxy, see Richard Ekins, ‘Legislative Freedom in the United Kingdom’ 
(2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 582. Cf Martin Loughlin and Stephen Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth of 
Sovereignty’ (2019) 81 Modern Law Review 989. On the legal enforceability of codified constitutional 
conventions, see R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, at 
paras [136]-[151].   
20 Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm O'Cinneide, ‘Editors' Introduction’ in Jeffrey Jowell, 
Dawn Oliver and Colm O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8th edn, Oxford University Press 
2015), 2-3. 
21 Which, in itself, is a source of major change. 
22 Jeffrey Jowell and Colm O'Cinneide, ‘Preface to the Ninth Edition’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Colm 
O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019), viii. 
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subject matters, this was just a first wave. Then, Gordon Brown’s government,23 the 
Coalition government24 and two successive Conservative governments,25 all 
incorporated modernising constitutional reform as part of their manifesto 
commitments and enacted some of their promises. For instance, there has been further 
devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales, reforms on local government, on terms 
for the election of a new Parliament, on political parties, and on procedures for the 
approval of international treaties, among others.  
Constitutional change not only takes place through legislation. There has been a 
trend towards the codification of political practices and understandings in 
administrative guidelines and manuals.26 This juridification of political practices has 
been a response to a series of scandals that reflected a decay in standards of conduct 
in public life.27 There was a sense that politicians could no longer be trusted as 
guardians of constitutional conventions, and codification was a means to reassert their 
existence. A final trend worth mentioning for the purposes of this chapter are 
constitutional referendums. They have been employed in matters as disparate as 
devolution, electoral system reform, independence of Scotland, transfer of new powers 
to EU institutions, and membership of the EU. This trend represents a shift from a 
paradigm of representative democracy to one of popular sovereignty, because it 
transfers political powers from the representative assembly to citizens. It is notable 
that Parliament enacted the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2016, 
despite the referendum being merely advisory and a significant majority of MPs 
supported remaining in the EU. This suggests that by referring fundamental political 
decisions to the people, Parliament is recognising the need to resort to alternative 
sources of legitimacy in the case of constitutional decisions of major relevance.28 Once 
                                                
23 For an account of Gordon Brown’s constitutional agenda, see Stephen Tierney, ‘A New Wave 
of Constitutional Reform for the UK?’ (2009) 15 European Public Law 289. 
24 Consider for instance the failed reform of membership to the House of Lords, the Fixed-Term 
Parliaments Act 2011, the referendum on Scotland’s Independence, and the enactment of the Scotland 
Act 2016. 
25 Consider for instance David Cameron’s referendum on UK’s membership to the European 
Union, and its manifesto commitment to scrap the Human Rights Act.  
26 Take for instance the Cabinet Manual, the Ministerial Code, the Guide for Making Legislation 
and the Civil Service Code. 
27 Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (n 12), 15-8. 
28 A relevant development that is not addressed here is a more assertive judiciary, with a relevant 
role by the European Court of Justice –Brexit putting a question mark over its jurisdiction–, the 
European Court of Human Rights, and domestic courts developing the doctrine of common law 
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the people’s will is known, Parliament ends up effectively constrained by the result of 
the referendum. 
These developments sit uncomfortably against the unitary principles of the UK 
constitution, namely the orthodox doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty” and the rule 
of law. It remains true that, from a legal point of view, Parliament continues to be able 
to centralise powers, legislate contrary to human rights and to the popular will as 
expressed in a referendum, etc.29 It is also true that Parliament has recently decided to 
repeal the European Communities Act 1972 by means of section 1 of the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. However, the constitutional developments of the last 
fifty years suggest a more complex and multi-layered constitution than that depicted 
by Dicey. Since the 1970s, the constitution has moved towards recognising different 
sources of authority such as the EU, devolved governments, the popular will and the 
judiciary. These developments are difficult to reconcile with the centralisation of 
unlimited political power at Westminster that is promoted by the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Recently, Martin Loughlin and Stephen Tierney have 
argued that parliamentary sovereignty is a shibboleth. In their view, the political 
conditions within the British state are such that Westminster Parliament is no longer 
able to express the “voice of the political nation assembled”.30 The point here is that 
the orthodox understanding of parliamentary sovereignty is under increasing pressure. 
Whether the constitution has definitively moved away from the traditional to now 
embrace modernity will remain a matter of controversy.31 As far as this chapter is 
concerned, the key issue is that there are two driving forces in the British constitution: 
tradition and modernisation. They overlap and have an uneasy coexistence, because 
they operate with different logics. This raises a major challenge for anyone trying to 
navigate the constitutional framework.  
The second feature that raises significant difficulties to perform LSCG in this 
jurisdiction is that UK’s constitutional arrangements have “worked against a settled 
                                                
constitutionalism. These developments raise additional doubts about the omnipotence of the legal 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
29 Ekins, ‘Legislative Freedom’ (n 19). 
30 Loughlin and Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth’ (n 19). 
31 Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing 2009). Cf Loughlin, The 
British Constitution (n 5); Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 5). 
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constitution in terms of substantive philosophy and principles of government.”32 This 
feature has provided enough room for the rise of different –even rival– theoretical 
accounts of the British constitution.33 A theoretical turn in public law scholarship has 
taken place since the 1980s. These different schools of thought have embraced 
different theoretical underpinnings and methodologies. The consequence has been 
contested views about the political philosophy of the UK constitution, thereby 
introducing an additional layer. Providing an account of these views goes beyond the 
limits of this work. A couple of examples may illustrate the point. Take for instance 
those who think that abstract notions of justice and liberty give coherence and unity to 
the British constitution. This view challenges orthodox understandings about 
parliamentary sovereignty upon which the traditional constitution is based.34 Slowly, 
since the 1990s, ideas of “common law constitutionalism” and a thick rights-based 
conception of the Rule of Law suggest that these theoretical developments have 
resonated among the judiciary.35 Confront this with a second example. As a reaction 
to developments in terms of the “legal” constitution, some scholars reacted reinstating 
the orthodox view of “parliamentary sovereignty”. However, they took their defence 
a step further. Rather than a plain defence of the traditional constitution, they grounded 
their arguments on modern normative constitutional ideas.36 The doctrine of 
“parliamentary sovereignty”, which emerged as a consequence of historical struggles 
that positioned Parliament as the hegemonic political power in Britain, was on this 
account reinterpreted on civic republican grounds.  
                                                
32 Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 5), 533. 
33 Distinctions between schools of thought in UK public law are quite common. Consider for 
instance polarities such as normativism and functionalism (Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political 
Theory (Clarendon Press 1992)); and political and legal constitutionalism (Tom Hickman, ‘In Defense 
of the Legal Constitution’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 981; Adam Tomkins, ‘What's 
Left of the Political Constitution?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2275; Martin Loughlin, ‘The 
Political Constitution Revisited’ (2019) 30 King's Law Journal 5). For an assessment, see Samuel 
Tschorne, ‘The Theoretical Turn in British Public Law Scholarship’ (DPhil thesis, London School of 
Economics 2016); Robert Brett Taylor, ‘The Contested Constitution: An Analysis of the Competing 
Models of British Constitutionalism’ [2018] Public Law 500. 
34 T. R. S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 5 and 9. Cf J. A. G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern 
Law Review 1, who argued that thinking about the constitution requires a description of the political 
conditions that prevailed at a given time, with a clear focus on the realities of public institutions, rather 
than on an exercise of theorising from highly abstract first principles. 
35 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Rule of Law’ (2018) 89 The Political Quarterly 659. 
36 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005); Richard Bellamy, 
Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
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These different views have been able to coexist, among other reasons, because 
their theoretical consequences have not been tested.37 Whatever its merits are,38 the 
point, as far as this chapter is concerned, is that they introduce an additional layer of 
complexity for those operating within the British constitutional framework. It is not 
possible to draw sharp distinctions between descriptive and normative views about the 
British constitution, simply because those distinctions are dependent on broader 
theoretical views about it. 
3. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, this account of two significant features of the British constitution 
throws into sharp relief the magnitude of the challenge of assessing the constitutional 
implications of legislation. It is not merely due to the lack of a written constitution, 
raising difficult questions about pedigree and content. It is also on account of two 
additional features. Firstly, there are two overlapping layers of the constitution, each 
operating with different logics. On the one hand, we have the traditional constitution 
based on two tenets, namely parliamentary sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Always 
adapting to changing political circumstances, its standards evolve at a slow and 
incremental pace, driven by experience and pragmatism. On the other hand, it is a 
modern and multi-layered constitution, which decentralises political powers from the 
UK Parliament to other sources of authority, and introduces constitutional reform 
partly inspired in the recognition of first abstract principles and values. Secondly, 
additional complexity flows from different and even competing theoretical accounts 
of the British constitution. The constitutional framework provides enough room for 
these different accounts to coexist. The consequence is a complex constitutional 
landscape that Parliament, and certainly constitutional committees, will struggle to 
navigate. However, more fundamentally, it shows that any normative argument about 
which conception should be preferred depends upon broader questions related to the 
nature of the British constitution. LSCG cannot provide a definitive answer to those 
                                                
37 Consider for instance dictum in Jackson v Her Majesty's Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, 
at paras [104]-[107] (per Lord Hope). 
38 Against this understanding of British constitutionalism in terms of polarities, see Aileen 
Kavanagh, ‘British Constitutionalism Beyond Polarities’ 
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/4nq0yb4ya3fhp3o/AK%20British%20Constitutionalism%20Beyond%2
0Polarities%20FINAL%20DRAFT%20Oct%202016.pdf?dl=0> accessed 27 June 2018; Taylor, ‘The 
Contested Constitution’ (n 33), 517ff. 
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questions. They remain contested and are beyond the extent of this work. As far as a 
theory of LSCG in the UK constitution is concerned, the point is to recognise these 
problems, and to note that exercises of LSCG may need to address some of these 
questions. In sum, a theory of LSCG must incorporate these problems into the analysis, 
and provide the theoretical tools to accommodate different accounts of the British 
constitution.  
III. Is the legalistic conception a partial fit? 
The unique characteristics of the British constitution discussed in section II 
above suggest that legalistic conceptions of LSCG may not fit, or may fit only partially 
in this jurisdiction. I will claim that it is possible to make a case for the application of 
the hard legalistic conception to assess the human rights implications of bills. By 
contrast, in other discrete areas where there is deep contestation, lack of constitutional 
standards with sufficient pedigree and/or unarticulated normative content, this 
conception may only fit imperfectly. I will also show that in those areas it is possible 
to employ a soft legalistic conception, and will briefly show how it shall operate by 
relying on the idea of “constitutional standards”, as developed by Dawn Oliver, Robert 
Hazell and Jack Simson Caird. Before developing the argument, it is important to 
clarify that the point of this section is not to make a normative argument about which 
conception should be preferred in the UK. Instead, this section aims at further 
advancing how LSCG may look like under the UK constitution, and what are the 
challenges that different conceptions face in this jurisdiction. 
I will illustrate the point that a legalistic conception of LSCG fits the activity of 
assessing the human rights implications of legislation by discussing David Feldman’s 
conception of legislative scrutiny.39 Feldman has advocated a model of scrutiny that 
closely resembles the legalistic conception developed in Chapter One. Feldman claims 
that legislative scrutiny should be a “principled exercise” based on four standards. 
These standards are meant to be “independent”, thus allowing scrutiny to be isolated 
–at least in part– from short-term political calculations. This is a rather unorthodox 
view about legislative scrutiny that moves away from a focus on political 
                                                
39 David Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ [2002] Public Law 
323, 328-30, 332. 
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considerations or policy objectives.40 Instead, the point of legislative scrutiny is to 
ensure that bills meet a series of four standards. Three of Feldman’s standards are legal 
standards, namely, standards arising from constitutional law; deriving from a formal 
conception of the rule of law; and from human rights and fundamental freedoms.41 Not 
surprisingly, Feldman puts special emphasis on the role of Convention rights as “a 
crude litmus test for the appropriateness of legislation”. In his view, the will of 
Parliament, as expressed in sections 19 and 4 HRA, is that Convention rights are 
employed as standards to assess the moral and legal appropriateness of legislation.  
Feldman is right to think that Convention rights provide a fertile terrain for a 
legalistic conception of LSCG. Convention rights provide a set of abstract moral 
values against which to scrutinise legislation. The HRA domesticated these rights, thus 
conferring legal authority and solving questions about the constitutional pedigree of 
these moral values. When addressing difficult questions about the normative content 
of these values, Parliament can rely on settled interpretations and case law both by the 
ECtHR and domestic courts. In addition, there are sophisticated legal techniques that 
may assist Parliament, such as proportionality analysis and constitutional 
interpretation, and numerous contributions by the academic literature. Parliament can 
rely on these materials and legal reasoning techniques to conduct its own assessments. 
If Parliament follows this route, legislative scrutiny on human rights grounds would 
mirror the doctrines and reasoning techniques employed by courts performing human 
rights adjudication. As noted in Chapter One, these assessments may correspond to a 
hard or a soft strand of legalism, depending on how close the analysis follows courts’ 
judgments and on whether political branches try to second-guess the likely outcome 
of these judgments where there is no case law. I am not making a normative argument 
that Parliament and constitutional committees should adopt either of the two strands 
of this conception or some variation of it.42 The point is that these considerations 
                                                
40 On Feldman’s view, the scrutiny of policy objectives is not an exercise in legislative scrutiny. 
Instead, it is essentially a political matter. See ibid, 337. 
41 Feldman’s fourth standard “is concerned with the fitness of the legislation for its declared 
purpose.” See ibid, 329. 
42 Note for instance that Feldman incorporates a few elements of constitutional deliberation in 
his model (ibid, 333). Furthermore, in Chapter Five, I will argue that the JCHR faces contradictory 
pressures to secure Parliament’s compliance with Convention rights, and to develop Parliament’s own 
voice on human rights matters. Responding to these contradictory pressures requires adopting different 
conceptions of LSCG. 
 91 
illustrate that legislative scrutiny on human rights grounds may easily accommodate a 
legalistic conception. 
By contrast, there are other dimensions of the constitution that may not easily 
accommodate to a legalistic conception. Consider, for instance, the case of delegated 
powers. This is a matter that has been in constant evolution for more than a hundred 
years.43 Since the 1850s, the scope of delegated powers has grown dramatically. The 
increasing complexity of society and the emergence of the Welfare state underscored 
Parliament’s inability to undertake many of the challenges posed by modernist social 
reform. Later, since the 1980s, the continued use of delegated powers as a privatization 
and de-regulation tool, demonstrated its plasticity as a law-making technique. 
Delegated powers continued to feature prominently, this time as a tool to roll back the 
state. The history of delegated powers has been one of constant evolution. However, 
if one thing has been constant, it is the quantitative and qualitative growth of delegated 
powers. This has fundamentally changed the balance of law-making powers between 
Parliament and the government in favour of the latter. This evolution is highlighted by 
contrasting the views about delegated powers held at the beginning and the end of the 
20th century. In 1932, the Committee on Ministers’ Powers argued that delegation was 
mainly confined to matters of detail and technicalities.44 By contrast, since the 1980s, 
public lawyers have argued that it has become a matter of routine for legislation to 
delegate powers on matters of principle and issues of policy,45 including wide-ranging 
powers to change primary legislation (Henry VIII clauses).46 As Adam Tucker notes, 
the UK has reached a point in which "delegated legislation is the dominant rule-making 
technique in the contemporary constitution across most areas of national life and we 
                                                
43 Michael Taggart, ‘From 'Parliamentary Powers' to Privatization: The Chequered History of 
Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 575. 
44 Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report (Cmd 4060, 1932), 31ff, argued that cases currently 
raising significant constitutional concerns, such as overly broad and not clearly defined powers, 
delegation on matters of principle and taxation, Henry VIII powers and ouster clauses, were by the 
1930s rather exceptional. Some 30 years later, on evidence to the Commons’ Select Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, Cecil Carr pointed out that statutory instruments were mainly about “routine or 
administrative character involving no great issues of liberty or public rights” (Select Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, Report (HC 1952-53, 310), at para 51). 
45 Peter Wallington and J.D. Hayhurst, ‘The Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’ 
[1988] Public Law 547, 573-4; Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House, (HL 1991-92, 
35-I), at para 133. 
46 Chris Himsworth, ‘The Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee’ [1995] Public Law 34; N. W. 
Barber and Alison Young, ‘The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and Their Implications for 
Sovereignty’ [2003] Public Law 112. 
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are thus substantially governed by the exercise of discretionary executive powers to 
legislate.”47 These developments, which have redistributed law-making powers 
between Parliament and the government, can only be understood as a product of the 
flexible nature of the traditional constitution.  
Thinking of delegated powers through the lenses of a legalistic conception is 
challenging. The most obvious difficulty is the lack of clear principles enjoying 
sufficient constitutional pedigree to address the issues raised by delegated 
legislation.48 As noted in Chapter One, when this is the case, legalistic conceptions can 
identify benchmarks against which to assess the issues raised by legislation by looking 
at contributions by constitutional theory. This is precisely what some scholars have 
done. They have suggested that the abstract legal principles of separation of powers 
and parliamentary supremacy be employed to assess the constitutional legitimacy of 
current practices in delegated legislation.49 However, these proposals have their own 
particular problems. Consider first the principle of separation of powers. Its 
constitutional pedigree in the UK is dubious. As Loughlin notes, Britain has never had 
proper separation of powers. Significant links between the two political branches of 
government derive from the fact that the government sits in Parliament.50 This raises 
questions about the suitability of assessing delegated powers by employing the 
separation of powers as a constitutional benchmark. Yet, even if we put issues of 
pedigree aside, difficult normative questions arise. The doctrine of separation of 
powers does not provide a clear answer about how law-making powers should be 
distributed between Parliament and the executive.51 The modern state is a much more 
complex machinery today compared with when the idea of a tripartite separation of 
                                                
47 Adam Tucker, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’ in Alexander Horne and 
Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 357. 
48 Concerns about the normative reach of delegated powers are long standing. They receive their 
first articulation in 1929. See Gordon Hewart, The New Despotism (Ernst Benn 1929). 
49 Aileen McHarg, ‘What is Delegated Legislation?’ [2006] Public law 539, 556ff; Tucker, 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation (n 47). 
50 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press 2003), 24-5. Cf Alison 
Young, ‘The Relationship Between Parliament, The Executive and The Judiciary’ in Jeffrey Jowell and 
Colm O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019), who 
challenges the traditional assumption that this doctrine is of little interest in the UK because of the close 
links between Parliament and the government. 
51 Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers 
(Oxford University Press 2013), 45 (“a clear concept of division [of powers] applies only to courts”). 
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state functions was proposed.52 On the other hand, society is much more complex than 
it was in the 18th century. Regulation must adequately respond to highly complex, 
technical and fast-changing issues. Legislation may not be suitable for addressing 
those challenges. There is an inherent pragmatic dimension in any decision to delegate 
law-making powers. 
The second proposal is to employ the doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty”. 
The argument would be that in a representative democracy, key questions of principle 
and policy should be discussed and decided at Parliament. This principle enjoys 
indisputable constitutional pedigree in the UK. However, it faces significant normative 
problems because delegation of powers is in itself the product of Parliament’s will. On 
the other hand, if “parliamentary sovereignty” means that Parliament has 
unconstrained legal authority to legislate at will, this power certainly includes the 
ability to delegate significant policy decisions to ministers. I noted above that 
modernisation has meant that since 1972, the centralisation of powers at the UK 
Parliament has been under increasing pressure from the EU. Furthermore, since the 
end of the 1990s, new pressures have emerged from the devolution settlements, 
common law constitutionalism, the HRA and the practice of constitutional 
referendums. Delegated powers are another example of this broader trend, stripping 
law-making powers away from Parliament to cede them to the executive. As in the 
other examples, this has been possible because of Parliament’s acquiescence.   
Hence, delegated powers is an area in which there are constitutional principles 
of dubious pedigree and disputed normative content, and a long-standing tradition of 
pragmatic accommodation to changing political and social circumstances. Consider 
also the unsettled constitutional philosophy of the UK constitution as a relevant factor 
here. It is likely that different theoretical views about the British constitution will 
approach delegated powers in quite different ways. Normative theories will be 
suspicious of delegated powers, but may differ in their strategies. Liberals may take a 
normative approach to parliamentary democracy, and employ the principles of 
parliamentary supremacy and separation of powers to argue that key questions of 
policy and principle ought to be taken by Parliament. Traditionalists may prefer to 
                                                
52 Frank Vibert, The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers 
(Cambridge University Press 2007). 
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maintain the flexibility of the constitution, supplemented by a strong development of 
the common law as a means to constrain ministerial discretion and protect the 
indigenous liberties of the British people. Finally, functional theories of public law 
have argued that it is not possible to think constructively about delegated powers 
through the lens of abstract principles, and will advocate for a permanent 
accommodation to changing political and social circumstances.53  
I am not arguing against identifying workable constitutional benchmarks against 
which to assess clauses delegating powers. Nor is it my intention to defend the 
functionalist view about the distribution of law-making powers between government 
and Parliament. In Chapter Four, I will argue that the DPRRC has fallen short of 
identifying clear standards against which to assess delegated powers. I will claim that 
the DPRRC should send a clearer message about the constitutional principles that 
underpin their assessment. I am sympathetic to the development of clear constitutional 
standards to assess clauses delegating powers in the UK. Nevertheless, , as far as this 
section is concerned, this discussion illustrates a key point about LSCG in the UK 
context. While the legalistic conception can operate with no difficulty in regard to 
certain aspects of the British constitution, such as human rights, it is more difficult to 
implement in more contested and evolving areas, such as delegated powers. This is 
simply because abstract reasoning based on first principles operates smoothly in more 
modernised aspects of the constitution, but less in regard to traditional aspects of the 
constitution. In less modernised aspects of the constitution, hard legalism provides an 
unsatisfactory framework. Abstract analysis needs to be qualified by pragmatic needs, 
accommodation of constitutional traditions and other relevant considerations. This 
suggests that it may still be possible to adhere to a soft strand of legalism, provided 
that this approach is grounded on flexible and broad statements of principle and value 
that are sensitive to the circumstances of the case.  
Such conception of soft legalism has been developed by Robert Hazell, Dawn 
Oliver and Jack Simson Caird’s (herein, “Hazell et al”). These authors advocate for 
the adoption of a “code of constitutional standards”. Their proposal addresses the 
                                                
53 Consider J.A.G. Griffith’s account of Ivor Jennings’ thinking in J. A. G. Griffith, ‘A Pilgrim's 
Progress (Book Review)’ 22 Journal of Law and Society 410. See also Ivor Jennings, ‘The Report on 
Ministers' Powers’ (1932) 10 Public Administration 333; J. A. G. Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament in 
the Legislative Process Part II’ (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 425, 291ff; William Robson, ‘The 
Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers’ (1932) 3 The Political Quarterly 346. 
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problem of identifying workable constitutional standards to assess government 
legislation in the context of the UK unwritten constitution.54 Looking at Hazell et al’s 
proposal is a fruitful way of thinking how a soft legalistic LSCG conception may 
operate in this jurisdiction. 
These authors developed the idea of a code of constitutional standards with a 
view to strengthen the SCC’s position as a legislative scrutiniser, and to foster its 
influence at governmental level. Hazell et al argue that constitutional committees, most 
notably the SCC, have developed a set of standards over the course of years of 
operation assessing the constitutional implications of legislation.55 These standards 
have been developed incrementally, in a similar fashion to the development of the 
common law. They can be distilled from the reasoning and recommendations 
contained in constitutional committees’ numerous reports. Hazell et al argue that these 
standards could be codified into a document containing a set of broad and coherent 
substantive and procedural principles. Then, this document could guide future 
exercises of LSCG both in government and in Parliament, at the floor of both Houses, 
at public bill committees, and at constitutional committees. Finally, Hazell et al also 
argue that such a code would be a significant contribution to LSCG in the UK, since 
it could provide some clarity about the contents of the constitution, filling in –to a 
limited extent– the vacuum created by the unwritten constitution.  
                                                
54 Robert Hazell and Dawn Oliver, ‘The Constitutional Standards of the Constitution Committee: 
How a Code of Constitutional Standards Can Help Strengthen Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (The 
Constitution Unit, 22 November 2017)  <https://constitution-unit.com/2017/11/22/the-constitutional-
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parliamentary-scrutiny/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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Legislation and Accountability (Hart Publishing 2016). 
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Select Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Edition (The Constitution Unit, November 2017). 
55 Oliver coined the term “legisprudence” to refer to a body of reasoning that “reflect[s] the 
experience and culture that have built up among politicians in both Houses in response to lessons learned 
and expressions of public opinion over many years.”  See Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House 
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As section II above has shown, Hazell et al are right to be concerned about the 
challenge that the unwritten constitution raises to identify workable constitutional 
standards with undisputed pedigree and clear normative content. Hence, they identify 
a fertile terrain for constitutional committees in enhancing the constitutional pedigree 
of certain principles, values and other standards, and in developing their content. A 
second point worth noting is that because of their specialised remit and permanent 
character, constitutional committees are in a good position to undertake this task. As 
argued in Chapter Two above, constitutional committees have the capacity to build up 
institutional memory. They are in an advantaged position to develop systematic and 
conscious thinking about the constitution.  
Yet, more significantly for the purposes of this discussion, Hazell et al are also 
right to be cautious about the process of developing constitutional standards. They 
claim that the standards ought to be broad and flexible.56 These characteristics perform 
a relevant function. Section II above has shown that the UK constitution is deeply 
contested, has no settled constitutional philosophy, and is in transition from a 
traditional to a modern constitution. Hence, it is preferable to avoid introducing 
excessive rigidity to the UK constitution, unless there are good reasons.57 
Constitutional standards, therefore, should recognise that an inherent characteristic of 
the British constitution is its ever-evolving nature. While Hazell et al adhere to a liberal 
normative conception of the constitution,58 their conception of LSCG is an example of 
nuanced soft legalism. They advocate for the development of broad and flexible 
constitutional standards with a core normative content. This recognises ample 
discretion for political branches of government to realise these standards in different 
ways. Nevertheless, the core normative content guides assessments, while also being 
sensitive to the circumstances of the case. Legislation may be a response to concrete 
political and social circumstances, broad and flexible constitutional standards provide 
room for accommodation. This is the sort of approach that may prove more fruitful 
when it comes to contested and ever evolving areas of the British constitution, such as 
that of delegated powers.  
                                                
56 Simson Caird and Oliver, ‘Parliament’s Constitutional Standards’ (n 54), 64. 
57 See for instance my analysis of the DPRRC in Chapter Four below. 
58 See Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ (n 54), 59, where she argues that 
Parliament’s constitution role is part of a broader normative project that seeks the flourishing of “liberal 
democracy”. 
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IV. Legislative Scrutiny on Constitutional Grounds and UK-style 
constitutionalism 
This chapter has already discussed some key characteristics of the British 
constitution in section II above. The purpose there was to illustrate the difficulties of 
adopting a single conception of LSCG for the UK. Here, I re-examine this discussion, 
but for a slightly different purpose. The point here is to understand how LSCG fits 
within UK style constitutionalism. For this purpose, I will provide a brief account of 
UK constitutionalism (section 1), and then situate LSCG within this tradition of 
constitutionalism (section 2). 
1. Parliament’s theoretically supreme legislative powers 
The UK is usually seen as an outlier from a comparative perspective because it 
lacks a written constitution. In contrast to modern written constitutions, the UK 
constitution is not the product of a single constitutive moment in constitutional 
engineering. Instead, it is a set of evolving arrangements – some of which even date 
back to pre-modern times – that have been adapted to ever-changing political 
circumstances. As argued in section II above, the contemporary UK constitution is 
complex and multi-layered, mixing traditional and modern components. It comprises 
statutes, principles and values, constitutional conventions, judicial decisions and soft 
law documents, among others. These different components remain in a state of 
constitutional unsettlement. 
Despite this complex constitutional landscape, as far as the law-making function 
is concerned, constitutional scholars would undoubtedly argue that the fundamental 
principle of the unwritten constitution is the supremacy of the Crown-in-Parliament. 
According to orthodox understanding,59 the Acts of Parliament constitute the higher 
form of law in the UK. This means, on the one hand, that there are no legal limits on 
Parliament’s will. The law of the constitution can be changed by statute, as there is no 
difference between constitutional law and ordinary law. It also means, on the other 
hand, that the UK lacks any special procedural requirement to pass constitutional 
legislation. Nevertheless, the problem with orthodox accounts of “parliamentary 
                                                
59 Ekins, ‘Legislative Freedom’ (n 19). 
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sovereignty” is that they offer an incomplete and misguided picture of the 
constitutional context upon which the UK Parliament is set to operate.60  
The fact that in contrast to most written constitutions, the UK Parliament 
recognises no legal limits on its legislative authority, is not inconsistent with the 
possibility of limitations of a different nature. Although most authors may differ in 
their interpretation of the nature of these limitations, they tend to agree on the examples 
provided.  The first example is the territorial constitution. Consider for instance Martin 
Loughlin and Stephen Tierney’s contention that evolving political relationships 
between the constituent parts of the Union have eroded the political authority of the 
UK Parliament to the point that it is no longer able to express the voice of the nation 
assembled.61 The devolution settlements are an institutional accommodation of claims 
for political and cultural recognition of the distinctiveness of Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales. The recognition of autonomy of the constituent parts of the Union 
has become so integrated into the UK’s constitutional landscape that the UK 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy has been conditioned by political factors. The very 
fact that the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 provide for the permanence 
of devolved governments and legislatures unless there is a referendum in Scotland or 
Wales, respectively, constitute an explicit recognition by the UK Parliament that it is 
unconceivable –although theoretically possible– for an Act of Parliament to abolish 
the devolution settlements. In addition, a set of conventions and practices govern the 
relationship between devolved governments and legislatures, and the central 
government at Whitehall and Westminster. The Sewel convention, which expresses 
the shared understanding that the UK Parliament should not normally legislate on 
matters within the competence of devolved legislatures without asking their previous 
consent, is –on Loughlin and Tierney’s reading– an institutional recognition of the 
evolving power relations between the centre and the regions. The more politically 
entrenched the devolution settlements become, the less room for manoeuvre the UK 
Parliament has to exercise its “theoretically” supreme legislative powers. This does 
                                                
60 Loughlin and Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth’ (n 19); Mark Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereingty in a 
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not go so far as to undermine the legal position, as the recent approval of the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 without a Legislative Consent Motion by the Scottish 
Parliament shows.62 However, it does point to the political need to reach agreements 
between the centre and the regions, as a necessary condition to maintain the unity of 
the nation. In this sense, the very fact that the passage of the Withdrawal Act, with all 
its shortcomings,63 demanded a more consensual approach by the government on 
devolution matters, including significant concessions that effectively rewrote the 
original provisions of the bill, exemplifies how these “non-legal” limits condition the 
exercise of Parliament’s law-making powers.64 
Secondly, the UK Parliament has refrained from taking certain decisions of the 
highest constitutional significance without previously putting the matter to the people 
through a referendum.65 The practice of constitutional referendums has become a 
feature of the contemporary constitution. Loughlin and Tierney note that, as in the case 
of the devolution settlements, this practice seems to come from the recognition by 
British political elites that their political authority to take certain fundamental 
decisions has been eroded.66 As in the former case, Parliament remains legally free to 
legislate on any constitutional matter. However, political elites have acknowledged 
that the people are the ultimate sovereign, and that some significant decisions cannot 
be legitimately taken without consulting them. The referendum on EU membership is 
quite relevant in this respect because it illustrates how politicians consider themselves 
bound by the expressions of will from the people. Consider in the first place that it is 
hard to imagine this decision without the matter being put before the people in a 
referendum. Furthermore, it is not a surprise that Parliament, despite arguably having 
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a majority for it, has never attempted to simply cancel referendum results. This was 
clearly exemplified by the quick passage of the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017, which was introduced immediately after the Miller No. 1 
case,67 and received Royal Assent less than two months from its passage by Parliament 
with no amendments.68 Even a critic of the Brexit process, such as Paul Craig, 
recognises that “the result of the referendum should be treated with constitutional 
respect” and “should not be revisited without good cause.”69 Whether or not the 
conditions for a second referendum have been met is beyond the scope of this work. 
As far as this chapter is concerned, the key point is to note the existence of “non-legal” 
limits to Parliament’s supreme legislative powers. MPs felt politically bound by the 
people’s decision to withdraw from the EU. 
A third factor setting the context for understanding the exercise of the UK 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy.70 This is the interpretative power of the Courts. 
Through common law artefacts such as the principle of legality, courts have managed 
to integrate and construct the content of Acts of Parliament in light of a wider set of 
moral values (common law rights). This interpretative function has been fostered by 
the interpretative powers provided by section 3 HRA, which requires courts to read 
and give effect to an Act of Parliament “in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights”. Through these interpretative powers, common law moral values 
and European moral values were incorporated into the UK constitutional landscape, 
effectively conditioning the way courts construct and enforce Acts of Parliament.71  By 
the same token, other doctrines that flow from the orthodox understanding of 
parliamentary supremacy, such as the doctrine of “implied repeal”, have been qualified 
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by common law through the concept of constitutional statutes.72 Additionally, there 
are a few cases in which Supreme Court justices have made explicit calls for political 
self-restraint in the exercise of Parliament’s supreme legislative powers, either in 
dictum or in extra-judicial lectures.73 They have warned that if Parliament does “the 
unthinkable”, courts might move away from their default deferent position into a more 
activist one.74 As in the cases of devolution and popular sovereignty, the common law 
courts also provide a context upon which Parliament’s supreme legislative powers are 
exercised. Thus, through the interpretative powers of the common law, courts have 
managed to integrate – if not also substantially shape –75 the content of Acts of 
Parliament into a wider constitutional landscape.  
So far, I have mentioned domestic limitations on parliamentary supremacy. 
However, there are also limitations imposed by international law. The HRA 
incorporated Convention rights into the domestic constitutional landscape. Although 
this Act is said to have preserved parliamentary supremacy, the political reality is 
much more complex. Chapter Five will argue that although declarations of 
incompatibility do not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provisions in regards to which they are given (section 4(6) HRA), these declarations 
carry such political weight, that they have become de facto binding.76 The same is true 
for adverse ECtHR’s judgments. Political branches of government have felt compelled 
to respond to adverse human rights judgements by changing the law. On the other 
hand, and for the time being, membership of the EU continues to shape domestic 
understandings of parliamentary supremacy by imposing the principle of supremacy 
of EU law over domestic primary legislation. This has meant that Acts of Parliament, 
even those approved after the passage of the European Communities Act 1972, have 
been disapplied by domestic courts when found incompatible with EU law.77 In this 
                                                
72 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council; R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v 
The Secretary of State for Transport and another. 
73 Young, ‘The Relationship Between’ (n 50), 332ff. 
74 The common law cannot condition the exercise of Parliament’s supreme powers. The point 
here is to illustrate how the interpretative powers of courts can condition Parliament’s intention. If courts 
were to disapply an Act of Parliament on constitutional grounds, this would amount to a constitutional 
revolution. 
75 Consider for instance R (Evans) v Attorney-General [2015] UKSC 21. 
76 See Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgements (CP 182, 2019). For 
discussion, see Chapter Five below. 
77 Factortame (No 2) v Secretary of State for Transport [1991] 1 AC 603. 
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way, the role of UK domestic courts in the context of EU law is quite similar to that 
of constitutional courts with strong review powers. EU law, therefore, has curtailed 
the ability of Parliament to exercise its legislative supremacy. It continues to do so at 
the time of writing, and may continue to operate in this fashion after withdrawal during 
the transition period as far as pre-exit primary legislation is concerned, by means of 
section 5 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the European 
Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. 
2. Contested views about the nature of non-legal limits 
Although most constitutional scholars recognise the existence of these “non-
legal” limits on Parliament’s supreme law-making powers, there is disagreement about 
the nature of these limits. These discrepancies are a consequence of contested views 
about UK constitutionalism examined in section II above. I will exemplify such 
differences by discussing two views on the nature of these limits. Firstly, a view that 
rationalises these limitations in light of modern constitutionalism. Secondly, a view 
that interprets these limitations as expressions of changing power relationships.  
I will start discussing the first view above by looking at Mark Elliott’s account 
of the nature of non-legal limits.78 Elliott’s starting point is to distinguish between the 
constitutional legitimacy, as opposed to the “legality”, of primary legislation. To 
assess the constitutional legitimacy of legislation, he identifies a set of constitutional 
principles and employs them as benchmarks. Legislation in breach of these 
constitutional principles remains valid, yet, in Elliott’s view, unconstitutional 
legislation may be politically problematic. This author identifies a few constitutional 
principles that serve as benchmarks for LSCG. In his view, the devolution settlements 
give rise to a constitutional principle demanding respect for the autonomy of the 
devolved institutions. Similarly, Elliott notes that UK’s international obligations 
deriving from membership to the EU and the ECHR have given rise to the 
constitutional principle according to which it would be improper for Parliament to 
legislate contrary to EU law, and to Convention rights. In Elliott’s view, this principle 
is grounded on the very decision by the UK to agree to be bound by international 
treaties, and by the domestic Rule of Law. Finally, from the operation of the common 
                                                
78 Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereingty in a Changing Constitutional Landscape’ (n 61), 53-7; 
Elliott, ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multidimensional Constitution’ (n 61), 80-2. 
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law, the very uncertain nature of the British constitution and the institutional tensions 
to which these factors give rise to, Elliott draws a general constitutional principle 
which recommends Parliament’s legislative supreme powers be exercised with 
political self-restraint.79 This means, for instance, that Parliament should not affect 
common law rights,80 or impede the common law courts’ reviewing powers. The key 
point to note is that Elliott’s methodology consists of identifying a set of constitutional 
developments and rationalising them in abstract formulations of principle. Then, these 
principles are employed as benchmarks to assess the “constitutional legitimacy” of 
government legislation. Elliott’s conception is an example of nuanced soft legalism.  
Other UK constitutional scholars take a similar view.81 This approach conceives 
LSCG as a principled exercise based on constitutional standards drawn from a variety 
of sources. One should note though that most of these authors are careful to tailor these 
constitutional benchmarks to the specificities of UK constitutional arrangements. The 
very idea of constitutional standards developed by Hazell et al –discussed above– is a 
good example of this approach. On the one hand, there is an intellectual exercise of 
rationalization that draws from constitutional theory. Yet, on the other, there is an 
attempt to tailor them to the British constitution. This requires flexibility to account 
for the UK’s ever evolving constitutional arrangements, as well as recognition of 
significant political discretion due to Parliament’s supreme legislative powers. Yet, 
these principles do have a core normative content. While they do not impinge upon the 
legality of legislation, these constitutional standards are not a mere description of UK 
                                                
79 Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereingty in a Changing Constitutional Landscape’ (n 61), 57 (“… 
the constitutional system demands and expects that Parliament will desist from exercising the full width 
of the extravagant powers which it would possess if it were sovereign.”). 
80 The doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty” assumes that Parliament can undermine common 
law rights. Hence, Elliott’s abstract formulation can only have, as a matter of constitutional law, an 
interpretative rule (the principle of legality) as an output.  
81 For instance, consider Thomas Poole’s analysis of the legitimacy of executive’s actions and 
law-making powers in Thomas Poole, ‘The Executive in Public Law’ in The Changing Constitution 
(9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019), 197; Aileen McHarg and Adam Tucker analysis of delegated 
powers in McHarg, ‘What is Delegated Legislation’ (n 49); Tucker, Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Delegated Legislation (n 47); Alison Young’s analysis of the principle of separation of powers in 
Young, ‘The Relationship Between’ (n 50); David Feldman’s account of LSCG (discussed above) in 
Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 39); Dawn Oliver’s analysis of 
LSCG in Dawn Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defense of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ in Gavin Drewry and Alexander Horne (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2018); Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (2004) 4 
Macquarie Law Journal 33; Hazell et al proposals to create a code of constitutional standards Hazell 
and Oliver, The Constitutional Standards (n 54); Simson Caird, Hazell and Oliver, The Constitutional 
Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Edition (n 54). 
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constitutional practices. They provide the basis to assess those practices against an 
idealized account of constitutional legitimacy. For this reason, the very idea of LSCG 
grounded on abstract formulations of principle sits comfortably against the broader 
trend of UK constitutional modernization. 
 Contrast this account about the nature of non-legal limits with Loughlin and 
Tierney’s account.82 Their account focuses on identifying and describing evolving 
political circumstances; and interpreting them as constitutional facts. Hence, “non-
legal” limits are seen as manifestations of a redistribution of political powers between 
the centre and the regions (devolution); the UK and the international legal order (EU 
law and the ECHR); between political branches and the judiciary (common law 
constitutionalism); and between citizens and elected representatives (constitutional 
referendums). Loughlin and Tierney claim that these instances are an expression of the 
erosion of the legislative authority of the UK Parliament. This approach does not 
translate these constitutional facts into abstract formulations of rational normative 
principles. Instead, these authors interpret them as changing “power relationships”.  
In Loughlin and Tierney’s view, the legislative supremacy of Parliament is a 
legal doctrine about the distribution of power within a set of institutional arrangements 
in the UK. Yet, this set of arrangements is ultimately dependent on a wider set of 
relationships that form the constitutive dimension of power in a nation. Historical and 
political developments have changed power relationships in the UK, to the point of 
making incoherent the orthodox understanding of “parliamentary sovereignty”. The 
very fact that Parliament acceded to the EU, introduced the HRA, created the 
devolution settlements, deferred key constitutional changes to the will of the people as 
expressed in constitutional referendums, among others developments, are explicit 
legislative recognition of the changing political relationships between the central 
power at Westminster and other sources of political authority. These instances show 
that in the contemporary constitution multiple sources of political authority condition 
the exercise of the UK Parliament’s supreme legislative powers.  
 Loughlin and Tierney’s account does not deny that there may be a role for 
juristic constitutional principles. However, in line with Loughlin’s previous 
contributions to public law theory, they argue that exercising political powers in a way 
                                                
82 Loughlin and Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth’ (n 19). 
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that respects the constitution strengthens the political authority of the legislature.83 The 
law-maker must bear in mind constitutional standards as a matter of “political 
judgement”.84 These authors do not think that the constitutional legitimacy of 
legislation should be assessed by reference to an abstract and idealized world. Instead, 
the constitutional domain is composed of contested principles, values, conventions and 
political practices that are concrete, contingent and indigenous products of ever-
changing political circumstances. The challenge for those exercising political powers, 
including law-makers, is to engage in an exercise in prudential reasoning, with a view 
to prevent political conflict, and maintain the unity of the state.  In the UK context, 
this requires from them recognition of the need to defer to the alternative sources of 
political authority referred above. 
 In sum, here I have introduced two alternative views regarding the nature of 
non-legal limits on Parliament’s legislative supreme powers. One view extracts from 
a series of developments and changes in the UK constitution a set of abstract 
rationalizations articulated in the form of constitutional principles, values and other 
standards. These principles, values and standards depict an idealized normative world 
against which the legitimacy of government legislative proposals is assessed. By 
contrast, the second view interprets ever-changing power relationships underpinning 
the British constitution as conditioning the “political authority” of the UK Parliament. 
This view, therefore, interprets these non-legal limits on political powers as prudential 
reasons to secure the “survival and well-being of the state”.85 
3. Concluding remarks 
A theory of LSCG in the UK cannot, on its own, arbitrate between these 
confronting views about the nature of non-legal limits on the exercise of Parliament’s 
theoretically supreme legislative powers. This is a broader debate that has numerous 
implications and broader consequences, one of which is to shape our understanding of 
LSCG in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the discussion in this chapter has relevant 
implications for the legislative scrutiny work conducted by constitutional committees. 
I will present in what follows two principles of good practice for constitutional 
committees when performing LSCG. Since they are intended to operate as 
                                                
83 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (n 50), 150-51. 
84 Martin Loughlin, Political Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2017), Ch1. 
85 Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (n 50), 148ff. 
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“principles”, not as “rules”, they admit a spectrum of possibilities, are context sensitive 
and must be balanced against other relevant considerations. 
Firstly, constitutional committees should not generally endorse a hard legalistic, 
highly morally committed account of the British constitution. The constitution is 
fraught with controversy between modernisers and traditionalists, which is expression 
of a deeper disagreement about the nature of UK constitutional arrangements. LSCG 
in the UK takes place in a context where there are lively debates about the 
constitutional pedigree and normative content of different constitutional standards, 
about the theoretical underpinnings of the constitution, and a complex interplay 
between its modern and traditional components. Constitutional committees are not in 
a good position to arbitrate these debates because they do not enjoy any special 
authority to state the contents of the constitution.86 This is especially critical in the case 
of the DPRRC and the SCC, which are exclusively Lords based committees. Hence, 
their membership lacks any democratic representative basis. In the case of the JCHR, 
the issues are more pressing because of competing conceptions of rights, and the 
controversial status of Convention rights. Nevertheless, as I shall show in Chapter 
Five, there are good reasons for the JCHR to pursue a soft legalistic LSCG conception, 
due to legal and political reasons. The very fact that constitutional committees’ 
recommendations are not binding is an institutional manifestation of their purely 
“advisory” role. The coercive nature of constitutional committee recommendations 
will ultimately depend on the quality of the reasons in support, the salience of the 
constitutional issues, the capacity of those driving constitutional considerations to 
influence debate and political decision-making, and the receptiveness of elected 
politicians to arguments of this nature, among other factors. While many of these 
factors are not entirely in control of constitutional committees, it will remain true that 
the more controversial the constitutional reasons in support of their recommendations, 
the less persuasive these committees will be.  
A second guiding principle is that where there is contestation or controversial 
constitutional matters, either because there are confronted views, principles of dubious 
constitutional pedigree or uncertain normative content, among others, there will be 
good reasons for constitutional committees to have a less normative take, and instead, 
                                                
86 Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 5), 544. 
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a more informative and descriptive one. Constitutional committees will make a 
significant contribution in this area by taking a more informative and less prescriptive 
approach which prompts debate by accounting for confronted views about the relevant 
issues. This does not mean that constitutional committees should not express a view 
of their own on a controversial matter, should they have a clear stance on the matter. 
Instead, this guiding principle recommends that it is good practice to provide 
additional information documenting any alternative views and the reasons in support 
of them, so that MPs and peers can make a judgment of their own. Neither it means 
that constitutional committees cannot push for a more assertive take, even in cases 
where there are no clear principles with core normative principle, when there is a trend 
or pressing issues. One example of this is delegated powers, as I shall argue in Chapter 
Four below. 
This second principle of good practice is also inspired by the same reason 
announced in support of the first principle. Yet, in addition to that, it is also prompted 
by the nature of Parliament as a pluralistic and representative assembly where different 
views about the most important aspects of society are discussed. It is the place where 
debate and confrontation must take place, and all views about the most relevant public 
matters, including constitutional matters, should find a space to be deliberated. 
Parliamentary debates must provide room for different views about British 
constitutional arrangements, in a context of deep contestation about those very 
arrangements. A theory of LSCG in the UK should pay tribute to the very 
representative nature of Parliament. It should not foreclose debate. This view also is 
more consistent with the “advisory” role that LSCG performs in the UK legislative 
practice, where constitutional committees lack vetting powers on constitutional 
grounds, and therefore shall focus on enriching debate and raise consciousness about 
the constitutional implications of government legislation.  
Ultimately, constitutional committees will benefit from a looser or more flexible take 
of controversial constitutional matters, not only to secure unanimous support from 
members for its reports, but also to appeal to a wider audience. From the point of view 
of members, having controversial views will stress constitutional committees’ 
operation, as different members may have different views about the issues. From the 
point of view of the audience, constitutional committees may prefer to be seen as “non-
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partisan”, to appeal to a wide range of MPs. Securing unanimous reports and avoiding 
dissenting opinions is key to achieve this. In general, as noted above, this may be 
achieved by constructing broad and flexible standards which can circumvent difficult 
and highly technical debates about the nature of the constitution and its underlying 
constitutional philosophy.  
V. Conclusion 
This chapter is premised upon one claim, namely, that the constitutional 
arrangements of a given country shape the theoretical conceptions of LSCG. The UK 
constitutional arrangements are unique in that this jurisdiction lacks a written 
constitution and a bespoke procedure for constitutional change, thereby generating 
uncertainty concerning the pedigree and normative content of constitutional standards. 
The picture becomes more complicated due to the mixed nature of the British 
constitution, which remains in relevant aspects a flexible and ever changing traditional 
constitution, but which has been subject to significant modernising reforms inspired 
by first abstract principles. This has put the constitution in a state of transition and 
unsettlement and has provided enough room for different, even rival accounts of its 
constitutional philosophy.  
The very fact that UK constitutional law is an essentially contested matter has 
significant implications for the theoretical conceptions of LSCG discussed in Chapter 
One. It suggests that the normative question about which conception of LSCG should 
be preferred in this jurisdiction will be dependent on broader debates about the nature 
of the UK constitution and the place of fundamental constitutional principles such as 
parliamentary democracy and the separation of powers, among others. Nevertheless, a 
theory of LSCG in the UK can draw some lessons from the unique nature of British 
constitutional arrangements. This chapter has discussed some of those lessons.  
Firstly, I have discussed the appropriateness of the legalistic conception to UK 
constitutional arrangements. The legalistic conception advocacy for abstract reasoning 
based on first principles applies smoothly to those more modernised layers of the 
constitution, notably, to human rights assessments. Yet, it is put under pressure as a 
framework to conduct constitutional assessments of those more flexible and evolving 
dimensions of the constitution. By discussing the issue of delegated powers, I argued 
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that a more nuanced and soft legalistic approach fits better the characteristics of these 
traditional areas of the constitution. Following Hazell et al, I have also pointed out the 
need for constitutional committees to develop “broad and flexible” standards if they 
were to follow a soft legalistic conception.   
The second lesson is that LSCG must take seriously the existence of “non-legal” 
limits on Parliament’s theoretically supreme legislative powers. It cannot simply 
dismiss these limits because they are extra-legal, as some orthodox understandings 
seem to suggest. However, contestation about the nature of the British constitution is 
also reflected on the question about the nature of these non-legal limits. I discussed 
two alternative accounts about non-legal limits on parliamentary supremacy. Many 
constitutional scholars interpret these limitations through the lenses of modern 
constitutionalism. They rationalise certain constitutional developments in terms of 
abstract formulations of principle. Their views are consistent with a soft approach to 
legalistic LSCG conceptions. By contrast, others maintain a more traditionalist 
account of these limitations. They interpret constitutional facts as expressions of 
changing power relationships that have an impact on the power distributive dimension 
of the constitution. These changing power relationships erode Parliament’s political 
authority, and demand that law-makers defer to alternative sources of authority. 
Constitutional standards are not seen, then, as abstract constitutional benchmarks as in 
the first view, rather as prudential reasons advising those exercising political powers 
to prevent political conflict and maintain the unity and integrity of the state. As far as 
LSCG is concerned, both views are workable frameworks to develop the activity of 
assessing the constitutional implications of legislation.  
Given these controversies, I claim that constitutional committees should follow 
two broad principles of good practice when conducting LSCG. Firstly, they should not 
generally endorse a hard legalistic, highly morally committed account of the British 
constitution. Secondly, where there is contestation or controversial constitutional 
matters, either because there are confronted views, principles of dubious constitutional 
pedigree or uncertain normative content, among others, there will be good reasons for 
constitutional committees to have a less normative take, and instead, a more 
informative and descriptive one. Both principles are context dependent, and must be 
balanced against other relevant considerations. 
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CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
DELEGATED POWERS AND REGULATORY REFORM COMMITTEE 
I. Introduction 
This work has shown that constitutional committees are the main drivers of 
constitutional thinking in the United Kingdom (“UK”) legislative process (Chapter 
Two). It has also identified alternative conceptions of LSCG (Chapter One), and 
discussed how those conceptions may apply to the peculiarities of the British 
constitution (Chapter Three). This chapter and the next one will discuss in greater 
depth the working practices of each constitutional committee. The aim is to identify 
how each committee approaches the constitution and which conception(s) of 
legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds (“LSCG”) underpins their work. This 
chapter will address both the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
(“DPRRC”) and the Select Committee on the Constitution (“SCC”). Chapter Five will 
be entirely dedicated to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (“JCHR”). 
This chapter claims that the DPRRC has promoted constitutional deliberation by 
operating as a reason-demanding body, imposing burdens of justification on the 
government, and prompted political self-restraint. However, I submit that the 
DPRRC’s ability to foster deliberation has been curtailed by its reluctance to clarify 
the criteria against which it assesses government legislation and the constitutional 
principles that underpin its work. This has arguably undermined the DPRRC’s 
capacity to send a clear message, both to government and Parliament, about what the 
boundaries of delegated powers should be. I suggest that a more assertive approach 
that resembles a soft legalistic LSCG conception could enhance the DPRRC’s 
deliberative impact, and be a more appropriate response to the exponential growth in 
clauses delegating powers. 
By contrast, the SCC has engaged in constitutional considerations with more 
depth. It has set out key tenets of the constitution, with a focus on the institutional and 
power-distributive aspects of the constitution. From the point of view of LSCG 
conceptions, there are two main ways to conceive the SCC’s work. Firstly, as an agent 
for constitutional deliberation in the process of constitutional change, which advocates 
for a careful and coherent development of the constitution. In performing this work, 
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the SCC sometimes discusses the content of reforms. In these cases, the SCC works 
under a conception of constitutional construction by providing reasons to revise or 
improve government proposals. In other cases, the SCC seeks to improve the quality 
of reform by making procedural recommendations. Secondly, the SCC also acts as a 
“constitutional scrutiniser”. In this second strand, the SCC reminds politicians about 
the existence of “non-legal” limits on Parliament’s supreme legislative powers. This 
role can be seen in different ways, depending on whether the SCC’s work comes closer 
to the conception Mark Elliott and others have developed regarding the nature of these 
“non-legal” limits, or to those of Martin Loughlin and Stephen Tierney (see Chapter 
Three above). For instance, in some cases the SCC develops abstract and rational 
principles, values and other standards, and employs them as benchmarks to assess the 
constitutional legitimacy of government legislation. In these cases, there are elements 
of different conceptions underpinning the SCC work. Their contribution seeks to 
improve constitutional deliberation. But in certain instances, legal reasoning and 
rationalizations are part of their scrutiny work, taking the SCC closer to soft legalism. 
By contrast, in other cases the SCC reasons on the basis of prudential considerations 
oriented towards the maintenance of an appropriate distribution of powers between 
different sources of political authority. In such cases, the emphasis is on promoting 
deliberation both at Parliament and government, and prompting political self-restraint. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. I will start by discussing the DPRRC, and 
then I will discuss the SCC. 
II. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
In this section, I argue that the DPRRC has remained attached to the methods of 
the traditional constitution. Pragmatism has taken priority over principled 
considerations and a deeper understanding of the British constitution. Clauses 
delegating powers and providing for degrees of parliamentary scrutiny have been 
assessed on a case by case basis, according to the particular circumstances. From the 
point of view of the DPRRC’s working practices, the committee has introduced a 
valuable dynamic of constitutional deliberation that has had a significant impact on 
government’s policy-making and legislative drafting. The government routinely 
justify provisions seeking delegated powers and providing degrees of parliamentary 
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scrutiny. Furthermore, there is evidence that the government is willing to change its 
mind and introduce amendments at the formal stages of the legislative process to 
address DPRRC’s concerns, suggesting political self-restraint. The DPRRC has 
enhanced Parliament’s ability to scrutinise closely these clauses. Nevertheless, I claim 
that the DPRRC’s capacity to enhance constitutional deliberation is undermined by its 
thin take on questions of constitutional principle. A more assertive soft legalistic 
approach to LSCG that puts forward clear and broad statements of principle would 
provide clear guidance to government departments and improve the deliberative 
impact of the DPRRC. 
1. Methodological considerations: flexibility and deliberation 
The DPRRC’s approach to legislative scrutiny of clauses that delegate powers is 
flexible and sensitive to the circumstances of each case. The committee does not 
involve itself in abstract reasoning based on first identifying principles and then 
developing its normative consequences.1 Nor has it adopted any fixed criteria or red 
lines by which to judge delegated powers. Instead, the DPRRC has preferred a more 
cautious and pragmatic approach.2 The committee is right to recognise that delegated 
powers are an inevitable need in the context of the modern state.3 The decision to avoid 
abstractions and instead adopt a flexible approach suggests that the DPRRC remains 
attached to the methods of the traditional constitution. This means that for the DPRRC, 
the so-called doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty” will continue to operate as the 
medium for an ever-evolving distribution of law-making powers between government 
and Parliament. Although implicitly the DPRRC may try to uphold the UK 
                                                
1 The core of the DPRRC’s approach is to conduct “line by line” scrutiny of any provision of a 
bill delegating powers and providing for degrees of parliamentary scrutiny. DPRRC’s 
recommendations, therefore, are context specific. The DPRRC, on the other hand, has an overwhelming 
focus on legislative scrutiny, rather than on inquiries into more general themes (Daniel Gover and Meg 
Russell, Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and Influence in the Making of British law 
(Oxford University Press 2017), 211). Inquiries do offer an opportunity for the DPRRC to look at wider 
developments and review its substantive criteria. In fact, in those rare instances in which it has 
conducted inquiries, criteria have been updated. See for instance, Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (HL 2014-15, 39); 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Response to the Strathclyde 
Review (HL 2015-16, 119). 
2 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (HL 1992-93, 57), at paras 
23, 25 and 30; Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Response to the 
Strathclyde Review (n 1), at paras 20-22. 
3 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2) at para 1. More 
recently, making the same point, see Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special 
Report: Response to the Strathclyde Review (n 1), at para 19. 
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Parliament’s position as the main law-maker, this committee thinks that it is ultimately 
for Parliament to decide about the appropriate boundaries between primary and 
secondary legislation. 
This methodological decision raises questions. The very creation of the DPRRC 
was motivated by “considerable disquiet over the problem of wide and sometimes ill-
defined order-making powers which give Ministers unlimited discretion”.4 There was 
a concern about the need to secure consistency on parliamentary assessments both on 
scope of powers and degrees of parliamentary scrutiny.5 There were different paths to 
follow. The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process (“Rippon 
Committee”) suggested an outline for a set of constitutionally suspicious cases.6 The 
DPRRC followed this suggestion. 
The point of these cases is to send a warning, as that of an amber traffic light. 
Government departments will know in advance about Parliament’s disquiet over 
certain developments in terms of both scope of delegated powers and degrees of 
parliamentary scrutiny. The message has two targets. On the one hand, at ministerial 
level, the government will be aware that clauses delegating powers may hinder the 
passage of the bill –most likely at the upper chamber. On the other hand, departmental 
lawyers and legislative drafters must seriously consider delegation in these cases, and 
produce appropriate justification.7 These civil servants will have to make a convincing 
case for delegation and for the chosen degrees of parliamentary scrutiny in a delegated 
powers memorandum attached to each bill incorporating clauses that delegate powers.8 
Otherwise they may risk a negative DPRRC’s report. The memorandum performs an 
essential role because is the starting point for the DPRRC’s assessment.9 The 
                                                
4 Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House, (HL 1991-92, 35-I), at para 133. 
5 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, 12th Report: Review of the Committee's 
Work (HL 1993-94, 90), at para 7. 
6 Hansard Society Commission on The Legislative Process, Making the Law (Hansard Society 
1992), at paras 266-67. The Commission was chaired by Lord Rippon, who later became the chair of 
the DPRRC’s predecessor (then known as the Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers). 
Note the report of the Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House (n 4), at para 133, 
which seems to suggest that the government was open to reach consensus on what should be the 
exclusive domain of primary legislation. 
7 For evidence that government departments are thinking carefully about delegated powers at the 
policy-making and legislative drafting stages, see Chapter Six. 
8 This commitment was undertaken by the government upon creation of the DPRRC. See Select 
Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), at para 20. 
9 The DPRRC has been concerned about the quality of the memoranda, and exerted pressure on 
government to improve this document. The committee has published clear guidelines about good 
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DPRRC’s analysis will be contained in a report assessing the issues raised by each 
clause delegating powers and defining degrees of parliamentary scrutiny. These 
reports are an input to improve the quality of debate and awareness between peers and 
MPs about the issues raised by these clauses. They also may prompt responses from 
the government, either in the form of additional justification, or may even trigger an 
amendment to address the DPRRC’s concerns. This operation as a reason-demanding 
body, as well as its ability to enlighten debate and prompt government’s responses 
shows that the DPRRC has a positive impact on constitutional deliberation, specially 
among civil servants. 
The DPRRC’s list of constitutionally suspicious cases is broad and flexible. 
There are no red lines. The committee took the decision to avoid abstractions and fixed 
criteria in its very first report.10 Different stakeholders were sceptical about adopting 
such criteria.11 As noted earlier in Chapter Three, there is a case for flexibility and 
pragmatism when assessing clauses delegating powers. This, among other reasons, 
because there are no clear and undisputed constitutional benchmarks against which to 
assess the constitutional implications of delegated powers, and because constitutional 
committees lack authority to state the normative contents of the British constitution. 
Among the reasons for this highly cautious approach, are that the DPRRC does not 
consider itself as the ultimate arbiter of the appropriateness of delegated legislation. 
The DPRRC thinks of its role as providing food for thought to the Lords.12 It leaves to 
the upper chamber to decide how far to press the government for constitutional 
                                                
practices on the memoranda. See Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special 
Report: Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (n 1), Appendix 4. For an earlier version of these 
guidelines, see Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Guidance for Departments on 
the Role and Requirements of the Committee (May 2010). 
10 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), at paras 23 and 25. 
11 The House of Lords Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House (“Jellicoe 
Committee”), which proposed the creation of the DPRRC, had anticipated that members to the DPRRC 
were unlikely to adopt rigid criteria (Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House (n 4), at 
para 133).  
In evidence to the DPRRC, the government argued against the idea of having rigid criteria. See 
Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), at para 8. Along the same 
lines, see Hansard Society Commission on The Legislative Process (n 6), at paras 266-67. 
12 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated 
Powers Memoranda (n 1), at para 4. 
As the predecessor of the DPRRC’s put it, “our primary aim is to inform debate”. See Select 
Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), at para 32. See also Select 
Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, 12th Report: Review of the Committee's Work (n 5), 
at para 2. 
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concerns to be addressed. Another relevant point is that the Jellicoe Committee warned 
that fixed criteria and a strong vigilant role could be confused with opposition to 
government policies, and therefore used for partisan purposes.13 This is a complex 
point for the upper chamber. The Lords must exercise self-restraint to secure its 
political survival.14 Peers, given their unelected nature and lack of democratic 
legitimacy, try to keep their role confined to operate as a revising chamber that rather 
than making a political point, addresses more technical or constitutionally inspired 
concerns raised by government legislation.  
In sum, the DPRRC has opted to promote political self-restraint and engagement 
in a process of reasoning, justification and assessment. Whether this approach can have 
a relevant impact on constitutional deliberation also depends on the substantive 
reasons that underpin the DPRRC’s assessments. I turn to this issue in the next 
subsections. 
2. The committee’s substantive criteria 
As explained above, the DPRRC has laid down a set of constitutionally 
suspicious cases. These cases demand from the government special justification, both 
in terms of the scope of delegated powers and of degrees of parliamentary scrutiny. 
This section accounts for and discusses the DPRRC’s criteria. 
Starting with the question about the scope of delegated powers, it is possible to 
classify the DPRRC’s set of cases into three main categories. Firstly, two cases attract 
the DPRRC’s main concerns, namely, skeleton bills and Henry VIII powers. Here, the 
DPRRC has not provided any substantive guidelines about their appropriateness. 
Instead, it has focused on demanding justification. Regarding skeleton bills, the 
DPRRC requires a “full explanation” and warns that they will “attract careful 
consideration”. Likewise, in the case of Henry VIII powers, the DPRRC demands them 
to be “clearly identified” and “fully justified”. A second category comprises content-
dependent cases. Here again the DPRRC refrains from providing any substantive 
guidelines. Instead, it expresses that it will be “particularly vigilant” over them. The 
DPRRC includes among these cases bills granting ministerial powers to decide on 
                                                
13 Select Committee in the Committee Work of the House (n 4), at para 133. 
14 Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Guardians: The House of Lords’ The Constitution Society 
<https://consoc.org.uk/publications/constitutional-guardians-the-house-of-lords/> accessed 8 January 
2018. 
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matters of policy and issues of principle; taxation; powers to create criminal offences 
and define penalties; and to interfere with vested rights or legal relations. Finally, there 
is a third group of more tailored cases that may capture the DPRRC’s attention. Among 
these are powers to define or amend key expressions of a bill; delegated powers 
concerning Scotland and Wales; powers to make provisions by directions, or in codes 
or guidance; delegation to a person or body other than ministers; and, in general, any 
unusual or novel delegation.15 As in the former cases, there are no substantive 
guidelines as to when and how these cases may be justified. 
The DPRRC has also defined cases of parliamentary oversight that may raise 
constitutional concerns. Initially, the DPRRC borrowed its criteria from the Brooke 
Committee’s report.16 By contrast to the DPRRC’s approach to the legitimate scope of 
delegated powers, here there are clear guidelines about when the affirmative procedure 
should apply. According to the Brooke Committee, the affirmative procedure should 
apply to cases where delegated powers substantially affect provisions of Acts of 
Parliament; impose or increase taxation or other financial burdens on the subject; or 
raise statutory limits on the amounts which may be borrowed or lent or granted to 
public bodies. Finally, it should apply to powers involving considerations of special 
importance, such as the creation of new varieties of criminal offences of a serious 
nature. Later, the DPRRC developed its own take on Henry VIII powers. It went on to 
say that a presumption in favour of the affirmative procedure would apply to such 
powers.17 This continues to be its position,18 although the DPRRC recognises that the 
                                                
15 There have been instances in which the DPRRC, rather than identifying constitutionally 
suspicious cases, has provided examples in which delegation is acceptable. Take for instance the case 
of Henry VIII powers to make incidental, consequential and similar provision in Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee, Henry VIII Powers to Make Incidental, Consequential and Similar 
Provision (HL 2002-03, 21). 
16 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), Appendix III. 
The Joint Committee on Delegated Powers (“Brooke Committee”) was created in 1972 by the 
House of Commons Procedure Committee. Between 1971 and 1973, it published three reports on 
parliamentary scrutiny of delegated powers.  
17 Ibid, at para 31. 
18  The presumption also applies to Henry VIII powers to make incidental, consequential and 
similar provision (Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Henry VIII Powers to Make 
Incidental, Consequential and Similar Provision) (n 15). For more contemporary statements, see 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Guidance for Departments on the Role and 
Requirements of the Committee (n 9), at paras 16-7; Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (n 1), Appendix 4, at paras 35 
and 37. 
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negative procedure may be appropriate in certain instances.19 On the other hand, the 
DPRRC has also made a significant contribution by criticising the variety of 
strengthened scrutiny procedures to which exceptionally wide Henry VIII powers are 
subject to. Noting that there are asymmetries between the additional safeguards in 
different procedures,20 the DPRRC has recommended consistency for the future.21 
The cases outlined above, both in terms of scope of delegated powers and 
degrees of parliamentary scrutiny, flow from four different reports. The first 
articulation was contained in the very first DPRRC report, dating back to 1992.22 It 
then took 18 long years for the DPRRC to revisit its criteria, and provide a new list of 
cases.23 Four years later, in the context of a special inquiry into the quality of delegated 
powers memoranda, the DPRRC revisited again and updated its previous criteria.24 
Finally, there is a fourth instance in which the DPRRC, without being all-inclusive, 
discussed some problematic cases of delegation.25 By looking at these four instances, 
it is possible to identify an evolution in the DPRRC’s thinking. While at the very 
beginning, the DPRRC opted for setting out quite general cases, as its scrutiny work 
developed, it set out more tailored cases. For instance, while the first report included 
cases of delegation on matters of principle and issues of policy, such cases are absent 
in subsequent formulations of cases. By contrast, a list of more tailored cases was 
developed in those later reports. Another trend is that the DPRRC has refined its views 
on delegated powers and criminal law. Finally, the DPRRC has developed its own 
criteria on parliamentary scrutiny of Henry VIII powers. 
3. Assessment 
The main question in terms of my assessment is whether the DPRRC has built a 
body of cases that relies on precedent and principle. This, with a view to send a clear 
                                                
19 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, 12th Report: Review of the 
Committee's Work (n 5), at paras 22-4. 
20 For instance, consultation, laying of supporting documents, and powers of veto by select 
committees. 
21 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Strengthened Statutory 
Procedures for the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers (HL 2012-13, 19). 
22 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2). 
23 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Guidance for Departments on the Role 
and Requirements of the Committee (n 9). 
24 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated 
Powers Memoranda (n 1), Appendix 4. 
25 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Response to the 
Strathclyde Review (n 1). 
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message to ministers, civil servants, legislative drafters, Law Officers, MPs and peers 
about the appropriate scope of delegated powers, and about appropriate degrees of 
parliamentary scrutiny. I employ this benchmark because if there are no clear common 
grounds upon which the DPRRC can launch a constitutional conversation among 
bureaucratic actors, peers and elected politicians about the issues raised by delegated 
legislation, the DPRRC’s capacity to improve deliberation is undermined.  
The first point to make is that the DPRRC has not engaged in a constitutional 
exploration of the issues raised by delegated legislation. As Meg Russell has argued, 
the DPRRC has pushed on the small questions, rather than on the big ones.26 The 
DPRRC has refrained from identifying the underlying constitutional principles that 
inspire its criteria. As the DPRRC’s list of cases has evolved from general to more 
tailored cases, the DPRRC’s deeper constitutional views have become even harder to 
identify. Furthermore, a line by line scrutiny technique focused on the special 
circumstances of the case has also undermined the DPRRC’s ability to engage with 
general principles and broader guidelines. The lack of an external, academic, legal 
advisor may also be a relevant factor preventing the DPRRC from engaging in broader 
constitutional debates about the issues raised by delegated legislation.27 Instead, it has 
favoured a more black letter approach and a line-by-line scrutiny technique. 
The second point is a more normative one. There are good reasons to be cautious 
when approaching an ever-evolving area of the British constitution, such as the 
distribution of law-making powers between Parliament and the government. 
Nevertheless, as argued in Chapter Three above, this is not an obstacle to the 
development of clearer constitutional standards to assess delegated powers. Without 
being overly prescriptive, the DPRRC could adopt a soft and nuanced legalistic LSCG 
conception and set out broad statements of principles with core normative content, but 
sensible to the circumstances of each case. The DPRRC has avoided that path, despite 
the fact that, as part of its scrutiny work, this committee is required to have a concept 
                                                
26 Evidence by Professor Megan Russel given to the Lords’ Secondary Legislation Committee 
inquiry on the Strathclyde Review. See Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Response to the 
Strathclyde Review: Effective Parliamentary Scrutiny of Secondary Legislation (HL 2015-16, 128). See 
full reply to Q37, Oral and Written evidence, 23, 24-5. 
27 The DPRRC employs parliamentary lawyers working at the Counsel to the Chairman of 
Committees. See Andrew Kennon, ‘Legal Advice to Parliament’ in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry 
and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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of the constitution.28 Hence, the DPRRC scrutinises regulatory reform orders created 
by means of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 (herein, “LRRA”). 
Among the safeguards imposed by this act, section 3 provides that the DPRRC must 
assess whether or not a regulatory reform order makes changes of constitutional 
significance. This shows that constitutional arguments are not alien to the DPRRC’s 
working practices. Section 3 LRRA requires the DPRRC to have a concept of the 
British constitution, and an idea of its different principles, values, rules and practices, 
both political and legal.29 In other words, it is part of the DPRRC’s work to engage 
with constitutional arguments. There is no reason in the context of regulatory reform 
orders for the DPRRC to engage in questions of constitutional principle, while in the 
context of clauses delegating powers it refrains from doing so.  
Arguably, the DPRRC has had an ambiguous position on these matters. 
Recently, on account of developments in terms of the scope of delegated powers, the 
DPRRC argued that the UK needed to “re-set the boundary between primary and 
delegated legislation”.30 On its view, “successive governments have attempted to 
relegate too many important policies to delegated legislation, leaving too little on the 
face of the bill”.31 However, it has argued that it will not adopt stricter criteria.32 In its 
view, the criteria and advice is available, but it has not been followed by ministers and 
officials. The challenge, according to the DPRRC, is how to secure government 
compliance with the available criteria. These two views are somewhat contradictory, 
because the first one assumes the need to start from scratch, and to set up new tougher 
criteria; while the latter retains the status quo in terms of substantive criteria and 
focuses on its dissemination and on other procedural arrangements. 
Following this route, the DPRRC has made some procedural proposals, most of 
them targeting the government’s internal procedures. Hence, in its response to the 
Strathclyde Review, the DPRRC suggested procedural changes to improve not only 
the quality of the memoranda, but more fundamentally, the way in which delegated 
                                                
28 I am grateful to Professor Adam Tucker for suggesting me this point. 
29 Tarunabh Khaitan, ‘'Constitution' as a Statutory Term’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 589, 
598-601. 
30 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Response to the 
Strathclyde Review (n 1), at para 2. 
31 Ibid, at para 22. 
32 Ibid, at paras 40 and 56. 
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powers thinking takes place during earlier stages of the policy making and drafting of 
legislation.33 In addition, the DPRRC sent a strong message to government, insisting 
on the need for proper justification when its criteria is engaged. It went on to say that 
if not satisfied with the memoranda, the DPRRC may require the minister to provide 
justifications in person. In addition, the DPRRC went on to say that it would consider 
asking the House for a “scrutiny reserve”. This means that the committee stage at the 
Lords should be parked to give enough time for the committee to take oral evidence 
and to report to the House.34 
The DPRRC has certainly made a significant point. To deal with delegated 
powers in a more constitutionally respectful way, the government should improve its 
internal procedures and practices. However, its contention that criteria and advice are 
available, and therefore this is just a matter of government willingness to comply, is 
not fully convincing. There is some evidence pointing in the opposite direction. In 
2014, providing evidence to the DPRRC, the then First Parliamentary Counsel 
expressed that there were no clear principles agreed by all relevant actors on the 
question about degrees of parliamentary scrutiny.35 These remarks by the head of the 
office in charge of drafting legislation may well have been influential in the DPRRC’s 
decision to revisit its criteria in 2014.36 However, later in 2016, on evidence to the 
Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Ruth Fox argued that there was no 
consensus among bill teams in different government departments on the boundaries 
between primary and secondary legislation. The obstacle to consensus was the lack of 
sufficient dissemination of parliamentary committees’ thinking on the matter. In her 
view, tackling this problem required establishing clear boundaries.37 It seems to me 
that Fox has identified a key problem. The DPRRC has not recognised that 
dissemination of the criteria among government departments will do little if the criteria 
                                                
33 Ibid, at paras 51-4, 56, 60 and 65. The report reminded that many of these improvements had 
already been discussed and agreed with the government two years before. See Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (n 1), at para 
24. See also paras 29-32 and Appendix 4, Part II. 
34 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Response to the 
Strathclyde Review (n 1), at para 48. 
35 See reference in Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: 
Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (n 1), at para 33. The full intervention is available in Richard 
Heaton’s reply to Q15, Oral and Written Evidence, 26. 
36 Ibid, Appendix 4. 
37 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Response to the Strathclyde Review (n 26), see 
remarks by Dr. Ruth Fox in her reply to Q15, Oral and Written evidence. 
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are not clearly defined in the first place. As noted above, the DPRRC’s criteria are so 
flexible that even if there is better dissemination among government departments of 
this criteria, this will not result in civil servants having a clear idea about what the 
committee expects from them. Clearer guidelines, grounded on principle and 
precedent, will send a strong message to government. The DPRRC has recognised the 
need to start a constitutional conversation about the appropriate boundaries of 
delegated legislation. However, it is making only a limited contribution to that 
conversation. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The DPRRC’s stance suggests that it will remain attached to its working 
practices, in line with the flexibility of the traditional constitution. No changes are 
expected in terms of a more assertive criteria, or a deeper engagement with the more 
theoretical questions raised by delegated powers. Despite this, it is fair to say that the 
DPRRC has improved internal governmental checks on delegated powers, and 
enhanced Parliament’s capacity to hold ministers to account for their legislative 
proposals.  
The question that arises is whether the DPRRC could do more to reverse the 
qualitative and quantitative trends on delegated powers. These have remained 
unaltered, if not exacerbated, despite twenty years of DPRRC’s contribution. 
Legislation continues to delegate significant powers on matters of principle and policy, 
including Henry VIII powers. On the other hand, deep dissatisfaction over the 
effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms persists. Certainly, the DPRRC 
should not be blamed for this. However, delegated powers continue to be at the 
forefront of constitutional concerns,38 and there is agreement that something needs to 
be done about it. It is then worth asking whether the DPRRC should do more, for 
instance, by way of adopting more assertive substantive criteria, and therefore 
                                                
38 Adam Tucker, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’ in Alexander Horne and 
Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018); James Chalmers and 
Fiona Leverick, ‘Criminal Law in the Shadows: Creating Offences in Delegated Legislation’ (2018) 38 
Legal Studies 221; Lord Judge, ‘A Judge's View on the Rule of Law’ (Bingham Centre for the Rule of 
Law, 2017)  
<https://www.biicl.org/documents/1637_2017_05_11transcript_of_lord_judges_speech_3.pdf?showd
ocument=1> accessed 15 September 2017; Ruth Fox and Joel Blackwell, The Devil is in the Detail: 
Parliament and Delegated Legislation (Hansard Society 2014); N. W. Barber and Alison Young, ‘The 
Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and Their Implications for Sovereignty’ [2003] Public Law 
112. 
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pursuing a soft legalistic LSCG conception.39 I have suggested that the answer to this 
question is affirmative. The DPRRC should be a relevant voice in the constitutional 
debate about resetting the boundaries between primary and secondary legislation.  
As things stand, the DPRRC will not be a relevant voice in this debate. The 
answer to questions about the fundamental principles governing the distribution of 
law-making powers between Parliament and government will have to be found 
elsewhere. The SCC has recently made a significant contribution to this matter in its 
inquiry into the legislative process.40 Perhaps other arrangements may be preferred. 
Consider for instance Russell’s proposal to create a Joint Committee of both Houses 
that puts down some statements of principle to establish the appropriate boundaries of 
delegated legislation.41 Russell’s proposal raises a final point. The challenges that 
delegated powers raise for contemporary constitutional practice are mainly due to the 
nature of the British constitution. If the UK had a written Constitution setting clear 
boundaries between primary and secondary legislation, the work of the DPRRC would 
look quite different. Since this is not the case, the committee works on “thin air”. In 
that context, perhaps the key point regarding Russell’s proposal is that any workable 
solution to the problem of delegated powers requires involving the Commons in 
reaching some sort of consensus. In the meantime, despite the DPRRC’s contributions, 
delegated powers will remain a fundamental feature of the British legal system, and 
will continue to be at the forefront of constitutional concerns. 
III. The Select Committee on the Constitution 
This section discusses how the SCC approaches the UK constitution, and what 
sort of LSCG conception it prefers. I will argue that the SCC’s remit covers a wide 
range of constitutional matters. However, it is fair to say that the focus is primarily on 
                                                
39 Note that by looking at the evolution of the DPRRC, it is possible to identify sometimes a 
more assertive language. Originally the DPRRC thought it should only “call the House’s attention”. 
However, slowly, it felt more confident to employ more assertive language. In certain cases, it bluntly 
qualifies delegation as “inappropriate”, or it expresses the urgency of the matter by employing similar 
language (for instance, the DPRRC is “strongly of the view…”). See Select Committee on the Scrutiny 
of Delegated Powers, First Report (n 2), at paras 13-5. Cf Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee, Special Report: Response to the Strathclyde Review (n 1), at paras 22 and 31-9. 
40 Select Committee on the Constitution, The Legislative Process: The Delegation of Powers 
(HL 2017-19, 225). 
41 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Response to the Strathclyde Review (n 26). See 
Professor Megan Russel reply to Q37, Oral and Written evidence, 23, 24-5 and reply to Q38, Oral and 
Written evidence, 26. 
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the institutional and power generational dimensions of the constitution, rather than on 
more substantive limits on the exercise of law-making powers. From the point of view 
of LSCG conceptions, there are two ways to think about the SCC’s work. Firstly, as a 
mechanism to foster constitutional deliberation in the process of constitutional change. 
In this first view, the SCC employs a conception of constitutional deliberation. 
However, when it engages with the content of these reforms, it may contribute to 
constitutional construction and development. Secondly, the SCC also operates as a 
“constitutional scrutiniser”. Here, the SCC’s work is more complex. Its remarks are 
directed towards improving constitutional deliberation, but in certain cases the SCC 
incorporates legal reasoning and rationalizations, moving closer to a legalistic 
conception. 
 Despite this, it should be noted that the SCC is cautious to frame its 
recommendations as the result of an analysis of government legislation based on either 
“constitutional benchmarks” (or standards), or as prudential “constitutional” reasons. 
1. The committee’s approach to the constitution 
The SCC’s remit is wide-ranging, as it covers all matters of constitutional 
significance. Within this domain, it is fair to say that this committee has focused on 
the institutional and power-distributive aspects of the constitution, rather than on the 
substantive – and hence, morally controversial– limitations over Parliament’s 
legislative powers. Consider firstly the very definition of the constitution that the SCC 
adopted in its first report. In the committee’s view, the constitution creates institutions, 
defines its competences and regulates inter-relations between them, and their 
relationships with the individual.42 Note secondly that the SCC identified five central 
tenets of the constitution. Only one of them may place substantive limits on law-
making powers, namely, the rule of law and the rights of the individual.43 Yet, two 
further qualifications are needed. On the one hand, SCC’s legislative scrutiny on 
constitutional grounds has focused on issues raised by retrospective legislation, the 
protection of legal certainty,44 and the control of government’s discretionary powers. 
                                                
42 Select Committee on the Constitution, First Report: Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of 
Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001-02, 11), at para 20. 
43 Ibid, at para 21. 
44 Jack Simson Caird, Robert Hazell and Dawn Oliver, The Constitutional Standards of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Edition (The Constitution Unit, November 
2017), 6 and 7. 
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The SCC does not commit to a thick and substantive conception of the Rule of Law. 
On the other hand, while the SCC argues that the rights of the individual are a central 
tenet of the constitution, it usually defers any human rights assessment to the JCHR. 
For this reason, the SCC usually makes brief remarks on human rights matters, with a 
focus on civil liberties and criminal law, legal safeguards, access to justice, due process 
and procedural fairness.45 This position should be contrasted with the fact that the SCC 
usually engages with delegated powers, despite the fact that there is a dedicated 
constitutional committee scrutinising each clause delegating powers at the Lords, 
namely, the DPRRC.  
The SCC’s methodological approach to LSCG differs from that of the DPRRC 
discussed above. The SCC does not conduct LSCG of every single constitutional issue 
raised by legislation.46 Nor is its work structured on the basis of a “line by line” 
scrutiny of the bill. To select which issues are worth scrutinising, the SCC applies a 
“significance” test. This means that the SCC subjects to LSCG only those bills which 
raise issues that are a principal part of the constitution and important questions of 
principle. Bills that are subject to scrutiny are not discussed in detail. Instead, the SCC 
may examine the broader “constitutional principles underlying legislation”. There 
have been some quite detailed instances of scrutiny, when the significance of the issues 
demands it. A final point worth making is that the SCC avoids making political 
remarks about the merits of government policies, except in the most exceptional 
circumstances. This also serves the purpose of preventing internal divisions and 
minority opinions in its reports.  
These broad conceptual and methodological definitions serve a variety of 
purposes. Two are worth mentioning. Firstly, a focus on institutions protects the SCC’s 
position as a legislative scrutiniser, because by not focusing on those more contentious 
aspects of the constitution, it does not need to commit to any of its competing 
theoretical accounts examined in Chapter Three above. Debates about rights or 
substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law are more akin to misinterpretation on 
political grounds. The same is true for the overarching assessment of the architecture 
of the bill, rather than on the more detailed assessment of each of the bills’ provisions. 
                                                
45 Ibid, 13-5. 
46 Select Committee on the Constitution, First Report: Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of 
Reference and Method of Working (n 42), at paras 22, 27, 35, 36 and 54. 
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Since this detailed scrutiny may have an impact on the government’s ability to pursue 
its policies, it risks being confused with policy scrutiny or providing ammunition that 
may be instrumentalized by the opposition or backbenchers. These definitions have 
contributed to building the SCC’s reputation as a technical and independent scrutiniser 
of broader constitutional developments that seeks to “enlighten” peers and MPs 
debates.47 
However, it is difficult to appreciate the impact of these fundamental decisions 
without looking at the SCC’s work in discrete areas of constitutional significance. 
Looking at these areas also throws into relief the different ways in which the SCC 
develops its work. For the SCC, in comparative terms, is the most versatile and 
complex UK constitutional committee. 
2. The committee as a deliberative agent to foster rationality in constitutional 
reform 
There is a first strand of SCC work. It is in line with the idea of those who 
proposed the creation of the SCC. They thought that a Lords’ constitution committee 
should act as an agent to promote the rationality of constitutional change in the UK. 
The idea was to address some of the issues raised by the UK style of constitutional 
reform. For this reason, to fully understand the contribution of the SCC to 
constitutional deliberation, it is valuable to begin by looking closely at the peculiarities 
of constitutional change in the UK. 
The starting point is the obvious contention that the UK lacks entrenched 
constitutional rules, and a special constitutional reform procedure. On the other hand, 
the British mentality has historically been attached to empiricism, avoiding deeper 
debates about underlying principles. This has resulted in the UK developing a 
distinctive style of constitutional change. Reforms tend to be piecemeal and pragmatic 
in approach. Issues are addressed as problems arise.48 This style of constitutional 
reform raises a number of problems, which shall be discussed below. 
Firstly, it creates a vacuum in the process of constitutional reform. Sometimes 
significant constitutional reform demands additional measures to secure political 
                                                
47 See SCC’s own description of its legislative scrutiny function at Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Sessional Report 2009-10 (HL 2010-11, 26), appendix 1. 
48 Robert Blackburn, ‘Constitutional Amendment in the United Kingdom’ in Xenophon 
Contiades (ed), Engineering Constitutional Change (Routledge 2013), 362. 
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legitimacy for the changes. The British are aware of this problem, and at different 
times, have filled this vacuum by different means.49 Secondly, this style of 
constitutional reform may work insofar as the pace of constitutional change remains 
slow. However, as explained in Chapter Three above, since 1997, there have been 
numerous and significant constitutional reforms. That year, New Labour was elected 
with a manifesto that included an energetic programme of constitutional reform.50 As 
the pace of change increased, the issues of UK style constitutional reform were thrown 
into sharp relief. New Labour reforms altered various strands of the constitution 
without an overarching principle or master plan inspiring them. Instead, that 
government undertook each reform as “pragmatic responses to political pressures and 
perceived problems”.51 This agenda of constitutional modernisation has continued 
under the Coalition and then two subsequent Conservative governments. Claims about 
the lack of a masterplan remain valid.52 However, constitutional modernization 
remains unfinished business. As argued in Chapter Three above, relevant aspects of 
the constitution continue attached to the traditional evolution of political conventions, 
practices and understandings. The complex interplay between traditional and modern 
components has led to what has been called “a state of constitutional unsettlement”.53 
It may well be that the flexible constitution risks becoming dysfunctional once the 
pace of change increases and the cumulative effect of constitutional reforms call into 
question its internal coherence.  
Thirdly, this background –namely, the lack of a special procedure for 
constitutional change and the increasing speed at which reform has taken place– raises 
                                                
49 Neil Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529, 543-4. 
Among these mechanisms are consultation (publication of green and white papers, and draft 
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Acts 1999 and 2000, and The Greater London Authority Act 1999), access to public information 
(Freedom of Information Act 2000), membership to the House of Lords (House of Lords Act 1999) and 
political system (Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000). 
51 Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (Oxford University Press 2003), 3; Matthew 
V. Flinders, Democratic Drift Majoritarian Modification and Democratic Anomie in the United 
Kingdom (Oxford University Press 2010). 
52 See for instance Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Future of 
the Union, Part One: English Votes for English Laws (HC 2015-16, 523), at para 69. 
53 Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (n 49). 
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concerns about the quality of parliamentary scrutiny. An energetic programme of 
constitutional reform puts significant pressure over parliamentary resources and time. 
In Chapter Two, I already noted the difficulties that parliamentarians face in grasping 
difficult issues of constitutional significance because they only have general 
knowledge, face time constraints, and limitations to gather information and to access 
experts’ advice. On the other hand, historically, the combined effect of the 
Westminster parliamentary system and the “first past the post” electoral system has 
been a majority government that controls both the legislative agenda and the Commons 
through different techniques such as programming, a strong presence of cabinet at the 
lower chamber, and the whip system. Although the recent experiences of a coalition 
and a minority government suggest that this trend may be changing,54 many of the 
most significant reforms since 1997 were introduced by strong governments and 
approached by Parliament along party lines. These factors are likely to have a negative 
impact on the quality of legislative scrutiny and do raise significant questions about 
the capacity of Parliament to approach constitutional change. The challenge, then, is 
to look for meaningful measures to secure that MPs and peers think through the 
underlying principles of the proposed changes, and their impact on the broader 
constitutional framework. 
The genesis of the SCC was driven by these concerns. New Labour was elected 
in 1997 with a significant majority. This secured the success of its constitutional 
reform programme. A Royal Commission was appointed to discuss the Reform of the 
House of Lords (“Wakeham commission”). Its report, published in January 2000, 
expressed anxiety over the enormous power the government had in the legislative 
process. Members advocated for the Lords to play a special role preventing the 
government to bring about “controversial and ill-considered changes to the 
constitution without the need to secure consensus support for them.”55 In their view, 
the Lords should act as a counterbalance to government’s powers, ensuring “that 
changes are not made to the constitution without full and open debate and an awareness 
of the consequences”.56 The Wakeham commission recommended the creation of the 
                                                
54 For discussion, see Chapter Two above. 
55 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future (Cm 4534, 
January 2000), at para 3.10. See also para 3.6. 
56 Ibid, at para 5.5. 
 128 
SCC to assist the Lords in this function.57 The concern of the Wakeham commission, 
therefore, was to promote the procedural value of deliberation in the process of 
constitutional change. This commission did not have in mind a substantive agenda. 
The SCC mission was not to secure specific legislative outcomes or to promote certain 
substantive principles or values. Instead, it was about improving the quality of debate 
in the context of constitutional reform. The idea was to enhance constitutional 
deliberation at Parliament.  
Consequently, the SCC was conceived as a measure to address the issues raised 
by UK style constitutional reform, namely incremental, piecemeal and pragmatic 
reform, undertaken at a rapid pace, pushed through by a strong government that 
controls the Commons. I emphasise this because cases of revolutionary and wide-
ranging constitutional reform require additional measures to provide political 
legitimacy.58 Wide consultation, including green and white papers, draft bills, 
constitutional conventions, citizens’ assemblies, joint parliamentary committees, royal 
commissions and constitutional referendums may provide political legitimacy to 
significant constitutional changes. The point is not to deny the potential contribution 
that the SCC could make to this sort of constitutional reform. Instead, the aim is to 
understand the constitutional context in which the SCC is set to operate. A Lords-
based committee will not be able to provide political legitimacy to wide ranging and 
revolutionary constitutional reform. Other measures may be needed to convey the 
voice of the nation assembled.  
There are cases in which the SCC has promoted the quality of constitutional 
reform. In these cases, the SCC’s efforts focus both on the content of the bill and on 
procedural measures to secure the quality of constitutional reform. The first strand is 
performed by asking the government whether it has thought through the issues raised 
by bills, and whether the constitutional policy inspiring change is sound. When the 
SCC performs this sort of scrutiny, it is not only contributing to constitutional 
deliberation, but also to the process of constitutional construction and development. 
                                                
57 Ibid, at para 5.21:  The committee should “take full account of all the constitutional 
implications when considering proposed legislation and scrutinising the actions of the executive.” See 
also recommendation 21. 
58 For discussion about procedural requirements for the adoption of a written constitution in the 
UK context, see Jeff King, ‘The Democratic Case for a Written Constitution’ (2019) 7 Current Legal 
Problems 1, 25-30. 
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Consider for instance the SCC’s assessment of the provisions of the Wales Bill 2017,59 
which changed the scope of powers of the Welsh Assembly from a conferred to a 
reserved powers model. Within a reserved model, there were different possible 
instantiations. The SCC argued that the particular configuration of limits on the 
Assembly’s legislative competence was complex and considerable.60 This, in 
circumstances that by comparison, a reserved powers model should be far simpler than 
a conferred powers model.61 The SCC claimed that there was no clear rationale 
inspiring the Bill’s scope of devolved powers.62 It also noted that there is a significant 
number of reserved matters and other matters subject to complex legal tests that are 
far from straightforward. The SCC argued for a clearer scheme which prevents judicial 
litigation over the extent of the Welsh Assembly’s powers.63 In this way, the SCC 
contributed by signalling alternative paths and technical reasons to change the way the 
government proposed to implement the reserved powers model in Wales.  
The second strand is fulfilled, for instance, by making the case for proper 
consultation. Consider the case of the Fixed-terms Parliaments Bill.64 The Bill was 
subject to a lengthy and highly critical report. The SCC concluded “that the origins 
and content of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature 
assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand.”65 For 
the SCC, a bill of this constitutional significance should have been subject to 
consultation, including green and white papers, and to a proper assessment of the pros 
and cons. A second example is provided by the SCC’s inquiry into the process of 
constitutional change, which sets out some key features that pre-legislative stages of 
constitutional bills should undertake, the need to avoid rushing these bills through 
parliament, and the desirability of subjecting this legislation to post-legislative 
scrutiny.66 In this line of thinking, the SCC has recommended that significant 
                                                
59 Wales HC Bill (2016-17) [5]. 
60 Select Committee on the Constitution, Wales Bill (HL 2016-17, 59), at para 24. 
61 Ibid, at para 34. 
62 Ibid, at para 33. 
63 Ibid, at paras 40, 50. 
64 Fixed-term Parliaments HC Bill (2010-11) [64]. 
65 Select Committee on the Constitution, Fixed-term Parliaments Bill (HL 2010-11, 69), at para 
20. 
66 Select Committee on the Constitution, The Process of Constitutional Change (HL 2010-11, 
177). 
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constitutional legislation should not be fast-tracked.67 This recommendation is based 
on the contention that there should be enough time for proper debate about the wider 
constitutional implications of legislation. However, as noted in Chapter Three above, 
the SCC develops broad and flexible constitutional standards, thereby recognising that 
certain circumstances political considerations may demand rushing legislation 
through. For instance, the SCC accepted the government’s contention that such 
conditions were met in the case of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Bill 2017.68 Despite this exception, it is fair to argue that when the SCC focuses the 
process of constitutional change, it seeks to ensure the quality of constitutional 
deliberation, both at government and Parliament. A final example is the SCC’s 
proposal to create a Joint Committee to assess the impact of English Votes for English 
Laws (“EVEL”) both in England and in the devolved regions.69 Here, the SCC 
proposed a concrete procedure to review the operation of EVEL, it suggested criteria 
against which to assess the trial operation of EVEL, and a longer period before the 
review takes place to get a better sense about the operation of the system. 
To sum up, a first approach to the SCC is to think of its contribution as an agent 
to promote rational debate in the context of constitutional reform. In this view, the 
SCC will be expected to enhance the quality of debate through its reports, as well as 
to insist on the need for a coherent development of the constitutional framework, and 
for appropriate procedural measures to secure the quality of the reform. 
                                                
67 Select Committee on the Constitution, The Process of Constitutional Change (n 66), at para 
99. 
68 European Union (Withdrawal) HC Bill (2017-19) [5]. See Select Committee on the 
Constitution, European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill (HL 2016-17, 119). Note that in the 
case of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017, questions about timing were a major concern for 
the SCC, especially regarding the domestication of EU law. The SCC argued that a constraint timetable 
would mean that significant transfers of powers would be needed from Parliament to the Executive. On 
the SCC’s view, this should not affect Parliament’s ability to subject statutory instruments to proper 
scrutiny, despite the special circumstances. This was anticipated in Select Committee on the 
Constitution, The 'Great Repeal Bill' and Delegated Powers (HL 2016-17, 123). Once the bill was 
introduced, concerns about fast tracking this domestication process would be focused on the proposed 
made affirmative procedure. See Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill: Interim Report (HL 2017-19, 19); Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill (HL 2017-19, 69). 
69 Select Committee on the Constitution, English Votes for English Laws (HL 2016-17, 61), at 
paras 35-47. 
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3. The committee as a constitutional “scrutiniser” 
There is an alternative way of thinking about the SCC’s contribution to 
legislative scrutiny. This alternative mode of operation is not incompatible with the 
first one. Most government legislation is not approached as a reform to the 
constitution, but as legislation that has an impact on the constitution, or that raises 
issues of constitutional significance, or alternatively, that is of constitutional 
significance. In these cases, the SCC examines government legislation from a 
constitutional point of view. To understand the nature of this scrutiny, I will refer back 
to the discussion held in Chapter Three above about the nature of the non-legal limits 
on Parliament’s supreme legislative powers. I will show that in certain instances the 
SCC adopts constitutional standards as abstract and rational statements of principle, in 
line with soft legalistic conceptions. In contrast, in other cases, most notably when it 
comes to the territorial constitution, it adopts a prudential approach closer to Martin 
Loughlin and Stephen Tierney’s conception of non-legal limits on Parliament’s 
supreme powers. 
Firstly, in a significant number of cases, the SCC identifies abstract normative 
constitutional principles, values and other standards, and employs them to assess the 
constitutional “legitimacy” of government proposals. This strand of work is an 
example of soft, liberally informed, legalism, inspired in the conception of non-legal 
limits on Parliament’s supreme powers articulated by Mark Elliott70 and others. It is 
also reflected in the idea of constitutional standards, as developed by Robert Hazell, 
Dawn Oliver and Jack Simson Caird.71 From the SCC’s point of view, the idea of 
                                                
70 Mark Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereingty in a Changing Constitutional Landscape’ in Jeffrey 
Jowell and Colm O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019); 
Mark Elliott, ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multidimensional Constitution’ in David Feldman and Mark 
Elliott (eds), Cambridge Companion to Public Law (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
71 Hazell, Oliver and Simson Caird have compiled a set of constitutional principles distilled from 
SCC’s reports. There have been three editions of this code. See Jack Simson Caird, Robert Hazell and 
Dawn Oliver, The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
1st Edition (The Constitution Unit, January 2014); Jack Simson Caird, Robert Hazell and Dawn Oliver, 
The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Edition 
(The Constitution Unit, August 2015); Simson Caird, Hazell and Oliver, The Constitutional Standards 
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Edition (n 44). 
These authors also make the case for the official adoption of this code by the SCC. See Robert 
Hazell and Dawn Oliver, ‘The Constitutional Standards of the Constitution Committee: How a Code of 
Constitutional Standards Can Help Strengthen Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (The Constitution Unit, 22 
November 2017)  <https://constitution-unit.com/2017/11/22/the-constitutional-standards-of-the-
constitution-committee-how-a-code-of-constitutional-standards-can-help-strengthen-parliamentary-
scrutiny/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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constitutional standards requires a two-step contribution. Firstly, to identify and flesh 
out general constitutional principles, values and other standards; and secondly, to 
apply those standards as benchmarks to assess government legislative proposals. 
However, these two steps are mutually adjusted, as these standards are drawn from 
particular instances of legislative scrutiny. Constitutional standards, to be effective, 
need to rely on precedent and must be grounded on clear statements of principle, and 
be applied more or less uniformly. Although the SCC has not codified a set of 
constitutional standards, its LSCG work does rely on precedent. The SCC has a 
coherent view of certain aspects of the constitution. This is most likely facilitated by 
the profile of its members, and by its highly learned academic advisors (see Chapter 
Two above). The very fact that the Constitution Unit at UCL has been able to publish 
an unofficial code of constitutional standards based on the SCC’s recommendations 
and reasoning illustrates that precedent and consistency are features of the committee’s 
work. 
Nevertheless, the SCC faces a challenge to disseminate its constitutional 
thinking. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter Six below, by contrast to the JCHR 
and the DPRRC, the Guide for Making Legislation contains no mention whatsoever 
of the SCC’s constitutional standards.72 This chapter has already discussed the 
importance of disseminating properly articulated criteria. I noted that this enables 
constitutional committees to send a clear message to those in charge of government’s 
internal checks on the constitutionality and legality of proposed legislation. These 
clearly articulated standards or criteria reinvigorate internal deliberation at 
governmental level, and may also promote political self-restraint. For these reasons, it 
should be noted that the capacity of the SCC to operate as a deterrent tool at the early 
stages of policy development and legislative drafting is undermined by the lack of a 
code of constitutional standards. It is also undermined by the lack of a dedicated 
“constitutional” memorandum. Despite this, one relevant advantage, when compared 
to the DPRRC for instance, is that the SCC regularly conducts inquiries on significant 
constitutional matters. In those instances, the SCC draws on its past experience, and 
sometimes sets out constitutional standards. Reports on inquiries are a good source of 
                                                
72 There is only a reference to the SCC’s report on Fast-track Legislation in Cabinet Office, 
Guide to Making Legislation (July 2017), appendix C. 
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information on the SCC’s thinking,73 and may provide an alternative –if imperfect– 
path to disseminate its constitutional standards. 
It is worth illustrating the SCC work assessing government legislation against 
constitutional standards by providing a few examples. Take firstly the introduction of 
a permanence clause for the devolved government and Parliament in Scotland and 
Wales. The SCC criticised this inclusion. It went on to say that the “sovereignty of 
Parliament” was the “fundamental principle of the UK constitution”.74 The SCC 
argued that the provisions incorporating sections 63A and 1A in the Scotland Act 1998 
and the Government of Wales Act 2006, respectively, introduced external procedural 
requirements to limit the UK Parliament’s own competence. The SCC warned that this 
may give rise to confusion as to the role of the courts in enforcing this provision, and 
as to the nature of the UK Parliament’s legislative supremacy. In the SCC view, this 
fundamental principle should not be called into question.75 
A second example of an area where the SCC has developed standards is that of 
delegated legislation.76 Take for instance the case of Henry VIII clauses.77 The SCC 
thinks that these clauses should be limited to the “minimum necessary”, grounded on 
a “pressing need”, and have a specific purpose clearly stated on the face of the Bill. In 
the case of widely drafted Henry VIII powers to “make consequential amendments”, 
the SCC’s recommendation was to identify the provisions that require amendment in 
a schedule, instead of leaving this matter to ministerial discretion.78 On the other hand, 
SCC’s overarching concern has been to protect Parliament’s ability to fulfil its scrutiny 
role in the legislative process. Delegated powers dealing with matters of constitutional 
significance is a case in point. In the Civil Contingencies Bill,79 the SCC expressed 
                                                
73 See for instance, Select Committee on the Constitution, The Legislative Process: The 
Delegation of Powers (n 40). 
74 Select Committee on the Constitution, Scotland Bill (HL 2015-16, 59); Select Committee on 
the Constitution, Wales Bill (60). 
75 Select Committee on the Constitution, Scotland Bill (n 74), at para 36; Select Committee on 
the Constitution, Wales Bill (n 60), at paras 11-14. 
76 In its most recent inquiry into delegated powers, the SCC employed the concept of 
“constitutional standards” to identify the principles that are developed in the scrutiny of clauses 
delegating powers. See Select Committee on the Constitution, The Legislative Process: The Delegation 
of Powers (n 40). 
77 Simson Caird, Hazell and Oliver, The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution, 3rd Edition (n 44). 
78 Select Committee on the Constitution, Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and 
Credit Union Bills (HL 2008-09, 158), at paras 20-1. 
79 Civil Contingencies HC Bill (2003-04) [14]. 
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concerns over the possibility of emergency powers being interpreted as to disapply or 
modify the Human Rights Act 1998, and argued there should be an express provision 
to prevent this.80 Likewise, in the Identity Cards Bill,81 the SCC was anxious about the 
bill’s skeleton structure. There was ministerial discretion to decide different stages of 
the scheme, including a shift from a voluntary to a compulsory phase. The SCC argued 
this should be a matter for primary legislation, because it involved a fundamental 
change, of a constitutional nature, in the relationship between the individual and the 
state.82 The last example is the passage of the controversial Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Bill.83 The SCC took a strong stance, arguing that Henry VIII powers, either 
deliberately or inadvertently, should not bring about constitutional change.84 The SCC 
recommended the imposition of a substantive limit on these powers, namely, that 
legislative reform orders could not change “constitutional fundamentals”. In addition, 
it recommended procedural assurances to prevent delegated powers from making 
constitutional changes. The text of the Act did include such a provision (see clause 
3(2)(f) Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006). 
However, there are instances where rather than abstract constitutional principles, 
the SCC seems to be thinking more in terms of prudential reasons to maintain the unity 
of the nation, and prevent conflict. This alternative view, as argued in Chapter Three 
above, focuses on understanding the constitution as a set of evolving arrangements 
that distribute and re-distribute powers according to changing political circumstances. 
These prudential reasons are not intended to be normative in the sense that 
constitutional standards as abstract principles are. Instead, they are approached as 
principles of good governance that seek to enhance the authority of political power. 
When the SCC employs prudential reasons, is not adopting a liberal normative 
approach. Instead, it is promoting constitutional deliberation based on a more holistic 
understanding of the constitution. I shall provide three examples of this approach to 
LSCG. Consider first the debate about the notification of withdrawal from the 
                                                
80 Select Committee on the Constitution, Civil Contingencies Bill (HL 2003-04, 114), at paras 
13-6. 
81 Identity Cards HC Bill (2004-05) [30]. 
82 Select Committee on the Constitution, Identity Cards Bill (HL 2004-05, 82), at para 12. 
83 Legislative and Regulatory Reform HL (2005-06) 109. 
84 Select Committee on the Constitution, Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill (HL 2005-06, 
194), at paras 21 and 52ff. 
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European Union, which took place after the Brexit referendum. The SCC’s report 
advocated for Parliament to have a role in triggering article 50 of the Treaty on the 
European Union.85  Furthermore, the SCC called Parliament’s attention to the need to 
find ways to be involved in the negotiations with the EU and the approval of the final 
deal.  These initial concerns have since shaped the SCC’s work scrutinising the Brexit 
process. There has been an insistence on the need to secure a relevant role for 
Parliament to provide political legitimacy to the Brexit process. In this sense, the three 
reports that the SCC published on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, followed 
this prudential consideration by insisting on the need to curtail both the scope of 
delegated powers, and to improve the mechanisms for parliamentary oversight. I will 
provide a more detailed account of this in Chapter Seven. As far as this chapter is 
concerned, the point is that these interventions have been inspired by the need to 
maintain a fundamental feature of the British constitution, namely, government’s 
accountability to Parliament. 
A second example of these prudential considerations directed to the maintenance 
of the unity of the state are the SCC’s views on the development of the territorial 
constitution. The SCC has issued several reports both on inquiries and on legislative 
scrutiny. In these reports, the SCC has insisted on the significance of the devolved 
settlements for “the constitutional stability of the Union”.86 The lack of formality in 
the structures and practices of inter-governmental relationships and the asymmetries 
between different devolved settlements,87 among other issues, have featured 
prominently within the SCC’s concerns. The committee has also insisted on the knock-
on effects that a piecemeal and ad hoc approach to the reform of the territorial 
constitution has had on the different constituent nations. The overall message is one 
about the need for the central government at Whitehall and Westminster to treat the 
territorial constitution with respect, and not to take the Union for granted. Hence, to 
                                                
85 Select Committee on the Constitution, The Invoking of Article 50 (HL 2016-17, 44). 
86 Consider for instance: Select Committee on the Constitution, The Union and Devolution (HL 
2015-16, 149); Select Committee on the Constitution, Scotland Bill (n 75); Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Wales Bill (n 60); Select Committee on the Constitution, English Votes for English Laws 
(n 67); Select Committee on the Constitution, Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of 
Functions) Bill (HL 2017-19, 211). 
87 See for instance Select Committee on the Constitution, Wales Bill (n 60), at paras 25-33. 
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understand the significance that consensus-building with devolved nations has for the 
maintenance of a healthy Union.  
Finally, I shall recall an example previously mentioned in Chapter One, namely, 
the case of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) 
Bill.88 The problem raised by the lack of an Executive in Northern Ireland is that it 
generated a vacuum of power in the devolved institutions. The government decided to 
empower civil servants in Northern Ireland to take certain policy-decisions and to keep 
the devolution institutions running. This raised a significant accountability problem, 
as civil servants are not elected and their chains of accountability depend on Northern 
Ireland Ministers, who are absent. On the other hand, a retrospective clause validated 
the exercise of powers by civil servants during this period where Northern Ireland has 
lacked an executive. Moreover, the bill was fast-tracked, despite its constitutional 
significance. Although the SCC considered these decisions to be problematic from a 
constitutional point of view, it went on to recognise the serious “political 
circumstances in Northern Ireland”, in particular, the significant impact that the 
suspension of devolved institutions has had for the territorial constitution. The SCC’s 
recommendation to accept government proposals is therefore grounded on prudential 
reasons to maintain the integrity of the devolution settlement, rather than on more 
abstract constitutional principles of legal and political accountability.89 
4. Concluding remarks 
The SCC is concerned with the constitutional implications of legislation. Its 
scrutiny work has focused on the institutional and power generating aspects of the 
constitution, rather than on identifying substantive limits on the exercise of law-
making powers. Its approach generally is to consider only highly significant 
constitutional matters, focusing on the broader architecture of the bill, rather than 
matters of detail. 
The SCC has made relevant contributions on a wide range of issues, such as 
devolution, delegated powers, Brexit and the legislative process. In certain cases, the 
SCC operates as an agent for rational debate in the process of constitutional change. 
In these cases, the SCC has discussed the content of the reform, with a view to improve 
                                                
88 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) HC Bill (2017-19) [425]. 
89 As the SCC explicitly recognises in Select Committee on the Constitution, Northern Ireland 
(Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Bill (n 86), at para 24. 
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the quality of these proposals. It also has proposed procedural measures to prevent ill-
conceived constitutional reform, such as consultation, and argued against fast-tracking 
constitutional change. This strand of work is not inspired by a given substantive 
conception of the constitution. Instead, it seeks to promote constitutional deliberation 
in the legislative process. Yet, there are instances in which the SCC makes substantive 
recommendations, which suggest that in certain cases this committees collaborates 
with constitutional construction and development. 
Secondly, there are other instances in which the SCC assesses the impact that 
legislation has on the constitutional framework. In some of these instances, LSCG 
involves identifying and applying abstracts formulations of principle, values and other 
standards as benchmarks to assess the constitutional legitimacy of government 
legislation. This is an example of the SCC performing soft legalistic LSCG. This 
scrutiny work is inspired by the protection of core normative constitutional principles 
and ultimately aims at political self-restraint, both at governmental level and at 
Parliament. Finally, there are instances where rather than abstract and idealized 
constitutional thinking, the SCC employs constitutional considerations as prudential 
reasons to protect the authority of political branches of government. Concerns about 
the political legitimacy of certain processes, balancing abstract principles against 
political circumstances and pressing social needs, maintaining the integrity of the state, 
and preventing further political conflict. In these cases, the SCC maintains its focus on 
improving deliberation, but moves away from a more juristic analysis grounded on 
abstract principles. 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the DPRRC and the SCC have approached the 
challenges that LSCG raises in this jurisdiction in distinctive ways. On the one hand, 
the DPRRC has refrained from engaging in deeper constitutional questions about the 
theoretical underpinnings of its work. It has not developed broad constitutional 
standards with core normative content, nor has explored the constitutional issues that 
the distribution of law-making powers between Parliament and the executive raises. 
The DPRRC’s methodology corresponds to a highly flexible case by case detailed 
analysis of each clause delegating powers. By contrast, the SCC looks at the broader 
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architecture of the bill and explores its consequences for the constitutional framework. 
With less emphasis on moral substantive limits on the exercise of political powers, this 
committee focuses on the institutional and power-distributive aspects of the 
constitution. The SCC covers a wide range of subject matters, such as devolution, 
delegated powers and the legislative process, among others. 
From the point of view of LSCG, the DPRRC operates as a reason demanding 
body with places a burden of justification on the government. It has also contributed 
to a more informed debate in Parliament, and prompted political self-restraint on the 
part of the government. Nevertheless, its thin take on questions of constitutional 
principle has undermined the contribution of the DPRRC to constitutional 
deliberation. The evidence suggests that the DPRRC has not sent a clear message to 
officials at government departments and at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
about the principles that should govern delegated legislation.  
In contrast, the SCC is a complex and dynamic constitutional committee, from 
the point of view of LSCG. In certain instances, it acts as an agent of constitutional 
deliberation and rational action in the process of constitutional change. At times, the 
SCC discusses and makes concrete proposals in the context of constitutional change, 
thereby contributing to the process of constitutional construction and development. In 
other cases, the SCC operates as a constitutional scrutiniser. Most of this scrutiny work 
is an example of a soft and nuanced legalistic conception of LSCG. Broad statements 
of principle with core normative content are employed to assess the legitimacy of 
legislation. Nevertheless, in other cases, most notably in the context of devolution, the 
SCC employs constitutional standards not as normative considerations, but as 
“prudential” reasons directed at enhancing the political authority of legislation, 
protecting the integrity of the State and preventing political conflict. This shows that 
in contrast to the DPRRC, the SCC is a complex and multifaceted constitutional 
committee. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: RESISTING 
THE PRESSURES CREATED BY THE DECISION TO DOMESTICATE 
CONVENTION RIGHTS? 
I. Introduction 
This chapter continues the effort initiated in Chapter Four to articulate how the 
United Kingdom (“UK”) constitutional committees assess the constitutional 
implications of legislation in the context of the UK constitution. As in the case of 
Chapter Four, this chapter draws on the three theoretical conceptions of legislative 
scrutiny on constitutional grounds (“LSCG”) developed in Chapter One. The chapter 
also resumes the general discussion started in Chapter Three on how these models 
operate in the context of the British constitution. 
The main claim of this chapter is that the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(“JCHR”) is in an uncomfortable position as a legislative scrutiniser. This is due to 
contradictory pressures arising from the decision to domesticate Convention rights by 
means of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). On the one hand, the JCHR is 
expected to prevent legislation found in breach of Convention rights. Yet, on the other, 
there is an expectation that Parliament will develop its own approach to human rights 
protection, and that the JCHR will assist the legislature in this task. This inherent 
ambiguity in the HRA sends contradictory messages about which conception of LSCG 
the JCHR should prefer. While the first expectation requires the JCHR to employ a 
legalistic conception; the second is akin to a conception of constitutional deliberation 
and of constitutional construction and specification. The constitutional framework, 
therefore, does not provide a clear guidance to the JCHR. I will argue that the choice 
of conception will ultimately depend on broader normative debates about the 
constitutional philosophy of the British constitution, the nature of human rights 
standards (moral or political), and the question about who should be the guardian of 
human rights. I will address these issues as the chapter approaches each alternative 
conception available for the JCHR. The chapter will also discuss whether these 
conceptions are reflected in the JCHR’s working practices. I will show that the JCHR 
approaches human rights assessments from a legalistic conception of LSCG, although 
it has evolved from a hard to a soft approach to legalism. Nevertheless, I will also 
claim that by engaging in a dynamic of justification and assessment with the 
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government, and providing a forum for experts and stakeholders, its working practices 
also foster constitutional deliberation. 
The last section of the chapter briefly discusses the issue of inter-institutional 
relationships between Parliament and courts when it comes to political responses to an 
adverse human rights judgment. Here, I make two points. Firstly, I argue that political 
branches of government are subject to significant political and legal pressures to 
implement adverse human rights judgments. The political and constitutional 
circumstances are such that adverse human rights judgments have become “de facto” 
binding. There is little room for disagreement. However, the second point is that 
compliance with an adverse human rights judgment is a matter of degree. There are no 
clear legal benchmarks to assess political responses to implementation of adverse 
judgements. This is reflected in the fact that the implementation process is subject 
mainly to political, rather than legal controls. I conclude this last section by assessing 
the JCHR’s contribution to this field.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Sections II, III and IV address the issue of 
LSCG. Sections II and III address each contradictory pressure. Section IV explores the 
deliberative credentials of a legalistic approach to legislative scrutiny on human rights 
grounds. Finally, section V addresses the issue of legislative responses to adverse 
human rights judgments. 
II. Convention rights and the expectation for compliance 
Since its creation, the JCHR has considered itself the appointed parliamentary 
guardian of Convention rights.1 There are historical and institutional reasons for this. 
The New Labour government’s proposal to create a human rights committee at 
Parliament came about during the pre-legislative stage of the HRA.2 In their 
consultation paper, Jack Straw and Paul Boateng argued that Parliament and 
government departments should ensure that legislation complied with Convention 
rights and other international human rights obligations of the UK.3 This was partly a 
                                                
1 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Bill 
(2001-02, HL 37, HC 405), at para 5. 
2 Paul Boateng and Jack Straw, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour's Plans to Incorporate the 
European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law’ [1997] European Human Rights Law Review 
71, 79 and Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill 
(Cm 3782, October 1997), at para 3.6. 
3 Boateng and Straw, ‘Bringing Rights Home’ (n 2), 78. 
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reaction to concerns over UK’s international reputation on human rights matters.4 The 
objective of the HRA’s drafters, therefore, was to introduce a culture of political 
compliance with Convention rights, both at government and Parliament. 
The HRA’s scheme incorporated structural conditions to develop this culture of 
political compliance. Firstly, instead of adopting an indigenous bill of rights, it opted 
for domesticating Convention rights, thereby granting constitutional pedigree to 
European human rights values. Secondly, by providing a role for courts in finding 
legislation in breach of Convention rights (section 4 HRA), it introduced incentives 
for government to prepare “Convention rights-proof” legislation to minimise the risk 
of legal challenges to their policies. Thirdly, the HRA sought to secure “closer scrutiny 
of the human rights implications of new legislation and new policies”5 at the political 
level. It did so by imposing on the relevant minister the duty to issue a declaration of 
compatibility with Convention rights prior to passage of any bill (section 19 HRA). In 
this way, the HRA framed internal government assessments on Convention grounds. 
Finally, the HRA created a fast-track remedy that granted prospective Henry VIII 
powers to ministers to change primary legislation if found in breach of Convention 
rights. As Janet Hiebert has convincingly demonstrated, the point of these institutional 
arrangements was “to alter the very norms of legislative decision-making”6 by 
permeating Convention rights throughout the political decision-making process, both 
at government and Parliament.  
In line with these considerations, the JCHR interpreted its role as that of 
protecting Convention rights.7 This meant securing a culture of political compliance 
                                                
4 Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK (Oxford University Press 2003), 124. 
5 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home (n 2), at para 1.18. See also 
para 3.1. 
6 Janet Hiebert and James Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2015), 236. 
7 The JCHR does not limit its analysis to Convention rights. It has also considered other legal 
standards. It has assessed legislation against common law rights (David Feldman, ‘Parliamentary 
Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ [2002] Public Law 323, 344; Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Justice and Security Bill (2012-13, HL 59, HC 370)). It has also considered 
international human rights law instruments other than Convention rights (Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, First Report Criminal Justice and Police Bill (2000-01, HL 69, HC 437); Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in the 2001-2005 Parliament (2004-05, HL 112, HC 552), 
at para 43; Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home (n 2), at para 3.7; Aileen 
Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ in 
Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 
2015), 119). 
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with Convention rights. In other words, in this view, the objective of the JCHR’s 
legislative scrutiny work is to prevent Parliament from enacting legislation in conflict 
with Convention rights, and therefore to secure that the UK keeps peace with its 
international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).8 This conception puts the JCHR’s role closely connected with domestic 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). Its reports and 
recommendations should diminish the likelihood of domestic courts issuing 
declarations of incompatibility, and the ECtHR finding primary legislation in breach 
of Convention rights. To achieve this, the JCHR must develop legal expertise, follow 
up case law developments, keep pace with settled interpretations and precedents, and 
master legal reasoning techniques such as proportionality analysis, deference and 
margin of appreciation. In addition, the JCHR must monitor the implementation of 
adverse human rights judgments both at international and domestic level. In sum, a 
mix of political expectations and institutional considerations led the JCHR to adopt a 
legalistic conception of LSCG. 
As discussed in Chapter One, there are two variants of the legalistic conception, 
namely, one that is uncompromised and court-centred (hard) and another that is more 
independent, nuanced and evidence-based (soft). The JCHR adopted a hard legalistic 
conception during the first five years of its legislative scrutiny work.9 It followed case 
law, and where there was no clear precedent, the JCHR tried to second-guess how 
courts would assess legislation, mimicking their reasoning techniques. JCHR’s reports 
contained a “risk-assessment” about the possibility that legislation could be found in 
breach of Convention rights.10 The assessment was based on a spectrum, which ranged 
                                                
8 Article 46 ECHR. 
9 Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional 
Watchdog’ (n 7); 127; Tom Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review with a Democratic Charter of Rights’ in 
Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - 
Sceptical Essays (Oxford University Press 2011), 468-69; Michael Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Rights in the United Kingdom: Assessing the Work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (2009) 
44 Australian Journal of Political Science 41, 46; Francesca Klug and Helen Wildbore, ‘Breaking New 
Ground: The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Role of Parliament in Human Rights 
Compliance’ [2007] European Human Rights Law Review 231, 243ff; Danny Nicol, ‘The Human 
Rights Act and the Politicians’ (2004) 24 Legal Studies 451. 
10 The JCHR went on to say: 
“(…) we see our role as to alert both Houses of Parliament on occasions when we consider that 
they might be at risk of proceeding in a manner which will later be held by a court to be incompatible 
with the ECHR” (Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in the 2001-2005 
Parliament (n 7), at para 44). 
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from “significant risk” to “no appreciable risk” of incompatibility with Convention 
rights. The JCHR thought this was the right approach, as “ultimately it is for the courts 
to decide whether legislation is compatible with Convention rights”.11 In other words, 
so pervasive was the court-centred assessment, that the JCHR did not feel confident 
enough to reach its own conclusion over legislative compatibility with Convention 
rights. 
Different reasons explain this approach. Firstly, the political decision to avoid a 
debate about the sort of rights the British people should have, and instead to 
domesticate Convention rights came at a price. As noted above, the HRA imposed 
“structural conditions to ensure that domestic legislation complies with European 
convention principles”.12 In these circumstances, the JCHR thought it had little choice 
but to recognise the ECtHR as the authoritative interpreter of these rights, and assumed 
its role as protector of the UK’s good record of compliance with its international 
human rights law obligations. Its core task in legislative scrutiny, consequently, would 
be to prevent Parliament from enacting legislation that breaches Convention rights. 
Other reasons are more pragmatic.13 As mentioned above, the government had 
incentives to secure Convention-proof legislation to avoid legal challenges to their 
policies. By signalling possible challenges, the JCHR’s voice could become more 
influential at government. A court-centred approach could also prevent divisions 
among committee members and promote an independent and non-partisan profile of 
the JCHR. Hence, the JCHR could gain a reputation before both Houses of Parliament 
as a technical and highly learned advisory committee. 
                                                
The government adopted the same approach. Bills teams were encouraged to perform 
proportionality assessments, and take into account case law on Convention rights and other international 
human rights law instruments when developing policy and drafting the human rights memorandum for 
the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee (Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation 
(July 2017), at paras 12.6, 12.11 and 12.33). Hiebert’s research demonstrated that government 
assessments are framed in terms of the likelihood of policies being successfully challenged before 
courts. Civil servants conduct a risk assessment, which in most cases employs a 50% chance threshold 
(See Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 6), 280-81 and 286-87).  
11 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in the 2001-2005 Parliament 
(n 7), at para 45. Notably, the JCHR then added, in brackets: “(although, of course, under the scheme 
of the HRA, it is theoretically possible for Parliament to disagree with the assessment of compatibility 
by the domestic courts)” (the emphasis is mine). 
12 Martin Loughlin and Stephen Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth of Sovereignty’ (2019) 81 Modern 
Law Review 989, 1009. 
13 Aruna Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication 
(Oxford University Press 2012), 157-58. 
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However, this legalistic and court-centred approach was not without criticism. 
Some legal scholars thought the JCHR went too far. In their view, the JCHR was 
neglecting the differences between the functions and responsibilities of courts and 
Parliament.14 The latter was a forum for deliberation and contestation, and it was not 
clear whether a court-centred approach would have a positive impact on the quality of 
parliamentary debates. A risk-based assessment of the human rights implications of 
legislation, for instance, does not leave enough room for an evidence-based assessment 
of government’s justification. On the other hand, the risk-based assessment pays little 
attention to Parliament’s ability to bring different voices to the debate, engage in a 
merits-based debate, draw from different sources of information, and address 
polycentric issues.  
In addition, other scholars committed to liberal moral values have argued that 
judicial protection of human rights is limited. This is reflected in certain techniques 
that domestic courts employ to defer to political branches of government on 
institutional, epistemic or democratic grounds. Likewise, at international level, the 
ECtHR recognises a wide margin of appreciation to member states. A court’s 
protection is inherently subsidiary and minimalistic. A robust human rights protection 
–this view argues– would require Parliament to go beyond case law. Hence a court-
centred approach could reduce rights to their minimum content. Finally, their criticism 
contended that a court-centred approach was likely to privilege Convention rights over 
non-enumerated rights, and individual rights over social and economic rights.15 
Overall, critics thought the JCHR’s insistence to mimic courts would diminish 
Parliament’s ability to contribute to human rights protection. 
On account of this criticism, the JCHR moved away from “attempting to second-
guess the view which courts might take”.16 Frome herein, the JCHR has come closer 
to a soft legalistic conception of LSCG. This change was the result of a process of 
                                                
14 Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional 
Watchdog’ (n 7), 127; Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), 70ff. 
15 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), 71. 
Keith Ewing and John Hendy have recently criticised the JCHR approach to legislative scrutiny 
of the Trade Union Bill 2016 (Keith Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Failure 
of Human Rights’ (2016) 45 Industrial Law Journal 391, 398-403). They note that a light touch 
protection of social rights in this case comes from JCHR’s insistence to stick to human rights case law.  
16 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in 2007 and the State of 
Human Rights in the UK (2007-08, HL 38, HC 270), at para 20. 
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critical reflection on its own working practices, with a view to the forthcoming 2005-
10 parliamentary session.17 The JCHR commissioned a report to Professor Francesca 
Klug,18 who herself was critical of the court-centred approach. On account of this 
review, the JCHR committed itself to write shorter and more focused reports that 
would address the most significant issues in an accessible way for non-lawyers, 
avoiding lengthy reports of the relevant law.19 Since then, scholars recognise that 
progress has been made, with the JCHR developing a more independent voice,20 which 
is evident from reading its more recent reports.21 
Although this is a significant development, it does not amount to a fundamental 
change of the JCHR’s working practices. The JCHR continues to frame its analysis on 
legal considerations. The key components of the JCHR’s assessment are Convention 
rights, securing legal certainty, and assessing the necessity and proportionality of the 
measures.22 There are multiple reasons for this emphasis on legal analysis. Firstly, the 
JCHR continues to consider itself as a guardian of Convention rights, as explained 
above. Secondly, the JCHR relies heavily on its legal advisers and clerks. The legal 
advisers exert significant influence over the JCHR’s scrutiny agenda through a sifting 
procedure, which is conducted on Convention rights grounds.23 In addition, they 
                                                
17 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (2005-06, HL 
239, HC 1575). 
18 Her findings were published in Klug and Wildbore, ‘Breaking New Ground’ (n 9). 
19 Consider also that Murray Hunt, legal adviser of the JCHR between 2004 and 2017, was 
himself a critic of the original JCHR’s approach. See Jonathan Morgan, ‘Amateur Operatics: The 
Realization of Parliamentary Protection of Civil Liberties’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam 
Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford University Press 
2011), 440. 
20 Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 9), 469; Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ (n 7), 127; Alexander Horne and Megan Conway, 
‘Parliament and Human Rights’ in Alexander Horne and Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law 
(2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 238. 
21 Take for instance Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: The Sanctions and 
Anti-Money Laundering Bill (2017-19, HL 87, HC 568), where although the analysis is mainly framed 
in terms of legal safeguards, necessity and proportionality assessment, the JCHR based its conclusions 
mainly on its own analysis and remarks made by expert witnesses.  
A remarkable example of a more independent voice is found in the JCHR’s disagreement with 
the House of Lords’ judgments on control orders in the cases of JJ and MB. For an account, see Adam 
Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and 
Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights - Sceptical Essays (Oxford University 
Press 2011), 35; Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 6), 326-27. 
22 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (n 17), at paras 
4, 29 and 47. 
23 Ibid, at paras 22-23, and 27-42. To decide which bills are subject to full scrutiny by 
membership to the JCHR, legal advisers employ a “significance” threshold and identify “patterns of 
incompatibility”. See also Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of 
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provide advice to the committee members on legislative scrutiny on each individual 
bill,24 and draft reports. Thirdly, as noted above, human rights are contentious issues 
of political morality on which MPs and peers disagree. Given that JCHR’s members 
come from different backgrounds and political loyalties, there will be contested views 
about the role of the state, social rights and individual liberties. This inherent political 
dimension of rights is problematic, since parliamentary select committees try to 
maintain a less partisan and more independent approach to the issues.25 Arguably, a 
legal perspective focused on expert advice, proportionality analysis and case law 
fosters unity among members who disagree about fundamental issues of policy that 
necessarily underpin any debate about human rights. By avoiding divisions, the 
JCHR’s reports may appeal to a wider audience at Parliament. The JCHR’s current 
legal advisers are aware of this issue.26 They have argued that committee members are 
unlikely to go further than courts on matters where there is policy disagreement.27 In 
sum, for several reasons legal considerations frame current JCHR’s legislative scrutiny 
work, and are likely to do so for the time being. 
To sum up, the JCHR has adopted a legalistic model of LSCG. This decision has 
not been haphazard. It is the consequence of political expectations for a compliance-
oriented culture among political branches of government at the time of the JCHR’s 
appointment, as well as other pragmatic considerations. The HRA’s architecture is 
                                                
Constitutional Watchdog’ (n 7), 118-9; Horne and Conway, ‘Parliament and Human Rights’ (n 20), 
239. 
24 See the JCHR’s own account of how it performs legislative scrutiny in Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in the 2001-2005 Parliament (n 7), at paras 47-8 and 52 
(the legal adviser prepares a “note” which operates as the basis for legislative scrutiny). See also Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (n 17), at para 44 (“(…) we 
would aim to give detailed consideration, on the basis of advice from our Legal Adviser, to those bills 
raising significant human rights issues”). 
25 Daniel Gover and Meg Russell, Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and 
Influence in the Making of British law (Oxford University Press 2017), 206 and 211. 
26 Horne and Conway, ‘Parliament and Human Rights’ (n 20), 242, 258, 263. Note that 
Alexander Horne and Megan Conway reply to Ewing and Hendy (see footnote 15 above) precisely 
concedes the point. They go on to argue that the right to association raises significant political issues 
that cause division among their members. On their view, “It is perhaps naïve to imagine that a 
parliamentary committee would go further that the Strasbourg court in relation to such a potentially 
politically contentious issue.” (ibid, 258). 
27 Cf Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 9), 471. Campbell is against the JCHR focusing its 
assessment on legal considerations. He recognises that “Whatever their content, parliamentary human 
rights committees dealing with a democratic charter of rights would have difficult practical choices to 
make, which would generate lively disagreement, increased demand for evidence-based justifications 
for controversial legislation, and wide-ranging enquiries into the human rights issues that are pressed 
upon them.”  
 147 
consistent with this culture. For instance, it domesticated Convention rights; it 
provided a role for courts in finding legislation in breach of them; and it introduced 
political mechanisms during pre-legislative and legislative stages to ensure that 
legislation complies with Convention rights. The JCHR understood its role as being 
the parliamentary guardian of Convention rights. For this purpose, it adopted a 
legalistic conception of LSCG. During its first parliamentary session, the JCHR 
followed a hard legalistic conception, taking the ECtHR as the authoritative interpreter 
of Convention rights, mimicking its techniques and trying to predict its likely 
outcomes. Later, the JCHR’s working practices evolved. The JCHR developed a more 
independent voice in line with a soft legalistic conception. It performed its own 
proportionality assessments and had a more evidence-based analysis.  
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the JCHR only faces pressure 
to secure a culture of political compliance. The HRA was drafted to retain 
parliamentary sovereignty. This introduced, as I will explain below, a different and 
contradictory pressure for Parliament to develop its own voice on human rights 
matters. An emphasis on this alternative pressure provides room for alternative 
conceptions of LSCG. 
III. The expectation for Parliament to develop its own voice 
1. The retention of “parliamentary sovereignty” as a conditioning factor 
The HRA is said to have preserved the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In 
this sense, New Labour did not attempt to create a constitutional revolution by 
incorporating US-style constitutional review. Domestic courts do not have the power 
to strike down legislation. Under the HRA, primary legislation remains valid, despite 
being declared in breach of Convention rights. Declarations of incompatibility by 
courts have a “purely exhortatory” power.28 Rather than a duty to remedy 
incompatibility, political branches have a discretionary power to respond.  Parliament 
retains the final word. Seeking to preserve the central role of parliamentary sovereignty 
doctrine in British constitutionalism and political culture, and to avoid democratic 
                                                
28 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), 4 and 23. 
Furthermore, section 6 HRA provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right. However, the definition of public authority does not 
include Parliament. 
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concerns over the role of the judiciary in the political domain, the HRA opted for a 
middle way model between parliamentary supremacy period, and judicial supremacy. 
For these reasons, the HRA has been described as a “weak-review” model,29 as part of 
a new model of commonwealth constitutionalism,30 and as an “open remedies” 
model.31 
The formal preservation of parliamentary sovereignty is not the only reason to 
emphasise Parliament’s freedom to move away from a legalistic and court-centred 
conception of LSCG. Consider the following additional points. Firstly, the HRA is not 
an entrenched piece of legislation. In principle, it is like any ordinary piece of primary 
legislation, and therefore can be repealed by Act of Parliament. On the other hand, 
Parliament can legislate contrary to Convention rights, insofar as it makes its will 
explicit in the bill. Secondly, even though the HRA domesticated Convention rights, 
the UK continues to be a dualist system. If a claimant is successful before the ECtHR, 
this does not confer her a right under domestic law to enforce the judgment.32 Thirdly, 
the HRA’s white paper stressed that it was for Parliament to decide how it would 
contribute to the task of protecting rights.33 These considerations suggest that both 
Parliament and the JCHR could adopt an alternative conception of LSGC.34  
These considerations take us back to the difficult question about the nature of 
the British constitution. The preservation of parliamentary sovereignty could be 
interpreted as a restatement of the orthodoxy. This view would stress that the HRA did 
not change the central tenets of the UK constitution. The UK constitution retained its 
flexibility and has not embraced abstract reasoning from first principles, as required 
by the legalistic conception. The British empiricist and pragmatic mentality, its strong 
belief in the workings of representative democracy and political accountability 
                                                
29 Mark  Tushnet, ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights - And 
Democracy - Based Worries’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 813. 
30 Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
31 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13). 
32 See R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice and Another [2013] UKSC 63, at para [42] 
(per Lord Mance). 
33 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home (n 2), at para 3.6. 
34 Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 9), 467. For Campbell, the decision to retain 
parliamentary sovereignty even if primary legislation is declared in breach of Convention rights 
provides conclusive evidence that the HRA did not expected the JCHR to second-guess courts.  
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mechanisms have been preserved.  Hence, Parliament retains legislative freedom to 
change settled understandings of rights, and even to act contrary to them.  
The theoretical underpinnings of this view are well known. Legal reasoning will 
not dissolve deep disagreements within our political communities over fundamental 
questions of political morality, such as rights, social justice and public policy.35 
Parliament is a representative assembly with democratic credentials. It is designed to 
take disagreements seriously. It is the place where different views present in society 
deliberate about these matters, by discussing everyone’s perspectives on the issues. On 
the other hand, legislative reasoning ought to remain open to all sort of relevant 
considerations when assessing the human rights implications of legislation. A 
legalistic conception, by contrast, focuses on legal reasoning, which is constrained by 
institutional considerations. Judges must employ the techniques of legal interpretation, 
proportionality and precedent. Ultimately, their arguments will depend on the legal 
validity of the reasons provided in support.36 While this view may accept the relevance 
of the legal dimension of human rights, it will stress that the JCHR should also 
consider other relevant dimensions. These include, for instance, moral, political and 
policy considerations, budget restrictions, possible polycentric effects, and whether 
the scheme of the bill fits within the broader constitutional framework and traditions, 
among others. This requires a more “political” approach to Convention rights. As 
Jonathan Morgan bluntly put it, “the JCHR should be a locus of parliamentary 
resistance to the legal-monopoly-of-wisdom view of human rights”.37 This would 
require the JCHR to consider alternative models of LSCG. The following sections 
explore two alternatives. 
2. A deliberative model for the Joint Committee 
Some supporters of political approaches to human rights have regarded the 
JCHR’s contribution in terms of a model of constitutional deliberation. Tom Campbell, 
for instance, argued that human rights considerations demand going beyond the 
                                                
35 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Clarendon Press 1999), specially 154ff; Grégoire 
Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2009), 
specially 19ff and 150 ff.  
36 For a conception of legal reasoning as a special case of moral practical reasoning, see Robert 
Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (Ruth M. Adler and Neil MacCormick trs, Oxford University 
Press 1989). See also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Judges as Moral Reasoners’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2. 
37 Morgan, ‘Amateur Operatics’ (n 19), 441. 
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“normality of ordinary democratic activities”.38 As explained in Chapter Two, 
mainstreaming human rights among politicians raises significant challenges. It is 
highly likely that human rights considerations will end up overshadowed by political 
and policy considerations. If this is the case, the expectations for a full and 
unconstrained assessment of the human rights implications of legislation advocated by 
the authors referred above will be merely theoretical. Following Campbell’s 
contention, the point of institutional arrangements such as section 19 HRA and the 
appointment of the JCHR is to prioritize human rights considerations among political 
branches of government. Rather than focusing on legislative outputs and substantive 
standards, this view looks at the quality of the legislative procedure. The expectation 
is that human rights should frame parliamentary debates, and by doing so, they may 
improve the quality of “constitutional deliberation”. 
A conception of constitutional deliberation fits the HRA because its scheme 
introduces a dynamic of reason giving and assessment. This flows, on the one hand, 
from section 19 HRA. This section imposes a burden of justification on the 
government, which is fulfilled by means of a statement of compatibility with 
Convention rights, supported by justification contained in a bill’s explanatory notes, 
and in some cases, a human rights memorandum.39 The government must make the 
case for the compatibility of its bills. On the other hand, the JCHR provides a special 
forum for politicians and other stakeholders to engage with human rights 
considerations and critically assess government’s justifications for its legislative 
proposals. The output of the JCHR should be clear and accessible reports containing 
insights about the human rights issues raised by government bills. These reports 
provide parliamentarians substantiation, and may promote a more informed debate40 
and result in stronger scrutiny of the human rights implications of bills. The point is to 
                                                
38 Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 9), 464ff. Pointing out that the JCHR ensures that human 
rights considerations are taken seriously in the legislative process, rather than being ignored altogether, 
see Richard Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions: 
Political Constitutionalism and the Hirst Case’ in Andreas Follesdal, Johan Karlsson and Geir Ulfstein 
(eds), The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes: Legal Political and Philosophical 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2015), 252. Making proposals to enhance the JCHR’s role 
in the legislative procedure, see Morgan, ‘Amateur Operatics’ (n 19), 444. 
39 As the New Labour government put it, section 19 should render the human rights implications 
of a bill more transparent. See Secretary of State for the Home Department, at para 3.2. 
40 Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (n 9), 47; Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights’ (n 21), 24; 
Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ (n 
7), 129. 
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build up a “culture of democratic justification”41 that promotes awareness about these 
issues and political responsibility for decisions contrary to human rights.42 Overall, 
these institutional arrangements could potentially improve the quality of deliberation 
at the legislative process and the quality and legitimacy of legislation. 
Although the JCHR’s approach to LSCG is rather legalistic, a closer look at its 
working practices suggests that some components of constitutional deliberation have 
been incorporated. Firstly, the JCHR critically assesses government bills and demands 
appropriate justification for their impact on human rights values. Since the JCHR 
reviewed its working practices and committed itself to develop a more independent 
voice, it has undertaken a more evidence-based assessment, testing the government’s 
justification.43 Another example of this has been the significant pressure that the JCHR 
has exerted on the government to improve the quality of its justification.44 As a result, 
the government moved away from its initial practice limited to providing bold 
statements of compatibility, and committed itself to publish an assessment of a bill’s 
most significant human rights issues.45 As mentioned above, in most cases, this 
assessment is included in the explanatory notes. Yet, if significant Convention rights 
issues arise, the government will deal with them in a separate memorandum.46 In either 
of these cases, if the JCHR is not satisfied with the government’s justification, it will 
                                                
41 In a similar fashion to the principle of legality, as formulated by Lord Hoffmann in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] UKHL 33, Parliament is sovereign, 
and can choose to “legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights”. Yet, if it chooses so, 
“(…) Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.” 
42 Murray Hunt, ‘Introduction’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), 
Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2015); David Dyzenhaus, ‘What is a Democratic 
Culture of Justification?’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and 
Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2015). 
43 Consider for instance the field of counter-terrorism. In the case of Gordon Brown’s Counter-
Terrorism Bill 2008, the JCHR was extremely critical of the lack of evidence to support his policy to 
increase the period of detention without charge from 28 to 42 days (Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary 
Bills of Rights (n 6), 323). In the debate about Terrorist Prevention and Investigation Measures, the 
JCHR questioned the claim that the UK faced a serious threat from terrorism, a “public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation” (ibid, 333). When scrutinising the Justice and Security Bill 2012, the 
JCHR questioned the government for not providing evidence about the need to use closed material in 
civil proceedings (ibid, 338). This evidence based approach is also reflected in its more recent legislative 
scrutiny work. See for instance Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: The Sanctions 
and Anti-Money Laundering Bill (n 21). 
44 See for instance Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Work of the Committee in 2007 and 
the State of Human Rights in the UK (n 16), at paras 24-30; Joint Committee on Human Rights, The 
Work of the Committee in 2007-08 (2008-09, HL 10, HC 92), at paras 43-6; Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Work of the Committee in 2008-09 (2009-10, HL 20, HC 185), at paras 38-41. 
45 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation  (n 10), at para 11.120. 
46 For instance, in the case of the Immigration HC Bill (2013-14) [110]. 
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demand additional explanations.47 Here, a more fluid communication between civil 
servants and JCHR staff members is a relevant development. These actors hold 
meetings in which the committees’ legal advisers identify matters of concern and make 
further requests for information. In other cases, these requests are submitted in writing 
by the JCHR’s chair to the minister responsible for the bill. Alternatively, the minister 
may be invited to a committee session and questioned.  
Secondly, the JCHR provides a forum for engagement with the broader political 
community. It is common for the JCHR to gather information from experts48 and 
pressure groups, both in writing and/or in oral hearings. These insights enrich JCHR’s 
assessments, and provide an opportunity for the general public to make their voices 
heard. However, an assessment of the JCHR’s contribution to constitutional 
deliberation requires considering other empirical dimensions. Once these dimensions 
are taken into account, a mixed picture emerges. I will discuss this matter in length in 
Chapter Six. As far as this chapter is concerned, suffice to say that a relevant 
component of deliberation is willingness of political actors to change their mind in 
light of the debate and reasons given.49 This means that the corresponding minister 
should consider amending bills in response to JCHR’s remarks and recommendations. 
As will be argued in next chapter, although there are some instances in which 
government’s amendments can be traced back to JCHR’s recommendations, in most 
cases the government insists on its proposals, unless there are prospects of backbench 
rebellions. On the other hand, it is far from clear whether JCHR’s reports and 
recommendations have an impact on parliamentary debates. Some have claimed that 
“references to JCHR reports helped to provoke robust, evidence-based deliberation 
and debate over human rights concerns.”50 However, these authors have also found 
that JCHR’s reports are “discussed more frequently and in greater depth in the House 
                                                
47 Horne and Conway, ‘Parliament and Human Rights’ (n 20), 239ff. 
48 For instance, when it scrutinised control orders, the JCHR gathered information from special 
advocates and made a proposal to introduce additional procedural safeguards for an all-encompassing 
reform of the control orders system (Tomkins, ‘Parliament, Human Rights’ (n 21), 35; Hiebert and 
Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 6), 326-7).  
49 Ron Levy and Hoi Kong, ‘Introduction: Fusion and Creation’ in Ron Levy and others (eds), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
50 Paul Yowell, ‘The Impact of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on Legislative 
Deliberation’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2015), 142. 
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of Lords than in the House of Commons.”51 This provides a more mixed picture about 
the JCHR’s deliberative impact on parliamentary workings. Political and policy 
considerations continue to dominate parliamentary debates at the lower chamber. 
3. Constitutional construction and development 
Political conceptions of human rights, which emphasise reasonable 
disagreement and the legitimacy of Parliament to take decisions about them are also 
compatible with a conception of “constitutional construction and development”. Its 
starting point is that legislatures make a significant contribution to the concrete 
realization of human rights values. This section discusses a recent theoretical 
articulation of how Parliament develops rights, contained in a collective book by 
Grégoire Webber, Paul Yowell, Richard Ekins, Maris Köpcke, Bradley Miller and 
Francisco Urbina (hereafter, “Webber et al”).52 I previously introduced some of its key 
aspects in Chapter One. Here I discuss how they envisage Parliament’s role in 
constitutional construction and explore what the JCHR’s contribution may be under 
this conception. 
A conception of constitutional construction and development advocates for a 
different understanding of the relationship between Parliament and human rights. As 
explained above, the legalistic model puts Parliament and human rights values in 
potential conflict. The relationship between the two is negative. Convention rights 
operate as substantive and legally enforceable constraints on legislation. By contrast, 
the constitutional construction conception claims that legislation is essential for human 
rights to have real existence and impact in our lives.53 To advance this view, Webber 
et al point out that human rights clauses –including Convention rights– are under-
determined, and subject to broad limitation clauses. The mistake of the traditional view 
has been to consider those clauses as “end-states”, when in reality they are merely the 
starting point for an ongoing contestation and democratic negotiation.54 Employing a 
                                                
51 Ibid, 142. 
52 Grégoire Webber and others, Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
53 Recognising the fundamental role of the legislature in specifying rights, see Aileen Kavanagh, 
Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2009), 279 (“(…) 
the detailed regulation of any right in legislative form is always a task for Parliament (…)”); Jeff King, 
Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012), 41ff (“The main engine for protecting social 
rights is and always will be primary legislation adopted by a representative legislature (…)”); Campbell, 
‘Parliamentary Review’ (n 9), 459-64. 
54 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 36), Ch1. 
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Hohfeldian analysis, Webber explains that rights embodied in bills of rights are 
incomplete because they only contain a “two-term” relationship, which specifies a 
right holder and an object of the right.55 For a right to have a proper “jural structure”, 
there is a need for legislative action that specifies a three-term relationship which 
includes a class of right holders, an act or act-description, a set of circumstances and a 
corresponding class of duty holders. Köpcke explains that legal systems deploy 
sophisticated chains of specification in which many decisions are taken by different 
kinds of agents “to transform certain generic claims of justice (two-term rights) into 
genuine (three-term) rights and duties.”56 She illustrates this point by noting that it 
takes the complex structure of the NHS to realise the right to health; it takes criminal 
law, traffic rules and regulations, a police force, prisons, criminal tribunals and 
procedures, building code standards, food standards, public health policies, among 
many other measures, to realise the right to life; and so on.  
Webber et al are not merely making an empirical claim about how rights acquire 
real existence in modern constitutional states. They make the normative claim that 
rights should be matters for the legislature, and not for courts. In their view, in the 
democratic constitutional state, questions of political legitimacy about how to 
accommodate the principles of democracy and human rights ought to remain open, on 
an ongoing basis, to contestation and re-negotiation.57 It is for the political branches 
of government to complete the “constitutional edifice”, by addressing the major 
debates about political morality left open by overly broad rights clauses. For these 
reasons, by contrast to the traditional view, these authors depict the relationship 
between rights and Parliament as a positive and empowering one. Political branches 
of government are free to choose how to realise rights within a range of reasonable 
alternatives.  
                                                
55 Ibid, 159; Grégoire Webber, ‘Rights and Persons’ in Grégoire Webber and others (eds), 
Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018). 
There are few exceptions, such as absolute rights. For instance, the right not to be tortured, which 
is not subject to limitation, and whose corresponding duty is imposed to all.  
56 Maris Köpcke, ‘Why it Takes Law to Realise Rights’ in Grégoire Webber and others (eds), 
Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018), 75. The theoretical account about how this 
process of constitutional construction operates is developed throughout the book. See Webber and 
others, Legislated Rights (n 53), especially chapters 1 to 5. See also Webber, The Negotiable 
Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 36).  
57 Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (n 36). This normative 
argument is developed further in Richard Ekins, ‘Legislation as Reasoned Action’ in Grégoire Webber 
and others (eds), Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018), 107ff. 
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To address political legitimacy concerns, Webber et al rely on a normative and 
idealistic account of legislative assemblies and the legislative process. Legalistic 
conceptions usually depict legislatures in an undignified way. They understand the 
legislative process mainly as a policy forum designed to aggregate preferences through 
majoritarian rule. Against this view, Webber et al offer instead a “dignified” account 
that makes the case for a reflexive legislature acting as a rational agent that changes 
the law deliberately grounded on reasons directed to promote the common good.58 
Ekins constructs this model by arguing that despite MPs’ disparate views and 
perspectives, Parliament can act as an agent. He claims that bills represent plans of 
action that provide a coherent purpose for joint action. He also notes that legislatures 
are institutionally designed to reflect on legislative proposals in a more coherent and 
orderly way. Ekins offers as examples certain offices designed to assist deliberation, 
such as the role of ministers moving the bill, party leaders and specialist select 
committees. Furthermore, he explains that the legislative process comprises a series of 
readings (parliamentary stages), held in two different chambers, in which a reasonable 
number of MPs meet to assess and exchange reasons to change the Law. According to 
Ekins, these institutional features stimulate MPs to act on the basis of good reasons. 
Although parliamentary decisions are ultimately taken by majority voting, these 
decisions can be the product of reasoned action. Hence, this dignified account of the 
legislative branch focuses on key institutional features and characteristics of the 
legislative process. However, it should be noted that Webber et al rely on the 
methodology of the “central case”.59 For this reason, they do not address the 
pathologies that affect real world legislatures. The House of Commons, for instance, 
faces significant challenges to perform proper scrutiny of legislation on human rights 
grounds. Some of those challenges have already been outlined in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Six will provide data confirming the modest impact that the JCHR has had in 
influencing debates at the Commons. Although Webber et al aim at providing a 
                                                
58 Ekins, ‘Legislation as Reasoned Action’ (n 58), 90, 96ff. See also Grégoire Webber and Paul 
Yowell, ‘Introduction: Securing Human Rights Through Legislation’ in Gregoire Webber and others 
(eds), Legislated Rights (Cambridge University Press 2018), 6. Note that legalistic conceptions usually 
rely on dignified accounts of the judiciary. Ronald Dworkin’s “herculean” judge is a case in point. 
59 Webber and Yowell, ‘Introduction’ (n 59). 
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normative account, there is a sense that something relevant is missing when significant 
gaps between ideals and political practices are not addressed.60  
To understand what the contribution of the JCHR may be under this conception, 
it is important to note how Webber et al envisage the role of human rights values in 
legislative reasoning. Ekins advances this role by providing an account of what counts 
as a good reason to change the law. According to him, a good reason is a morally sound 
reason that takes account of relevant facts and is framed by technical reasoning about 
what the existing law dictates, and the likely effects of legislative proposals. This 
requires reflection on the ends, an analysis of the current state of affairs, legislative 
means and their prospects to achieve policy objectives, including an analysis of 
alternative courses of action and possible unintended consequences. For Webber et al, 
the overall objective of legislation is to achieve the common good. The common good 
requires securing those conditions that allow each person to flourish.61 Human rights, 
therefore, are essential components of the common good. Hence, the common good 
and human rights are not in tension. There is no need to employ proportionality 
analysis to balance the relative weight of policy aims and human rights. Since human 
rights are fundamental components of the common good, the tension is dissolved. The 
point of human rights, according to Ekins, is to draw Parliament’s attention to an 
aspect of human wellbeing that ought to be considered in legislative reasoning.62 A 
second function of rights clauses is to suggest modes of action that are either consistent 
or likely to support that aspect of the wellbeing. It will be for Parliament to decide 
between different courses of action about how best to specify these values. In sum, 
rather than being constraints on political powers, human rights will perform a guiding 
function, featuring in political decision-making in different ways, namely, as ends, 
means or side-constraints on means.  
A conception of constitutional construction and development offers a rich 
theoretical framework to reconceptualise the relationship between human rights and 
Parliament. However, it offers no recipe to address the pathologies of real world 
legislatures. The JCHR could contribute to addressing the gap between ideals and 
political practices by operating as a vehicle for constitutional deliberation, along the 
                                                
60 For discussion, see Chapter Six. 
61 Webber, ‘Rights and Persons’ (n 56). 
62 Ekins, ‘Legislation as Reasoned Action’ (n 58), 102ff. 
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lines outlined above (see section III.2). It could prevent legislatures from unprincipled 
action that diverts MPs’ attention from the common good. There are different ways in 
which a model of constitutional construction could benefit from the JCHR. Here are 
some possibilities. Firstly, the JCHR has the capacity to identify relevant human rights 
issues arising from government bills. Since human rights clauses are broad and open-
ended, it would be valuable for the JCHR to point out different forms of specification 
that may enhance its enjoyment. Take for instance the JCHR’s practice of 
recommending human rights-inspired amendments to government legislative 
proposals as an example of how this committee identifies alternative courses of action. 
63 Secondly, the JCHR may foster deliberation by providing a forum for public 
engagement. This contributes to ensure that different perspectives and voices enrich 
the debate about issues of moral significance. On the other hand, calls for evidence 
may gather expert information necessary to take informed decisions, for instance, on 
the possible effects of proposed legislation once enacted. By incorporating these 
moral, empirical and technical insights in its reports and recommendations, the JCHR 
could contribute to a more informed parliamentary deliberation. Thirdly, by publishing 
brief and accessible reports, the JCHR will help MPs to reflect on the issues in a more 
coherent and orderly way. Last but not least, the process of reason giving and 
assessment largely explained in section III.2 above, may have a positive overall effect 
on the quality of deliberation. In sum, the JCHR may contribute to the process of 
construction and development of human rights values because it is an institutional 
arrangement that seeks to address the pathologies of real world legislatures conspiring 
against reasoned action and principled parliamentary debates.64 
4. Concluding remarks 
To sum up, the HRA also created an expectation for Parliament to develop its 
own voice on human rights protection. This expectation is consistent with the HRA’s 
retention of parliamentary sovereignty. This section explored two alternative 
conceptions of LSCG which move away from a legalistic and court-centred model. In 
                                                
63 Yowell, ‘The Impact of the Joint Committee’ (n 51), 144, noting that one of the reasons why 
JCHR’s reports have featured more prominently in parliamentary debates since 2006, is because of the 
introduction of the practice of recommending amendments that later are moved by prominent members. 
64 Whether it really succeeds in fostering this reasoned action in the UK Parliament will be 
discussed in Chapter Five below.  
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both of these alternative conceptions, the role of the JCHR is to act as an agent for 
deliberation and rational action. 
IV. The deliberative credentials of legalistic conceptions of legislative scrutiny 
on human rights 
Sections II and III have identified two pressures that flow from the ambiguity of 
the HRA regarding parliamentary sovereignty, namely, a pressure to comply with 
Convention rights, and a pressure to develop Parliament’s own understanding of rights. 
These sections have discussed alternative conceptions of LSCG that may address the 
expectations flowing from these pressures, their theoretical underpinnings and whether 
they have been incorporated into the JCHR’s working practices. In this section, I 
discuss the deliberative credentials of the legalistic LSCG conception. I explore 
whether legalistic legislative scrutiny on human rights grounds can have a positive 
impact on constitutional deliberation. This discussion will benefit from Aileen 
Kavanagh’s claim that the JCHR is a “hybrid breed of constitutional watchdog”.65  
Kavanagh argues in favour of a predominantly legalistic conception of LSCG 
for the JCHR. However, this legalistic approach is ultimately directed at having a 
positive impact on Parliament’s ability to deliberate. She goes on to say that the JCHR 
should develop legal expertise to improve “human rights literacy” among 
parliamentarians.66 By making legal language more accessible, the JCHR should 
strengthen parliamentarians’ ability to deliberate on human rights issues and to 
scrutinise government legislation. Furthermore, Kavanagh is not only thinking about 
the impact of JCHR’s legal expertise on Parliament. She is also thinking about the 
JCHR’s ability to target a different audience, namely, legal advisers at government 
departments, bill teams and Law Officers. According to Kavanagh, legal expertise can 
also be a tool of political influence on those developing policies and drafting 
legislation.67 By channelling legal considerations into the legislative process, a 
traditional forum for political accountability, and exerting influence on governmental 
legal advisers, Kavanagh depicts the JCHR as “mediating” between legal and political 
                                                
65 Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional 
Watchdog’ (n 7). 
66 Ibid, 128-30. 
67 These remarks raise an important question about who is the target of constitutional 
committees. I shall come back to this in Chapter Five. 
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models of accountability.68 What underpins Kavanagh’s argument is a deeper 
theoretical attempt to think constructively about the constitution beyond the traditional 
polarities of legal and political constitutionalism. Instead, she argues that the 
protection of human rights values is a collaborative enterprise in which different 
branches of government have a role to play.69  
While this may be an attractive way of looking at things, it is not clear whether 
there are necessary connections between legal considerations and an improvement in 
parliamentary deliberation on human rights matters. It seems to me that Kavanagh 
should start by distinguishing between two strands of the legalistic model, namely, the 
hard and soft ones (see Chapter One and section II above). The former emphasises a 
strong culture of compliance with Convention rights. This may well impoverish rather 
than enhance deliberation. A court-centred approach takes the possibility of an adverse 
human rights judgment at face value. Parliament will have to take case law and judicial 
interpretations as an authoritative statement of the Law. In this view, there is little 
room for political disagreement grounded on enlightened deliberation, for instance, 
about the consequences of undermining Convention rights for the sake of achieving 
other public values. In other words, too much emphasis is put on the possibility of a 
legal challenge, diverting parliamentary deliberation away from the quality of the 
reasons for a given course of action, including the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative courses of action.70 A more positive impact on parliamentary deliberations 
will demand a critical assessment of legal materials, including settled interpretations 
and case law. Ministers, MPs and peers should be prepared to disagree with domestic 
courts and ECtHR’s judgments and interpretations, insofar as they ground their 
disagreement on debate and good reasons.  
Another issue that arises is a paradoxical relationship between a court-centred 
conception of LSCG, and constitutional deliberation. As Aruna Sathanapally notes, 
                                                
68 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘British Constitutionalism Beyond Polarities’ 
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69 See also Dawn Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defense of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ in Gavin Drewry and Alexander Horne (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd 
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70 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), 70. 
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the contribution of human rights judgments to deliberation will ultimately depend on 
the quality of their reasoning.71 If sentences are merely black letter exercises, they will 
provide less relevant material for deliberation. By contrast, if sentences engage in 
deeper moral reasoning, they will provide relevant material for parliamentary 
deliberations. However, one should note that the flip side of the coin is that if courts 
engage too deeply on questions of political morality, they will trespass the domain of 
politics. The paradox, consequently, is that for legal human rights to provide a 
meaningful input into the quality of deliberation, judicial reasoning will need to be 
more political, and less legalistic.  
In sum, we should be cautious about the relationship between legal reasoning in 
human rights matters, and constitutional deliberation. As shown above, this connection 
can develop in multiple ways, and may raise some additional problems. Legal 
considerations may enrich parliamentary deliberations, but they should be part of a 
wider pool of reasons and considerations. A more nuanced and soft approach to 
legalism may contribute better to constitutional deliberation than a hard approach to 
legalism. 
V. Inter-institutional relationships between courts and Parliament 
So far, this chapter has discussed conceptions of LSCG in the context of 
legislative scrutiny of government bills. I have focused my attention on these 
preventative instances because they are the most neglected in the literature. By 
contrast, the question about how Parliament should react to an adverse human rights 
judgment has attracted a significant body of scholarship.72 Interest on this question has 
gone in tandem with the growing body of literature on constitutional dialogue. Most 
of the issues have been addressed by numerous contributions that focus on the 
normative question about who should have the final word.  
These contributions recognise that the UK is under an international obligation to 
comply with adverse human rights judgments by the ECtHR. They also recognise that 
if domestic courts find legislation in breach of Convention rights, it is highly likely 
                                                
71 Ibid, 72. 
72 In my view, this is regrettable. Only a small portion of legislation subject to scrutiny is 
litigated, which means that the literature has mainly focus in the margins of Parliament and JCHR’s 
work on human rights matters. 
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that the ECtHR may come to a similar judgment. On the other hand, since Parliament 
has retained its sovereignty as a matter of domestic law, these contributions focus on 
the normative question about if –and when– it would be legitimate for politicians to 
override a decision of the courts. Although this is a key question, its practical relevance 
is undermined by the fact that the UK is quite responsive to adverse human rights 
judgments. For that reason, in what follows I will not address this normative question. 
Instead, I will make two points. First, I will argue that under the HRA’s scheme, 
political branches of government have little room for disagreement with courts. My 
second point will stress the difficulties that assessing legislative responses to adverse 
human rights judgments raises. Compliance with adverse human rights judgments is a 
matter of degree. People may disagree about whether a legislative response complies 
–or fully complies– with a given judgment. However, there are no clear benchmarks 
to assess its implementation. An institutional manifestation of this is that political 
branches of government enjoy wide discretion in implementing an adverse judgement. 
I will conclude this section discussing the JCHR’s work monitoring compliance with 
adverse human rights judgments. 
1. Political responses to adverse human rights judgments 
In the UK political branches of government have little room to disagree with 
adverse human rights judgments. To illustrate why this is the case, it is useful to 
compare these with ordinary cases of legislative scrutiny on human rights grounds. 
There is a qualitative difference between these two cases. In ordinary cases, the 
question about a possible breach of Convention rights is merely hypothetical. Efforts 
to consider case law will be at best preventative. Parliament will not be able to foresee 
all the different instances in which applying the provisions of a bill may be held 
incompatible with Convention rights. There will be cognitive limitations and 
reasonable interpretative disagreement about the normative consequences of 
Convention rights. On the other hand, it may well be that case law is inconsistent, 
underdeveloped, or leaves the door open to different interpretations. For these reasons, 
it is likely that different people may have different opinions about the question of 
compatibility. By contrast, when Parliament is confronted with a judgment declaring 
legislation in breach of Convention rights, either by domestic courts or by the ECtHR, 
there is an authoritative declaration stating that the law should be changed to comply 
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with human rights. Although Parliament is not bound, as a matter of domestic law, to 
respond, there are significant political and constitutional reasons to address the 
incompatibility with Convention rights, as I shall explain below. 
The legal position is quite straightforward. Section 4 HRA provides that courts 
lack power to strike down legislation. On the other hand, the power of remedial order 
under section 10 HRA is discretionary. The default position therefore is that politicians 
can simply dissent by maintaining the status quo.73 By contrast, in the case of ECtHR, 
the UK is bound under international law to abide by an adverse judgement (article 
46(1) ECHR). This means that if the ECtHR finds legislation in breach of Convention 
rights, the UK has an international obligation to remedy the incompatibility. However, 
at the domestic level, implementation of adverse ECtHR judgments is a matter of 
political will, as the UK’s dualistic system means that the claimant has no legal 
remedies to enforce such judgments.  
Despite this, there are political and constitutional reasons why political branches 
of government in the UK feel bound to abide by adverse human rights judgments. 
Firstly, the decision to domesticate Convention rights blurred the lines between the 
domestic and the international spheres. The dualistic system would carry less weight 
if legislation in breach of Convention rights, although legally enforceable, were 
problematic as a matter of domestic constitutional law. This decision was, among other 
reasons, inspired by the pragmatic aspiration to protect the UK’s international 
reputation and standing. Secondly, the imposition of the duty to make a statement of 
compatibility for every bill passed before Parliament (section 19 HRA), and the very 
creation of the JCHR, introduced structural factors to secure a culture of political 
compliance with Convention rights. This was driven by the explicit political 
expectation that these rights would permeate across different branches of 
government.74 Finally, it is worth paying attention to section 10 HRA. This provision 
creates a prospective Henry VIII power to implement an adverse human rights 
judgment. The thinking here is that ministers should be empowered to implement such 
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Constraints’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2015), 56-57. 
74 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 6), 258. Hiebert provides evidence that 
the drafters of the bill expected political branches of government to tackle any incompatibility with 
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judgements75 because compliance will carry enough political consensus. The 
expectation is that mainstream political parties will not risk UK’s international 
reputation by preventing the implementation of a human rights judgment. Therefore, 
ministers should have a quick remedy to address the incompatibility. This shows that 
the complex interplay between political expectations, demands flowing from 
international law, and from domestic constitutional law that underpins the architecture 
of the HRA has reduced the room for political branches of government to override 
adverse human rights judgments. Adverse human rights judgments, either by the 
ECtHR or by domestic courts, carry significant constitutional and political weight.  
Scholars do recognise these constitutional and political limitations on 
Parliament’s supreme legislative powers. Discussing declarations of incompatibility, 
Kavanagh argues that ignoring or contesting these judgments result in significant 
political costs. She also points out that if the government and Parliament fail to remedy 
the incompatibility, the claimant could petition before Strasbourg. In the face of a 
domestic declaration of incompatibility, it is highly likely that the ECtHR would come 
to the same conclusion. Kavanagh notes that although remedies in the HRA are 
discretionary, the link between Convention rights and the HRA means that 
declarations of incompatibility may give rise to UK’s responsibility as a matter of 
international law. She concludes that unless there is a “very strong justification”, 
political branches of government will have little alternative but to remedy the 
incompatibility. A second example –from someone who is sceptical about legal human 
rights– is Jonathan Morgan.76 In his view, declarations of incompatibility under section 
4 HRA are de facto binding. If the ECtHR finds legislation in breach of Convention 
rights, the UK government will face a stark choice: it either complies or denounces the 
ECHR and repeals the HRA. Perhaps Morgan’s contention goes too far. Significant 
litigation costs and time delays are involved in the decision to issue a petition before 
the ECtHR. A declaration of incompatibility will not necessarily trigger the 
international dimension. Despite this, both Kavanagh and Morgan identify a key point, 
namely, that the architecture of the HRA brings together the international law 
dimension, the domestic constitutional dimension, and the political expectations to 
                                                
75 Boateng and Straw, ‘Bringing Rights Home’ (n 2), 74 and 77; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Rights Brought Home (n 2), at paras 1.10, 1.16 and 2.17-19. 
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consolidate a culture of compliance. The combination of these factors means that 
political branches of government face significant political and constitutional pressures 
to comply, to the point that adverse human rights judgments are de facto binding.77 
The figures on the implementation of adverse human rights judgments provide the 
most compelling evidence of its constitutional and political weight. The UK is quite 
responsive, and has a good record implementing adverse human rights judgment, 
either by the ECtHR or by domestic courts.78  
While the above considerations explain why adverse human rights judgments 
carry significant weight, Aruna Sathanapally’s detailed analysis of declarations of 
incompatibility shows that pragmatic considerations have also performed a significant 
role in the government’s decision to respond.79 She argues that when the HRA came 
into force, the government was interested in demonstrating before the ECtHR that 
declarations of incompatibility were an effective remedy. This would have an effect at 
the admissibility stage, because procedures before the ECtHR require the applicant to 
exhaust domestic effective remedies. The aim was to prevent individuals from going 
before the ECtHR without prior legal challenge at domestic level. A second reason is 
that many declarations of incompatibility have been uncontroversial. The government 
has not considered them to challenge its policies, and therefore it has made the changes 
in legislation required. However, even in cases where the government considers that 
its policies have been challenged, it has not directly confronted the judgment. Instead, 
it employed more subtle strategies.80 Most notably, in these cases the government 
                                                
77 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), Ch6. 
78 For both domestic courts and ECtHR’s adverse human rights judgments figures and responses, 
see Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgments (Cm 9728, November 2018). For 
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80 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘'Striking Back' and 'Clamping Down': An Alternative 
Perspective on Judicial Review’ in John Bell and others (eds), Public Law Adjudication in Common 
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delayed its responses.81 A second strategy is to comply in a minimalistic fashion.82 
Finally, in some cases the government has found a different means to achieve the same 
policy aim challenged before courts.83 
Once these considerations are taken into account, it appears that the debate about 
who should have the final word on human rights matters is of marginal practical 
importance. The critical question raised by legislative scrutiny of government’s 
proposals to implement adverse human rights judgments concerns identifying 
workable standards to assess the degree of compliance with the substance of the 
judgement. This takes me to my second point. There are no clear legal benchmarks to 
assess political responses to adverse human rights judgments. The very fact that both 
at the domestic and international levels, courts have little or no role whatsoever in 
monitoring compliance is a case in point. Instead, assessing the implementation of an 
adverse human rights judgment is mainly a political and administrative process. Take 
first the case of domestic declarations of incompatibility. Once domestic courts issue 
a declaration, there is no further role for them. The declaration does not affect the 
validity, enforcement and continuing application of primary legislation (section 4(6) 
HRA). The HRA contains no provision forcing the executive to remedy the 
incompatibility, nor to be proactive in considering a response.84 Furthermore, section 
10 provides for a “discretional” power of remedial action by ministers. The 
consequence is that the implementation process is mainly political, and dependent 
upon the pressure exerted by Parliament. As I will argue below, the JCHR performs a 
relevant role demanding government responses to declarations of incompatibility. 
In the case of the ECHR, article 46(2) provides that it is for the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to supervise the execution of ECtHR’s judgments. 
This Committee is a political entity, composed by the Foreign Affairs Ministers (or 
their permanent representatives) of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. It 
                                                
81 Consider also that, according to Jeff King, legislative responses to adverse human rights 
judgments in the UK tend to be more delayed, when compared with the situations of Canada, Germany 
and France. See King, ‘Parliament's Role Following Declarations of Incompatibility under the Human 
Rights Act’ (n 79). See also Harlow and Rawlings, ‘Striking back’ (n 81). 
82 According to scholars and the JCHR, many UK government responses to adverse human rights 
judgments have been “minimalistic”. See Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model (n 31), 175-6; 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights 
Judgments (2009-10, HL 85, HC 455), at paras 168-70. 
83 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (n 13), 149-52. 
84 Ibid, 139 and 163. 
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is supported by civil servants and legal advisors that form part of member states’ 
permanent missions.85 Involvement by the ECtHR in the implementation phase only 
takes place exceptionally. For instance, pilot judgment procedures offer a response to 
large-scale systematic or structural breaches of Convention rights by a given state.86 
Such judgments are relevant in the case of legislation being found in breach of 
Convention rights. They may exert additional pressure against states who have failed 
to comply with a previous judgment, as happened in the case of Greens.87 Another 
example are the interpretation and the infringement procedures introduced by Protocol 
14. The former provides an opportunity for the Council of Ministers to refer to the 
ECtHR for a clarificatory interpretation of a judgment (article 46(3) ECHR). The latter 
provides for the Council of Ministers to refer the question about compliance to the 
ECtHR (article 46(4) ECHR). This procedure effectively provides for the ECtHR to 
declare that its judgment has not been complied with. However, the procedure has been 
subject to strong criticism.88 The 2/3 majority of Member states on the Council of 
Ministers requirement to trigger the infringement procedure suggests that the ECtHR 
will only be exceptionally involved in assessing compliance. Not surprisingly, since 
2014, the infringement procedure has been followed only against Azerbaijan. On the 
other hand, resistance against an adverse judgment may be grounded on principled 
reasons. National governments and/or Parliament’s refusal to introduce changes in 
legislation can arise from substantive disagreement with the judgment, or because of 
democratic concerns. In these cases, employing the infringement procedure may only 
aggravate existing wounds, and may be counterproductive for the European system of 
human rights protection as a whole. It may well be that difficult questions about 
implementation are better served by a political solution achieved at the Council of 
Ministers, rather than by providing a legal remedy such as the infringement procedure.  
Assessing compliance with adverse human rights judgments is a difficult matter, 
open to disagreement depending on our wider views on political morality, questions 
of national sovereignty, and questions about democratic legitimacy and the separation 
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of powers. The implementation of an adverse human rights judgment is a matter of 
degree, rather than a “black or white” assessment.89 As Alice Donald and Phillip Leach 
note, the ECtHR recognises a wide margin of appreciation to member states in 
deciding how to respond to an adverse judgment.90 Consequently, the ECtHR is 
cautious when it comes to demanding general measures to redress a breach of 
Convention rights, including changes to primary legislation. As Donald and Leach 
argue, the wide margin of appreciation recognised introduces additional ambiguity that 
makes assessments of compliance quite difficult. This has had knock-on effects on the 
role of the Council of Europe in monitoring compliance, making it an “unavoidably 
political” process.91 Consider for instance the situation created by long-standing 
British threats to denounce the ECHR,92 and the political controversy generated by the 
prisoners’ right to vote case.93 These issues have resulted in the ECtHR recognising 
significant margins of appreciation to the UK.94 The wide margin of discretion 
conferred to the UK in Scoppola is a case in point.95 This suggests that compliance 
with general measures is difficult to assess, because there are no clear legal 
benchmarks to assess government responses during the monitoring phase. 
2. The role of the Joint Committee monitoring the implementation of adverse 
human rights judgments 
Considering that the implementation of an adverse human rights judgment is to 
a significant extent a political process, the existence of parliamentary bodies in charge 
of monitoring compliance provides Parliament with a significant source of information 
and insights to address this process.  
The JCHR began monitoring responses to adverse human rights judgments a few 
years after its creation.96 Its work was reduced mainly to correspondence with the 
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relevant minister about how the government would implement an ECtHR judgment.97 
This practice evolved to a regular progress report on these judgments in 2006. By 
2007, the JCHR extended this progress report to domestic declarations of 
incompatibility. The current position, which dates to 2011, is that the Ministry of 
Justice prepares and submits an annual report on the implementation of adverse human 
rights judgments to the JCHR.98 This annual report is one of the most –if not the most– 
valuable sources of information on this matter in the UK. It has also provided an 
opportunity for the government to improve its internal following up procedures. The 
Ministry of Justice performs a role coordinating responses by each relevant 
government department concerned with a particular case. The evolution of these 
working practices shows that both the JCHR and the government have approached 
questions about implementation along the lines outlined above. Adverse human rights 
judgments are considered as de facto binding, and political branches have felt 
compelled to respond. The improvement of its internal procedures also shows that the 
government is responsive to pressure exerted by the JCHR.  
The JCHR’s work monitoring adverse human rights judgments has focused on 
three main areas. Firstly, government’s internal procedures. I have already mentioned 
the practice of publishing an annual report, which provides a reliable source of 
information on this matter. In addition, the JCHR has proposed changes in 
governmental working practices to improve the UK capacity to respond to an adverse 
human rights judgment,99 fostering transparency. Secondly, the JCHR exerts pressure 
upon the government not to delay its response.100 Among other measures, it requires 
the government to notify Parliament when there is an adverse human rights judgment, 
                                                
97 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Implementation of Strasbourg Judgments: First Progress 
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either by the ECtHR or the domestic courts.101 The JCHR also submits correspondence 
and may question the relevant minister in oral hearings, and requires the government 
to disclose its plan, including the measures that it may take in response. As noted 
above, the government has adopted delaying as a strategy when it strongly disagrees 
with an adverse judgment. We may think of this role as strengthening Parliament’s 
ability to hold the government to account. However, difficult issues arise when 
Parliament is also strongly opposed to the judgment. Take for instance the prisoners’ 
right to vote litigation saga.102 Different governments employed a range of delaying 
strategies, such as lengthy consultation processes103 and the publication of a Draft 
Bill.104 On the other hand, Parliament expressed its fundamental disagreement with the 
judgment through a motion submitted by backbenchers from the two main parties.105 
This case put the JCHR in an uncomfortable position, because it kept insisting on the 
need to comply even though Parliament had made its position clear.106 Eventually, 
after Scoppola was delivered,107 and recognising parliamentary resistance, the JCHR 
argued in favour of a minimalistic implementation of the Hirst No. 2 judgment.108 This 
suggests that the JCHR can be put in an uncomfortable position when Parliament is 
not willing to comply.  
Finally, the JCHR scrutinises draft remedial orders and remedial orders, as well 
as bills implementing judgments. In these cases, the committee calls for evidence to 
gather the views of stakeholders and experts.109 It therefore provides a forum for 
experts and interest groups to make their voice heard. In addition, the JCHR operates 
as a reason demanding body. The government must justify its proposals implementing 
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adverse human rights judgments. JCHR’s reports assess the government’s response, 
and may propose alternative courses of action. For these reasons, the JCHR contributes 
to the improvement of deliberation within Parliament in regards to adverse human 
rights judgments.110 In this sense, the JCHR has advocated for the need to reinforce 
parliamentary involvement on legislative responses. From a substantive point of view, 
the JCHR has been critical of the government’s minimalistic approach to 
implementation. Although the JCHR has recognised that adverse human rights 
judgments leave room for political discretion,111 it has also advocated for a “full 
implementation” of these judgments. Arguably, the JCHR has had an activist 
approach. Hence, it has not questioned the reasoning and outcomes of human rights 
judgments. Instead, it has interpreted its function mainly as securing compliance with 
these judgments. This suggests a legalistic and court-centred approach on matters of 
implementation. 
VI. Conclusion 
The JCHR faces different and contradictory pressures, namely, pressure to 
comply with Convention rights as well as pressure to develop Parliament’s own voice 
on human rights matters. Responding to each of these two pressures requires different 
conceptions of LSCG. The legalistic conception corresponds to pressure for 
compliance. In contrast, the conception of constitutional deliberation and the 
conception of constitutional construction correspond to pressure for Parliament to 
develop a more independent voice. In this respect, the JCHR is an outlier. The Select 
Committee on the Constitution (“SCC”) and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee (“DPRRC”) do not face institutional and political pressures to 
employ a legalistic conception of LSCG. Neither is confronted with anything like the 
difficult questions raised by the architecture of the HRA. This chapter explored to what 
extent alternative LSCG conceptions are reflected in the JCHR’s working practices. 
The chapter argued that the JCHR mainly performs a legally framed legislative 
scrutiny assessment, although one that has evolved from a hard to a soft approach to 
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legalism. Currently, the JCHR focuses on proportionality assessments, legal 
interpretation, and follows-up case law developments, yet it is also open to 
empirically-based analysis. In addition, the  JCHR also contributes to constitutional 
deliberation by engaging in a dynamic of justification and assessment with the 
government, providing a forum to hear the voices of experts and other stakeholders, 
and seeking to improve MPs knowledge about human rights law issues.  
 For these reasons, when compared with the SCC and the DPRRC, the JCHR is 
an outlier. A second feature of the JCHR is that the very fact that human rights law 
seeks to impose substantive limits on the exercise of political powers, means that this 
committee may clash with the views of a majority of MPs less sympathetic to these 
arguments in controversial cases. While the DPRRC and the SCC may enter at times 
in confrontation with majoritarian views held at the Commons, a feature of their work 
is that, to a significant extent, it is ultimately directed towards protecting Parliament’s 
role as the senior partner in the relationship between both political branches of 
government. This feature is obvious from the DPRRC work, but is also reflected in the 
SCC work. The SCC seeks to protect the position of Parliament in delegated powers 
and in international negotiations, for instance. The very fact that the SCC has opted to 
focus on the institutional rather than on the substantive dimensions of the constitution, 
have prevented this committee from entering into conflict with Parliament. Perhaps 
one area in which the SCC’s work resembles that of the JCHR is on the territorial 
constitution. However, as argued in Chapter Four, the SCC has employed a 
“prudential” rather than a legalistic approach to the territorial constitution. 
Finally, I discussed the role of the JCHR in the case of legislative responses to 
adverse human rights judgments. I noted the limited room for manoeuvre when 
political branches of government disagree. Political and constitutional pressures 
demand a response from government and Parliament. I argued that the implementation 
process has mainly a political nature. Courts do recognise wide margins of 
appreciation of political branches when it comes to remedies, and there are no clear 
legal benchmarks against which to assess political responses to adverse human rights 
judgments. I concluded by noting the relevant role that the JCHR performs in 
improving government’s internal procedures, preventing delayed responses, and 
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assessing government’s implementation responses from wider and evidence-based 
perspectives.
 173 
CHAPTER 6 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEES AND DELIBERATION IN 
THE UK LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE 
I. Introduction 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that gaining a proper understanding of 
legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds (“LSCG”) requires moving forward from 
purely theoretical considerations to an analysis grounded on the peculiarities of a real-
world legislature operating against a given constitutional framework. I have argued 
that to advance this understanding there are two strands of inquiry. Firstly, since 
Parliaments are complex institutions, LSCG must be situated within the different 
constituent bodies of a given legislature. Therefore, the possibility of LSCG must be 
assessed by looking at the ethos of parliamentary members (at both chambers, if 
applicable), its relative independence from the executive, the nature of its select 
committees, among other factors. Secondly, LSCG is necessarily shaped by the 
peculiarities of the constitutional framework against which Parliament operates. 
Whether there is a written or unwritten constitution, its principles and values, whether 
or not there is constitutional review of legislation, are among many other factors that 
have an impact on theoretical conceptions of LSCG. Chapters Three, Four and Five 
have focused on this second strand of inquiry. Chapter Two, by contrast, advanced 
some relevant issues regarding the first strand of inquiry.  
In this chapter, I return to the first strand of inquiry by resuming the discussion 
started in Chapter Two. Here, I focus on the operation of LSCG in the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) Parliament, with emphasis on the role of the three constitutional committees. 
I will rely on the key findings of Chapter Two. These are that peers are more likely to 
engage with and debate the issues of constitutional significance raised by government 
bills than MPs; and that constitutional committees are the main forums for 
constitutional thinking and drivers of LSCG at the UK Parliament.  
However, Chapter Two provided a “static” analysis, because it did not explore 
the interactions that constitutional committees have with both political branches of 
government. This chapter undertakes this task by, firstly, providing a practice-oriented 
account of the operation of constitutional committees (section II). This account is 
based on primary and secondary sources, such as parliamentary debates, reports, soft 
law documents, empirically grounded analysis by political scientists and lawyers, 
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among others. The main finding is that the impact of constitutional committees at the 
formal stages of the legislative process, among elected politicians within government 
and at the Commons, is rather modest. Instead, I claim that at the heart of constitutional 
committees’ operation are bureaucratic experts working at the government, as well as 
committee members and their legal advisors, and peers. Furthermore, I claim that 
constitutional committees have a preventive effect which has reinvigorated internal 
checks of constitutionality and legality at government in the early stages of policy-
making and legislative drafting. Finally, I note that the influence of constitutional 
committees on the legislative process is dependent upon the possibility that the Lords 
engage in constitutional considerations, advancing constitutionally-inspired 
amendments, and managing to defeat the government. 
Based on these findings, section III discusses and reconsiders the place of 
politics in LSCG in the UK Parliament. Here, I discuss the theoretical implications of 
the fact that politicians do not necessarily engage in principled or value-based 
assessment of the constitutional implications of government legislation. In section III, 
I make three points. Firstly, I discuss whether there should be more constitutional 
deliberation among elected politicians. I note that my practice-based account suggests 
that constitutional committees have not had a transformative effect on parliamentary 
debates. Nevertheless, I argue that the problems created by their modest effect on 
political constitutional deliberation is not that acute in the UK, due to the significant 
effect that these committees have had among civil servants and peers. Secondly, I 
argue that constitutional committees conform to the UK-style of constitutionalism. 
Constitutional committees, through their influence on bureaucratic experts in 
government and peers in Parliament warn elected politicians about the need to avoid 
certain courses of action, or to prevent certain effects. I claim that constitutional 
committees operate as a conduit for constitutional considerations in two respects. 
Firstly, as reason-demanding bodies which have an impact on, and reinvigorate, 
internal governmental constitutionality checks. Secondly, as reason-giving bodies, 
which provide peers and MPs constitutionally grounded reasons for legislative action. 
I conclude this theoretical discussion by arguing that the legitimacy of constitutional 
committees as an accountability mechanism does not necessarily flow from a 
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democratically elected basis, but that their authority can be grounded on a variety of 
reasons. 
II. Understanding the operation of constitutional committees 
This section makes a series of points to advance a practice-oriented account of 
constitutional committees’ contribution to LSCG. I note that theoretical accounts 
about constitutional committees tend to focus on their contribution to political 
engagement with the constitution. However, relying on empirical evidence, I will show 
that constitutional committees have a somewhat modest impact at the formal stages of 
the legislative process. Conversely, political scientists claim that constitutional 
committees exert a subtle and informal – but hard to measure – influence during the 
early policy-making and legislative drafting stages of a bill. Against this background, 
I will argue that constitutional scholars should be careful not to place too much faith 
on constitutional committees’ ability to mainstream constitutional considerations 
among politicians, both at government and Parliament. Instead, the evidence shows 
that the main actors involved in the operation of constitutional committees – apart from 
committee members and its legal advisers – are peers and bureaucrats and other non-
elected experts working at the government and Parliament. It is not possible to grasp 
the operation of constitutional committees, and their contribution to LSCG, without 
recognising the reduced place that politics has for LSCG. 
1. Managing normative expectations: constitutional committees and their 
impact in the legislative process 
a. Normative expectations 
A few authors have provided theoretical accounts of constitutional committees. 
These accounts revolve around concepts such as democratic legitimacy, constitutional 
deliberation, culture of democratic justification, and the protection of constitutional 
fundamentals. By embracing these concepts, theoretical accounts hold normative 
expectations about the impact of constitutional committees at the formal stages of the 
legislative process. I will illustrate these points by providing one example. There is a 
body of literature whose aim is to redress a perceived democratic deficit of human 
rights values by exploring ways of reforming the legislative procedure to facilitate 
political engagement with them, and to mainstream human rights thinking in political 
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decision-making.1 This literature emphasises the role of the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (“JCHR”) in securing two aims. Firstly, that every piece of primary 
legislation is scrutinised at Parliament on Convention rights grounds; and secondly, 
that Parliament is involved in monitoring compliance with adverse international and 
domestic human rights judgements.  
These theoretical insights shed light on the sort of aims that the JCHR should 
advance. Firstly, the JCHR is expected to improve political engagement with human 
rights values by fostering political and moral deliberation about these issues within 
government and among parliamentarians.2 As Lord Hoffman put it, politicians cannot 
simply ignore human rights considerations; they must face up to their actions, and 
accept the political cost of acting in breach of Convention rights.3 Secondly, these 
authors expect the JCHR to promote a culture of democratic justification. This means 
that politicians both at government and Parliament should provide public reasons for 
legislative proposals having a negative impact on human rights values.4 Thirdly, there 
is a substantive normative expectation placed in the JCHR. The overall effect of this 
committee should be to enhance political accountability mechanisms, and deliver 
stronger protection of human rights values.5 Two normative expectations arise from 
these remarks. Firstly, an expectation that politicians will engage in human rights 
reasoning and justify any legislative measure with negative implications for 
Convention Rights. Secondly, an expectation that raising consciousness and imposing 
burdens of justification will improve human rights protection. Although these 
theoretical insights are mainly discussed in regards to the JCHR, Dawn Oliver and 
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Jack Simson Caird have employed a similar framework to discuss the Delegated 
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (“DPRRC”) and the Select Committee on 
the Constitution’s (“SCC") contribution to the legislative process.6  
In sum, the theoretical accounts outlined here emphasise the impact that 
constitutional committees should have among politicians, at the formal stages of the 
legislative process. There are normative expectations that constitutional committees 
should have a relevant impact on two goals. These are, first, to improve parliamentary 
deliberations on constitutional matters, and, second, to secure a compliance-oriented 
legislative outcome. I do not argue that these are the only goals of constitutional 
committees.7 The point here is that these two goals are implied by theoretical accounts 
of UK constitutional committees.  For these reasons, it is worth looking at the evidence 
provided by political scientists and other secondary sources to assess these normative 
expectations against the practice. 
b. The impact of constitutional committees in the legislative process 
In this section, I will briefly outline the main findings of a few empirical studies 
that have explored the impact of constitutional committees in the legislative process. I 
will measure impact by looking at traces of committees’ influence both in 
parliamentary deliberations, and in shaping legislative outcomes. The literature 
suggests that constitutional committees have not had a significant impact on both 
goals. The lesson is that the theoretical insights referred to above have placed too much 
faith in the ability of constitutional committees to prompt constitutional deliberation 
and to reinvigorate political mechanisms of constitutional protection at the formal 
stages of the legislative process. 
I will start by assessing the first normative expectation, namely, whether 
constitutional committees’ reports have had an impact in parliamentary deliberations. 
Relying on the evidence provided by these empirical studies, it is possible to make the 
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following claims about the degree of engagement of MPs and peers with committee 
reports. Firstly, the degree of engagement is significantly higher in the Lords. Data 
collected by Daniel Gover and Meg Russell about the influence of select committees 
in parliamentary debates concluded that about 96% of Lords committees’ references 
are made in the upper chamber.8 Hence, the SCC and the DPRRC have a marginal 
impact on parliamentary debates at the Commons, both at the floor and on public bill 
committees. By contrast, according to Gover and Russell, references to Joint 
Committees tend to be split in equal numbers between both chambers. However, a 
study by Murray Hunt, Paul Yowell and Haley Hooper (herein, “Hunt et al”) found 
that engagement with JCHR’s reports is qualitatively and quantitatively superior at the 
Lords.9 Thus, the Commons accounted for only 34% of references made to JCHR’s 
reports at parliamentary debates. Hence, this data shows that while almost all of SCC 
and DPRRC’s references take place at the Lords, references to JCHR’s reports at the 
Lords almost double the number of references at the Commons.10  
Secondly, the number of references to constitutional committees in 
parliamentary debates has increased significantly along the years.11 This may be the 
product of constitutional committees effectively consolidating their reputation as non-
partisan, technical and learned instances which have gained cross-party recognition. 
In addition, constitutional committees have refined their techniques for capturing the 
attention of MPs and peers. A significant development is that committee members 
have sometimes tabled constitutionally-inspired amendments. This more proactive 
approach to LSCG has fostered the profile of constitutional committees.12  
Thirdly, engagement with the constitutional issues raised by government 
legislation tends to be a niche interest. Discussing the impact of the SCC, Andrew Le 
                                                
8 Daniel Gover and Meg Russell, Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and 
Influence in the Making of British law (Oxford University Press 2017), 218. 
9 Paul Yowell, ‘The Impact of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on Legislative 
Deliberation’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2015), 152-53. 
10 According Janet Hiebert, the instances in which JCHR’s reports are referenced at the 
Commons are “rare”, and mainly prompted by committee members themselves. See Janet Hiebert, 
‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between Ideals and Constraints’ in Murray Hunt, 
Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2015), 51. 
11 Andrew Le Sueur and Jack Simson Caird, ‘The House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution’ in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 292; Yowell, ‘The Impact of the Joint Committee’ (n 9). 
12 Yowell, ‘The Impact of the Joint Committee’ (n 9), 144. 
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Sueur and Jack Simson Caird note that at the Lords there is a group of peers who have 
a special interest in constitutional issues.13 The profile of these peers is telling. They 
tend to have a legal background, or have held high offices at government or at the 
judiciary, or are former SCC members. JCHR’s reports have also been able to capture 
the attention of no more than a minority of MPs and peers. Hunt et al found that at the 
Commons, 51% of references to JCHR’s reports had been made by 10 MPs. However, 
within this universe, 38% of those references had been made only by two MPs who 
happened to be JCHR members. This is quite a narrow number of MPs engaging with 
JCHR’s reports. At the Lords, the study identified five high frequent users of JCHR’s 
reports, four of which were committee members. However, by contrast to the 
Commons, there were other 28 “medium” users. Both high and medium frequent users 
accounted for 76% of total references to JCHR’s reports at the Lords. This represents 
a significantly higher number of users than at the Commons. However, considering 
that the upper chamber is composed of about 800 peers, the number of peers engaging 
with JCHR’s reports is quite small.  
A fourth and final point emerging from the literature is that the impact of 
constitutional committees’ reports is dependent upon the salience of constitutional 
issues during the passage of government bills. Gover and Russell, for instance, found 
that constitutional committees’ influence was higher in debates about controversial 
bills which raised issues of constitutional significance, such as the Identity Cards Bill14 
and the Public Bodies Bill.15 Other political considerations, such as the position of the 
main parties on the issues, the degree of government commitment to its policies, 
among other issues, may also be relevant.16 
Before moving on to discuss constitutional committees’ influence on legislative 
outcomes, I would like to briefly identify some reasons why their impact on 
parliamentary deliberations is rather modest. The legislative process, especially at the 
Commons, is mainly a forum for policy debates and political contestation. This leaves 
                                                
13 Le Sueur and Simson Caird, ‘The House of Lords’ (n 11), 292. 
14 Identity Cards HC Bill (2005-06) [9]. 
15 Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-11) [25]. See Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 
8), 218. 
16 See for instance Janet Hiebert’s analysis of the impact of LSCG in the Canadian context in 
Janet Hiebert, ‘The Charter’s Influence on Legislation: Political Strategizing about Risk’ (2018) 51 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 727. 
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little room for principled debate about issues of constitutional significance. As argued 
in Chapter Two, parliamentary debates in the lower chamber are dominated by partisan 
politics, meaning, a two-sided confrontation between different policy alternatives. 
Furthermore, the executive exerts significant control of the legislative process. On the 
other hand, MPs struggle to grasp constitutional issues, due to the technical nature of 
these considerations. These are general reasons why the Commons does not fully 
engage with constitutional considerations. Yet, there are additional reasons that 
undermine the ability of constitutional committees’ reports to exert influence at 
parliamentary debates in the lower chamber.  
Firstly, according to the Guide to Making Legislation, bills that have major 
constitutional implications should begin their passage through Parliament at the 
Commons.17 This means that in most cases, although not all, the Commons will not 
benefit from having access to constitutional committees in advance of a bill’s 
committee stage. The SCC normally reports before the bill reaches its second reading 
at the Lords.18 Likewise, the DPRRC usually reports before the committee stage at the 
Lords.19 Timing is essential for LSCG to flourish. If a bill starts its passage at the 
Commons, MPs will not benefit from SCC and DPRRC’s reports in advance of the 
committee stage. Hence, the chances of MPs engaging in informed debate about the 
constitutional implications of bills will be lower, as they will lack the time and 
resources to address them. The SCC and the DPRRC are aware of this problem. Due 
to the significance of the constitutional issues involved in the Brexit process, as an 
exceptional measure, they have published some reports in advance of the Commons’ 
committee stage. 20 
                                                
17 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (July 2017), at para 21.20. Consider also that 
flagship bills and those having major spending implications are also introduced at the Commons (ibid, 
at para 27.1). There are pragmatic reasons for this, as the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 only applies 
to bills introduced at the Commons. 
18 Select Committee on the Constitution, Sessional Report 2009-10 (HL 2010-11, 26), Appendix 
1. 
19 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (HL 2017-19, 22), at para 6. 
20 The SCC and the DPRRC reported on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill before committee 
stage at the Commons. See ibid; Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill: Interim Report (HL 2017-19, 19). The DPRRC took this measure in the case of the Fisheries Bill 
and the Agriculture Bill. See Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 39th Report: 
Fisheries Bill; Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill; Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]; 
Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Bill (HL 2017-19,  226); Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee, Agriculture Bill (HL 2017-19, 194). Note also that both the DPRRC 
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 A second procedural reason is related to one of the findings mentioned above. 
The committee stage of a bill at the Commons takes place in public bill committees. 
These committees normally consist of between 18 to 30 MPs.21 This small number of 
MPs diminishes the impact of constitutional committees at the Commons. I have 
already noted that constitutional considerations are a niche interest. Hence, the lower 
the number of MPs conducting detailed scrutiny of bills, the lower the chances that the 
Commons will engage with constitutional considerations during the detailed 
consideration of a bill. The data suggest that there is little engagement by MPs with 
SCC and DPRRC reports. Yet, even in the case of the JCHR, the chances of a frequent 
user and/or a JCHR committee member being appointed as a member of a public bill 
committee will be low. This also decreases the chances of public bill committees 
engaging with matters of constitutional significance. Although by convention bills of 
“first class constitutional importance” should have their committee stage at the 
Commons in a committee of the whole house, the application of this convention has 
been patchy at best.22 By contrast, at the Lords, the committee stage takes place in a 
committee of the whole house. Hence, more chances for the Lords to be confronted 
with a committee report during the detailed consideration of a bill, as constitutional 
committee members and “constitutionally-aware” peers will attend the debate.  
Now it is time to move on and explore whether constitutional committees are 
shaping legislative outcomes. Firstly, this analysis must go beyond a purely formalistic 
assessment. The formal stages of the legislative process are largely controlled by the 
government. This includes the legislative agenda, the timing of bills, successful 
amendments and which bills make their way into the statute book. Judged from this 
point of view, not only constitutional committees but also Parliament as a whole would 
be considered as largely ineffective. However, that analysis is inadequate. Political 
scientists argue that a qualitative analysis suggests that Parliament does shape 
legislative outcomes. Research conducted by Gover and Russell claims that most 
                                                
and the SCC reported on the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, even though the Lords do not have 
powers to amend supply bills. See Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 11th Report 
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill and others (HL 2017-19, 65); Select Committee on the Constitution, 
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (HL 2017-19, 80). 
21 Simon Patrick and Mark Sandford, House of Commons Background Paper: Public Bills in 
Parliament (House of Commons Library SN/PC/06507, 17 December 2012), 9. 
22 Robert Hazell, ‘Time for a New Convention: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Constitutional Bills 
1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247, 248ff. See also Chapter Three above. 
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government amendments are reactions that address concerns voiced by MPs and peers. 
This includes concessions and responses to non-government amendments, which in 
turn may be inspired by constitutional committees’ recommendations.23 For these 
reasons, assessing the capacity of constitutional committees to shape legislative 
outcomes involves conducting a qualitative analysis of the impact of their 
recommendations on government amendments. These amendments may be either a 
direct response to constitutional committees’ recommendations, or a response to MPs’ 
concerns or non-government amendments, which in turn may be inspired or overlap 
with constitutional committees’ remarks.  
This qualitative analysis is highly complex, as the attribution of causation is a 
matter of lively debate among political scientists.24 Endeavouring to overcome these 
difficulties, Gover and Russell claim to have found evidence of select committees’ 
influence on legislative outcomes. Their research is based in a case study of twelve 
bills. They found a total of 300 successful changes to these bills during the legislative 
process, and argued that one-sixth of them “involved some kind of committee 
influence”.25 Gover and Russell argued that among all select committees, 
constitutional committees are the most influential.26 However, there are noticeable 
differences between these committees in terms of their capacity to shape legislative 
outcomes. By a significant margin, the DPRRC is the most successful constitutional 
committee.27 This finding confirms previous figures referenced by Russell back in 
2013. She noted that according to the DPRRC’s own data, between 80 to 85% of its 
recommendations had been adopted through government amendments.28 Further 
                                                
23 Meg Russell and others, ‘Actors, Motivations and Outcomes in the Legislative Process: Policy 
Influence at Westminster’ (2017) 52 Government and Opposition 1; Meg Russell, Daniel Gover and 
Kristina Wollter, ‘Does the Executive Dominate the Westminster Legislative Process?: Six Reasons for 
Doubt’ (2016) 69 Parliamentary Affairs 286; Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8). 
24 Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 209ff; Donald and Leach, Parliaments 
and the European Court of Human Rights (n 5), 109-10. 
25 Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 219. 
26 This finding is not surprising. As noted in chapter two, by contrast to the Commons’ 
departmental select committees, constitutional committees are directly involved in legislative scrutiny 
of government bills. 
27 However, Gover and Russell warn that some concessions to the DPRRC might be 
prefabricated, and part of the government’s parliamentary handling strategy. By doing this, the 
government shows a sense of goodwill and allows backbenchers or opposition members to appear as 
wining a point. See Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 222-23. 
28 Meg Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords Westminster - Bicameralism Revived (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 219-20. See also Philippa Tudor, ‘Secondary Legislation: Second Class or 
Crucial?’ (2000) 21 Statute Law Review 149. 
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evidence of DPRRC’s influence is provided by the Guide to Making Legislation. The 
Guide demands that bill teams “seriously consider” whether the government should 
accept the DPRRC’s recommendations.29 No equivalent statement is made in regards 
to the SCC and the JCHR. 
Neither the JCHR, nor the SCC can claim this degree of influence. Janet Hiebert 
found that once the government makes up its mind about the policy and the bill’s 
compatibility with Convention rights, it is highly unlikely that ministers will introduce 
substantive changes in response to a critical JCHR report.30 No studies have been 
conducted to assess the impact of the SCC in legislative outcomes, apart from that of 
Gover and Russell. These authors found evidence of SCC’s influence during the 
passage of the Identity Cards Bill,31 the Welfare Reform Bill32 and the Public Bodies 
Bill.33 More detailed case studies by Le Sueur and Simson Caird found evidence of 
SCC’s influence in legislative outcomes of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform 
Bill34 and the Health and Social Care Bill.35 However, these instances, although 
prominent, are not necessarily representative. Further research on the impact of SCC’s 
reports in legislative outcomes remains pending. 
To sum up, the evidence points to a rather modest capacity of constitutional 
committees to shape legislative outcomes. Among the three constitutional committees, 
                                                
29 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at paras 16.14-8. However, cf with the 
much more assertive language of the 2015 Guide. See Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation 
(July 2015), at para 16.17: “It is usual for the Government to accept most, if not all, of the DPRRC’s 
recommendations but any changes to the bill as a result must nonetheless be cleared through the PBL 
Committee in the normal way, and may also require clearance through the relevant policy committee at 
Cabinet.”  
30 Janet Hiebert and James Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press 2015), 299-300; Hiebert, ‘Legislative 
Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between Ideals and Constraints’ (n 10), 50-2. See also Francesca 
Klug and Helen Wildbore, ‘Breaking New Ground: The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the 
Role of Parliament in Human Rights Compliance’ [2007] European Human Rights Law Review 231. 
Francesca Klug, on account of the JCHR’s low capacity to shape legislative outcomes, recommended 
that the committee expand its work to pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills, in the hope that at earlier 
stages of policy-making the JCHR may exert more influence. See also Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (2005-06, HL 239, HC 1575). 
31 See footnote 14. 
32 Welfare Reform HC Bill (2005-06) [208]. 
33 See footnote 15. Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 222-3. For a more 
detailed case study of the influence of the SCC in the Public Bodies Bill, see Jack Simson Caird, 
‘Parliamentary Constitutional Review: Ten Years of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution’ [2012] Public Law 4, 7-8. 
34 Legislative and Regulatory Reform HC Bill (2005-06) [111]. 
35 Health and Social Care HC Bill (2010-11) [132]. Le Sueur and Simson Caird, ‘The House of 
Lords’ (n 11), 295-6 and 297-99. 
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the DPRRC is the most influential one. The JCHR and the SCC have not been as 
successful as the DPRRC in securing constitutionally inspired amendments. Their 
success will ultimately depend on the salience of constitutional issues before MPs, 
peers and the public. This throws into relief a key factor that helps understand the 
dynamics between political branches in the formal stages of the legislative process. 
The government’s approach is largely pragmatic. If ministers are deeply committed to 
a policy, the government may not introduce substantive changes to a bill –for instance, 
to address constitutional concerns–, unless risking defeat at the Commons. 
Constitutional committees, therefore, will have a long route to follow. Firstly, they 
will need constitutionally aware peers or MPs willing to advance constitutional 
committee recommendations through non-government amendments. Alternatively, 
the committee chair and/or some prominent committee members may promote a non-
governmental amendment. It is more likely that such amendments will resonate 
stronger at the Lords than at the Commons. If the Lords manage to defeat the 
government, then the ability of constitutional committee recommendations to shape 
legislative outcomes will depend on the response of the government or the Commons 
at the ping pong stage. This illustrates the difficulties constitutional committees 
encounter in shaping legislative outcomes. 
The conclusion is that constitutional committees have not been able to exert 
significant influence at the formal stages of the legislative process, both in terms of 
influencing parliamentary debates and shaping legislative outcomes. 
2. Preventive influence and political self-restraint: constitutional 
committees’ capacity to exert subtle and informal influence 
I have noted that most theoretical expectations placed on constitutional 
committees focus on their capacity to exert influence at the formal stages of the 
legislative process. Nevertheless, political scientists have shown that select 
committees, including constitutional committees, have a preventive influence.36 Their 
very existence can motivate political self-restraint at the early stages of policy-making 
and legislative drafting. Although this influence is subtle and difficult to measure, 
                                                
36 Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 227-8; Meghan Benton and Meg Russell, 
‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British 
House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772; Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords 
(n 28), 224ff. See also Hiebert’s findings about the JCHR’s preventive influence in Hiebert and Kelly, 
Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30), 296ff. 
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empirical studies based on interviews with ministers and civil servants suggest that 
select committees’ influence is significant. Political scientists note that at earlier stages 
of the policy development, governments are more willing to change their minds. 
Before the introduction of a bill, the government may adjust policy aspects without 
assuming major political costs.37 For instance, David Feldman, former legal advisor to 
the JCHR, pointed out that 
“Fewer initiatives seemed to me to give rise to serious human rights concerns in 
bills introduced in the 2002-03 session of Parliament than was the case in the 
2000-01 or 2001-02. Fewer provisions are now drafted in ways that leave rights 
subject, in my view, to inadequate safeguards.”38 
It is beyond the scope of this work to explore the degree of preventive influence 
that constitutional committees effectively exert. For the purposes of this thesis, I will 
accept at face value claims made by political scientists, as well as Feldman’s position. 
My interest here is to advance an understanding of the operation of constitutional 
committees by exploring the reasons why they exert preventive influence. In my view, 
the reasons are threefold. Firstly, ministers have pragmatic reasons to prevent adverse 
constitutional committees’ reactions. Secondly, civil servants have institutional 
reasons to anticipate constitutional committees’ negative reactions. And thirdly, 
constitutional committees promote open government and transparency. The very fact 
that the government is required to think through the constitutional implications of its 
legislative proposals and to provide justifications for its decisions promotes political 
self-restraint. I will briefly describe these reasons in the same order.  
The first reason is pragmatism. From a strategic point of view, ministers will 
have incentives to avoid a negative report from a constitutional committee report that 
may hinder the passage of their bills. The government knows that committees’ reports 
will be in the public domain, accessible for consultation by parliamentarians and the 
                                                
37 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30), 297. Note that the emphasis on pre-
legislative scrutiny and consultation are premised on the assumption that Parliament and other 
stakeholders may be able to influence more substantially when governments are not fully committed to 
a policy or a given legislative scheme. For this very reason, the JCHR changed its working practices in 
the 2005-10 Parliament, in order to incorporate pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills. See Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, The Committee’s Future Working Practices (n 30). See also Klug and 
Wildbore, ‘Breaking New Ground’ (n 30), 240-41 and 248. 
38 David Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process’ (2004) 25 
Statute Law Review 91, 93. However, cf Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30), 300. 
According to Hiebert’s research, “Anticipation of a negative JCHR report does not appear to regularly 
divert government from pursuing a bill for which it is deeply committed, or influence its judgment about 
compatibility.” 
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public. Since their reports represent the unanimous view of committee members from 
different political loyalties, constitutional committees may be able to appeal and 
mobilise a wider audience. Potentially, their recommendations may gain cross-party 
support among peers and MPs, including government backbenchers. This may put 
pressure on the government. Consider for instance the case of unhappy Coalitions or 
Minority governments, where a few backbench rebels may be enough to inflict a defeat 
at the Commons. To avoid political defeat or the appearance of making concessions 
that may be capitalised on by the opposition, the government will have incentives to 
anticipate constitutional committees’ reactions. This may enable ministers to avoid 
criticism contained in negative committee reports that may spark further criticism at 
the floor of both Houses and possible backbench rebellions. In short, it is in the interest 
of the government to make the passage of bills smoother by preventing criticism from 
constitutional committees.   
A second factor is institutional. The Guide to Making Legislation explicitly 
requires bill teams in charge of developing policy to anticipate constitutional 
committees’ reactions. According to the Guide, bill teams must incorporate 
constitutional considerations as an integral part of the policy-making process, rather 
than as “a last minute compliance exercise”.39 The Guide contains chapters on 
compatibility with Convention rights40 and on delegated powers,41 which provide bill 
teams with essential information to address these matters. In both chapters, the work 
of the JCHR and the DPRRC features prominently.42 Although there is no equivalent 
chapter on the constitution, the Guide does include a few paragraphs warning about 
the work of the SCC.43 The Guide briefly instructs bill teams on the issues that may 
capture each committee’s attention. Hence, government departments are subject to soft 
law requirements to consider carefully the prospects of constitutional committees 
closely scrutinising government’s bills.  
                                                
39 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), 113. 
40 Ibid, Ch12. 
41 Ibid, Ch16. 
42 See ibid, at paras 12.30-35 and 16.7-24. Note the Guide’s explicit recommendation to 
anticipate the DPRRC’s views at para 16.17. 
43 Ibid, at paras 35.12-15. The focus on these sections is on warning bill teams when bills are 
likely to attract the attention of the SCC. 
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A third factor is that constitutional committees effectively impose a requirement 
of transparency and a burden of justification on the government. Open government 
requirements have traditionally been essential for the effectiveness of political 
accountability mechanisms.44 They act as a deterrent for the government to disregard 
constitutional considerations. The operation of constitutional committees has forced 
the government to move away from the inherent opacity of its internal procedures for 
making legislation.45 By convention, the internal legal advice given by the Law 
Officers on the legality of government’s measures cannot be disclosed.46 Against that 
background, requirements such as issuing statements on compatibility with 
Convention rights, drafting explanatory notes and dedicated delegated powers and 
human rights memoranda, have partially disclosed information about the 
government’s constitutional thinking.  
Take for instance the case of Convention rights. Section 19 HRA imposes a 
requirement on ministers to express their view about the compatibility with 
Convention rights of every government bill. However, the HRA fell short of imposing 
a duty to disclose the reasons that supported the government’s case for compatibility. 
The JCHR was aware that government departments were producing an internal human 
rights memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet Office’s Parliamentary 
Business and Legislation Committee (“PBL Committee”).47 These memorandums, 
which contain a “frank assessment” of each bill’s vulnerability to legal challenges, 
have never been disclosed to the JCHR. As noted in Chapter Five, the quest for the 
government’s justification of its compatibility assessments has been a constant 
concern of the JCHR.48 Eventually the government agreed to supplement bald section 
19 HRA statements of compatibility with reasoning supporting its conclusion. This 
reasoning is incorporated in the explanatory notes. However, when the issues are “too 
substantial”, government departments prepare a detailed human rights memorandum.49  
                                                
44 As J.A.G. Griffith famously put it, “It is not by attempting to restrict the legal powers of 
government that we shall defeat authoritarianism. It is by insisting on open government.” See J. A. G. 
Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 16. 
45 Jack Simson Caird, ‘Public Legal Information and Law-making in Parliament’ in Alexander 
Horne and Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 174; Hiebert 
and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30), 291. 
46 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (August 2019), at para 2.13. 
47 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at paras 12.8-13. 
48 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30),  293-95. 
49 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at paras 12.32. 
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The DPRRC also benefited from a dedicated memorandum. In this case, it was 
the government who committed itself in 1992 to supply the newly created Delegated 
Powers committee with a dedicated delegated powers memorandum justifying the 
scope of powers sought and the degrees of parliamentary scrutiny proposed.50 
However, the quality of those memorandums has been inconsistent, prompting the 
DPRRC’s criticism. In 2014, the DPRRC undertook an inquiry into the quality of 
delegated powers memorandums, which resulted in further commitments by the 
government to improve its working practices, and in guidance issued by the committee 
to government departments.51  
Both the JCHR and the DPRRC have benefited greatly from these dedicated 
memorandums. By contrast, the SCC cannot rely on a dedicated constitutional 
memorandum as the starting point of its scrutiny function. It can only rely on the 
information contained in the explanatory notes. A major difficulty for the SCC is that 
its remit is wider than in the case of other constitutional committees, as it covers all 
sort of matters of constitutional significance. The combination of the lack of a 
dedicated constitutional memorandum and its wide remit, prompts the Guide to 
Making Legislation to be less assertive on the work of the SCC.  
Constitutional committees can pursue other instruments to press for open 
government and transparency. The government knows in advance that constitutional 
committees may demand additional information to conduct their scrutiny work. This 
can take the form of letters directed to ministers, or calling ministers and other officials 
to give evidence at committee meetings.52 On the other hand, constitutional 
committees will rely on information provided by expert witness and other stakeholders 
to perform evidence-based assessments of the government’s justification.53 The 
government knows in advance that if it does not anticipate possible objections, it may 
face embarrassment at committee meetings and will be required to provide additional 
reasons. This shows that constitutional committees can enhance transparency and act 
as reason-demanding bodies, thus effectively requiring the government to think 
                                                
50 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers, First Report (HL 1992-93, 57). 
51 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Quality of Delegated 
Powers Memoranda (HL 2014-15, 39). 
52 See for instance Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at para 12.31. 
53 Hiebert and Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights (n 30), 299. 
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carefully about issues of constitutional significance and to justify its decisions. This 
constitutes, on its own, a motivation for political self-restraint. 
In sum, there is evidence that constitutional committees exert preventive 
influence at the early stages of policy-making and legislative drafting. Political self-
restraint is motivated by pragmatism, since ministers have incentives to avoid any 
constitutional debates that may obstruct the passage of their bills. It is also motivated 
by institutional requirements demanding civil servants to anticipate possible adverse 
reactions from constitutional committees. And finally, it is motivated by demands for 
transparency and justification imposed on the government. This shows that the 
influence of constitutional committees is not limited to the formal stages of the 
legislative process. These committees are also relevant at the pre-legislative stage. 
3. The role of non-elected experts in the operation of constitutional 
committees 
Politicians are not experts on constitutional matters. A major challenge for 
LSCG, which was anticipated in Chapter Two above, and was confirmed by the 
modest impact of constitutional committees at the formal stages of the legislative 
process, is the technical nature of constitutional arguments. Although some of the most 
prominent members of constitutional committees have legal expertise (see Chapter 
Two above), this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Constitutional 
committees are formed by members that come from different backgrounds. Hence, 
they are likely to have, at best, a general understanding of constitutional matters. For 
these reasons, the operation of constitutional committees is supported by 
parliamentary clerks and lawyers. Likewise, at government, Ministers will have –at 
best– a broad understanding of basic constitutional matters. They will need to rely on 
a wealth of policy and legal expertise drawn from policy officials and departmental 
lawyers working in bill teams, as well as lawyers working at the Office of the 
Parliamentary Council (herein, “OPC”). In performing their roles, these bureaucratic 
actors may act in consultation with the Law Officers. This section accounts for the role 
that non-elected experts at government and Parliament perform in the operation of 
constitutional committees. I will start by describing for the contribution of bureaucratic 
actors at government. Secondly, I will continue with that of clerks and legal advisors 
to constitutional committees. Finally, I will argue a significant part of the inter-
institutional relationships between political branches of government that are at the 
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heart of constitutional committees’ operation, are conducted between non-elected 
experts assisting both branches. 
a. Intragovernmental constitutionality checks 
Government departments delegate the development of policy on “bill teams”, 
composed of policy officials, experts on the subject matter, and departmental lawyers. 
These civil servants provide the knowledge and legal techniques needed for politicians 
to achieve their policy objectives.54 As a former Attorney General put it, departmental 
lawyers are the “day-to-day” guardians of legality.55 They are in charge of making the 
case for the constitutionality of government bills.56 Departmental lawyers will draft 
legal documents such as the Human Rights memorandum, the delegated powers 
memorandum, the memorandum on constitutional and legal issues, and the 
explanatory notes of every bill.57 The Attorney General or the Solicitor General will 
look at these documents to assess whether the department has made a convincing 
case.58 These materials will frame debates at the PBL Committee. Here, the Attorney 
General will advise the PBL Committee about the “readiness” of government bills and 
authorise its introduction.59  
On the other hand, bill teams will develop a “Parliamentary Handling 
Strategy”,60 which shall cover the content of the bill and any other issues that 
parliamentarians may raise. Bill teams must anticipate any possible negative reaction 
to the bill during the formal stages of the legislative process. This includes possible 
negative constitutional committees’ reports. Bill teams and civil servants are also in 
charge of advising on how to react to non-government amendments, and when to make 
concessions. If a constitutional committee demands additional information or 
justification, or if it questions ministers or civil servants in committee sessions, bill 
                                                
54 Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2014), 192; 
Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2009), 141. 
55 Dominic Grieve, ‘The Role of Human Rights in a Law Officer's Work: Challenges Facing the 
HRA and the ECHR’ (2012) 17 Judicial Review 101, 101. 
56 If they face difficult or politically sensitive issues, they may consult the Law Officers. See 
ibid, 101. 
57 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at para 3.23. It is worth noting that there 
is a “Government Legal Department” that assists government departments by providing legal advice on 
the development, design, and implementation of government policies, and work with the Parliamentary 
Counsel on primary legislation. 
58 Grieve, ‘The Role of Human Rights’ (n 55), 102. 
59 Ibid, 102. 
60 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at para 3.22, 6.22 and Ch20. 
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teams and departmental lawyers must support the government’s case. These 
considerations show that departmental lawyers working hand in hand with policy 
officials at bill teams are key bureaucratic actors that engage with the work of 
constitutional committees. At early stages of the law-making process, they anticipate 
possible reactions, conduct internal constitutionality checks, and make the case for the 
constitutionality of bills in explanatory notes and memorandums. These materials are 
the starting point for constitutional committees’ legislative scrutiny work. 
There is a second group of non-elected bureaucratic experts that perform 
constitutionality checks on policy proposals. These are the OPC lawyers, who have a 
monopoly in legislative drafting in the government.61 Departmental lawyers prepare 
policy instructions, and OPC lawyers translate them into legal language. This is a 
complex process which involves thinking carefully about the internal coherence of the 
bill, and its external coherence with the statute book.62 In explaining the nature of this 
drafting process and its significance for upholding core Rule of Law values, Lord Sales 
claims that OPC lawyers discipline and refine “political will through the application 
of constitutional reason”.63 In his view, these lawyers protect values such as legal 
certainty, predictability, formal justice and equality, non-retrospectivity and basic 
standards of fairness. Similarly, Terence Daintith and Alan Page argue that OPC 
lawyers protect the integrity of the statute book, by upholding values such as non-
retrospection, proper use of delegation and civil liberties.64 OPC lawyers are key actors 
during the preliminary stages of a bill. The head of this service, the first parliamentary 
counsel, attends meetings at the PBL Committee, and therefore also advises on the 
legal and constitutional aspects of legislation, if needed. A key point of the OPC’s 
work is to “give effect to the government’s intention in a form capable of withstanding 
Parliamentary and later judicial scrutiny”.65 For these reasons, in performing their 
tasks, OPC lawyers will take into account constitutional committees’ 
                                                
61 Writing 20 years ago, Terence Daintith and Alan Page argued that the OPC “is as close as our 
system has traditionally come to a check on the ‘constitutionality’ of legislation.” See Terence Daintith 
and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control (Oxford 
University Press 1999), 254. 
62 Phillip Sales, ‘The Contribution of Legislative Drafting to the Rule of Law’ (2018) 77 
Cambridge Law Journal 630, 632-33. 
63 Ibid, 630. 
64 Daintith and Page, The Executive in the Constitution (n 61), 250, 254-56. 
65 Ibid, 250. 
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recommendations.66 They may address committees’ concerns and raise possible issues 
to government departments. In this sense, Dawn Oliver notes that OPC lawyers warn 
ministers when “aspects of a proposed bill (…) are not consistent with normal legal or 
constitutional values”.67 If disagreements arise, OPC lawyers may refer the issues to 
the law officers. This shows that, as departmental lawyers, OPC lawyers are also 
involved in the operation of constitutional committees.  
Bill teams, departmental lawyers and lawyers at the OPC form part of a 
“bureaucratic system of internal legal accountability checks”. As noted above, the hard 
work of assessing the constitutional implications of government legislation before its 
introduction to Parliament, is performed by these actors. There is a division of labour 
because Ministers are not equipped to perform these assessments. Instead, they are 
concerned with the political implications of bills, and with securing enough support at 
Parliament for their policies. On complex constitutional and legal matters, they defer 
to the advice given by government lawyers and OPC lawyers.68 By contrast to 
Ministers, civil servants are legally bound to act with independence and objectivity.69 
They are subject to a series of institutional duties set out in statutory and soft law 
documents. In addition, as lawyers, they are also bound by their professional ethics to 
exercise an independent professional judgement.70 The combination of these factors 
means that government lawyers and OPC lawyers will provide frank assessment about 
the legal and constitutional implications of proposed legislation. If they do not provide 
legal advice to the best of their knowledge, with professionalism, objectivity and 
independence, governmental lawyers and OPC lawyers will not retain respect from 
their political masters, Parliament and the public. The effectiveness of their advice will 
be called into question.71 
                                                
66 See for instance Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: 
Quality of Delegated Powers Memoranda (n 51), at para 37. 
67 Dawn Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 
33, 45. 
68 Elin Weston, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Scrutiny’ 
(2015) 26 King's Law Journal 266, 277. 
69 Section 7(4) Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2000. 
70 Dawn Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defense of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ in Gavin Drewry and Alexander Horne (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd 
edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 311-2; Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (n 67), 42. 
71 Daintith and Page, The Executive in the Constitution (n 61), 256. 
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However, none of these bureaucratic actors enjoys veto power. Civil servants 
are ultimately accountable to ministers. They owe professional duties to their client, 
the government.72 If Ministers are willing to include provisions against the legal or 
constitutional advice of government lawyers or OPC lawyers, these matters can be 
escalated and ultimately referred to the Law Officers. They have the final word on 
constitutional and legal matters at government. Consequently, bill teams and 
departmental lawyers have to consult them if doubts arise about “the legality or 
constitutional propriety of proposed primary (…) legislation” and about “the powers 
necessary to make proposed subordinated legislation”.73 By contrast to civil servants, 
Law Officers are politicians, but their role is to ensure that the government and 
ministers act lawfully and in accordance with the rule of law.74 Because of their special 
position, they will mediate between lawyers and politicians,75 resolving disputes and 
showing political sensitivity, while at the same owing respect to the rule of law.  
In sum, there are bureaucratic non-elected government experts who advise 
ministers about the constitutionality and legality of government legislative proposals. 
Their role in assessing the constitutionality of government legislation is invigorated 
by the operation of constitutional committees, as these actors must anticipate possible 
negative reports. They are only advisors, and decisions about the content of legislation 
are ultimately political. However, if issues of political sensitivity and constitutionality 
arise, it will be for the Law Officers to decide. This shows that there is an internal 
system within government that performs constitutionality checks. It is based on the 
interaction between experts and politicians. The system protects ministers from 
possible criticism and adverse parliamentary reactions, as well as possible legal 
challenges that may frustrate their policy objectives. In doing so, it contributes to an 
appropriate assessment of the constitutional implications of bill proposals at 
government.  
                                                
72 Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defense of the Sovereignty of 
Parliament’ (n 70), 312. 
73 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (October 2011), at para 6.6. See also David Howarth and 
Shona Wilson Stark, ‘H.L.A. Hart's Secondary Rules: What Do ‘Officials’ Really Think?’ (2018) 14 
International Journal of Law in Context 61, 18. 
74 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (n 73), at para 6.4. 
75 Howarth and Stark, ‘H.L.A. Hart’ (n 73), 17-8. 
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b. Parliamentary legal advisers 
The operation of constitutional committees not only involves non-elected 
experts working in government. There are also non-elected experts who support the 
work of parliamentary constitutional committees. I already introduced them in Chapter 
Two above. It is now time to briefly expand on their role in the operation of 
constitutional committees. There are two main advisors. Firstly, parliamentary clerks. 
They perform a variety of tasks, such as managing and advising committees on matters 
of parliamentary procedure, briefing members on different subject matters, assisting 
members in dealing with witnesses and evidence, and advising committees to 
maximize their influence.76 Secondly, parliamentary lawyers.77 Here, there are 
differences between constitutional committees. The DPRRC is supported by 
parliamentary lawyers who work at the Counsel to the Chairman of Committees.78 The 
JCHR employs two full time legal advisers, but draws one of them from the legal 
profession.79 Finally, by contrast, the SCC employs two part-time learned legal 
academics.  
Some of the most prominent members of constitutional committees have a legal 
background (see Chapter Two above). However, most members have only a general 
understanding or no knowledge about complex and technical constitutional matters. 
For this reason, legal advisors perform an essential role for the operation of 
constitutional committees, and exert significant influence among committee 
members.80 This is accentuated by the nature of the tasks that the JCHR and the SCC 
entrust to their legal advisers.81 Firstly, legal advisers have a direct influence in the 
                                                
76 Ben Yong, Greg Davies and Cristina Leston-Bandeira, ‘Tacticians, Stewards, and 
Professionals: The Politics of Publishing Select Committee Legal Advice’ (2019) 46 Journal of Law 
and Society 367, 11. 
77 Most in-House parliamentary lawyers were formerly employed by the government legal 
service. See Andrew Kennon, ‘Brexit and the House of Commons’ The Constitution Society 
<https://consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Andrew-Kennon-Brexit-conference-notes.pdf> 
accessed 10 March 2018, 124. 
78 Andrew Kennon, ‘Legal Advice to Parliament’ in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn 
Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishing 2013), 123. 
79 Usually, an experienced barrister or solicitor. See ibid, 124. 
80 Yong, Davies and Leston-Bandeira, ‘Tacticians, Stewards’ (n 76), 27. 
81 Note that these two constitutional committees have similar working methods: Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, Future Working Practices (n 30), at paras 22-3, and 27-42; Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Sessional Report (n 18), at Appendix 1. See also Le Sueur and Simson Caird, ‘The House 
of Lords’ (n 11), 290-2; Alexander Horne and Megan Conway, ‘Parliament and Human Rights’ in 
Alexander Horne and Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2018), 
238-39. 
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committees’ legislative scrutiny agenda, because they must conduct a sifting procedure 
to identify bills that have “significant” impact on Convention rights or on the 
constitution, respectively.82 Secondly, as I will explain below, legal advisers may 
directly engage with departmental lawyers, and attend private meetings. In these 
meetings, they may anticipate objections that might arise during the passage of the bill, 
and/or point out some additional information that the committee may need to conduct 
LSCG. Thirdly, legal advisors may draft preliminary notes or briefings directed to 
committee members. These notes will enlighten their assessment. Finally, legal 
advisors draft reports that present the results of the committee’s legal and 
constitutional analysis. These draft reports will then be circulated to committee 
members for approval. These numerous and critical tasks show that legal advisors have 
significant responsibility in the operation of constitutional committees.83 
Considering the significance of legal advisers’ role, it is important to question 
what sort of relationship they have with committee members. These lawyers are not 
subject to accountability from their political masters in the way that civil servants are. 
This raises questions about the position of legal advisors. Consider the following three 
points. Firstly, given that constitutional committees deal with highly technical 
constitutional matters, it is possible that committee members will have to defer to the 
advice provided by their legal advisers. Secondly, as argued in Chapter Three above, 
constitutional matters in the UK are essentially contested. There are different views 
about key constitutional questions. Sometimes it is challenging to distinguish technical 
advice from merits-based assessments. Thirdly, constitutional committees work on a 
consensual basis and do not record any dissenting views. By reading their reports, one 
may presume, at face value, that such reports represent the views of all committee 
members, and not merely those of its legal advisors. Yet, this same work method 
impedes identification of the degree of control that legal advisers exert over the 
workings of constitutional committees. Such issues raise concerns about the role of 
constitutional committees’ legal advisors. 
                                                
82 Yet, their proposals are ultimately dependent on a decision of the committee chairman, in the 
SCC’s case, or of the committee members, in the JCHR’s case. 
83 Le Sueur and Simson Caird, ‘The House of Lords’ (n 11), 291; Kavanagh, ‘The Joint 
Committee’ (n 4), 118-19. 
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A recent study by Ben Yong, Greg Davies and Cristina Leston-Bandeira (herein, 
“Yong et al”) sheds light on the relationship between committee members and their 
legal advisers. It provides a useful background for discussing the role of legal advisers. 
These authors argue that clerks and parliamentary lawyers are subordinated to select 
committees.84 Yong et al claim that MPs and peers are the key actors within select 
committees because only they are capable of exerting influence, not their legal 
advisers. On the other hand, a key finding is that legal advisers interpret their 
relationship with committee members as a lawyer-client professional relationship.85 
This means that legal advisers provide advice to the best of their knowledge, subject 
to professional and ethical norms. This has two relevant implications. First, the legal 
adviser recognises the client’s autonomy. Hence, it is ultimately incumbent upon 
committee members to decide what to do with the advice given. Even if legal advisers 
draft committee reports, committee members must appropriate this document.86 By 
approving the draft, they make the legal advisers’ provisional remarks their own 
remarks. This means that committee members take political responsibility for what the 
report states. Secondly, legal advisers will have an interest to protect their own 
independence.87 This requires them to appeal to MPs and peers from the whole 
political spectrum. Otherwise, their reputation may be damaged, and they may be 
exposed to political criticism. It should be noted that among committee members, 
some may have legal expertise, and therefore those members may be able to flag issues 
regarding the advice provided. A similar role may be performed by parliamentary 
clerks. In addition, if legal advisers fail to account for the whole range of views on a 
given matter, they may be open to criticism from the legal community. Hence, the need 
to draw a line between technical constitutional considerations, on the one hand, and a 
more merits-based assessment, on the other. There are no sharp lines between these 
two arenas. However, by protecting the independence of their advice, and promoting 
the ability of committee members to form a view of their own, legal advisers will avoid 
being held responsible for their client’s decision, and therefore, seeing their function 
politicised.  
                                                
84 Yong, Davies and Leston-Bandeira, ‘Tacticians, Stewards’ (n 76). 
85 Ibid, 13-14. 
86 Ibid, 17. 
87 Ibid, 17ff, especially 25. 
 197 
In sum, legal advisers perform a critical function in the workings of 
constitutional committees. The highly technical nature of constitutional arguments 
demands a significant contribution in essential tasks, such as defining the committees’ 
agenda and drafting reports. However, as in the case of the relationship between the 
government and bureaucratic non-elected experts, decisions will be taken by 
committee members, who are ultimately politically responsible for constitutional 
committees’ remarks and recommendations. 
c. Interactions between non-elected experts at government and Parliament 
A final point is that the work of non-elected experts in government and in 
constitutional committees is largely collaborative. They interact informally and behind 
the scenes when assessing the constitutionality of bills through phone calls, emails and 
meetings. This shows that constitutional committees promote different layers of inter-
institutional relationships between political branches of government. At political level, 
there are interactions when ministers are questioned by a committee in writing or at a 
committee session. There are also interactions when committees publish a report and 
the government formally responds, either in parliamentary debate or in writing. 
However, these are not the only avenues for interaction and dialogue. Bureaucratic 
experts and legal advisers to constitutional committees engage in dialogue. The Guide 
to Making Legislation encourages these interactions, because it suggests that civil 
servants make informal contact with their counterparts at constitutional committees.88 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that informal discussions between civil servants 
and legal advisers are “clearly relatively commonplace”.89 This includes meetings 
between constitutional committees’ legal advisers and bill teams. Considering the 
essential role that bureaucrats and legal advisers to constitutional committees perform, 
these interactions are a fundamental component of the successful operation of 
constitutional committees. 
                                                
88 For instance, see Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (n 17), at paras 12.34-5. Note 
that the Guide in its Appendix B contains the contact details of the three constitutional committees’ 
clerks. 
89 Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 227-28; Le Sueur and Simson Caird, ‘The 
House of Lords’ (n 11), 290; Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills’ (n 67), 43; Kavanagh, 
‘The Joint Committee’ (n 4), 123; Horne and Conway, ‘Parliament and Human Rights’ (n 81), 239-40. 
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4. Revising normative expectations 
This section opened by identifying the normative expectations for theoretical 
accounts of constitutional committees. These theories expect that by improving 
political engagement with constitutional arguments, constitutional committees will 
contribute to redress a perceived lack of democratic legitimacy of constitutional 
arguments, and will enhance political accountability mechanisms. To tests these ideas, 
I reviewed the relevant literature about the impact of constitutional committees on 
parliamentary deliberations, and on shaping legislative outcomes. Literature suggests 
that constitutional committees have a modest impact on parliamentary deliberations, 
especially at the Commons. Similarly, constitutional committees, except for the 
DPRRC, have a rather modest influence in shaping legislative outcomes.  
These findings suggest that when assessing the contribution of constitutional 
committees, attention should be paid not only to the formal stages of the legislative 
process, but also to the pre-legislative stages of policy-making and legislative drafting. 
Thus, evidence indicates that constitutional committees have had a preventive 
influence on the government. Their very existence has motivated political self-restraint 
on the part of ministers, and obligated government departments to incorporate 
constitutional considerations as an integral part of the policy-making and legislative 
drafting process.  
When thinking about this preventive influence, the role of non-elected experts 
who assist both the government and constitutional committees was thrown into relief. 
The last part of this section provided an account of their contribution. I argued that bill 
teams and government departments undertake the hard work of making the 
government’s case for the constitutionality of its bills. This includes anticipating 
possible negative reactions from constitutional committees. In performing this role, 
they are assisted by OPC lawyers, who also take into account constitutional 
committees’ recommendations when drafting legislation. When difficult and/or 
politically sensitive issues arise, the Law Officers also get involved. I argued that these 
actors are part of a system of internal legal accountability checks on government’s 
legislative proposals. This system is reinvigorated by constitutional committees. Non-
elected experts also assist constitutional committees. Parliamentary clerks and lawyers 
perform many tasks. Yet, the significant responsibilities that shouldered by 
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constitutional committees legal advisers comprised the main focus. According to the 
JCHR and the SCC’s own accounts of their working practices, legal advisers perform 
an essential role. They define the committee’s legislative scrutiny agenda, interact 
informally with government civil servants, brief committee members, and draft 
reports. Finally, I argued that constitutional committees facilitate a series of 
interactions and dialogue between the government and Parliament. Although some are 
conducted by politicians, a significant part of such inter-institutional interactions take 
place informally and behind the scenes, between non-elected experts.  
These findings suggest that theoretical accounts of constitutional committees 
should take care not to overstate the role of politicians, and not to understate the role 
of non-elected experts advising both government and Parliament. A practice-based 
account of constitutional committees must look at their operation from different 
angles. The most accurate rendering, then, must consider constitutional committees’ 
contribution to LSCG as part of a broader system of inter-institutional relationships 
between government and Parliament to assess the constitutional implications of 
legislation. This system operates from the earlier stages of policy-making, and 
throughout the formal stages of the legislative process. At different stages, different 
actors get involved. These include not only politicians at government and Parliament, 
but notably, non-elected experts advising the government and constitutional 
committees. The evidence reviewed in this section suggests that theoretical accounts 
would do well to avoid placing too much faith in the capacity of constitutional 
committees to foster political engagement. That evidence also suggests that without 
accounting for the role of non-elected experts, and the interactions and collaborative 
work that takes place between them, it is not possible to have a proper grasp of the 
operation of constitutional committees. 
III. Reconsidering the place of politics in Legislative Scrutiny on 
Constitutional Grounds 
My practice-based account of constitutional committees has highlighted key 
aspects of its operation. Notably, it has become apparent that the place for politics in 
LSCG is limited. In this section, I discuss the theoretical implications of these findings 
by looking at three issues. Firstly, whether constitutional committees should transform 
parliamentary deliberations at Parliament. Secondly, how constitutional committees 
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fit within UK-style constitutionalism. Finally, what is the source of legitimacy of 
constitutional committees’ remarks and recommendations. 
1. Do we need more constitutional deliberation among politicians? 
Constitutional committees are expected to improve deliberation among 
politicians on matters of constitutional significance during the passage of bills. 
However, empirical evidence reviewed here portrays quite a different picture of 
constitutional committees’ outcomes. Although these committees do improve 
constitutional deliberation, it is not necessarily deliberation among elected politicians. 
Undoubtedly, that constitutional committees do engage in a deliberative process. 
There are discussions between committee members, assisted by their legal advisors. 
Constitutional committees gather and assess evidence from a variety of constitutional 
experts, political scientists, pressure groups and stakeholders, among others. 
Committee members question ministers and civil servants, and pressure the 
government to provide justification for its decisions. Secondly, as discussed above, 
constitutional committees have had an impact on parliamentary deliberations at the 
Lords. The SCC and the DPRRC, as Lords based committees, mainly influence 
debates at the upper chamber. While the JCHR is a Joint Committee, engagement with 
its reports is qualitatively and quantitatively superior at the Lords than at the 
Commons. This shows that the deliberative impact of constitutional committees not 
only takes place within the confines of committee sessions. Their remarks and 
recommendations also inform parliamentary debates at the Lords. 
Thirdly, constitutional committees have also prompted constitutional 
deliberation among bureaucratic actors. The mere prospect of adverse reaction from a 
constitutional committee has reinvigorated internal governmental constitutionality and 
legality checks. Bill teams, government lawyers and OPC lawyers, assisted by the Law 
Officers, are alert to the constitutional implications of government legislation. There 
is a wealth of constitutional deliberation among bureaucratic experts. There is also 
constitutional dialogue and deliberation between these bureaucratic non-elected 
experts and constitutional committee legal advisers, which takes place informally and 
behind the scenes. In addition, there is further constitutional deliberation and dialogue 
when ministers and civil servants are questioned. Dialogue also occurs when the 
government responds to a constitutional committee’s report, engaging with its 
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reasoning and recommendations; and in certain cases, addressing in full or in part, 
constitutional concerns raised by its bills.90  
However, in section II above, I concluded that constitutional committees have 
been unable to mainstream constitutional considerations among elected politicians at 
government and at the Commons. The data suggests that ministers tend to defer 
matters of constitutional significance to departmental and OPC lawyers. Their focus is 
on the political dimension of bills. At the Commons, constitutional committees’ 
reports have had a rather modest impact on debates, as MPs are mainly concerned with 
policy and political confrontation.91 This leaves little room for debate about the 
constitutional issues raised by government legislation. There may be instances in 
which MPs truly engage with constitutional arguments. However, these are the 
exception rather than the rule. Constitutional committees have been unable to position 
constitutional considerations at the heart of parliamentary debates at the Commons. 
They have not had a “transformative” effect on parliamentary debates at the Commons. 
Scholars recognise these limitations.92 As things stand, the impact of constitutional 
committees is mainly dependent on the Lords taking interest in these matters, 
advancing constitutionally-inspired amendments, and reaching a compromise with the 
government or defeating it.   
These remarks raise a normative question, namely, whether constitutional 
committees should transform politics at ministerial level and at the Commons into a 
more principled and value-based exercise dominated by constitutional considerations. 
In answering this question, the first point to note is that my practice-based account has 
shown that in the UK experience, a system of constitutional committees has not been 
able to deliver the promise of routine engagement by politicians with the constitutional 
implications of legislation. These institutional devices have not overcome the 
                                                
90 These two instances of dialogue are essential for constitutional deliberation, as one of the key 
tenets of deliberative constitutionalism is the disposition of the participants to change their minds (see 
Chapter One above). 
91 This point had already been anticipated as highly likely in Chapter Two. 
92 See Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between Ideals and Constraints’ 
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Committee’ (n 4), 134ff; Hunt, ‘Introduction’ (n 1). 
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challenges discussed in Chapter Two. That chapter noted that House of Commons is 
an overburdened chamber that must discharge a variety of constitutional functions, 
other than legislative scrutiny, let alone on constitutional grounds. Furthermore, it 
argued that among the chief constitutional functions of the Commons, the very idea of 
political confrontation between the two main political forces is fundamental for the 
House to perform its functions of electing the government, expressing the opinion of 
the people on matters of public significance, informing public debate and educating 
citizens. There is an inherent tension between constitutional considerations and 
partisan interests that is at the heart of the failure of constitutional committees to exert 
significant influence at parliamentary debates.  
Nevertheless, my practice-based account has shown that this problem, namely, 
the modest engagement by elected politicians with matters of constitutional 
significance, is not as acute in this jurisdiction as it may be in other countries. This, 
because the evidence shows that constitutional arguments are nevertheless being 
channelled to the law-making process, thanks to the influence that constitutional 
committees exert on the Lords and on civil servants. In countries that lack 
constitutional committees, and/or a less partisan upper chamber, these issues may 
prove more pressing. 
Finally, it should be noted that, although a system of constitutional committees 
in the UK is far from achieving its theoretical objectives, over constitutionalising 
political debates might have negative effects. If the normative ideal of a legislature is 
to act as deliberative and pluralistic presentative assembly, then a hard legalistic LSCG 
conception can prove problematic as a way of constitutionalising political debates. As 
noted in Chapter Four, hard legalistic LSCG conceptions can have a negative impact 
on political deliberation. On the other hand, since it requires a highly specialised 
knowledge of the intricacies of legal doctrines developed in case law, it is unlikely to 
operate as a model that fosters political ownership of the constitution. Rather, 
politicians may not feel confident to challenge these doctrines, as this could be 
interpreted as an act contrary to the Rule of Law, the independence of courts, and as 
outside their areas of expertise. A hard legalistic conception further reinforces the 
inherent “elite” and “expert” nature of constitutional considerations. By contrast, a 
more nuanced approach to LSCG may present constitutional standards as highly 
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relevant, but defeasible, considerations that shall be weight against other relevant 
considerations. While it remains true that politicians will lack expertise and time to 
understand constitutional considerations, the mediating role of constitutional 
committees publishing simple and clear reports could prove helpful. Such approach 
may foster confidence among elected politicians about the significance of their views 
when assessing the merits of government legislation. 
2. How do constitutional committees fit within UK-style constitutionalism? 
It has been argued that constitutional committees fit within the UK 
constitutionalism “political style” because they encourage elected politicians to 
scrutinise legislation in the framework of the very constitutional principles and 
procedures underpinning the UK political process.93 However, as this chapter has 
shown, this claim is problematic because elected politicians are not significantly 
engaged in LSCG in the UK. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss how constitutional 
committees fit within UK-style constitutionalism. In this section, I provide an 
alternative explanation for this. 
I have argued that LSCG can be understood in different ways. In most cases, it 
is about assessing the constitutional implications of government legislation. This 
requires taking seriously the existence of “non-legal” limits on Parliament’s 
theoretically supreme legislative powers. Parliament can assess legislation against a 
wide range of constitutional considerations, such as principles, values, case law, 
conventions and political practices and even highly regarded scholarly contributions. 
In the UK, this body of considerations can be interpreted either as benchmarks or 
standards to assess “constitutional legitimacy”, as opposed to the legality of 
legislation; or alternatively, as prudential reasons to defer to alternative sources of 
political authority in order to prevent political conflict and maintain the unity of the 
state. In either of these accounts about the nature of these “non-legal” limits, the role 
of constitutional committees is to employ these constitutional materials to constantly 
remind politicians about the need for self-restraint in the exercise of their law-making 
powers.  
Seen in this light, constitutional committees are one conduit through which these 
constitutional benchmarks or prudential reasons are channelled to political actors. 
                                                
93 Simson Caird and Oliver, ‘Parliament’s Constitutional Standards’ (n 6), 70. 
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Constitutional committees contribute in different ways, by recommending procedural 
measures to enhance the legitimacy of legislation, or by engaging with the content of 
bills. In the latter sense, committees may recommend amendments that seek to achieve 
the same policy objectives, but in a more “constitutionally legitimate” way. 
Constitutional committees may recommend that politicians avoid certain courses of 
action, or to prevent undesirable effects. They provide reasons for legislative action. 
Hence, the main way in which constitutional committees channel constitutional 
considerations is by operating as “reason-giving” bodies which provide good 
constitutionally grounded reasons to legislate in certain ways, and/or to avoid 
legislating in other ways. However, constitutional committees also operate as conduit 
for constitutional considerations because they are “reason-demanding” bodies. They 
impose a burden of justification on the government. In doing so, constitutional 
committees reinvigorate internal governmental constitutionality checks on legislative 
proposals. Here, these are indirect conduits, because civil servants directly operate as 
a check on the exercise of political power by ministers.94 In these two ways, 
constitutional committees seek to prevent the political system from exerting too much 
strain on the constitution.  
This role conforms to the UK-style constitutionalism. As some constitutional 
scholars have argued, a critical feature for the healthy operation of the British 
constitution is that all branches of government exercise self-restraint, comity, and 
show mutual exhibitions of respect.95 Constitutional committees are one of many 
mechanisms through which the UK constitution demands self-restraint from political 
branches of government. 
3. The legitimacy of constitutional committees as an accountability 
mechanism 
My practice-based account suggests that constitutional committees’ legitimacy 
claims cannot rest on the fact that they promote political ownership of the constitution. 
Although constitutional committees possess many positive features, it is important to 
                                                
94 Martin Loughlin, The British Constitution (Oxford University Press 2013), 60-61. 
95 Mark Elliott, ‘Interpretative Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten Constitution’ 
[2011] New Zealand Law Review 591; Mark Elliott, ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multidimensional 
Constitution’ in David Feldman and Mark Elliott (eds), Cambridge Companion to Public Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2016), 90ff; Oliver, ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or 
Principled) Defense of the Sovereignty of Parliament’ (n 70). 
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examine their legitimacy. This is especially so in the current context of mass 
democracy, with continued claims against the political legitimacy of the appointed 
House of Lords, and contested views regarding the British constitution. Here, I argue 
that constitutional committees’ claims to authority can be justified in a variety of 
reasons. 
Firstly, it should be noted at the outset that democratic legitimacy concerns about 
the technocratic character of constitutional committees’ operation in this jurisdiction 
must be put in perspective. Constitutional committees lack vetting powers, their 
recommendations are merely advisory. In those cases where constitutional committees 
manage to inspire peers’ amendments, and then the government suffers a defeat at the 
Lords, there is always an opportunity at ping pong stage to water down or revert the 
amendment, provided that the government manages to assert its parliamentary 
majority at the Commons. Although there is no rule limiting the number of exchanges 
in case of disagreement between both chambers, the constitution recognises final 
legislative authority to the Commons.  
While this is true in theory, an argument could be made that if the government 
does not routinely revert constitutionally-inspired amendments, this suggests that 
constitutional committees’ recommendations have become the facto binding, thereby 
raising concerns about a technocratic imposition over the political branches of 
government. Thinking in terms of the evidence available, this argument would only 
carry weight in the case of the DPRRC, which is the most successful constitutional 
committee in terms of shaping legislative outcomes. Yet, the evidence suggests a more 
complex picture. Daniel Gover and Meg Russell have suggested that many of the 
DPRRC’s recommendations adopted by the government do not involve a real 
concession, and may well be part of its parliamentary-handling strategy.96 For 
instance, if the government accepts a DPRRC’s recommendation to upgrade from the 
negative to the affirmative procedure, this does not involve any significant risk to its 
policy objectives. The DPRRC’s degree of success, therefore, is not signalling that the 
power of reversal is largely ineffective, and therefore, that this committee is imposing 
its will over the democratically legitimate government.  
                                                
96 Gover and Russell, Legislation at Westminster (n 8), 222-23. 
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It seems to me that as important as the question of constitutional committees’ 
effectiveness in shaping legislative scrutiny is the issue of whether the government 
engages in good faith with their recommendations. In this regard, a healthy 
constitutional democracy should hold a normative expectation that the government 
would not merely address constitutional committee recommendations in a pragmatic 
fashion. The government should not limit is analysis to a question about whether it 
would manage to revert at the Commons a Lords’ constitutionally inspired 
amendment. This expectation should be stressed in circumstances where, as it is 
usually the case, constitutional committee recommendations do not endanger the 
achievement of policy objectives, and instead only seek the introduction of additional 
safeguards or alternative means to achieve them. 
Secondly, constitutional committees can claim authority because they are 
reason-giving and expert bodies. Their recommendations are supported by reasons 
provided in clear and accessible reports. The political authority of constitutional 
committees’ recommendations depends on the wisdom of the reasons provided. 
Hence, constitutional committees may struggle to exert influence and gain prestige if 
they adopt controversial views about the principles, values, conventions and practices 
of the constitution. If constitutional committees’ recommendations are not supported 
by good reasons, they will be subject to criticism by politicians and the wider 
community of legal and political scholars, and this will inevitably damage their 
prestige and stance at government and Parliament. This also shows that constitutional 
committees’ legitimacy draws from their expertise and specialist knowledge. 
Thirdly, closely connected with their claims to expertise and specialist 
knowledge is their non-partisan and independent approach. The fact that its reports 
have cross-party support shows independence of judgment both from government and 
from partisan interests. This fosters the legitimacy of their recommendations, as 
reports may potentially appeal to a broad range of MPs and peers because they are 
presentative of an unanimity of views among their members. 
Fourthly, constitutional committees may have a representative reinforcing effect 
when they call for evidence and interest groups promoting the views of under-
represented groups manage to make their voices heard. This broadens the range of 
views that are taken into consideration in the decision-making process. This is 
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certainly the case of the JCHR and the SCC, which through regular calls for evidence 
are keen to listen the views of a wide spectrum of civil society. 
Fifthly, the transparency of constitutional committees’ procedures is another 
legitimating factor. As any other parliamentary select committee, constitutional 
committee sessions are broadcast online in the UK Parliament website. Furthermore, 
constitutional committee procedures are highly transparent. They make open calls for 
evidence to the public, experts and other stakeholders. If there are written submissions, 
constitutional committees make them available in their websites. They also make 
available transcripts of oral evidence sessions. In addition, constitutional committee 
reports reference their witnesses, thereby acknowledging those who influence their 
thinking. Finally, constitutional committee reports are published online and printed. 
For these reasons, constitutional committee procedures are subject to public scrutiny, 
thus operating openly and transparently. 
Finally, my practice-based account has shown that constitutional committees’ 
impact must be understood in close connection with the role of the Lords in the 
legislative process. The upper chamber’s role is to act as a revising chamber that 
complements the Commons, specially by addressing those matters that are not 
considered properly by MPs. Among these matters, assessing the constitutional 
implications of legislation features prominently. If constitutional committees are 
assisting the Lords to discharge their role in law-making, then the legitimacy of these 
committees should also be seen in close connection with the legitimacy of the Lords 
as a revising chamber. 
To sum up, constitutional committees do not necessarily rely on significant 
political involvement by elected MPs to provide legitimacy to their recommendations. 
However, as expert bodies that advice rather than vet Parliament, they can rely on the 
quality of the reasons given in support, their representation-reinforcing effect, the 
transparency of their procedures, and their close links with the role of the Lords in the 
UK law-making process. 
IV. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is fair to say that LSCG is driven by a minority of non-elected 
experts and peers. Constitutional committees have not been able to exert significant 
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influence among elected politicians, both at government and at the Commons. 
However, it is through a series of interactions between Ministers and bureaucratic 
experts such as departmental lawyers and OPC lawyers; between these bureaucratic 
experts and constitutional committees’ legal advisors; between constitutional 
committees and peers; and finally, between constitutionally-aware peers and ministers 
and MPs, that constitutional committees manage to channel constitutional 
considerations into political decision-making.  
Some theoretical accounts expected constitutional committees to mainstream the 
constitution among politicians. Despite the introduction of a system of constitutional 
committees, these institutional devices have not managed to promote regular 
engagement among elected politicians with the constitutional implications of 
legislation. Nevertheless, this failure is not as acute in the UK as it may be in other 
countries lacking a system of constitutional committees. The UK constitution is 
providing alternative institutional arrangements that seek to promote political 
responsibility for decisions that have significant constitutional implications. 
Constitutional committees have managed to make a relevant contribution in this 
respect, although in subtle ways. They demand open government and impose burdens 
of justification on the exercise of law-making powers. This reinvigorates internal 
constitutional checks at government, whereby civil servants operate as a check upon 
the exercise of ministerial powers. On the other hand, constitutional committees 
operate as reason-giving bodies, which provide reasons for legislative action that 
seriously regard the existence of non-legal limits on the exercise of Parliament’s 
theoretically supreme legislative powers. Although in this respect constitutional 
committees have not managed to feature prominently among elected politicians, the 
Lords may engage with their remarks and recommendations and press the government, 
either through compromise or defeat, and, in this way, cause the Commons to think 
twice. Constitutional committees, therefore, promote relationships of mutual 
institutional tension between elected politicians and non-elected experts on 
constitutional matters. Since they lack veto powers, and since they conform to UK-
style constitutionalism, they may be an attractive institutional arrangement for 
channelling constitutional considerations into political decision-making. The fact that 
elected politicians do not fully engage their reports is not necessarily a sign of defective 
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operation, if we recall that constitutional committees have managed to enter into 
dialogue with bill teams, departmental lawyers, OPC lawyers, Law Officers and the 
Lords.
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CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDIES 
I. Introduction 
This chapter contains two detailed case studies. The first discusses the 
contributions of the Select Committee on the Constitution (“SCC”) and the Delegated 
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (“DPRRC”) to legislative scrutiny of 
clauses delegating law-making powers to the executive during the passage of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The second assesses the Joint Committee 
Human Rights’ (“JCHR”) contribution to the UK’s political response to the adverse 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) judgment in the case of Hirst v UK (No. 
2).1 The purpose of these cases studies is to illustrate many of the claims made in 
previous chapters. I will divide my assessments on each case study into two parts. 
Firstly, a substantive assessment will look at the approach to the constitution and the 
conception of legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds (“LSCG”) underpinning 
the work of each committee. Secondly, a procedural assessment will look at the 
contribution of constitutional committees to deliberation, and to dialogue and 
collaboration between different parliamentary bodies, as well as with the executive. 
Each case study will have its own conclusion. 
II. Delegated Powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
My first case concerns the issue of delegated powers in the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018. This Act repeals the European Communities Act 1972, putting 
an end to EU law as a source of domestic UK law. However, as 50 years of European 
Union (“EU”) membership has left a profound mark on the statute book, to protect 
“certainty and stability”, the Act retains the body of EU law and converts it into 
domestic law. As far as this analysis is concerned, a key point of this Act is to provide 
ministers with corrective powers to make changes to domesticated EU law to prevent 
deficiencies and failures in its operation on a post-Brexit context.  
                                                
1 Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41. 
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The Withdrawal Act was subject to unprecedented levels of legislative scrutiny,2 
scholarly debate3 and public discussion. The Act raises a number of legal issues, 
including the status of retained EU law in domestic law, the status of the European 
Court of Justice’s case law, and the implications of Brexit for the devolved 
governments, among others.4 However, in this case study I will only focus on the issue 
of delegated powers, and will limit my analysis to legislative scrutiny contributions by 
the SCC and the DPRRC. Both committees were involved in legislative scrutiny of 
delegated powers since the early stages of the policy development and legislative 
drafting. I will compare their analysis and recommendations on two substantive 
dimensions. These are, on the one hand, their substantive analysis of the scope of 
delegated powers sought by the government; and, on the other, the degrees of 
parliamentary scrutiny proposed. Secondly, I will compare the procedures that each 
committee undertook as part of their legislative scrutiny work on the Withdrawal Bill. 
1. Substantive assessment 
My comparative assessment about the substantive dimension of the DPRRC and 
the SCC’s legislative scrutiny work is twofold. I will identify their methodological 
approach to LSCG, and discuss what role constitutional standards perform in their 
analysis. To identify the differences between these two committees, I will provide 
insights about each committee’s views at the different stages of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill (“Withdrawal Bill”),5 when appropriate. 
                                                
2 Whilst this chapter focuses on the SCC and the DPRRC, it is worth noting that many select 
committees performed legislative scrutiny of the Bill. See for instance, Exiting the European Union 
Select Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC 2017-19, 373); Select Committee on 
Procedure, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Interim 
Report (HC 2017-19, 386); Select Committee on Procedure, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation Under 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (HC 2017-19, 1395); Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Legislative Scrutiny: The EU (Withdrawal) Bill: A Right by Right Analysis (2017-19, HL 70, HC 774). 
See also at the pre-legislative scrutiny stage: European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary 
Scrutiny (HL 2016-17, 50), ch7; European Union Committee, Brexit: Acquired Rights (HL 2016-17, 
82); Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Human Rights Implications of Brexit (2016-17, HL 88, 
HC 695); Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Special Report: Submissions to the House of 
Commons Procedure Committee (HL 2016-17, 165). 
3 Only in the UK Constitutional Law Association’s blog there are more than 25 blog posts 
discussing the Withdrawal Act at various points in time. 
4 For a survey of these constitutional issues, see Paul Craig, ‘Constitutional Principle, the Rule 
of Law and Political Reality: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018’ (2019) 82 Modern Law 
Review 319; Paul Craig, ‘Brexit and the UK Constitution’ in Jeffrey Jowell and Colm O'Cinneide (eds), 
The Changing Constitution (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2019). 
5 European Union (Withdrawal) HC Bill (2017-19) [5]. 
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I will begin with the SCC. This committee did not undertake a detailed “line-by-
line” analysis of every single clause of the Withdrawal Bill.6 Instead, it looked at 
broader constitutional issues and trends arising from the Bill. Take three examples, all 
of them contained in the SCC’s third and final report on the Withdrawal Bill. Firstly, 
this committee discussed the impact that ambiguities about the concept of retained EU 
law and uncertainties about its status as domestic law may have for delegated powers 
in legislation other than the Withdrawal Bill.7 Secondly, the SCC expressed concerns 
about the effects that vaguely drafted provisions delegating powers may have in 
judicial review. The SCC pointed out that this might either render judicial review 
ineffective, or introduce uncertainty and promote costly litigation.8 Finally, the SCC 
claimed that the upper chamber should prepare itself to cope with the significant 
increase in the volume of statutory instruments that will have to be scrutinised within 
a constrained timetable.9  
A second manifestation of this methodological approach is reflected in the 
drafting of the reports themselves. The SCC’s three reports are striking for their clarity 
and accessibility, while employing academic language. This is most likely due to the 
influence of its part-time academic legal advisors. SCC’s reports read like an essay on 
the constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Bill. Consider for instance the 
structure of these reports, whose headings are organised around issues, principles or 
problems. Secondly, note that the SCC’s analysis is enriched by discussion of 
hypothetical problems and issues that may arise in the application of the Withdrawal 
                                                
6 However, note that in its final report (Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill (HL 2017-19, 69)), it came close to a “clause-by-clause” assessment. Note for 
instance, its analysis of the concept of deficiencies in clause 7 (ibid, at paras 168-76). This is probably 
due to the fact that most provisions of the Withdrawal Bill raised matters of constitutional significance. 
7 Ibid, at paras 21-22, 58-66, 168-76. The SCC noted that the concept of retained EU law was 
over inclusive, as it incorporated EU-derived domestic legislation, which would end up subject to 
ministerial corrective powers. As far as the status of retained EU law as domestic law, the SCC 
recommended to give to all retained direct EU law the status of primary legislation enacted on exit day. 
This would protect this body of law from clauses delegating powers in other legislation. 
Another example of the degree of sophistication of the SCC’s analysis is provided by their 
understanding of the nature and nuances of EU law. This underpins its pre-legislative scrutiny report 
recommendation to take the body of EU law as a whole, and divide its domestication process into two 
phases. See Select Committee on the Constitution, The 'Great Repeal Bill' and Delegated Powers (HL 
2016-17, 123), at paras 38-42. 
8 Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill: Interim 
Report (HL 2019, 21), at para 38; Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill (n 6), at paras 172-76. 
9 Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (n 6), at paras 229-
233. 
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Bill. Thirdly, consider that there are pressing concerns in these reports that run 
throughout the passage of the Bill. For this reason, the SCC constantly references its 
previous reports. Finally, the SCC supports its analysis on a wealth of evidence 
provided by constitutional experts and other stakeholders. This rich body of insights 
and views about the constitutional significance of the bill -including discussion on the 
relevant constitutional issues and the application and interpretative problems to which 
its provisions may give rise- enables the SCC to conduct a highly learned and wide-
ranging constitutional assessment of the Withdrawal Bill. 
At this point, I will proceed to study the role that constitutional standards 
perform in the SCC’s assessment. In the committee’s view, the Withdrawal Bill raises 
constitutional concerns about the appropriate distribution of law-making powers 
between Parliament and the executive.10 The SCC has two broad principles in mind, 
namely, the separation of powers and the legislative supremacy of Parliament. The 
SCC developed the content of these principles by proposing a constitutional standard 
according to which matters of policy and issues of principle should be subject to full 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
A good illustration of how the SCC develops this constitutional standard is 
provided by its pre-legislative scrutiny report. Here, the SCC proposed a scheme to 
allow ministers to make the necessary corrections to the body of EU laws to fit the 
UK’s domestic legal framework, and to implement the result of the negotiations with 
the EU.11 The point was to prevent ministers from implementing new policies desired 
by the government in areas that are within the competence of EU law without full 
parliamentary scrutiny. In the SCC’s view, these changes should be brought forward 
by means of primary legislation.12 The SCC recommended to take the body of EU laws 
as a whole and divide its domestication process into two phases. The first phase should 
be limited to perform the technical adaptation of domesticated EU law to fit into UK 
law on exit day.13 A substantive constraint would apply, namely, that ministers will 
not make policy changes on the preserved EU acquis. Parliament should also provide 
ministerial powers to account for the outcome of the Article 50 of the Treaty of the 
                                                
10 Select Committee on the Constitution, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ (n 7) at paras 45-49. 
11 Ibid, at paras 14-16, 28-51. 
12 Ibid, at para 49. 
13 Ibid, at paras 69-72. 
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European Union negotiations. Then, there will be a second phase, in which after 
serious thinking in government about the domesticated EU law, substantive changes 
may be brought forward on this body of laws, including the implementation of new 
policies in areas previously under the competence of EU law. The SCC argued that 
these changes should be brought forward by means of primary legislation, thus 
allowing for full parliamentary scrutiny.14 The SCC argued that if the government did 
not follow these recommendations, then any statutory instrument that “amends EU law 
in a manner that determines matters of significant policy interest or principle” should 
be subject to a “strengthened scrutiny procedure”.15 This procedure should secure 
opportunities to revise the content of regulations to respond to parliamentary concerns. 
The SCC also went on to recommend the creation of a sifting procedure that gives 
Parliament the power to decide about the appropriate degree of parliamentary 
scrutiny,16 and required that each statutory instrument be accompanied by an 
explanatory memorandum.17 This second-best proposal, which focuses on 
parliamentary scrutiny, is also inspired by the same overarching standard. If ministers 
have powers to make policy changes, then a strengthened scrutiny procedure should 
secure proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the possibility that the content of regulations 
may change in light of parliamentary debates.18 
In contrast, the DPRRC’s approach to legislative scrutiny consists of a 
meticulous, line-by-line, black letter analysis of each clause in the Withdrawal Bill 
that delegates powers. Its analysis is more detailed and precise, when compared to the 
SCC. The structure of the DPRRC’s reports is based on individual clauses (clause 7, 
                                                
14 In this phase, the government should also draw an appropriate division between primary and 
secondary legislation, depending on the nature of the subject matter. See ibid, at paras 67-68. 
15 Ibid, at paras 100-102. 
16 Ibid, at para 102. 
17 This memorandum should indicate whether the regulation of a mechanical nature or simply 
implements the Brexit deal, it should provide additional details about its object, and recommend a 
degree of parliamentary scrutiny. This should direct MPs and peers’ limited time and resources only to 
those statutory instruments that merit careful consideration.  
18 Note that once the Withdrawal Bill was passed, the SCC continued making the case for a 
strengthened scrutiny procedure in its interim report. See Select Committee on the Constitution, 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Interim Report (HL 2017-19, 19), at paras 53-55. However, note 
that in its final report, the SCC lowered its expectations, and argued in favour of the affirmative 
procedure in case of regulations making policy proposals. See Select Committee on the Constitution, 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (n 6), at para 219.   
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clause 8, clause 9, etc.), rather than issues.19 It is worth noting that the DPRRC’s 
reports contain examples and illustrations of possible abuses of powers20 and a few 
references to precedent.21 There are a few cases when the committee employs assertive 
normative language. For instance, in their analysis of ministerial powers to tax or to 
impose tax-like fees.22 Another distinctive feature of the DPRRC’s analysis is that it 
followed-up the progress of the Withdrawal Bill through the different stages of its 
passage, from its beginning to its end. Like the SCC, it published an interim report for 
the Commons and a longer report for the Lords.23 Yet, it went on to publish two 
additional reports assessing government amendments at the Lords report stage of the 
Bill.24 In these reports, the DPRRC discussed the government’s amendments and 
responses to its recommendations.  
From the point of view of constitutional standards, the DPRRC is less engaging 
than the SCC. Constitutional standards are implicit and remain at the background level. 
However, it is worth noting that the DPRRC explicitly frames the constitutional issues 
arising from the Withdrawal Bill in terms of striking an appropriate balance between 
the law-making powers of the executive and of Parliament.25 The DPRRC’s main 
                                                
19 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (HL 2017-19, 22); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill No. 2 (HL 2017-19, 73). 
20 For instance, see Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill No. 2 (n 19), at para 8, 14, 17, 21, 22, etc. See also Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee, Special Report: Second Submission to the House of Commons Procedure 
Committee on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" (HL 2016-17, 164), at para 9; Delegated 
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 1 (n 19), at paras 
22, 23, 28. 
21 For instance, the following recommendations: loosely-drawn powers based powers should not 
be subject to ministerial discretion. Instead, they should be subject to a necessity test (Delegated Powers 
and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 1 (n 19), at para 24). Henry 
VIII powers should be subject to the affirmative procedure (Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 2 (n 19), at para 53). The recommendation of the 
sifting procedure should be determinative (ibid, at para 58). Powers to “make consequential and 
transitional provisions” should be subject to the affirmative procedure (ibid, at para 38; Delegated 
Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 1 (n 19), at para 
73). 
22 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
2 (n 19), at paras 42-46. 
23 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (n 19); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
2 (n 19). 
24 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: 
Government Amendments (HL 2017-19, 124); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Further Government Amendments (HL 2017-19, 128). 
25 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Submission to the 
House of Commons Procedure Committee Inquiry on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" 
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concern is similar to that of the SCC, namely, the risk of ministerial powers 
encroaching into the domain of policy.26 It is possible to track this concern in various 
DPRRC’s remarks and recommendations. At the early stages of the Withdrawal Bill’s 
policy-making, the DPRRC argued that the Bill should not “make major changes to 
policy or establish new legal frameworks in the UK beyond those which are necessary 
to ensure that the law will continue to function properly from day one.”27 The DPRRC 
criticised the government’s White Paper on the Repeal Bill and the Withdrawal Bill 
itself, because its proposals could lead to the implementation of “significant and 
controversial policy matters” by means of secondary legislation.28 The DPRRC 
employed the criterion outlined above as its overarching constitutional standard 
throughout the passage of the Withdrawal Bill.29 On the one hand, this criterion 
informed the DPRRC’s criticism of clause 7, Henry VIII powers, ministerial powers 
to define “exit day” and the limited scope of application for the affirmative 
procedure.30 On the other hand, consider the following amendments proposed by the 
DPRRC, informed by this criterion:31 the introduction of a “necessity test”;32 the 
removal of Henry VIII powers contained in clause 9 to amend or even repeal any Act 
of Parliament whenever passed, including the Withdrawal Bill itself;33 the 
recommendation to tighten-up powers to “make consequential provision” in clause 
17(1);34 and the recommendation to deny ministerial powers to impose “tax-like” 
charges or to confer powers on public authorities to tax. 
                                                
(HL  2016-17, 143), at paras 6, 13; Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 2 (n 19), at paras 3, 4. 
26 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Second Submission to 
the House of Commons Procedure Committee on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" (n 
20), at paras 6-12. 
27 Ibid, at para 12. The DPRRC adopted the very own government’s criterion. See Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom's Withdrawal from the 
European Union (Cm 9446, March 2017), at para 1.21. 
28 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (n 19), at paras 1, 2, 6, 9. 
29 Ibid, at paras 8, 9, 31. 
30 Ibid, at paras 9, 16, 18, 21, 24, 31, 33, 45, 47-49, 63, 65, 73, 102-103, 99-106. 
31 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
2 (n 19), Annex 1. 
32 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (n 19), at paras 20-26; Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill No. 2 (n 19), at paras 6-12, 20, 37. 
33 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (n 19), at paras 44, 45, 48, 49. 
34 Ibid, at paras 71, 72.  
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2. Procedural assessment 
In this section, I discuss the SCC and DPRRC’s contributions to legislative 
scrutiny of the Withdrawal Bill from a procedural point of view. My assessment is 
twofold. Firstly, I assess their practices through the register of deliberative theories; 
and secondly, through the lenses of dialogic theories. Although both committees made 
a contribution in these respects, I will show that quality of the SCC’s procedures is 
superior to that of the DPRRC.  
The SCC’s legislative scrutiny work on the Withdrawal Bill is a remarkable 
example of high quality deliberation. From the very early stages of the policy-making, 
the SCC launched a “call for evidence”. The committee gathered a wide-range of 
written submissions.35 Academics from the fields of Public Law, EU Law and Human 
Rights Law, among others, sent contributions. There were also written submissions by 
members of the legal profession, including former senior judges, the Bar Council, the 
Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society of Scotland. Parliamentarians also sent 
contributions to this inquiry. Among them, individual MPs and peers, the Leader of 
the Commons and the Leader of the Lords, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lords, 
other representatives of opposition parties and even the Lords’ Secondary Legislation 
committee. The government Department for Exiting the European Union also sent 
written evidence. Finally, it is worth mentioning that a variety of stakeholders such as 
the Hansard Society, the Association for British Insurers and various non-
governmental organizations such as the Public Law Project, submitted written 
evidence as well. These submissions had a significant impact on the SCC’s 
assessments. The SCC works out and discusses this body of evidence throughout its 
reports. It is clear from reading its reports that the SCC’s legislative scrutiny work 
benefited greatly from the views of experts, parliamentarians, the government and 
other stakeholders. There are traces of this body of contributions in the SCC’s analysis 
of the provisions of the Withdrawal Bill, as well as in their discussion of the 
government justification for its proposals. 
It is also worth mentioning the SCC’s proactive stance since the very early stages 
of the policy-making. Hence, the SCC published a report even in advance of any Green 
                                                
35 See Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (n 6), Appendix 
2: List of Witnesses. 
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or White Paper on the Withdrawal Bill,36 with a view to influence the government’s 
thinking and to call Parliament’s attention to issues that were likely to be contested 
during the passage of the Bill. During the passage of the Withdrawal Bill, the SCC 
published two reports to improve the quality of deliberation, both at the Commons and 
at the Lords. Note also that these reports contained concrete recommendations to 
address the challenges raised by the Bill in more constitutionally-friendly ways. 
This stands in sharp contrast with the DPRRC’s analysis. This committee did 
not call for evidence. There is no reference or records in their reports of any evidence 
session, either to question ministers, civil servants, or to hear the views of experts, 
MPs, peers, select committees and other stakeholders. The DPRRC’s analysis seems 
to be restricted to two main sources. These are, on the one hand, the delegated powers 
memorandum, including its four supplementary memorandums; and on the other, the 
very Withdrawal Bill provisions which delegate powers. It is fair to say, therefore, that 
the SCC’s procedures are more deliberative than those of the DPRRC.  
In terms of its attitude at the early stages of policy-making, the DPRRC adopted 
a reactive approach. At this stage, its interventions were two submissions to an inquiry 
launched by the Commons’ Procedure Committee on the “Delegated Powers in the 
‘Great Repeal Bill’”.37 The DPRRC published four reports during the passage of the 
Withdrawal Bill; one for the Commons, and three for the Lords. The main DPRRC 
report contains an Annex with a set of draft amendments, ready to be taken forward 
by peers.38 Subsequently, the DPRRC published two additional reports, assessing 
government amendments.39 This provided the Lords food for thought in the later stages 
of their scrutiny work. 
Now I turn to the issue of dialogue. Here, the SCC continues to perform better 
than the DPRRC. However, it is fair to say that both committees have fostered different 
                                                
36 Select Committee on the Constitution, The ‘Great’ Repeal Bill (n 7). This report was published 
on 7 March 2017. The government published its White Paper on 30 March 2017.  
37 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Submission to the 
House of Commons Procedure Committee Inquiry on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" 
(n 25); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Second Submission to 
the House of Commons Procedure Committee on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" (n 
20). 
38 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
2 (n 19), Annex 1. 
39 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: 
Government Amendments (n 24); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Further Government Amendments (n 24). 
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layers of interactions and collaboration with government, and between both Houses of 
Parliament and other parliamentary bodies. In what follows, for the sake of clarity, I 
will distinguish these different layers, and point out the contributions that each 
committee has made in each case. 
A first set of interactions and collaboration takes place between these 
committees and the lower chamber. First, both committees collaborated with the 
Commons by publishing interim reports in advance of second reading and committee 
stage of the Withdrawal Bill in the lower chamber.40 It is common practice for the SCC 
and the DPRRC to report before committee stage in the Lords. However, motivated 
by the exceptional circumstances of Brexit, and the constitutional significance of the 
Withdrawal Bill, interim reports were published before second reading in the 
Commons. These reports had an impact on parliamentary debates at the Commons. At 
second reading, there were no references to the DPRRC’s report. By contrast, ten MPs 
referenced and/or quoted passages of the SCC’s interim report that discussed delegated 
powers in the Withdrawal Bill.41 At committee stage, by contrast, both committees 
were referenced by MPs. Whilst four MPs referenced the DPRRC’s report;42 the SCC 
got nine mentions, most of them on delegated powers.43 Some of these interventions 
                                                
40 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill No. 
1 (n 19); Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Interim Report (n 
18). Note also that the DPRRC followed this practice with other Brexit Bills. See Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee, Agriculture Bill (HL 2017-19, 194); Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee, 39th Report: Fisheries Bill; Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill; Divorce 
(Financial Provision) Bill [HL]; Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Bill (HL 2017-19, 
226). Similarly, the SCC’s report on the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, which was 
published even in the knowledge that the parliamentary season will come to a close, and with no clarity 
about whether the Bill would be introduced in the same form. See Select Committee on the Constitution, 
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill: Interim Report (n 8). 
Another significant example of this trend is that both the SCC and the DPRRC reported on the 
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, despite being a supply bill, and therefore the Lords lacked any 
power to amendment. See Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 11th Report Taxation 
(Cross-border Trade) Bill and others (HL 2017-19, 65); Select Committee on the Constitution, Taxation 
(Cross-border Trade) Bill (HL 2017-19, 80). 
41 MPs making references to the SCC’s reports at second reading at the Commons were: Keir 
Starmer (Lab), Ian Duncan Smith (Con), David Jones (Con), Pat McFadden (Lab), Richard Burden 
(Lab), Richard Graham (Con), Daniel Zeichner (Lab), Vernon Coaker (Lab), Antoinette Sandback 
(Con) and Chris Philp (Con). See HC Deb 7 September 2017, vol 628, cols 358, 361, 377, 379, 410; 
HC Deb 11 September 2017, vol 628, cols 474, 497, 512-14, 517-18, 564.  
42 MPs making references to the DPRRC’s interim report at committee stage at the Commons 
were: Ian Blackford (SNP), Steve Baker (Department for Exiting the European Union Under-Secretary), 
George Freeman (Con), Matthew Pennycook (Lab). See HC Deb 4 December 2017, vol 632, col 726; 
HC Deb 12 December 2017, vol 633, col 280; HC Deb 13 December 2017, vol 633, col 511, 554. 
43 MPs making references to the SCC’s reports at committee stage at the Commons were: Steve 
Baker (Department for Exiting the European Union Under-Secretary), Joanna Cherry (SNP), Kerry 
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make explicit recognition of constitutional committees’ influence in the drafting of 
amendments. Stephen Gethins MP argued that an SNP amendment to incorporate a 
“necessity” test had been inspired by the SCC.44 Chris Leslie MP also argued that a 
similar amendment to introduce a necessity test had been inspired by SCC’s 
recommendations.45 Yvette Cooper MP claimed to have introduced amendments to 
tighten-up clause 7 powers, including a necessity test, inspired by DPRRC and SCC’s 
remarks.46 Jenny Chapman MP, on the other hand, recognised to have taken forward 
as an amendment a DPRRC recommendation to prevent taxes or fee-raising powers 
via tertiary legislation.47 Finally, Steve Baker, the Under-Secretary of State at the 
Department for Exiting the European Union, pointed out that the DPRRC had been 
influential in the Commons’ Procedure Committee proposal for a sifting committee.48 
This shows that the SCC and the DPRRC managed to influence parliamentary debates 
and inspired amendments.  
The practice of publishing an interim report to enlighten Commons debates 
proved quite beneficial in terms of strengthening the capacity of MPs to scrutinise the 
constitutional implications of government legislation. As Mark Elliott and Stephen 
Tierney note, this represents a significant example of collaboration between the two 
houses when constitutional issues are at stake.49 It is also significant because there are 
limits to the capacity of the Lords to defeat the government. As argued in Chapter 
Two, the Lords must exercise political self-restraint, and defer to the views of the 
democratically elected lower chamber. For this reason, collaboration between 
constitutional committees and individual MPs is significant, as they enjoy democratic 
legitimacy to pressure the government to amend legislation in ways that would not be 
appropriate for the Lords.50  
                                                
McCarthy (Lab), Pete Wishart (SNP), Chris Leslie (Lab), Tom Brake (LibDem), Angela Smith (Lab), 
Stella Creasy (Lab), Alex Sobel (Lab). See HC Deb 14 November 2017, vol 631, cols 204 and 295; HC 
Deb 15 November 2017, vol 631, col 431; HC Deb 4 December 2017, vol 632, col 751; HC Deb 12 
December 2017, vol 633, cols 215, 218-19; HC Deb 12 December 2017, vol 633, col 269, 316, 330-31, 
336. 
44 HC Deb 6 December 2017, vol 632, cols 1077-78. 
45 HC Deb 12 December 2017, vol 633, col 219. 
46 HC Deb 12 December 2017, vol 633, col 253. 
47 HC Deb 6 December 2017, vol 632, vol 1135. 
48 HC Deb 12 December 2017, vol 633, col 280. 
49 Mark Elliott and Stephen Tierney, ‘Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle: The 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018’ [2019] Public Law 37, 39. 
50 Constitutional committee reports featured much more prominently at the Lords. This is 
consistent with the points made in this work in chapters two and six. For this reason, I will not make an 
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A second layer of interactions and collaboration took place between these 
committees and other select committees. There is significant evidence of these 
interactions as early as the pre-legislative scrutiny stage. In its report on the so-called 
“Repeal Bill”, the SCC recorded meetings with DPRRC and Secondary Legislation 
Scrutiny Committee (“SLSC”) members.51 In addition, the SCC engaged in further 
collaboration with the SLSC, which also sent written evidence to the SCC’s inquiry 
into delegated powers in the “Repeal Bill”.52 The SCC also employed as secondary 
sources previous reports published by other select committees. Among these, the 
DPRRC’s report on strengthened scrutiny procedures, as well as responses by the 
DPRRC, the SLSC and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee to the Strathclyde review.53 By looking at the contribution of other 
committees, this significant degree of engagement by the SCC shows that select 
committees can operate as a system by interacting and complementing each other’s 
work. The DPRRC did not engage with other select committees’ reports as the SCC 
did. Yet, the DPRRD did engage in collaboration at the pre-legislative stage by making 
two submissions to the inquiry launched by the Commons’ Procedure Committee.54  
During the formal stages of the legislative process, these interactions continued, 
mainly driven by the SCC. The SCC employed as sources other Brexit reports 
published by the Lords’ European Union Committee, the DPRRC,55 and the 
Commons’ Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee.56 It is also 
                                                
analysis of references and quotations of passages of these reports during the Lords stages of the 
Withdrawal Bill. Nor will I identify amendments by peers inspired in recommendations by these 
constitutional committees. It is worth noting that an amendment to introduce a necessity test was put 
forward at the Lords and eventually approved. However, the government managed to turn this 
amendment down at ping pong stage. This example serves to illustrate Mark Elliott and Stephen 
Tierney’s contention that “the most turbulent period” for the government took place at the Lords. See 
ibid, 38-39. 
51 Select Committee on the Constitution, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ (n 7) at para 2. 
52 Ibid, at para 85. 
53 Ibid, Ch3.  
54 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Submission to the 
House of Commons Procedure Committee Inquiry on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" 
(n 25); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Second Submission to 
the House of Commons Procedure Committee on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" (n 
20). 
55 Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (n 6), at para 157. 
At paras 105 and 120, the SCC defers to the JCHR’s analysis on questions about the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
56 Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: Interim Report (n 
18), at para 71. 
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remarkable that the SCC decided to collaborate with devolved legislatures. This 
committee held informal meetings with select committee representatives in the 
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly.57 Its final report gives an 
account of some of their views on devolution.58 
A final point worth mentioning are interactions between the SCC and the 
DPRRC. There is an overlap between the tasks that both committees undertake. This 
raises a question about the rational use of scarce parliamentary resources. It could also 
give raise to contradictory views. Nevertheless, the passage of the Withdrawal Bill 
shows that the work of these two committees is complementary. One reason for this 
had already been anticipated in Chapter Four, and was confirmed in my substantive 
assessment. Both committees approach the analysis of clauses delegating powers from 
different points of view and methodologies. Yet, the Withdrawal Bill also shows that 
these two committees complement each other due to a cautious approach by the SCC. 
This committee prevented conflict by recognising that the DPRRC had a prevalent 
opinion on matters of delegated powers.59 At times, the reader gets the sense that the 
SCC feels compelled to justify its engagement with questions about delegated powers. 
The SCC’s reports show deference and engage with the DPRRC’s views. In contrast, 
the DPRRC’s analysis tends to be self-contained, and does not fully engage with the 
SCC’s views. For instance, the DPRRC only makes brief comments about the SCC’s 
proposals at the pre-legislative scrutiny stage.60  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both the SCC and the DPRRC engaged 
in dialogue with the government. This took place in different ways. Firstly, in the 
Withdrawal Bill’s documents. Both the explanatory notes61 and the delegated powers 
memorandum62 reference passages of the SCC’s pre-legislative scrutiny report. The 
government takes a strategic approach when it quotes those passages of the SCC’s 
report that recognise the magnitude of the task ahead in domesticating EU law, and 
                                                
57 Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (n 6), at para 4. 
58 Ibid, at paras 247, 258, 266. 
59 Select Committee on the Constitution, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ (n 7) at para 50. 
60 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Special Report: Second Submission to 
the House of Commons Procedure Committee on the Delegated Powers in the "Great Repeal Bill" (n 
20), at paras 16, 17, 21. 
61 Explanatory Notes to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, at para 13. 
62 Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
Memorandum Concerning the Delegated Powers in the Bill for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee (13 July 2017), at paras 13, 35, 37, 43, 44, 48, 49, 60. 
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therefore, the need for some flexibility in the Bill.63 The government seeks recognition 
and legitimacy when it claims to have implemented some SCC’s recommendation. 
The delegated powers memorandum makes explicit recognition of this when it 
explains the incorporation of a sunset clause, and the requirement of an explanatory 
memorandum accompanying statutory instruments made in exercise of corrective 
powers.64 In contrast, the memorandum only contains a few references to the 
DPRRC.65 This is mainly due to the lack of substantive proposals coming from this 
committee at the pre-legislative stage, as explained above.  
Secondly, the government engaged in further dialogue with constitutional 
committees by publishing four supplementary memorandums to assists the DPRRC’s 
legislative scrutiny work. These memorandums accounted for the changes introduced 
to the Bill at the Commons, and later at committee and report stage at the Lords. In 
addition, the government sent a written response to the DPRRC’s third report on the 
Withdrawal Bill.66 Furthermore, previously, the Department for Exiting the European 
Union submitted written evidence to the SCC. Thirdly, the government engaged in 
dialogue with the SCC through oral evidence sessions in which ministers and the 
Solicitor General were questioned about the constitutional propriety of the 
government’s legislative proposals.  
Fourthly, the government also entered in collaboration with the SCC and the 
DPRRC by introducing amendments that partly responded to their concerns. For 
instance, the government removed the powers to comply with international 
obligations, the powers in clause 9 to amend the Withdrawal Bill itself, and 
incorporated additional sunset clauses. There was a modest improvement in the set of 
substantive limits on ministerial corrective powers.67 The government also modestly 
improved the scope of the affirmative procedure. At the Commons stage, the 
government accepted an amendment to introduce a sifting procedure, although it 
rejected the SCC and the DPRRC’s recommendation to make the sifting committee’s 
                                                
63 Ibid, at paras 13, 37, 48, 60. 
64 Ibid, at paras 43, 44, 49. 
65 Ibid, at paras 12, 46. 
66 See Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill: Government Response (HL 2017-19, 119), Appendix 1. 
67 No powers to create new public authorities or to amend the devolution statutes of Scotland 
and Wales. 
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recommendations binding upon the government. Finally, in response to an SCC 
recommendation, the government expanded the scope of the explanatory statements 
attached to regulations by including a “good reasons” statement.68 
3. Conclusion 
This substantive analysis of the legislative scrutiny work of the SCC and the 
DPRRC on the Withdrawal Bill illustrates evident differences between these 
committees in terms of their methodology and approach to the constitution. The SCC 
focused on the broader constitutional issues and trends arising from the Withdrawal 
Bill. Each report read like an essay on the constitutional implications of this Bill, 
grounded on a wealth of evidence provided by constitutional experts and other 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the SCC’s analysis was underpinned by two main 
principles, namely, the separation of powers and the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament. The SCC developed the content of these principles in its 
recommendations. It went on to construct a constitutional standard according to which 
the executive should not take policy decisions without full parliamentary scrutiny. 
Two of its main recommendations, namely, to constrain delegated powers only to 
technical matters, and to subject statutory instruments that make policy choices to a 
strengthened procedure, are concretizations of this overarching constitutional 
standard. This shows that the SCC acted as a “constitutional scrutiniser” that identified 
constitutional principles, developed its content, and finally employed them as 
benchmarks to assess government legislation and make recommendations. In contrast, 
the DPRRC’s methodology is best described as a meticulous, line by line, black letter 
analysis of each provision of the Withdrawal Bill that delegates powers. The DPRRC 
conducts a detailed analysis that follows up the passage of the Bill from beginning to 
end. There is no explicit constitutional language in the DPRRC’s analysis, apart from 
a very general appeal to the separation of powers. However, it is possible to argue that 
this principle operates at the background. Ultimately, the DPRRC is concerned with 
protecting Parliament’s role as the senior partner in its relationship with government, 
as well as with preventing the exercise of arbitrary executive powers. 
                                                
68 At ping pong stage at the Commons, David Davis MP, Secretary of State for the Department 
for Exiting the European Union, made an explicit recognition that the government’s amendment to 
incorporate a “good reasons” statement in the explanatory notes was in response to a recommendation 
by the SCC. See HC Deb 12 June 2018, vol 642, col 735. 
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From a procedural point of view, although the government managed to retain 
effectively broad corrective powers,69 the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
stands as a notable example of constitutional deliberation. The SCC provided a forum 
to discuss the views and arguments of a variety of relevant actors. Both committees 
engaged critically with the government justification. The government was forced to 
justify its proposals, and to partially change its mind in light of the debate. Therefore, 
from a dialogic point of view, the passage of the Withdrawal Act also shows that 
constitutional committees do make a difference. The SCC and the DPRRC managed 
to interact and collaborate with different actors, such as other select committees, peers, 
and – most notably – with individual MPs. On the other hand, the government also 
engaged in good faith dialogue with these committees. Furthermore, it was forced to 
tighten-up the scope of delegated powers, and to introduce measures to improve 
parliamentary oversight of statutory instruments, as a consequence of criticism by 
these two constitutional committees.  
Both, in terms of deliberation and in terms of dialogue and collaboration, the 
SCC’s contribution was more significant than that of the DPRRC. Some drawbacks 
on the DPRRC’s legislative scrutiny work are its lack of engagement with the wider 
public, the lack of evidence gathered from other sources, and less engagement with the 
work of other select committees. Despite these differences, it is fair to say that both 
constitutional committees acted as conduits through which constitutional 
considerations were channelled to elected politicians. Furthermore, they were an active 
and key part of parliamentary efforts to hold the government to account during the 
passage of the Withdrawal Act, because they subjected the Bill to a degree of detailed 
scrutiny that would have not been possible on the floor of either House.70 
III. Prisoners’ right to vote 
My second case study concerns the UK political response to the litigation-saga 
over section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. This provision deprives 
prisoners serving custodial sentences of their right to vote on parliamentary and local 
elections during their imprisonment. The litigation-saga originated more than 18 years 
                                                
69 Elliott and Tierney, ‘Political Pragmatism’ (n 49), 57. 
70 Ibid, 58. 
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ago, when Mr John Hirst, a post-tariff prisoner serving a discretionary life sentence, 
challenged this provision.71 He argued that the ban breached his right to vote protected 
by Article 3 of Protocol 1 (”A3P1”) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(”ECHR”). His claim was rejected by the High Court, which also denied his 
application for permission to appeal. Mr Hirst filed an application before the ECtHR. 
In the judgment of Hirst, a majority of the Grand Chamber held that the UK imposed 
a “general, automatic and indiscriminate” restriction on a vitally important right that 
fell outside its margin of appreciation,72 and found the provision in breach of A3P1. 
This judgment was fraught with political controversy. Both New Labour and 
Coalition governments held strong views against Hirst, but felt bound by the 
judgment.73 However, neither of them introduced a Bill nor took remedial action in 
response. Instead, they deployed a number of delaying techniques to refrain from 
responding. The New Labour government conducted a two-staged consultation 
process, and then took no further action.74 The Coalition government asked permission 
to intervene as a third party in the case of Scoppola to argue for a review of Hirst.75 
This attempt failed, and the ECtHR imposed a new six-month deadline to introduce 
“legislative proposals” to implement Hirst. A day before this deadline, rather than a 
Bill, the government introduced a Draft Bill for pre-legislative scrutiny.76 It is worth 
noting that these two governments put forward proposals that, if implemented, would 
                                                
71 R (Pearson & Martinez) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001) EWHC Admin 
239. 
72 Hirst (No. 2), at para [82]. 
73 The New Labour government declared its firm belief that prisoners should lose their right to 
vote. See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners Detained within 
the United Kingdom - The UK Government's Response to the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights Judgment in the Case of Hirst v the United Kingdom (CP 29, 2006) at para 3, Ministry 
of Justice, Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners Detained within the United Kingdom - Second Stage 
Consultation (CP 6, 2006) at para 23. While head of the Coalition government, Prime Minister David 
Cameron bluntly stated that complying with Hirst made him “physically ill”. See HC Deb 3 November 
2010, vol 517, col 921. 
Lord Falconer’s forewords to New Labour’s first consultation paper pointed out that “we must 
take steps to respond to the Grand Chamber’s judgment”. Likewise, David Cameron in the debate 
referred above went on to say “we are in a situation that I am afraid we have to deal with. This is 
potentially costing us £160 million, so we have to come forward with proposals (…)”. 
74 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners (n 73); Ministry 
of Justice, Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners Second Stage (n 73). 
75 Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) 56 EHRR 19. The ECtHR granted the UK leave to intervene and 
extended a previous six-month deadline to implement Hirst imposed in the case of Greens and MT v 
United Kingdom 53 EHRR 21.  
76 Ministry of Justice, Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill (Cm 8499, 2012). 
 227 
have reflected a “minimal-compliance” approach.77 After the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee published its report on the Draft Bill, the ECtHR denied compensation and 
legal costs to ten prisoners in the case of Firth,78 confirming the criteria previously 
held in Greens. This took place in the context of more than 2,000 applications against 
the UK pending at the ECtHR. A few months later, the Coalition government decided 
to postpone discussions on Hirst until September 2015.79 In contrast, David Cameron’s 
Conservative government decided against implementation. It argued that “the UK’s 
policy on prisoner voting is well-established and remains a matter for the UK 
Parliament to determine.”80  
Eventually, in November 2017, eleven years after Hirst was delivered, Theresa 
May’s Conservative government announced a proposal for implementation that would 
not require a change in primary legislation, but the adoption of administrative 
measures.81 The government amended the Prison Service guidance to confer the right 
to offenders serving short sentences that are released on temporary license to vote 
while released.82 In addition, the government also conferred this right to prisoners 
released on Home Detention Curfew.83 These administrative measures raise serious 
questions about the degree of compliance, if any, with ECtHR’s judgment on this 
subject-matter.84 According to the government’s data, these measures would benefit 
                                                
77 Labour proposals at the second consultation stage were to enfranchise prisoners serving 
sentences of (1) less than a year; (2) less than two years; (3) less than four years; or (4) less than two 
years, but those sentenced to less than four years could apply before a judge to be granted the vote. The 
Coalition government’s Draft Bill put forward three alternative proposals: (1) enfranchisement of 
prisoners sentenced to terms of less than four years imprisonment; (2) less than six months 
imprisonment; or (3) a restatement of the existing ban. 
78 Firth and Others v The United Kingdom [2014] ECHR 874. 
79 Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgments - Report to the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights on the Government response to Human Rights Judgments 2013-14 (Cm 8962, 
December 2014), 29. 
80 Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgements (Cm 9360, November 2016), 
38. 
The Conservative party’s unwillingness to implement Hirst should be understood in the wider 
context of their proposals substantially change UK human rights law by scrapping the HRA and replace 
it with a British Bill of Rights. See The Conservative Party, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 
(2015), 60; The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK - The Conservatives' Proposals 
for Changing Britain's Human Rights Laws (2014).  
81 HC Deb 2 November 2017, vol 630, cols 1007-1008.  
82 Secretariat General of the Committee of Ministers, Execution of Judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights - Action Plan Hirst No. 2 and others (DH-DD(2017)1229, 2017), at para 13. 
83 Ibid, at para 14-15. 
84 Elizabeth Adams, ‘'Prisoners' Voting Rights: Case Closed?’ (UK Constitutional Law 
Association Blog, 30 January 2019)  <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/01/30/elizabeth-adams-
prisoners-voting-rights-case-closed/> accessed 18 April 2019. 
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about one hundred offenders.85 The flexibility of the implementation process discussed 
in Chapter Five is thrown into sharp relief by the Committee of Ministers’ decision to 
accept this plan of action, and to close the monitoring procedure for the 
implementation of the Hirst litigation-saga.86  
At Parliament, debates about the implementation of Hirst had some unique 
features. Firstly, MPs debated this matter with relative independence from 
government, free from partisan loyalties. Secondly, MPs enjoyed opportunities to 
influence the government response at the early stages of policy-making. As mentioned 
above, there were two consultation processes, and a draft bill. These two features are 
quite relevant. As argued in Chapters Two and Six, both executive control of the 
Commons and partisan politics undermine the ability of MPs to scrutinise legislation 
on human rights grounds. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that government is 
more willing to change its mind on human rights matters when policy is being 
developed.87 Another point worth noting is that Hirst led to lengthy and intense 
parliamentary debates. There were four parliamentary debates on this matter. Firstly, 
a Westminster Hall debate on a motion put forward by Phillip Hollobone MP (Con).88 
Secondly, a backbenchers debate on a motion put forward by Jack Straw MP (Lab), 
Dominic Raab MP (Con), Stephen Phillips MP (Con), Phillip Hollobone MP (Con), 
John Baron MP (Con) and David Davis MP (Con).89 Thirdly, a debate upon the Lord 
Chancellor’s announcement of the passage of the Draft Bill referred above for pre-
legislative scrutiny.90 Finally, a debate upon the Lord Chancellor’s announcement of 
the adoption of administrative measures to comply with Hirst.91 
In what follows, I will discuss the contribution of the JCHR to monitoring 
government response to the Hirst litigation-saga. The committee discussed this matter 
                                                
85 HC Deb 2 November 2017, vol 630, col 1008. 
86 Secretariat General of the Committee of Ministers, Execution of Judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights - Action Report Hirst No. 2 and others (DH-DD(2018)843, 2018). 
87 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Committee's Future Working Practices (2005-06, HL 
239, HC 1575), at paras 6-7; Janet Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between 
Ideals and Constraints’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human 
Rights (Hart Publishing 2015), 52. 
88 HC Deb 11 January 2011, vol 521, cols 1WH-24WH. 
89 HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, cols 493-586. 
90 HC Deb 22 November 2012, vol 553, cols 745-762. 
91 HC Deb 2 November 2017, vol 639, cols 1007-1015. 
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in eight reports.92 I will assess these contributions from a substantive and procedural 
point of view. 
1. Substantive assessment 
The JCHR adopted a legalistic and court-centred approach to monitoring 
government responses to Hirst. The JCHR was generally reactive, and did not fully 
engage with the democratic concerns of MPs strongly opposed to the judgment. I will 
provide two illustrations of this approach. Firstly, the JCHR criticised the New 
Labour’s second stage consultation process.93 The committee considered the 
government’s proposals “to take a very limited approach to the judgment” that “can 
lead to further unnecessary litigation”.94 The JCHR, following the ECtHR’s line of 
reasoning, and employing proportionality analysis, argued that setting a threshold 
based on a “set period of custodial sentence” may not create a clear link between the 
offence and the necessity of the removal of the right to vote.95 However, years later, 
the JCHR would revisit this assessment,96 when this committee endorsed the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill (“JCDB”) 
recommendation.97 The JCDB recommended enfranchisement of prisoners serving 
                                                
92 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Fifth Progress Report (2005-06, HL 
115, HC 889), at paras 1.40-1.42, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Implementation of Strasbourg 
Judgments: First Progress Report (2005-06, HL 133, HC 954), at paras 51-53; Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Court Judgments Finding Breaches of 
Human Rights (2006-07, HL 128, HC 728), at paras 67-79; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Monitoring the Government's Response to Human Rights Judgments: Annual Report 2008 (2007-08, 
HL 173, HC 1078), at paras 47-63; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Political 
Parties and Elections Bill (2008-09, HL 23, HC 204), at paras 1.10-1.19; Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights Judgments (2009-10, HL 85, HC 
455), at paras 99-119; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: (1) Superannuation 
Bill; (2) Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (2010-11, HL 64, HC 640), at paras 2.7-
2.15; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Judgments (2014-15, HL 130, HC 1088), at 
paras 3.15-3.26. 
93  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights 
Judgments (n 92), at paras 99-119. Note that previously, the JCHR had criticized the New Labour 
government’s first consultation paper for asking views about maintaining the current blanket ban, as 
this was held incompatible with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. See Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Court Judgments Finding Breaches of Human Rights 
(n 92), at paras 77-78. Criticizing the New Labour’s hesitant views on the need for legislative reform 
and insisting that Hirst imposed such a need, see Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the 
Government's Response to Human Rights Judgments: Annual Report 2008 (n 92), at para 51.  
94  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights 
Judgments (n 92), at para 107. 
95 See also lengthy quotation of the ECtHR’s judgment on how to struck a balance when 
removing the franchise from individual prisoners in Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the 
Government's Response to Human Rights Judgments: Annual Report 2008 (n 92), at paras 57 and 58. 
96 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Judgments (n 92), at paras 3.15-3.26. 
97 Ibid, at para 3.26. 
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custodial sentences of less than one year. Note that before the JCHR had argued against 
a “set period of custodial sentence”, and criticised a four-year period as “minimal 
compliance”. This time the JCHR came to accept a one-year threshold. Notably, its 
justification for accepting this proposal is “court-centred”. It is worth quoting the 
relevant passage in full:  
“(…) if Parliament were to legislate to give effect to the recommendation of the 
Joint Committee on the Draft Prisoner Voting Bill, the Committee of Ministers 
would accept that the UK had done enough to implement the outstanding 
judgments against the UK, and the Court in any future challenge would also 
uphold the new law as being a proportionate interference with prisoners’ right to 
vote.”98 
The JCHR provided two sets of reasons. Firstly, it argued that the ECtHR 
recognised a wide margin of appreciation to national parliaments on the regulation of 
prisoners voting. Secondly, it went on to say that recent ECtHR case law granted a 
wider margin of appreciation in cases where national parliaments had deliberated 
properly about the issues at stake. The JCHR envisaged that the passage of a Bill 
implementing the JCDB recommendation, debated in light of the insights contained in 
its report, “would weigh heavily with the Court”.99 The JCHR insisted on the need to 
take action, and went on to draft a “one-clause” Bill to amend s. 3 of the Representation 
of the People Act 1983 to implement the JCDB’s recommendation.100 This shows that 
although the JCHR had previously argued for a strong response, it later changed its 
views. However, this change was not the product of a new analysis of the substantive 
issues raised by prisoners’ disenfranchisement. Instead, it was motivated by an 
evolution in the ECtHR’s views about the margin of appreciation that national 
parliaments enjoy. This shows how strong the JCHR’s court-centred approach was. 
While the JCHR interpreted its role as that of securing UK compliance with its 
international obligations, arguably, a more critical approach to the judgment would 
have been welcomed. The JCHR did not provide alternative reasons in support of 
lifting the ban, other than compliance with the ECtHR judgment. In the context of 
strong parliamentary opposition against a change in the law,101 there was a need for 
                                                
98 Ibid, at para 3.20. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid, at para 3.24. 
101 On 10 February 2011, the Commons debated a backbench motion stating that the Commons 
supported the current ban on prisoners vote and considered that a decision of this nature should be a 
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more nuanced approaches to call the Commons’ attention. This put the JCHR in an 
uncomfortable position before Parliament, because it kept insisting on compliance in 
circumstances that the Commons had made its views clear. The JCHR did not find an 
alternative way to communicate with Parliament, and instead opted for focusing on 
exerting pressure over the government. Contrast this with the JCDB’s pre-legislative 
scrutiny work on the Coalition government Draft Bill.102 Its report addressed the 
principled question about the disenfranchisement’s rationale.103 It also subjected to 
criticism the two arguments provided by the government in support of the ban. The 
report also contained relevant background information, such as an account of the 
history of prisoners’ disenfranchisement, of parliamentary debates held on Hirst, and 
of relevant case law developments on the issue, both at ECtHR and domestic level. 
The JCDB addressed the controversy about the ECtHR legitimacy in the context of the 
UK doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty”. It also discussed the political 
consequences of non-compliance and withdrawal from the Convention. Finally, the 
report scrutinised the government’s three alternative proposals employing a 
proportionality analysis framework, and made a recommendation of its own, namely, 
to enfranchise those prisoners sentenced to less than one year imprisonment.104 The 
contrast between the JCHR and the JCDB is stark. The latter engaged with a variety 
of relevant constitutional issues raised by Hirst, whereas the JCHR had a narrow 
approach limited to compliance.105 
2. Procedural assessment 
As indicated above, this section assesses the JCHR’s contribution to monitoring 
responses for adverse human rights judgments through the register of dialogue and 
collaboration between institutions, as well as that of deliberation. I will start by 
assessing the JCHR’s contribution to dialogue and interactions between institutions. 
On this matter, the JCHR’s main contribution was its engagement with the 
                                                
matter to democratically-elected lawmakers. After more than five-hours debate, an overwhelming 
majority of 234 votes against 22 approved the motion. See HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, col 584. 
102 Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, Draft Voting Eligibility 
(Prisoners) Bill Report (2013-14, HL 103, HC 924). 
103 Ibid, Ch5. 
104 Ibid, Ch7. 
105 Note that the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s report on 
this matter took a similar approach to that of the JCDB. See Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee, Voting by Convicted Prisoners: Summary of Evidence (HC 2010-11, 776). 
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government. There is evidence of letter exchanges between the committee and the 
Lord Chancellor, the Human Rights Minister, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
for Europe on the Hirst case throughout its reports.106 Ministers were also questioned 
in oral evidence. JCHR reports account for discussions with the Secretary of State for 
Justice and the Human Rights Minister,107 as well as a long oral evidence session with 
the Lord Chancellor.108  
The JCHR’s key concern was the lack of progress on the implementation 
process. Consider for instance the JCHR’s views on New Labour’s consultation 
process. The committee demanded justification for the delay in launching the 
consultation, as well as for having a two-stage process in circumstances that this was 
a fairly straightforward legal issue.109 In the JCHR’s view, this issue should be the 
object of a quick solution in the form of a Remedial Order. Upon New Labour’s launch 
of the second consultation stage, the committee criticised the scant progress made, 
which it attributed to a lack of commitment with the implementation of Hirst.110 
Furthermore, it went on to qualify the delay as “unacceptable”, and argued that it 
damaged the international reputation of the UK, placing the nation at risk for 
continuing litigation and compensation payments. The JCHR demanded from the 
government clear plans of action.111  
In contrast, JCHR reports had little impact, if any, at the Commons. As 
mentioned above, MPs debated Hirst four times. In these debates, only one MP made 
an explicit reference to JCHR reports. In the debate on the backbenchers’ motion, Tony 
                                                
106 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Fifth Progress Report (n 92), at para 
1.41; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Court Judgments 
Finding Breaches of Human Rights (n 92), at paras 71, 72, 74 (see also appendix No. 5, 12, 13); Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Human Rights Judgments: 
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Superannuation Bill; (2) Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (n 92), at paras 2.11-
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107 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Political Parties and Elections Bill 
(n 92), at para 1.15-1.16. 
108 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Government's Human Rights Policy and Human 
Rights Judgments Oral Evidence (HC 1726-i, 20 December 2011, Q 1-36). 
109 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Court 
Judgments Finding Breaches of Human Rights (n 92), at paras 71, 78, 79. 
110 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation to Human 
Rights Judgments (n 92), at paras 108, 117-18. 
111 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the Government's Response to Human Rights 
Judgments: Annual Report 2008 (n 92), at para 52. 
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Baldry MP (Con) quoted the committee’s criticism of the New Labour government’s 
decision to include consultation about views on retaining the current blanket ban, thus 
creating the expectation that this was a workable plan of action.112 This finding 
confirms the remarks made in Chapters Two, Five and Six. Constitutional committees 
have little impact at the Commons. Despite this, two points are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, none of the JCHR’s reports had been published with a view to enlighten the 
four debates that took place at the Commons. Secondly, even if that had been the case, 
this is not a guarantee that MPs would engage with JCHR’s reports. Consider that the 
House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (”PCRC”) 
prepared a special report to inform the very debate on the backbenchers’ motion.113 
Only four MPs referenced this report; one of them was the committee chair.114 This 
suggests that MPs are generally not keen on relying on select committees’ 
contributions to parliamentary debates.  
A final remark about interactions and collaboration concerns relationships with 
other select committees. On this matter, the JCHR entered into collaboration with the 
JCDB when it argued in favour of implementing their recommendation in response to 
Hirst, as mentioned above. 
Moving on to deliberation, the most significant feature of the JCHR’s work was 
its engagement with the wider public and experts on the field. Over the years, the 
JCHR gathered written and oral evidence on the broader question about the 
implementation of human rights judgments.115 Some of this evidence concerns Hirst. 
For instance, as part of its 2010 review of “Government’s response to judgments 
identifying breaches of human rights”, the JCHR made a successful call for 
evidence.116 It received written evidence from a variety of stakeholders, such as the 
Prison Reform Trust, the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Liberty. Also 
from members of the legal profession, such as the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association, the Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland, among others. 
Significantly, between 2011-12, JCHR members discussed the Hirst case with senior 
                                                
112 HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, col 551.  
113 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Voting by Convicted Prisoners (n 105). 
114 HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, cols 522, 528-29, 554, 566-67 (Eleanor Laing MP Con). 
115 Some JCHR reports contain a full transcript of this evidence as an Annex. 
116 See evidence available at <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/human-rights-judgments/> accessed 15 December 2019. 
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judges, namely, Lord Phillips, at the time President of the Supreme Court; Lord Judge, 
at the time Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales; and Nicholas Bratza, at the time 
President of the ECtHR. It also examined high profile witnesses such as Dr Michael 
Pinto-Duschinsky, an influential policy exchange advisor; Phillip Leach, professor of 
human rights at London Metropolitan University; and Jeremy Waldron, Chichele 
professor of political theory at Oxford University.117 Despite this wealth of evidence, 
on the specific matter of prisoners’ disenfranchisement, JCHR reports reflect only a 
few explicit traces of this evidence.118 Despite this, the JCHR procedures offered a 
forum for views from experts and other stakeholders. In addition, as noted above, the 
JCHR questioned the government, not only for the continuous delays on 
implementation, but also for its minimal compliance approach, thus prompting the 
government to provide justification for its proposals. 
3. Conclusions 
From a substantive point of view, the Hirst case illustrates nicely the claims 
made in Chapter Five. The JCHR has interpreted its role as being the parliamentary 
guardian of Convention rights. Hence, their insistence on implementing a quick 
response to Hirst, in order to secure compliance with UK’s international obligations 
under the ECHR. From a methodological point of view, the JCHR framed its 
assessments on legal considerations. Their argument against a “sentence-length” 
criterion was grounded on proportionality analysis. The JCHR suggested that in that 
case there is “no rational connection” between the offence and disenfranchisement. 
                                                
117 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Judgments Oral Evidence (HC 873-i, Oral 
Evidence, 15 March 2011 Q 1-61); Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Judgments Oral 
Evidence (HC 873-ii, Oral Evidence, 15 November 2011, Q 62-135); Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, Human Rights Judgments Oral Evidence (HC 873-iii, 13 March 2012, Q 136-165). 
The evidence by professor Waldron is interesting, because despite his widely known views 
against the legitimacy of strong judicial review, he went on to argue in favour of prisoners’ 
enfranchisement. Professor Waldron also discussed the significance of the backbenchers’ motion 
debate, among other issues. 
118 See for instance Joint Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Parliament's Role in Relation 
to Human Rights Judgments (n 92), at para 104; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the 
Government's Response to Court Judgments Finding Breaches of Human Rights (n 92), at paras 68, 76.  
Note that the JCDB conducted a formidable deliberative process during a period of eight months. 
It is evidenced in its report, but also in 682 pages recording both oral and written evidence. It received 
43 submissions from a wide range of individuals and institutions. Along 11 evidence sessions, 39 
witnesses were examined, including academics, politicians, pressure groups and individuals associated 
with prison management. The JCDB questioned both the Attorney General and the Lord Chancellor. 
JCDB members visited two prisons and met with a group of prisoners. This historically marginalized 
group had a unique opportunity to be heard. This is a remarkable example of parliamentary deliberation 
at its best. 
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One of its reports had a lengthy quotation of key passages of the relevant judgment. 
Later, when the JCHR watered down its views, and accepted the JCDB’s 
recommendation, the very reason for accepting a proposal that was in contradiction 
with its previous views was a change in the ECtHR’s case law on prisoners’ 
enfranchisement. 
From a procedural point of view, the JCHR’s work monitoring the 
implementation of Hirst confirms that this committee does contribute to enhance 
constitutional deliberation. On the one hand, it engages in a dynamic of justification 
an assessment with the government. Numerous letters show that the JCHR exerted 
pressure over the government. The JCHR also held oral evidence sessions in which 
their members questioned ministers. The JCHR demanded from the government 
justification for the delays on the implementation, and for a minimal compliance 
approach contained in the proposals put forward for discussion. On the other hand, the 
JCHR contributed to deliberation by providing a forum to discuss the views of senior 
members of the judiciary, stakeholders and experts. However, in their specific analysis 
of Hirst, the JCHR could have taken more advantage of this valuable material. These 
remarks also show that the JCHR engages in dialogue with the government and the 
wider civil society. However, as suggested in Chapter Six, the JCHR struggles to 
contribute to parliamentary debates at the Commons. None of the eight JCHR’s reports 
had an impact on parliamentary debates at the Commons. I have suggested some 
reasons that may explain this. However, I have also noted that the PCRC had prepared 
a special report for one of the parliamentary debates, that was seldom referenced by 
MPs. This evidence confirms the claims made in Chapter Six. The Commons tends to 
focus on more political questions, such as the supremacy of Parliament vis-à-vis the 




This thesis employed the methodology of an in-depth case study to explore, both 
from a theoretical and a practical point of view, institutional arrangements designed to 
strengthen the ability of political institutions to assess the constitutional implications 
of legislation in the law-making process. I employed the United Kingdom (“UK”) law-
making practice, with an emphasis on the contribution of constitutional committees to 
legislative scrutiny on constitutional grounds as my case study. This thesis has shown 
that the UK has a set of institutional arrangements, consolidated through time, which 
are designed to foster legislative scrutiny of the constitutional implications of 
legislation. Constitutional committees have been presented as part of a wider network 
of political and legal accountability checks that operate on the basis of interactions and 
collaboration taking place between the government, Parliament and other relevant civil 
society actors. 
In these concluding remarks, I will provide an outline of the main claims of this 
thesis. I will also recognise a variety of limitations on my analysis. Finally, I will 
suggest further areas of inquiry that arise from this work. 
I. Main claims 
In a nutshell, this thesis has argued that three constitutional committees, namely, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights (“JCHR”), the Select Committee on the 
Constitution (“SCC”) and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
(“DPRRC”), are the main drivers of parliamentary constitutional thinking in the UK 
law-making process. In pursuing their legislative scrutiny work, these committees 
must face significant challenges, both substantive and procedural. In terms of the 
former, as in the case of anyone operating under the UK unwritten constitution, 
constitutional committees struggle to work out the contents of constitutional 
principles, values, conventions, practices, doctrines and other standards. Each 
constitutional committee has its own approach to the constitution, and their legislative 
scrutiny work is underpinned by different conceptions of legislative scrutiny on 
constitutional grounds (“LSCG”). From a procedural point of view, committees’ 
operation encounters significant difficulties to mainstream constitutional 
considerations among elected politicians, both in government and in Parliament. Yet, 
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constitutional committees have become necessary points of reference for bill teams, 
legislative drafters, and Law Officers. In Parliament, the House of Lords has followed 
with interest their reports, which inform their debates and are reflected in some peers’ 
amendments to government legislation. Hence, whilst the UK experience suggests that 
a system of constitutional committees may not mainstream constitutional 
considerations among elected politicians, this case study shows that they have 
managed to operate as conduits through which constitutional considerations are 
channelled to political decision-making. This takes place through to a series of 
institutional interactions and collaboration between these committees and peers, 
academics and other legal experts, stakeholders, civil servants, and sometimes, with 
ministers and MPs.  
The stakes were high. Changing the way political decision-making takes place 
may be too ambitious. Constitutional committee reports provide a highly valuable 
resource. They contain first quality assessments, drafted in clear and accessible 
language. MPs generally lack technical knowledge about constitutional matters and 
have insufficient time, energy and information to assess the constitutional implications 
of legislation. Constitutional committee reports could bridge that gap by informing 
parliamentary deliberations. However, political and policy considerations continue to 
be prioritized at the Commons. This House of Parliament is already heavily charged 
with significant constitutional functions other than legislative scrutiny, let alone on 
constitutional grounds. Therefore, the thesis claims that, as far as the UK is concerned, 
although these institutional arrangements have not met their normative expectation to 
mainstream constitutional considerations among elected politicians, they have 
managed to channel constitutional considerations into political decision-making.  
These arguments can be categorised in a series of claims that are developed 
throughout the seven chapters of this thesis. These claims are as follows: 
LSCG is a neglected subject matter in constitutional scholarship. In Chapter 
One, this thesis provided a theoretical framework to assess the work of constitutional 
committees. I provided a conceptualization of LSCG. The thesis claimed that there are 
three main LSCG conceptions. There is a legalistic conception, which understands the 
Constitution as a set of substantive –and morally informed– limits, as well as 
procedural limits imposed on legislative powers. Under this conception, assessing the 
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constitutional implications of legislation requires employing legal reasoning 
techniques such as interpretation, proportionality analysis and case law. This 
conception is directed towards the identification of “no-go areas” or restrictions on 
political decision-making. In terms of its constitutional philosophy, the legalistic 
conception is akin to moralised accounts of the Constitution, informed by a liberal 
understanding of constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, I have identified two strands 
of this conception, namely, hard and soft legalism. While the former is a highly 
uncompromised assessment based on first abstract principles, the latter is a more 
nuanced approach that is based upon the assumption that different branches of 
government pay due regard to the value of comity and therefore respect each other’s 
legitimate scope of decision-making. 
Although this view is mainstream in constitutional theory, there are two 
alternative understandings of LSCG. One conception of constitutional deliberation 
claims that the Constitution is a source of principles, values, conventions, doctrines 
and other standards that serve to promote rational debate among politicians. 
Constitutional considerations ought to be prioritized in political decision-making, from 
the early stages of the policy-making and legislative drafting, and throughout the 
formal stages of the legislative process. Constitutional deliberation does not have a 
clear normative grounding in terms of constitutional philosophy. However, it does 
have a strong commitment to the workings of representative democracy, in 
circumstances of fundamental disagreement among members of a political community 
about constitutional principles, values and other standards. However, this conception 
does hold procedural normative expectations. Democratic decisions should not be 
taken merely on a majoritarian basis. Inspired by the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory, constitutional deliberation is concerned with the quality of the procedure 
through which legislative decisions with constitutional implications are taken.  
The other conception is one of constitutional construction and development. This 
conception has close connections with constitutional deliberation. However, in terms 
of its constitutional philosophy, it sits in stark contrast with the legalistic conception. 
Constitutional construction claims that constitutional standards are highly under-
determined, and therefore cannot impose meaningful constraints on the democratic 
legislature. Rather than limiting, the Constitution empowers the legislature to develop 
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the content of its principles, values and other standards. In performing this function, 
the legislature enjoys a wide margin of discretion to choose between different 
alternatives. This conception expects legislation to be the product of rational action, 
grounded in deliberation. However, this view seems to be opposed to abstract 
rationalizations. Its scepticism not only comes from the idea of political disagreement 
about matters of political morality, as in the case of constitutional deliberation. It is 
also driven by a “conservative disposition” to change, an organic view about the 
development of constitutional principles, values and practices in different political 
communities, and therefore, an attachment to indigenous constitutional traditions. 
This thesis claims that mere theorizations do not suffice. LSCG must be 
understood in context. My second claim is that these LSCG conceptions are shaped by 
two contingent considerations. Firstly, by the constitutional framework that is 
employed to assess legislation. There are countries with written Constitutions, and 
others with unwritten constitutions. Some countries have indigenous bills of rights, 
while others lack such statement of rights. Some countries are members of an 
international human rights protection system, or supranational organizations with law-
making powers, such as the European Union, while others are not. Most countries 
provide a role for courts in constitutional review, although there is a spectrum from 
relative strength to relative weakness of the review power of the judiciary. Finally, 
there are countries that only recognise “interpretative” powers to courts. These 
institutional factors have an impact on LSCG conceptions. Secondly, the possibility of 
LSCG is dependent on the characteristics of a real-world legislature. Understanding 
the practice of LSCG requires deep knowledge of the internal dynamics of Parliament. 
If the legislature is bicameral, the analysis must look at the ethos, political culture and 
working practices of each House of Parliament. It must also bear in mind the 
relationship between the two chambers. A key component is the system of select 
committees: whether it is strong or weak, whether these committees have access to 
legal advisers, their capacity to gather external expert knowledge and views from the 
public and other stakeholders, and how select committees interact with the Houses of 
Parliament and government. Finally, the degree of independence that Parliament 
enjoys from the executive.  
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Following the methodology set out above, Chapters Three, Four and Five of this 
thesis discussed how the UK unwritten constitution shape the LSCG conceptions. 
Chapters Two and Six discussed the possibility of LSCG in the UK Parliament. Each 
of these two contingent considerations set out above give rise, respectively, to my third 
and fourth claims, which discuss substantive and procedural aspects of LSCG in the 
UK. Starting with the first point, the UK unwritten constitution raises significant 
challenges for LSCG. Its principles, values, conventions, doctrines and other standards 
are fraught with questions about pedigree and normative content. Constitutional 
assessments are further complicated by the fact that the constitution is unsettled. It 
mixes traditional and modern components. Although incremental constitutional 
reform has modernized certain aspects of the constitution, this project remains 
incomplete. The contemporary UK constitution is one of multiple layers and no clear 
constitutional philosophy. It remains essentially contested, and therefore cannot 
provide clear normative guidance about which of the LSCG conceptions should be 
preferred. The answer to this question therefore depends on broader normative debates 
about the UK constitution. It is beyond the scope of this work to address those debates. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the main claim is that a theory of LSCG in the UK 
cannot provide an answer to this question. As with any constitutional debate in the 
UK, the aptness of each conception will have to be tested against the “coercion” of the 
arguments in support. Nevertheless, the thesis discusses the suitability of different 
conceptions to different aspects of the UK constitutional framework, and has presented 
a sceptical view about the hard approach to the legalistic LSCG conception. Be as it 
may, it is worth noting that a theory of LSCG in the UK requires the different 
parliamentary bodies to take seriously the existence of “non-legal” limits on 
Parliament’s theoretically supreme legislative powers (Chapters Three and Seven). 
Each constitutional committee approaches the UK constitution in different ways. 
Their work is also underpinned by different LSCG conceptions. The DPRRC engages 
with the government in a dynamic of justification and assessment. This committee 
managed to impose a burden of justification on the government, which is fulfilled by 
a dedicated memorandum. On this basis, the DPRRC conducts a meticulous black 
letter analysis of each clause delegating powers and providing for degrees of 
parliamentary oversight. For this reason, the DPRRC mainly aims at having an impact 
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on constitutional deliberation. However, I claim that this committee has refrained from 
clarifying the criteria to assess government legislation, and the constitutional standards 
that underpin its work. Arguably, this undermines the DPRRC’s capacity to influence 
the government, and to improve deliberation further (Chapters Four and Seven).  
In sharp contrast, the SCC engages deeply with the constitution, especially with 
its institutional and power-distributive aspects. Furthermore, rather than detailed 
analysis, the SCC focuses on broader trends, the key principles underlying legislation, 
and the provisions that raise significant constitutional concerns. In terms of LSCG 
conceptions, the SCC’s analysis can develop in different ways. There are instances 
where the SCC must assess legislation promoting constitutional change. In these 
instances, the committee advocates for a careful and coherent development of the 
constitutional framework, and therefore, acts as an agent that promotes constitutional 
deliberation. In other instances, the SCC operates as a constitutional scrutiniser which 
assesses the impact of legislative proposals on the constitutional framework. This 
strand of work is directed towards reminding politicians about the existence of “non-
legal” limits on legislative powers. I identify cases where the SCC develops the content 
of constitutional principles, values, conventions and doctrines into broad and flexible 
standards, open to qualification in light of political needs and circumstances. Then, the 
SCC employs these standards as benchmarks to assess legislative proposals and to 
make recommendations to achieve the same policy objectives in constitutionally 
consistent ways. This is an instance of nuanced and soft legalistic LSCG. 
Alternatively, there are cases, most notably on the territorial constitution, in which the 
SCC takes a more prudential approach. Either because of an incoherent development 
of the devolution settlements, or because the central government tends to forget the 
significance of regional autonomy, the SCC insists on the need for an appropriate 
distribution of powers between different sources of political authority. This is a 
prudential approach because it is directed towards the avoidance of political conflict. 
It reminds central government about the need to exercise self-restraint to maintain the 
unity of the state (Chapters Four and Seven). 
Finally, the JCHR faces contradictory pressures emerging from the architecture 
of the HRA. There is pressure for the JCHR to prevent legislation from being found in 
breach of Convention rights, either by domestic courts or by the European Court of 
 242 
Human Rights. On the other hand, there is an expectation that Parliament will develop 
its own approach to human rights protection, and that the JCHR will assist the 
legislature in this task. While the first pressure requires the JCHR to employ a  
legalistic conception of LSCG, the second pressure requires an alternative conception, 
either of constitutional construction and development, or of constitutional deliberation. 
I argued that the JCHR has opted for a legalistic conception of LSCG. The committee’s 
analysis is framed mainly in terms of proportionality assessments, legal interpretation, 
case law and legal safeguards. Nevertheless, gradually, the JCHR moved from a hard 
to a soft approach to legalism by developing a less court-centred and more independent 
and evidence-based assessment, although one that continues to be framed in terms of 
legal analysis (Chapters Five and Seven). 
The fourth claim concerns the operation of LSCG in the UK law-making practice 
(Chapters Two and Six). I argued that the three constitutional committees are the main 
drivers of constitutional thinking in the UK legislative process. There are five reasons 
for this. Constitutional committees are directly involved in legislative scrutiny; they 
are a permanent component of Parliament, they have expertise on the subject matter; 
they operate in a consensual and non-partisan basis; and they regularly engage in 
dialogue with the government, both at political and civil service level. Constitutional 
committees operate as mediators that offer high quality insights on difficult and 
technical constitutional issues through clear and accessible reports. In this way, 
constitutional committees can address two basic challenges that parliamentarians face 
to assess the constitutional implications of legislation. These are, on the one hand, the 
highly complex and technical nature of constitutional considerations, and, secondly, 
the lack of expertise, and of time and energy to devote to these matters.  
Although constitutional committee reports provide a valuable source of 
information, the empirical evidence suggests that their remarks and recommendations 
have neither significantly impacted parliamentary debates, nor motivated a high 
number of governmental defeats at the Commons. Westminster factors have prevented 
MPs from engaging in constitutional assessments. The government still exerts 
significant control over the lower chamber. Party loyalties are still relevant. The logic 
of confrontation between the party in government and the main opposition party leads 
to the prioritization of policy issues and political considerations, thus leaving little 
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room for constitutional considerations in parliamentary debates. In sharp contrast, the 
Lords offer a natural forum for LSCG. The upper chamber operates in relative isolation 
from partisan politics, and relative independence from the executive. In addition, it 
faces less pressures over its parliamentary time, it can rely on the expertise of some of 
its members, and on the assistance of its constitutional committees. The Lords provide 
the ideal conditions for LSCG to flourish (Chapter Two). Not surprisingly, the 
empirical evidence suggests that peers regularly assess the constitutional implications 
of legislation, and engage with constitutional committee’s reports. 
The impact of constitutional committees at the formal stages of the legislative 
process is highly dependent on the capacity of the Lords to take forward their 
recommendations through amendments, and to defeat the government. In these cases, 
the government may back down and reach a compromise; or it may choose to attempt 
to revert these amendments at ping pong stage. If the government manages to reassert 
its parliamentary majority at the Commons, the Lords may exercise self-restraint. A 
major limitation of reliance on the Lords is that this House has understood its role as 
that of a revising chamber that prompts second-thoughts on the democratically 
legitimate lower chamber. The Lords will not challenge the primacy of the Commons, 
even if significant constitutional issues are at stake. Empirical data about successful 
amendments on government legislation suggests that the DPRRC is the most 
influential constitutional committee. In contrast, neither the SCC, nor the JCHR, can 
claim a significant rate of success in shaping legislative outcomes (Chapter Six). 
Although these considerations canvas a rather modest picture about 
constitutional committees’ influence, the evidence suggests that they exert a subtle and 
difficult to measure, but significant, preventive influence. The operation of 
constitutional committees has had an impact on bill teams, departmental lawyers, 
legislative drafters and the Law Officers. These bureaucratic experts are in charge of 
developing policy, performing internal governmental accountability checks, and 
preparing the case for the constitutionality of government bills. These actors are 
subject to soft law requirements to anticipate potential constitutional committees’ 
negative reactions. They are encouraged to interact informally and behind the scenes 
with constitutional committees, and to engage in collaborative work with their legal 
advisers. By reinvigorating internal accountability checks at government, 
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constitutional committees have successfully promoted assessments about the 
constitutional implications of legislation at the early stages of the policy-making and 
legislative drafting. They have also imposed a duty to justify government proposals, 
and have promoted transparency and open government. In this way, preventive 
influence takes place by motivating political self-restraint (Chapter Six). 
This takes me to my fifth and final claim. Statutory duties and long-standing 
political practices of governmental justification for its legislative proposals, as well as 
constitutional committees at the UK Parliament, have been theorised as institutional 
arrangements designed to promote political engagement with the constitutional 
implications of legislation, and political ownership of the constitution. However, a 
practice-oriented account of these institutional arrangements in the UK law-making 
process suggests that the main actors in the operation of constitutional committees are 
bureaucratic experts in government, and their interlocutors (peers, committee 
members, committee legal advisers) in Parliament. I claim that this should not be taken 
as a failure of the system. Instead, it shows that our normative expectations should be 
revisited. Politicians have a limited role on constitutional committees’ operation. 
However, this is not a matter for serious concern in the UK, due to the existence of 
alternative avenues to channel constitutional considerations into political decision-
making. On the one hand, constitutional committees operate as reason-demanding 
bodies, impacting and reinvigorating internal governmental legal accountability 
checks. On the other hand, they provide constitutionally informed recommendations 
to enlighten debates and facilitate rational legislative action on ministers, MPs and 
peers. Although elected politicians do not fully engage with these considerations, 
constitutional committees are operating as conduits through which constitutional 
considerations are channelled into political decision-making through a series of 
interactions. These interactions take place between ministers, departmental lawyers 
and legislative drafters; between these governmental lawyers and constitutional 
committees’ legal advisers; between constitutional committees’ reports and 
government’s official responses; between constitutional committees and peers; and 
between constitutionally-aware peers and ministers and MPs (Chapter Six). In this 
way, constitutional committees are a welcome addition to UK law-making practice in 
terms of strengthening the accountability of government to Parliament by means of 
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demanding reasons, promoting governmental transparency and motivating political 
self-restraint. 
II. Limitations of this work 
The analysis contained in this thesis suffers from inevitable limitations coming 
from the lack of empirical research conducted for the purposes of this thesis. I have 
employed the primary sources, namely, committee reports, Bills’ official documents, 
parliamentary debates, transcripts of oral and written evidence; as well as empirical 
studies conducted by political scientists. My analysis about the impact of constitutional 
committees would have greatly benefited from interviews with MPs, peers, committee 
members, legal advisers to constitutional committees, bill teams and government 
departmental lawyers, lawyers of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (“OPC”), 
ministers, and the Law Officers. Unfortunately, I did not have the time, funding and 
resources to conduct such interviews.1 Nevertheless, I believe that this work provides 
a framework to conduct further empirical studies, as I shall explain in section III below. 
It is also worth mentioning that assessing impact is quite difficult. An argument could 
be made that this requires thinking in terms of “counterfactuals”: whether –and to what 
extent– MPs and peers, civil servants, departmental lawyers and lawyers at the OPC 
would have considered the constitutional implications of legislation, had constitutional 
committees never come to exist.2 
Secondly, the claims contained in Chapters Four and Five concerning each 
constitutional committee are based, among other sources, on my own assessment of a 
number of reports. Yet, word constraints have impeded me to provide additional in-
depth case studies in Chapter Seven discussing the contribution of constitutional 
committees during the passage of concrete Bills. This would have provided additional 
illustrations about the claims made in this thesis. Although I submit that my two case 
studies have provided valuable illustrations of many claims made in this thesis, I 
recognise that questions may arise about the distinctiveness of those cases. The 
                                                
1 Note that had this work taken that direction, it would have resulted in quite a different thesis, 
employing a different methodology. 
2 Consider for instance the case of the JCHR. Counterfactuals are quite difficult. Arguably, 
Convention rights gained momentum in the UK due to the enactment of the HRA, hence, upon creation 
of this very committee. Furthermore, this also coincided with a trend towards more debate about human 
rights law in public law scholarship and these human rights gaining more political salience both at 
government and Parliament.  
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passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 has two features. Firstly, it is 
a rare example of a Bill in which constitutional issues gained significant political 
salience. Secondly, to a relevant extent, the controversy about the Bill revolved around 
the relationship between Parliament and the executive in the implementation of the 
Brexit referendum result. There was significant tension between a weak minority 
government trying to implement the result of the referendum, and a mainly remain-
backing Parliament trying to exert significant policy influence over the process. This 
context made both the DPRRC and the SCC’s remarks and recommendations on 
delegated powers attractive to MPs. Thus, these committees sought to protect the 
position of Parliament as the senior partner in the UK law-making process. As far as 
the prisoners’ right to vote case is concerned, two features are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, although the Hirst3 judgment gained significant political salience, this was 
mainly a factor of the controversy about the role of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Many MPs lamented the ability of this “foreign” court to “impose” a decision 
against the “will” of the democratically elected and “supreme” UK Parliament. A 
second feature of the prisoners’ right to vote issue is that this is a case about monitoring 
the implementation of an adverse human rights judgment. Unfortunately, word 
constraints did not provide an opportunity to undertake an in-depth case study on the 
JCHR legislative scrutiny of a government bill. 
III. What is next 
Constitutional committees remain a matter of significant interest, and should be 
the object of further research.  
A first area to be developed is more empirically informed work on the 
relationship between constitutional committees and Parliament. For instance, when 
assessing the impact of constitutional committee reports on parliamentary debates, the 
analysis should not be limited to a question about whether there are references to those 
reports, or whether their recommendations inspired amendments. The analysis should 
also incorporate a qualitative assessment about the reasons why MPs and peers employ 
these reports. This may shed light on a number of relevant questions: to what extent 
these reports are instrumentalised to make a point against the government, or employed 
                                                
3 Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41. 
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as authoritative sources to make a point for a MP’s own convenience? Do MPs 
employing constitutional committees’ reports really gain a proper understanding of 
constitutional issues? To what extent are MPs learning, being educated on 
constitutional matters by these reports? What are the differences, in terms of 
understanding, between peers and MPs? 
A second area of further research concerns the relationship between 
constitutional committees and the executive. This thesis has shown that these 
committees have become a point of reference for civil servants. Empirical studies 
could be conducted on the views of departmental lawyers, OPC lawyers and the Law 
Officers on constitutional committees, as well as the degree of knowledge of their main 
doctrines and constitutional standards. 
A third area of research concerns the internal workings of constitutional 
committees. Further research is needed about the degree of involvement of 
constitutional committees’ legal advisers, the degree of involvement of individual 
members in the committees’ work, and on how divergences between committee 
members are solved. 
Fourthly, the analysis of UK constitutional committees would benefit from 
comparative studies. There is an internal dimension to these studies. The work of the 
SCC could be compared with the role on constitutional change played in the past by 
Royal Commissions. On the other hand, the work of the DPRRC could be compared 
with the work that ad hoc parliamentary select committees, such as the 1952 Select 
Committee on Delegated Legislation,4 or the 1971-73 Brooke committee,5 as well as 
with the work performed by the House of Commons Procedure Committee on 
delegated powers in 1977-78,6 and during the late 1990s and early 2000s.7 There is 
also an external dimension. Constitutional committees could be compared with other 
select committees performing similar work in other jurisdictions. Australia would be 
a natural candidate. 
                                                
4 Select Committee on Delegated Legislation, Report (HC 1952-53, 310). 
5 Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation, Report (1971-72, HC 475, HL 184). 
6 Select Committee on Procedure, First Report (HC 1977-78, 588). 
7 Select Committee on Procedure, Delegated Legislation (HC 1999-00, 48); Select Committee 
on Procedure, Delegated Legislation: Proposals for a Sifting Committee (HC 2002-03, 501); Select 
Committee on Procedure, Delegated Legislation: Proposals for a Sifting Committee: The Government's 
Response to the Committee's First Report (HC 2002-03, 684). 
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Finally, a key issue that arises from this thesis is that constitutional scholarship 
should pay more attention to bureaucracies as guardians of legality and 
constitutionality.8
                                                
8 Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and 
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